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PREFACE: THE RULE OF AUTONOMY
IN A SECULAR CULTURE, there is no time present. Occidental time oscil-
lates precariously between the senses of ruin and anticipation, tradition
and restitution. The present of the West has always been hopelessly caught
between its Hellenic past and Hebraic future, the reason of the first Mes-
siah (Socrates) and the revelation of the last one. That is why Europe
(including its assimilated former colonies, the rest of the West) can only
re-form, de-form, trans-form; it can only seek in form, in unmediated pres-
ence, the moment that time does not grant in the present moment. Since
the great schism of the churches (1054), Europe (i.e., alienated Christian-
ity everywhere) has been pursuing the expression of form, expression in
form, the formulation of history. It has been seeking the arrest of time
through the illumination of matter: the structure of monotheism in the
sculpture of idols. This quest for the suprahistorical form (in which quest
the West originated) reached a turning point with the Reformation and its
decree against referentiality, against heteronomy, against matters of the
world. From now on, matter had to be either spiritual (form) or worldly
(material). If the Catholic church had been un-Orthodox, the Protestant
denominations were going to be heterodox and heterotrophic, relying only
on the organic material of autopoietic form for their spiritual food.
The rule of autonomy is the law of immanence, the reign of secular
self-begetting form. Counter-ecclesiastical and anti-dogmatic faith needs
to anchor itself in an event other than the (recurring) ritual, and it discov-
ers such an event in form, the spiritual happening of matter. Form (this
arrested history, this soteriological event) provides a mimesis of redemp-
tion: the redemption of the world through representation, the communion
of the word. What forms the form is the verb (as opposed to the unreliable
noun of nominalism), the word of the divine Logos; what occurs in the
event of form is enunciation; what replaces referentiality is representation.
The new ritual, the secular one, is verbal communication, the communion
of forms, in which everyone may partake and contribute. The only prereq-
uisite is faith in form—rejection of both scholastic exegesis and nominal-
ist skepticism in favor of belief in literalist meaning. To promote this
view, the reformists adopt the text as the preeminent type of form. With
its basis in language, the text represents the most eloquent example of
secular communion, the communion of tongues that rescues communica-
tion from Babel. The text becomes the purest form, the body of all form,
and the depth of all immanence. At the same time, a new technology
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of understanding is created for the penetration of that body and depth,
interpretation.
This discipline of communion (which oversees the supreme secular rite)
is not imposed from above, from outside, but is bestowed upon, granted to
the faithful when its potential (reason) is recognized in the structure of
their minds. Its goal is to train people in literalism so that they may receive
through reading the body of forms, the spirit of letters. Those people, how-
ever, might not be enticed to accept the present of the grace, the gift of an
(evangelized) present moment of unmediatedness, if it were not for a
promise of freedom, of personal (specifically, spiritual) liberation from sub-
servience to every (other) worldly authority, from worldliness itself, so that
humans can now begin doing things with, or even to, this world. Interpreta-
tion promised emancipation: acceptance and independence in the civic
society. The community of independent interpretation was going to build
the kingdom of God on earth (and share it with those qualified). This
contract of emancipation through interpretation, of redemption through
the letter of the form—this civic covenant proposed by the European mid-
dle class marks the inauguration of modernity. By this contract, Christian-
ity abandoned eternal time in exchange for a pledged present.
That present, however, that epiphany, that identity, has never happened.
By definition it could not—except in short-lived pagan outbursts of revolu-
tion, quickly silenced by accommodating emancipatory arrangements. Nor
has liberation transpired, although millions of people have been success-
fully assimilated in regimes of negotiable rights and responsibilities. What
has been happening instead is the Western libration between the Hellenic
and the Hebraic poles that have come to represent not only the tension
separating a complete past from an unfulfilled future, but also every other
contradiction and conflict experienced over the meaning of communion.
This essay, an exercise in nomoscopy, chronicles the development of the
Hebraic rule of Hellenic autonomy by studying the techniques of intrinsic
governance that have prevailed in modernity. It does not provide a linear
history, an interdisciplinary overview, or a consistent narrative. Rather, it is
organized as a series of digressions on the issue of the aesthetic, the dis-
interested contemplation of purposeless beauty, which has dominated def-
initions of autonomy over the last three centuries of the second mil-
lennium. Each chapter begins with a major twentieth-century aesthetic
position; but the examination of the interpretive regime diverges from di-
gression to digression. When enough courses and detours have been ex-
plored to make the starting point disorientingly conditional and contin-
gent, the chapter stops. As in every passacaglia, however, the bass line (in
this case, the Hebraism-Hellenism comparison) keeps reappearing in vari-
ous guises to reassure readers that the author is indeed still with them. In
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any case, this kind of composition procedure is justified by playing the
game, which is by no means the same as putting the cards on the table.
The book is not “complete” in other respects as well. So far as discus-
sions of the central comparison are concerned, the attentive reader will
certainly miss many names, from Blake, Coleridge, and Kierkegaard, to
Renan, Nietzsche, and Freud (to mention just a few). For reasons of space,
economy, and structure, the study of much relevant material has been
postponed for possible future occasions. The same must be said about ob-
vious (and less obvious) bibliographical background which was left out in
the hope that the rhythm of what has been devised here compensates for
some omissions and that other opportunities may arise for a fuller use of
such background. In general, this kind of approach is rather uninterested in
two particular criticisms: those demanding exhaustiveness and rational
consistency. The strength and insight of so-called contradictions deserve
more recognition than they currently enjoy. As the book itself explains,
critique (the contumelious controverting of contumacious contradictions)
is little more than the confession and expiation of the aesthetic sin of au-
tonomy. Furthermore, in an attempt to move beyond a dialectical under-
standing of debate, the book, instead of citing its re-sources, re-cites and
engages sources directly in a quiet (though sometimes unfaithful) way that
makes them parts of, or passages into, its centrifugal digressions.
These and many other strategies of this work are efforts to take different
(constructivist) looks at a cluster of related topics, an assemblage of inter-
acting issues. The occasional experimental move, even when unsuccessful,
could not have been entirely avoided at a time when all creativity ponders
its very possibilities and must therefore experiment. The serenity of cer-
tainty during eras of anarchy (that is, dissolution of autonomy) is an unnec-
essary luxury. The intellectual purview of the book tries to exclude the
imperial overviews of theoria (contemplation of universals) in favor of posi-
tions of scope (consideration of particulars) like those helpful to a no-
moscopy, to the study of regimes of rules. At the same time, while the book
presents through its limited scope only some dimensions of a complex de-
velopment, one hopes that its didactic (as opposed to interpretive or peda-
gogical) effectiveness has not been compromised.

The Rise of Eurocentrism

Chapter One
THE RITES OF INTERPRETATION
[T]he criticism of religion
is the presupposition of all criticism.
—Karl Marx
THE LAW OF INTERPRETATION
Readers of Mimesis will remember the well-prepared and touching compar-
ison in chapter 1, where the two basic types of literary representation in
Western culture are dramatically contrasted. The scene of Odysseus’ rec-
ognition by his old housekeeper Euryclea in the Odyssey is examined in
great thematic and stylistic detail, and then interpreted against a parallel
reading of the sacrifice of Isaac in Genesis. The wide variety of distinct
features exhibited in the two texts is organized in two corresponding sets
of diametrically opposed character and tone. These sets are then seen as
concise pictures of the worldview expressed in the respective works, and are
used as the basis for a broad outline of the Homeric and the Biblical sys-
tems of thought. At the end of the chapter, the two types are set forth as
the starting point for the investigation of European literary representation
that the rest of the book conducts through the centuries, from antiquity to
modern times.
All this is scrupulously explored and narrated in painstaking philological
fashion. Passages are selected carefully and read thoroughly, distinctions
are made with an informed eye on stylistic detail, and differences are estab-
lished with discriminating attention to the particular aspects and the over-
all pattern of the texts. Both works are considered as epics, but their quali-
ties are found to differ in such a fundamental way that they express (and
allow for) opposing modes of understanding and of literary writing. Erich
Auerbach (1892–1957) states that he chose to elaborate on this opposition
because it operates at the foundations of Western literature, and therefore
must be posed at the beginning of his study. But his presentation immedi-
ately raises questions. Mimesis (1946) does not have an introduction: there
is no first, separate section to present its purpose and describe its approach.
Instead, the work begins in medias res: “Readers of the Odyssey will remem-
ber the well-prepared and touching scene in book 19, when Odysseus has
at last come home” (Auerbach 1953: 3). It begins with a first chapter which,
like the rest, bears a neutrally descriptive title, “Odysseus’ Scar,” and im-
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mediately proceeds to conduct a close reading of a classic text. Only after
several pages does it become clear that it deals with two texts, rather than
one, that it seeks to establish the origins of Western mimetic modes, and
that it functions as an introduction to the whole volume. Thus the title is
deceptive: while it seems to promise a treatment of a Homeric passage, the
chapter is as much about Abraham’s sacrifice as it is about Odysseus’ scar.
It appears, then, that the book is introduced in a surreptitious manner. The
suppression of the character of the piece and of its second major topic are
closely linked: what at first glance looks like a first chapter and a discussion
of the Odyssey proves to be an introduction and a comparison of Homer
with the Old Testament.
The basic opposition, which the essay establishes but the title does not
acknowledge, is posited and developed in a long series of dichotomies,
purported to articulate the distinctive features of the Homeric and the
Biblical style: external-internal, presence-absence, unity-disconnectedness,
totality-fragmentation, illuminated-obscure, clarity-ambiguity, foreground-
background, simplicity-complexity, stability-fermentation, serenity-anguish,
being-becoming, legend-history. In all these binary oppositions, the first
member refers to the Homeric world and the second to the Biblical, while
each polarity indicates the antithesis and clash of the two worldviews and
mimetic modes. Auerbach argues that the two sets of categories indicate
contrasting ways of thinking and dictate contrasting ways of understanding
them: each has to be comprehended in its own terms. Consequently, he
insists: “Homer can be analyzed . . . but cannot be interpreted” (13), while
“the text of the Biblical narrative . . . is so greatly in need of interpretation
on the basis of its own content” (15). Auerbach refrains from explicitly
defining his terminology; but from the basic sets of categories it may at
least be inferred that analysis (which applies to the Homeric) is more of a
description of simple incidents, surface meanings, and direct messages,
while interpretation (which responds to the Biblical) uncovers hidden
meanings, implied messages, and complex significances. This is not the
place to discuss the critical validity of such a distinction.1 It is more impor-
tant to see how the approach called “interpretation” describes Auerbach’s
own method of reading literature.
Auerbach is faithful to his position when he reads the scene from Gene-
sis in that he conducts an in-depth, penetrating interpretation which seeks
to elucidate all its dimensions. As exemplified in this application, interpre-
tation is the search for an ultimate explanation of both meaning and pur-
pose. It tries to uncover the hidden, obscure, silent, ineffable, multiple
meanings of a text, promising and at the same time threatening, retrievable
yet always elusive, under the thick layers of language. It also tries to explain
the purpose of it all, to describe the overall plan, to specify the final direc-
tion toward which everything is moving. In this part of his investigation,
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Auerbach is consistent. But he does not show the same consistency in his
approach to Homer. For although he argues that the Greek epic allows only
for analysis, his discussion exhibits all the unmistakable signs of an inter-
pretive reading: it presents the hidden complexity of the incident with
Euryclea, traverses successive layers of significance, exposes invisible as-
sumptions, and finally builds on it a whole theory about Homeric mimesis.
Interpretive understanding is again his guiding motive, since he asks persis-
tently why everything in the text happens in this way. Auerbach violates his
own epistemological principle and applies an interpretive reading to the
Odyssey, a Biblical reading to a Homeric text. Although he argues that the
two works express opposite worldviews and dictate different readings, he
uses for both the approach derived from the second. He does not read
Homer against the Bible, as he claims, but rather reads Homer through the
Bible: his is a Biblical treatment. Thus his conclusion that Homer cannot
be interpreted is an interpretive one, which results from a successful search
for deep meanings in his work. Auerbach treats both works in an interpre-
tive fashion, seeking to uncover their artistic essence behind the literary
surface.
What appears to be omitted in the title of the essay is the most impor-
tant element; what is not mentioned is the dominant feature; what is miss-
ing is central to what is there—the Biblical mode of mimesis and interpre-
tation. The title promises a study on the recognition of Odysseus’ scar, but
the essay delivers a model of literary interpretation derived from Abraham’s
sacrifice; and the number above the title indicates a first chapter but refers
to an introduction. These deceptive signs are part of the same tactic: while
the essay identifies itself as a chapter on Homer, it is in fact an introduction
to the Biblical method of reading; what seems to be an example of repre-
sentation is nothing less than a model of interpretation. Thus the subtitle
of the book, “The Representation of Reality in Western Literature,” in
order to reflect its approach, should read: “The Interpretation of the Repre-
sentation of Reality in Western Literature.” As the introductory chapter
shows, the purpose of the whole project is not to analyze the dominant
modes of this representation (i.e., present, describe, show their structure
and effects), but rather interpret them (i.e., explain the secret meanings
and purposes, unravel the significant pattern of their emergence and devel-
opment). Auerbach’s approach is exclusively Biblical: he comprehends lit-
erature according to rules that he finds dictated in the Bible, and conse-
quently sees Western literary tradition as a (secular) Bible.
The purpose of Auerbach’s book is to provide a sweeping Biblical view of
literary history. His choice of texts alone is ample evidence. All his selec-
tions are canonical2 (and often predictable), made from the revered master-
pieces (Cahn 1979) of the dominant European tradition: Satyricon, Chan-
son de Roland, Divina Commedia, Decameron, Gargantua et Pantagruel,
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Henry IV, Don Quixote, Manon Lescaut, Luise Millerin, To the Light-
house—to mention but a few. These choices make the book “a massive
reaffirmation of the Western cultural tradition” (Said 1983: 8). Further-
more, selections are made and arranged with the Bible as a model. Accord-
ing to Auerbach, the Bible is the greatest canonical book, the Book of
books, the absolute Book—the Book containing all the books that are
worth reading and preserving. In it (and because of it), there are no other
gods, no other books, no other world.3 “The truth claim of the Bible, Auer-
bach says, is so imperious that reality in its sensuous or charming aspect is
not dwelt upon; and the spotlight effect, which isolates major persons or
happenings, is due to the same anagogical demand that excludes all other
places and concerns. Bible stories do not flatter or fascinate like Homer’s;
they do not give us something artfully rendered; they force readers to be-
come interpreters and to find the presence of what is absent in the fraught
background, the densely layered (Auerbach uses the marvelous word ge-
schichtet ) narrative” (Hartman 1986: 15). As the central cultural construct
of an entire tradition, it constitutes a colossal tautology and self-affirma-
tion (and concomitantly a monument of ethnocentrism as well as censor-
ship): the book that tells you what to read is both the single one worth
reading and the privileged domain of human experience: “it seeks to over-
come our reality: we are to fit our own life into its world, feel ourselves to
be elements in its structure of universal history” (Auerbach 1953: 15).4
Auerbach treats the Western literary canon in similar terms: his is a univer-
sal history of literature without references, notes, or bibliography; without
any room for minor characters, neglected incidents, or marginal works. We
are commanded to have no other books before it. As a historical survey, it
is organized in autonomous, self-contained units, and deals with a tradition
of glorious achievements from its origins through its continuous evolution
to the present. The notion of the tradition itself is not discussed, and its
authority is recognized unquestionably. The unity, borders, jurisdiction,
and goals of that authority are established. The driving implication is that
the West has its own Bible, although a secular one, which is its literary
canon.
Beyond Auerbach’s veneration of the tradition, there is an impressive
number and range of similarities that bring Mimesis and the Bible even
closer—and again I am referring, of course, to his Bible, to the conception
of the book that emerges from his discussion. Here are some characteristics
he attributes to the Old Testament:
— the intent of the stories “involves an absolute claim to historical truth”
(14);
—the narrator “was obliged to write exactly what his belief in the truth of the
tradition . . . demanded of him” (14);
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—the narrator composed “an effective version of the pious tradition” (14);
—“its claim to truth . . . excludes all other claims” (14);
—“we are to . . . feel ourselves to be elements in its structure of universal
history” (15);
—“[it] presents universal history: it begins with the beginning of time . . . and
will end with the Last Days . . . Everything else that happens in the world
can only be conceived as an element in this sequence” (16);
—“interpretation in a determined direction becomes a general method of
comprehending reality” (16);
—“it is pieced together—but the various components all belong to one con-
cept of universal history and its interpretation” (17);
—“the reader is at every moment aware of the universal religio-historical per-
spective which gives the individual stories their general meaning and pur-
pose” (17);
—“The greater the separateness and horizontal disconnection of the stories
and groups of stories in relation to one another . . . the stronger is their
vertical connection, which holds them all together” (17);
—an “element of development gives the . . . stories a historical character”
(18);
—the style exhibits “development of the concept of the historically becoming,
and preoccupation with the problematic” (23).
Although this list includes only characteristics attributed by Auerbach to
the Bible, their applicability to his own book is so broad and striking that
they may easily be taken as descriptions originally intended for Mimesis.
They were not; but they do summarize its contents and episodic structure:
brief, concise, paradigmatic, didactic, moral stories from the adventures of
secular writing in the post-Biblical world, namely, literature.5 Auerbach did
not compose a History of Literature or the history of a particular idea,
figure, or theme that would have been yet another all-encompassing, ency-
clopedic compendium; he wrote the Story of Literature—a selective philo-
logical survey which traces the origins and evolution of that chosen art, the
art of the Book.
Mimesis is directly and extensively modeled on the Bible, and aspires to
work like it: it consists of episodic stories of concentrated tension and high
significance; it exhibits a discontinuous and yet evolutionary unity; it is
driven by an urgent sense of universal history; it makes absolute claims on
historical truth; it has a concrete, stable point of reference which makes
everything involved in its sphere meaningful; it is fraught with religious,
social, and political background; it employs a multi-layered, multi-dimen-
sional narrative; finally, it seeks canonical authority. Mimesis aspires to be
recognized as the Old Testament of exegetical philology, the Bible of liter-
ary criticism, by presenting and defending history as tradition, reading as
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interpretation. In its effort to cover Western literature in a definitive
way, it employs two principal arguments: there is only one literature worth
reading, the very canon which is its subject; and there is only one proper
way of reading this canon, Biblical interpretation. By adopting the world-
view and reenacting in an intensely dramatic fashion the method of its
model, it attempts to achieve the same canonical status in the field of
literary studies.6
When it outlines in a grand manner the order, the evolution, the laws,
the purpose, and the justification of literary tradition, Mimesis performs a
number of propaedeutic tasks that are important for an exercise of intellec-
tual authority: it gives its readers what they need to know about the world
of literature and helps them comprehend it properly; it trains their under-
standing and cultivates their judgment; and it explains the complex, intri-
cate sense that great literature makes. Out of a large-scale philological ex-
plication, based on the orthodoxies of humanism and stylistic exegesis,
there emerges a grandiose project: a Biblical interpretation of literature and
a monumentalization of its Western canon. While Auerbach gives the
modest impression that he is simply attending to the nuances and idiosyn-
crasies of individual texts, and is not imposing a uniform explanatory
method on any of them, his first chapter already testifies to his use of an
ahistorical uniformity of standards and universality of principles. His no-
tion of the real is a renunciation of the political: “The argument against
‘politics’ made throughout Mimesis is just this—the realist must surrender
himself to his material, suspend all his beliefs, prejudices, and political
convictions (which Auerbach assumes is possible) in order to achieve a total
and direct presentation of reality” (Carroll 1975: 8). (Naturally, this does
not mean that his bias is reprehensible, only that his objectivist claims are
false.)
Still, the paradox of the chapter’s title, which deceives with its unwar-
ranted emphasis on Odysseus, persists: why a discussion of Homer under a
misleading heading and in an introduction veiled as a chapter? Given the
orientation and methodology of the volume, it appears surprising that
Auerbach decided to start with Homer and apply to the Odyssey a Biblical
treatment, an interpretive reading, instead of simply beginning with the
Bible and proceeding from his real model. The problem is not why the
second term of the Homeric-Biblical distinction is so heavily privileged,
but rather why this very distinction was necessary and what it says about
the possible functions of the essay. To answer that any similar project
should commence with the Greek epic, an acknowledged classic, would be
an inadequate (not to say Eurocentric) response, since it does not solve the
problem of the devious title. The basic questions remain: why oppose the
Homeric mode of representation to the Biblical one, when what was in-
tended was an adoption, emulation, and propagation of the latter? Why
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was a discussion of Homer essential to a work modeled on the Bible, a work
which aspired to become the Bible of literary criticism? And why did the
overwhelming presence of the Bible have to be initially concealed? Auer-
bach’s conception of (what he calls) the Old Testament suggests the
answer.
Auerbach believes that the dramatic quality and cultural authority of the
Bible is enhanced by an intrinsic dialectic between what is there and what
is not, what is present and what is absent, what is said and what is implied,
what is mentioned and what is omitted, what happens and what could have
happened—the constant, unrelieved tension between presence and ab-
sence, voice and silence, promise and fulfillment, being and becoming. His
understanding of the Bible depends on polar oppositions which remain
unresolvable. The Book of books is constantly valorized as the supreme text
because of what it does not state, does not fully narrate, does not reveal,
does not name—thus preserving the prophecy about the “fulfilling of the
Covenant” (Auerbach 1953: 16) and binding people to its eschatology.
This type of valorization through contrast needs a second, almost negative
term of comparison, an abject possibility, so that a positive value can be
postulated. In the Old Testament, the supreme value is “a single and hid-
den God” (17), who, after the Fall of Man, “is not comprehensible in his
presence, as is Zeus; it is always only ‘something’ of him that appears, he
always extends into depths” (12). He is the hidden or absent God of Abra-
ham whose (condemning) silence enables the Bible to speak (about human
guilt). The positive value, then, is constituted as the fundamental other-
ness, the hidden depth of that ostensibly complete presence, that imme-
diate experience, which defines the negative term of the dichotomy.
The need for defense of a Biblical interpretation like Mimesis to include
(and even begin with) a discussion of Homer must be explained on the
basis of Auerbach’s theory about the dialectic inherent in the Old Testa-
ment. The Bible is fraught with background, the presence of God’s ab-
sence: “Since so much in the story is dark and incomplete, and since the
reader knows that God is a hidden God, his effort to interpret it constantly
finds something new to feed upon” (15). An effective valorization of the
Bible would similarly present it as the background haunting Western litera-
ture, with its dark presence always in ambiguous retreat, its power con-
stantly felt through its radical difference that allows only something of its
depths to appear, inalienable and yet urgent. This presentation requires an
absolute contrast to a world of light, immediacy, and fullness, a foreground
of false essence and illusionary being. The Homeric epic is called to play
this indispensable role, portrayed in every small detail as the negative term
of the opposition: in its two-dimensional clarity, it makes readers under-
stand where the Bible is not, what it does not do, how it does not work.
Against its foreground, against its unrippling surface, the total difference of
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the Bible can be recognized as the dramatic, historical, religious, and aes-
thetic background of all literature.
Analysis too, as a mode of reading, is fraught with the background of
interpretation, of that dimension of understanding which feeds on insight
rather than vision. The contrast with Homeric analysis highlights the
power of interpretation to overcome the charm of appearance and pierce
through the spectre of presence. Without analysis, there would be no need
for the promise of depth and delivery that interpretation carries. By pre-
senting the Bible as the non-Homeric and non-analytic, Auerbach is in a
position not only to praise the originary monument of the canon, but also
to show that the kind of reading it invites is the best way to read the whole
canon.7 The purpose of employing the Homeric term is to illustrate graph-
ically the perils of secular representation and understanding. This strategy
also explains the character of Auerbach’s revisionary reading of the canon.
It does not pertain to individual names, works, or events but to the overall
approach. The philologist is not interested in changing the entries or their
order but rather the way these masterworks are read. He proposes and prac-
tices Biblical interpretation as a more powerful approach to the great tradi-
tion. In order to do this, he must articulate at his position as the positive
term of a binary opposition and construct an idea of the epic as its hostile
negative. The tasks of literary interpretation must be established as a moral
alternative to the pleasures of Greek physical/material understanding (or
analysis).
In addition to critical techniques, the book employs literary devices as
well. The systems of thought and style outlined in the description of the
Biblical mode bear a very close resemblance to standards of modernist taste
(which are not always the same as techniques of modernist writing). No-
tions like background, interiority, suspense, multi-layeredness, disconnect-
edness, absence, suggestiveness, fragmentariness, silence, individuality,
and others associated with them express qualities of the modernist aes-
thetic which dominated the first half of the twentieth century. Critics have
already noted the successful appropriation of such literary techniques:
“With its high respect for randomness and discontinuity, Mimesis is an-
other classic of modernism” (Robbins 1986: 49). In his review, René Wel-
lek went even further, suggesting that Mimesis “must be judged as some-
thing of a work of art.” Many years before Roland Barthes or J. Hillis Miller
argued for (and pursued) the literariness of criticism, Auerbach had learned
from the structural experiments of the post-Flaubertian novel. Thus, in his
treatment of the Bible, he is not only tracing the origins of our tradition,
but is also suggesting that the Biblical mode has outlasted the Homeric,
reigning over the masterful literary representations today, even though the
Homeric mode was the first to achieve wide appeal and recognition. The
contemporary world is understood and represented in Biblical terms: its
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literature itself is, at its best, Biblical. Now that this world has almost over-
come the old Greek influence, the Bible is its true, authentic contempo-
rary, since contemporary literature was unmistakably prefigured in it.
In historical viewpoint, Mimesis is a work of figural interpretation: it inter-
prets the Western canon as a figure of the Bible and, conversely, claims
that the Bible finds its fulfillment in our literary tradition. Figural or typo-
logical understanding constitutes the exegetical approach of the book.
Auerbach’s celebrated essay “Figura” (1944), written just before Mimesis,
may be seen as the missing methodological introduction.
Figuralism or typology8 originated in early Christian efforts to show that
Jesus Christ was indeed the Messiah and had fulfilled Jewish prophecies, by
retrospectively explaining the Hebrew Bible as the “Old” of the “New Tes-
tament”—as the first announcement of a promise that had been kept. A
figura or type is constituted by a historical event or person and can be
identified only when fulfilled by a later event or person in a providentially
structured history, i.e., by its anti-type. The purpose of figurae is “to ac-
commodate the events and persons of a superseded order of time to a new
one” (Kermode 1983: 90). Auerbach explains that the rhetorical tropos of
figura acquired its first modern meaning with Tertullian: “[F]igura is some-
thing real and historical which announces something else that is also real
and historical. The relation between the two events is revealed by an accord
or similarity” (Auerbach 1984: 29). This meaning is connected by defini-
tion with the theological topos of fulfillment, which is the coming into
being, the historical happening, of what the figure prophetically an-
nounced—the revelation of the future originally intimated by it. Thus the
figure is also the prefiguration of things to come, and therefore it is based
on an eschatological view of history. The textual reading which takes figura
as its starting point is called figural interpretation: “[It] establishes a con-
nection between two events or persons, the first of which signifies not only
itself but also the second, while the second encompasses or fulfills the first.
The two poles of the figure are separate in time, but both, being real events
or figures, are within time, within the stream of historical life” (53). Thus
emphasis falls decisively on the typological design of developments and on
fulfillment in history: “Both remain historical events; yet both, looked at in
this way, have something provisional and incomplete about them; they
point to one another and they both point to something in the future, some-
thing still to come, which will be the actual, real, and definitive event. . . .
Thus history, with all its concrete force, remains forever a figure, cloaked
and needful of interpretation” (58).
Auerbach’s definition of figural interpretation describes both the inter-
pretive project he finds dictated by the Old Testament and his own ap-
proach. In opting for a figural narrative of literature, he subscribes to an
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eschatological view of history under an unequivocally theological inspira-
tion. The story he tells presents a series of developments that draw their
significance from a higher order, that of a destined completion. As he puts
it, “in the figural system the interpretation is always sought from above;
events are considered not in their unbroken relation to one another, but
torn apart, individually, each in relation to something other that is prom-
ised and not yet present” (59). Prefigurative understanding and the lan-
guage of types allow him to claim the Western tradition for the Biblical
mimesis, and criticism for typological interpretation. Auerbach’s view of
the past may also account for the book’s organizing typological principle:
“Historical events or literary texts may have their own unique and local
significance—if they have any meaning at all—but in a history’s figural
interpretation they are metaphorized as carrying some further significance,
so that some may ‘foreshadow’ others in a narrative which would grant the
sense of a whole to otherwise self-contained parts” (Bahti 1981: 111).9 Thus
the appropriation of this Christian exegetical technique for literary criti-
cism, which may be also seen as “another belated repetition of the Chris-
tian appropriation and usurpation of the Hebrew Bible” (Bloom 1984: 5),
serves many purposes: it establishes a deeper unity between religious and
secular writing; it argues for a narrative continuity between the ancient and
the modern; it defends the transhistorical modernity of the Bible, making
it the originary event in literature; it intimates the Biblical character of
modernism; lastly, it emphasizes the messianic destination of literature
and the prophetic role of interpretation.10
Typology declined around the turn of the nineteenth century with the
emergence of Higher Criticism in Germany. By the time David Friedrich
Strauss published The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined (1835), all interest
in it had disappeared. Consequently its revival by Auerbach was quite a
bold move, since his audience could not be expected to have any direct
familiarity with it. Through the concerns of Romance philology, however,
Auerbach was able to provide some informative background, as he did in
Dante: Poet of the Secular World (1929). More importantly, the distance in
time allowed for a return to that method without its original Christian
connotations. Philology and literary history provided a new, scholarly (as
opposed to theological) context. Thus Auerbach employed it while trans-
ferring its religious dimension to questions of aesthetic meaning and liter-
ary tradition.11
For him, philology (as interpretation) is above all an act of faith, and its
theory is the theology of literature, of the secular Scripture. In Auerbach’s
hermeneutics, “divinity is not so much removed as secularized. That is to
say, continuity of history is preserved thanks to a new incarnation” (Costa-
Lima 1988: 489). Auerbach understands figural interpretation and prac-
tices it in Mimesis as an exegesis of prophecy, as divination through explo-
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rations of prefigurement, as an explication of promises yet to be fulfilled.
Near the end of the essay, he identifies figura with prophecy in explicitly
theological language: “In this way the individual earthly event is not re-
garded as a definite self-sufficient reality, nor as a link in a chain of develop-
ment in which single events or combinations of events perpetually give rise
to new events, but viewed primarily in immediate vertical connection with
a divine order which encompasses it, which on some future day will itself be
concrete reality; so that the earthly event is a prophecy or figura of a part of
a wholly divine reality that will be enacted in the future. But this reality is
not only future; it is always present in the eye of God and in the other
world, which is to say that in transcendence the revealed and true reality is
present at all times, or timelessly” (Auerbach 1984: 72). Thus the figure is
both a prophecy about an eschaton that will occur at the End of Time, and
a revelation of that ultimate reality as it is presently encoded in this world,
specifically in its re-presentations by Western literature.12 To return once
more to the subtitle of Mimesis (which Auerbach never explains): it has
become clear that the term “representation” refers to his understanding of
all major literature (already prefigured in the Bible) as figura, while “real-
ity” refers to the divine truth that inheres in every present and that will be
actualized in/as a unique future, the advent of the Messiah. Rephrased and
completed according to its messianic perspective and eschatological yearn-
ing, the subtitle should now read: “The Biblical Interpretation of the Pre-
figurement of the Fulfillment of the Covenant in the Tradition of the Sec-
ular Scripture.”
In “Figura,” Auerbach claimed that the figural view of history was active
from the early days of Christianity until the eighteenth century. In Mime-
sis, however, the historical origin is replaced with a universalist invariable,
the polar distinction between the two modes of Western representation. In
the original account, the pagan/archaic/allegorical was what came before
the Biblical/Christian/figural. In the new account, the figural is reduced to
a variation of the Biblical, one of the two dominant modes—and the same
has been done, of course, to all things Christian. The two modes are made
to oppose, antagonize each other, and to compete for mastery over human
understanding. The Biblical is treated as the most important one, and is
used systematically throughout the book as the basic approach to Western
literature. On the other hand, the Homeric mode, although almost totally
forgotten after the second chapter—receiving brief mention in chapters 5
and 8—returns at the end. Chapters 18 and 19 form the apogee of Mimesis,
a celebration of the Biblical understanding of history which entered its
modern maturity with the nineteenth-century realist novel. But in the last
chapter, gloom and doom prevail. This is an age of confusion and hopeless-
ness caused by “the complicated process of dissolution which led to frag-
mentation of the exterior action, to reflection of consciousness, and to
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stratification of time” (Auerbach 1953: 552–53), in fiction as well as in real
life. The last work examined, Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse (1927), is
compared extensively to the Odyssey. Thus the pagan element reappears in
obvious response to a question that was tacitly left unanswered in “Figura”:
what happened after the long domination of the figural view ended? The
answer here is implicit, yet ominous: the Homeric, the pagan element,
threatens to take over again.
Auerbach is not fighting against Christianity. He is content to indicate
the continuity uniting it with Judaism through quiet references to the
“Judeo-Christian view of history” (73) or arguments showing that “the first
effect of the Judeo-Christian manner of dealing with the events in the
world of reality led to anything but rigidity and narrowness. The hidden-
ness of God and finally his parousia . . . brought about a dynamic move-
ment in the basic conception of life . . . which went far beyond the clas-
sic-antique norm of the imitation of real life and living growth” (119).13
Auerbach does not see Christianity as a serious opponent: he skillfully de-
velops an idea of the Biblical that includes and appropriates it, reducing it
to a variation on the Old Testament. The real enemy is the non-Biblical:
the Homeric, the pagan, the Greek.14 He often alludes to this imminent
threat by detecting unsettling parallels between the ancient world and the
present order of things, as in the following passage: “Homer . . . likes to
bring in the lineage, station, and previous history of his characters. . . . His
Greek audiences are schooled in mythology and genealogy; Homer under-
takes to give them the family-tree of the character in question as a means
of placing him. Just so, in modern times, a newcomer into an exclusive
aristocratic or bourgeois society can be placed by information concerning
his paternal and maternal relatives. Thus, rather than an impression of
historical change, Homer evokes the illusion of an unchanging, a basically
stable social order, in comparison with which the succession of individuals
and changes in personal fortunes appear unimportant” (28). Auerbach por-
trays the Homeric as the enemy of the Judeo-Christian tradition: from the
Greek stems everything septic, static, autocratic, absolutist. “ ‘Just so, in
modern times,’ he writes, in order to demonstrate that Homer’s genealogy
is not so very different from the Nazis’ ‘Aryanization’ laws, which traced
back one’s ancestors to three or four removed generations. Homer’s my-
thology is not so different from the new mythology of the Thousand-Year
Reich and its Volkstaat” (Green 1982: 42–43). Auerbach’s attack on Greek
thought becomes anti-Hellenic when he blames the evils of modernity on
the Homeric spirit.15
Auerbach believes that he is witnessing a critical stage of the historical
process, the modern Drama of Europe, and like Ezra Pound (Davie 1975:
17–31) before him in The Spirit of Romance: An Attempt to Define Some-
THE R ITES OF INTERPRETATION 15
what the Charm of the Pre-Renaissance Literature of Latin Europe (1910),
he thinks of “the European possibilities of Romance philology as . . . a task
specific to our time” (Auerbach 1965: 6). With great faith in the necessary
mission of his discipline, “he sees philological historicism . . . not only as
the means by which ‘humanity’ becomes aware of its own spectacle of ‘hu-
manisation,’ but also, in traditional idealistic fashion, as the highest point
or culmination of that spectacle, the drama of history come to self-con-
sciousness, as it were” (Bové 1986: 164). He is deeply concerned about the
present crisis, fearing that “European civilization is approaching the term
of its existence.” The philologist studying literary history through stylistics
proposes, as a way out of this intellectual malaise and historical crisis, inter-
pretive and figural understanding as moral renewal. Interpretation prom-
ises spiritual emancipation.
Mimesis represents the epitome of this effort toward a return to Biblical
textual faith. The politics behind the Manichean strategy of the book is
obvious since Auerbach “conceived of his survey as a unity, as a generalized
interpretation of the history of Western civilization and its literature de-
signed and arranged so that two opposing strands or evolutions appear. The
one—rigid, restrictive, categorizing, pompous, elitist, hedonistic, deca-
dent, posturing, and ultimately anti-humanity—is meant to be associated
with the forces of totalitarianism that were challenging the fate of the
world. The other—fluid, open, populist, honest, democratic, moral, seri-
ous, and ultimately pro-humanity—is meant to be associated with the best
qualities of the democratic Western world” (Green 1982: 62–63). As we
have seen, the first strand represents Greek analytical thought, while the
second is associated with Biblical figural interpretation. History, tradition,
and writing are viewed in terms of this on-going dialectic confrontation,
and the only possibility of a synthesis is the eventual assimilation of Chris-
tianity into its Biblical roots, resulting in the complete eradication of
paganism.
Auerbach’s main goal was to study (what he defined as) the Biblical
mode of understanding, and promote it as a model for literary and histori-
cal knowledge/experience in all its timeliness and urgent relevance. A com-
plementary goal was to show that Christianity is derivative and should
faithfully return (as it has been doing for some time) to its religious and
historical roots. In both respects, an outstanding feature of his argumenta-
tion is the consistent presentation of Greek thought as the negative, alien,
and hostile element, which must be neutralized, and finally extinguished.
In Auerbach’s survey of the canon, the central dialectic evolves between
the Homeric and the Biblical, the pagan and the religious, the mythical and
the historical, the Hellenic and the Hebraic. The same survey inquires into
the possibility of a new (Judeo-Christian) synthesis, whose model has been
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already prefigured in the representational style of the Old Testament. This
synthesis is necessary in order for humanity to survive the modern crisis
created by the resurgence of totalitarianism, as the powers of paganism
have again increased their influence. Until recently, Western culture
seemed to move toward that direction, as indicated, for example, by the
historical awareness of realist fiction. But that progress was interrupted by
the forces of order, stability, and hierarchy, causing the confusion and
hopelessness that modernism reflects. Still, although the possibility of a
new synthesis looks at this time very difficult, “the approaching unification
and simplification” (Auerbach 1953: 553) remain the only way to a true
humanism. The interpretive struggle against the tyranny of antiquity must
continue until complete emancipation (of understanding and represent-
ing). Thus Auerbach portrays the development of Western literature as the
conflict between two incompatible modes of expression, and its larger con-
text of world history as a cosmic battle between the irreconcilable forces of
evil and good, or (to put it in the most appropriately banal way) between
Athens and Jerusalem (Clark 1984; Eidelberg 1983; Weltin 1987). The
pagan evil must be defeated, because it is the source of all anguish, terror,
superstition, discrimination, and oppression; the power of God, so mag-
nificently represented in the Biblical prefigural style, will again prevail. In
Auerbach’s prophecy against the Greek Lucifer of Days, the construction
of the Homeric as a paronomastic substitute for the Hellenic served to
define and defend not only figural interpretation and historicist realism,
but above all the Biblical mode and the Hebraic spirit. Mimesis, however,
besides being an affirmation, monumentalization, and appropriation of
the Western literary canon on behalf of Biblical thought, has a more nar-
row focal point: it constitutes a revision of that other major modernist
Geistesgeschichte, The Theory of the Novel (1916) by Georg Lukács (1885–
1971).16
Lukács’ study responded to the Romantic call for “a philosophy of the
novel, the rough outlines of which are contained in Plato’s political theory”
(Schlegel 1971: 198). In the “Dialogue on Poetry” (1799–1800), Friedrich
Schlegel had defined the task of this philosophy as “a spiritual viewing of
the subject with calm and serene feeling, as it is proper to view in solemn
joy the meaningful play of divine images. Such a theory of the novel would
have to be itself a novel which would imaginatively reflect every eternal
tone of the imagination and would again confound the chaos of the world
of the knights. The things of the past would live in it in new forms; Dante’s
sacred shadow would arise from the lower world, Laura would hover heav-
enly before us, Shakespeare would converse intimately with Cervantes, and
there Sancho would jest with Don Quixote again” (Schlegel 1968: 102–3).
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Lukács’ book, like Mimesis, a work of theory and criticism inspired by He-
gelian dialectic (Bernstein 1984), deals with the development of Western
literature and is based on a fundamental polarity, discussing from a his-
torico-philosophical perspective the two major forms of epic literature, an-
cient epic poetry and the modern novel. Lukács differs from Auerbach in so
far as he compares the two categories diachronically, not synchronically,
and therefore presents them as opposed forms, not antithetical modes.
Thus they are compared as paradigmatic expressions of two different ages,
not as perennial modalities of thinking and writing. The contrast is abso-
lute but does not allow for direct conflict because it is grounded in his-
torico-cultural circumstances rather than fundamental structures of lan-
guage and experience.
For Lukács, the epic is the expression of the ancient Greek world, whose
primary characteristic was totality of being, completeness of self-being.
That world was completely rounded, homogeneous, and meaningful, with-
out any internal gaps or divisions. Dichotomies of experience like interior
and exterior, self and other, will and destiny, immanence and transcen-
dence, theory and praxis, and history and philosophy, did not exist, or
rather they appeared in an integrated form, articulated in unity. The
earthly world and the given moment were the supreme principles in life,
and man felt at home everywhere within that all-encompassing, comfort-
ing wholeness. Everything was tangible and physical because the world of
objects was fully present in its extensive totality. There was no need for
theory—no questions, no philosophy: the sensual world of forms was the
direct answer, the well-ordered wholeness of immediate reality the only
philosophy. The world of the epic is perfectly organic: everything coexists,
connects, coheres. All that matters and transpires is the total immediacy of
the fully given: there is only foreground, light, form, completeness, unity,
as essence and existence become inextricably interwoven into luminous
being. That is the meaning of what Lukács calls “integrated civilization,”
and the epic constitutes its paradigmatic expression.
This understanding of the Greek epic bears many similarities with Auer-
bach’s, as outlined in Mimesis: “fully externalized description, uniform il-
lumination, uninterrupted connection, free expression, all events in the
foreground, displaying unmistakable meanings, few elements of historical
development and psychological perspective” (Auerbach 1953: 19). Al-
though Auerbach borrowed these crucial ideas from Lukács, his rhetoric
was quite different. He strengthened the credibility of the argument in two
ways: first, he referred to a specific author, Homer, and concentrated on a
concrete work, the Odyssey; second, he discarded the lyrical, nostalgic in-
cantations of Lukács, using instead the discourse of philology, and the
techniques of stylistics in particular. Thus by focusing on one author, one
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work, one passage, and adopting a respectable scholarly language, he au-
thorized his repetition as an academic study, free from the romantic liber-
ties taken in the philosophical essay.
With regard to the novel (which Goethe had called “a subjective epic”
and Hegel the “bürgerliche epopoeia”),17 Lukács believes that it is the con-
temporary epic—the epic of the age of philosophy, homesickness, and sin-
fulness, of the fragmented and God-forsaken world. Where there was unity
and totality, now there is division and separation. This is the time of the
homeless individual, of the unredeemed fall, of decentered metaphysics.
“The abandonment of the world by God manifests itself in the incommen-
surability of soul and work, of interiority and adventure—in the absence of
a transcendental ‘place’ allotted to human endeavor” (Lukács 1971: 97).
The transcendental has been displaced by exile, the extrovert hero of the
epic by the introspective subject of the novel. Existence is dissonant, un-
certain, suppositious; estrangement and nostalgia afflict the tragic soul.
The world of objects has been reduced to a fixed category, nature. Nothing
bridges the within to the without. Individuality has become an end in it-
self; autonomy and independence are the desolate spaces humans inhabit.
Subject and object, present and past, history and philosophy are irreparably
torn apart. Self-reflexivity is the common lot, interiority the sole realm of
adventure. Time turns into History as it moves inexorably toward the Last
Judgment; totality flees into the heterogeneous. The gods have departed or
remain silent; the project of salvation has been left incomplete. This is
what Lukács calls the “problematic civilization.”
A comparison of this lament of belatedness with Auerbach’s description
of Biblical representation shows further convergence of opinion: “certain
parts brought into high relief, others left obscure, abruptness, suggestive
influence of the unexpressed, ‘background’ quality, multiplicity of mean-
ings and the need for interpretation, universal-historical claims, develop-
ment of the concept of the historically becoming, and preoccupation with
the problematic” (Auerbach 1953: 19). The similarities become more sig-
nificant in light of Auerbach’s aim to establish diachronic equivalences be-
tween the Biblical mode and the realist style of fiction. Not only does the
novel emerge as a central topic of interest for both critics; an important
equation between their oppositions can also be identified: Lukács’ Greek
epic corresponds to Auerbach’s Homeric mode; and Lukács’ novel corre-
sponds to Auerbach’s Biblical mode (and realist fiction). It is rather super-
ficial to say that the “distinction between the epic and the novel is founded
on a distinction between the Hellenic and the Western mind” (de Man
1983: 53). The founding distinction, as articulated by Auerbach, is that
between the Hellenic and the Hebraic.
Furthermore, Lukács’ conception of the epic, too, is Biblical. Consider
his depiction of the Greek world: placed in the context of a binary opposi-
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tion, it functions only as an alternative possibility for Judaism, as a substi-
tute for the Biblical world, where gods and humans still inhabit the same
universe, share the same space, speak the same language; where existence
is still home because it is united with essence and blessed by benevolent
divinities; where life is a totality because religion and philosophy (or the
nation and its book) are one. In his dichotomy, Lukács contrasts ancient
and secular Judaism (represented respectively by the epic and the novel)
and, overwhelmed by nostalgia for the lost wholeness, paints the Biblical
past in bright, Greek colors. Critics have charged that Lukács “neglected to
do what that other commentator on the realism of the Homeric epic, Erich
Auerbach, was later to do in the brilliant first chapter of his Mimesis. That
is, he confined classical civilization to the Greeks and failed to examine
another seminal ancient text, the Hebrew Bible” (Jay 1984: 93). It seems,
however, that although he did not analyze the Bible, he did appropriate
classical civilization for the Hebraic ideal in his Biblical reading of it.
Auerbach revised (and universalized) this approach, as he probably saw
that Lukács had fallen into the trap of romantic Hellenism and that idealist
Hegelianism had lured him into lamenting secular Judaism while portray-
ing the Biblical world in a Greek, detached fashion. The picture of Hellen-
ism was too positive to allow what was really privileged to emerge, while the
negative assumptions about the present of Hebraism were fatalistic and
defeatist. A new affirmation, rather than decadent yearning, was needed:
the dream of return was futile. Auerbach adopted Lukács’ recognition of
the great artistic achievements of the late Medieval ages—when “aesthetics
became metaphysics once more” (Lukács 1971: 38)—and of Dante’s role in
the transition from the epic to the novel through the architectural (67–68);
but the evaluation of subsequent developments had to change. He there-
fore undertook two tasks, one narrow and one general: early in his career, to
look into Dante and see how he contributed to that transition; and later, to
revise Lukács’ dichotomy in such a way as to maintain the real and endur-
ing power of the Hebraic. His plan was supported by two complementary
strategies: the replacement of idealist Hegelianism with his own historicist
one, and the transformation of the Hellenic from a lost origin to the repre-
sentative of evil.
Thus Auerbach constructed a dichotomy of irreconcilable styles: he pre-
sented the characteristics of the Biblical mode itself as positive by pointing
to their openness, fluidity, historicity, modernity, specificity, and egalitari-
anism; he made Christian understanding—which Lukács ignored almost
completely—heir to Biblical thought through figural interpretation; he re-
jected Lukács’ proposition to see in Wilhelm Meister the model for a syn-
thesis, launching against Goethe his strongest—and only personal—attack
in Mimesis (Auerbach 1953: 446–52); he warned against the confusion of
his time expressed in radical Modernism, and against the political threat
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manifest in the return of the paganistic in Nazism; and he proposed his
own synthetic ideal, a Biblical humanism with a historicist awareness. This
is the specific revisionary project sustaining Mimesis, and Auerbach’s de-
bate with Lukács over fiction, historicism, and Hebraism is one of the sub-
texts of the entire work.
The public success of Mimesis, and the first chapter in particular, cannot
be overestimated: Biblical and classical studies, from scholarly publications
to course syllabi, have taken it as a starting point of definition and direc-
tion. Seldom in literary studies have origins been traced in such a well-
ordered, well-packaged way and with such populist appeal. Nevertheless,
the stylistic comparison of Hebrew and Greek writing (as well as mind and
worldview) has had a long history of treatment. In his analysis, Auerbach
drew (without attribution, of course, as was his manner) from a volumi-
nous tradition of parallel readings that have compared the two ancient
canons and have rather consistently ascertained the artistic, let alone
moral, superiority of the Bible.
To take an eminent example, the Right Reverend Robert Lowth (1710–
87), Lord Bishop of London and Praelector of Poetry at the University of
Oxford (1741–50), dealt with the artistic merits of the Bible in a series of
lectures he delivered in 1749–50 and published in 1753 as De sacra poesia
Hebraeorum, praelectiones academicae Oxonii habitae. His examination is a
landmark in literary studies, as it made legitimate (and even proposed the
contours of) a literary reading of the book. In these thirty-four lectures, he
rejected the figural approach of traditional theology and transformed typol-
ogy into Biblical poetics. Anticipating the Romantic infatuation with the
religious dimension of literature, he assimilated poetry to prophecy (Lec-
tures XVIII–XXI) and identified the sublime as a characteristic Biblical
quality (XIV–XVII, XXVI–XXXVII).18 Poetry was distinguished from phi-
losophy (Lowth 1816: 7, 12–16) and religion (36–37), and the approach was
resolutely critical rather than theological (50–51). The driving argument
was that Hebrew poetry is superior to any other (43), as well as to nature
and art (44), and can teach the origin and the proper evaluation of artistic
excellence (46).
The basis of all analysis, however, was a comparison with the Greek clas-
sics. After explaining why religion is the origin of poetry, Lowth noted:
“These observations are remarkably exemplified in the Hebrew Poetry,
than which the human mind can conceive nothing more elevated, more
beautiful, or more elegant; in which the almost ineffable sublimity of the
subject is fully equalled by the energy of the language and the dignity of the
style. And it is worthy observation, that as some of these writings exceed in
antiquity the fabulous ages of Greece, in sublimity they are superior to the
most finished productions of that polished people” (36–37). Elsewhere, he
compared Pindar and lyric Biblical poetry (225), the Psalms and Greek
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Hymns (174), Job19 and Oedipus (398), while among the Biblical genres he
distinguished Hebrew elegiac, didactic, lyric, idyllic, and dramatic poetry—
all of them superior to their Hellenic equivalents. Throughout the book,
his stylistic commentary prefigures, so to speak, Auerbach’s search for the
structure of the ethnic mind. Here is his comparison of the metric capabil-
ities of the two languages: “For the Greek, beyond every other language
(and the Latin next to it), is copious, flowing, and harmonious, possessed
of a great variety of measures, of which the impression is so definite, the
effects so striking, that if one should recite some lame and imperfect por-
tion of a verse, or even enunciate hastily several verses in a breath, the
numbers would nevertheless be clearly discernible. . . . But in the Hebrew
language the whole economy is different. Its form is simple above every
other; the radical words are uniform, and resemble each other almost ex-
actly; nor are the inflexions numerous, or materially different: whence we
may readily understand, that its metres are neither complex nor capable of
much variety; but rather simple, grave, temperate; less adapted to fluency
than dignity and force” (70–71). Like Lowth, who looked at the Hebrew
Bible in his search for the fundamentals of poetry and established them by
comparing it to Greek writing,20 Auerbach adopted the same comparativist
approach in his own search for the essence of narrative.
Lowth’s book is arguably the first work of literary criticism, of that mod-
ern reading (called “divine discipline” by Friedrich Schlegel) which isolates
texts and analyzes them for their inherent structure and intrinsic qualities.
The focus of his attention is uniqueness of style and artistic significance.
The fact that such an approach was first applied to the primary religious
work of the West is not at all paradoxical. On the contrary, it was the
precarious, ambivalent use of the Bible by the believers at that time that
dictated the approach. When the voice of the text is no longer heard by its
community, “it is literature that rises out of the absence of Holy Writ, its
evasions, withdrawals, and silences” (Needler 1982: 397). Literary criticism
emerged as the paradox of secular theology, of a theology that could no
longer depend on faith alone for the legitimation of its sources and author-
ity. Literary theory was originally the hermeneutics of that theology, the
close reading which was dedicated to extracting from the text itself, from
its signifying operations, its meaning and importance. “Saving the Text,”
to borrow a title (Hartman 1981), was from the beginning its raison d’être
and rallying cry. That Text has been the Bible.
The very possibility of the project of criticism as a non-theological inter-
pretation was first fully established by Benedict (Baruch) de Spinoza
(1632–77), who explored the links between theology, close reading, and
politics. Spinoza tried to save the Bible from the devastating Wars of Reli-
gion (1560–1660) and the onslaught of empiricist reason in diverse ways:
he mediated between Maimonides and Descartes, he dismissed divine in-
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spiration, he wrote a Hebrew grammar. No other effort, though, can be
compared with his anonymously published Tractatus Theologico-politicus
(1670), that “prescient masterpiece of the higher criticism” (Gay 1966: 24),
which attracted considerable attention from the start, though until the
1780s in mostly hostile responses. In it, Spinoza attacked superstition and
opposed reason to revelation, trying to support Jan de Witt’s struggles with
Calvinism. While Reformists like Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560) had in-
sisted that philosophy be regarded as ancilla theologiae, he distinguished
metaphysics as an independent inquiry from theology. This was a bold
book that raised issues of understanding (as independent close reading of
the Bible), natural rights (such as the right of the individual to interpret),
and governance (which should take the Hebrew polity as its model). Spi-
noza was explicit about his intent and its ideological context: “As I marked
the fierce controversies of philosophers raging in Church and State, the
source of bitter hatred and dissension, the ready instruments of sedition
and other ills innumerable, I determined to examine the Bible afresh in a
careful, impartial, and unfettered spirit, making no assumptions concern-
ing it, and attributing to it no doctrines, which I do not find clearly therein
set down. With these precautions I constructed a method of Scriptural
interpretation” (Spinoza 1951: 8). In response to social upheavals and
philosophical disputes that threatened Biblical authority, he devised a new
approach that promised to respect the political (but of course not the reli-
gious or philosophical) legitimacy of every reading. Spinoza was the first to
argue that the right to interpret (the Bible) was a political one, and to
demand the philosophical emancipation of that right.21
According to his immanentist hermeneutic principle, the Bible must be
understood exclusively by itself, its knowledge derived from its own literal
meaning. “His Theologico-Political Treatise is the first attempt at a philo-
sophical justification and foundation of Biblical criticism” (Cassirer 1951:
184). The book is addressed to Christian philosophers, and its primary goal
is to free philosophy from (Christian) theology. “Precisely because Spinoza
openly abandoned in the Treatise the belief in the cognitive value of the
Bible, his maxim to speak ‘ad captum vulgi’ forced him to assign the high-
est possible value to the practical or moral demands of the Bible” (Strauss
1952: 197). Reading acquires practical importance: it governs understand-
ing and guides morality. Consequently, any attempt to govern it from out-
side ignores this useful importance. Spinoza’s interpretive “immanentism”
(Yovel 1990) was not entirely new. The very concept of interpretation as a
personal, independent (and ultimately ascetic) exercise had already been in
place for some one hundred fifty years. Erasmus had defended the right of
individuals to read the Bible in their common language. As for the idea that
knowledge of the Scripture ought to be “looked for in Scripture only” (Spi-
noza 1951: 100) and that the pursuit of this knowledge was an individual’s
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task and responsibility, it had been propagated by the Reformation since its
inception. Spinoza’s own original contribution was to politicize the issue
by inserting it into discussions of governance.
In Spinoza’s work, interpretation, the Reformers’ religious duty, became
a political right. He claimed that it was political because it was natural
(211), civil, and private (207). Instead of being the privilege of the few, “the
highest power of Scriptural interpretation belongs to every man” (119)—to
the extent, of course, that this is a religious duty and an individual right:
this is the democratic Biblical secularism of the Tractatus. In a telling pas-
sage, the possibility as well as the limits of interpretation as a civil right are
defined: “Therefore, as the supreme right of free thinking, even on religion,
is in every man’s power, and as it is inconceivable that such power could be
alienated, it is also in every man’s power to wield the supreme right and
authority of free judgment in this behalf, and to explain and interpret reli-
gion for himself. The only reason for vesting in the hands of the magistrates
the supreme authority for the interpretations of law and judgment on pub-
lic affairs is that they concern questions of public right. Similarly the su-
preme authority in explaining religion, and in passing judgment thereon, is
lodged with the individual because it concerns questions of individual
right” (118–19). At issue here is not the legitimacy of personal faith but the
right to private understanding. Interpretation can be contested as a right
only when it is presented and practiced as private. On the other hand, when
the believer becomes a reader of the Bible and when its understanding can
be entrusted to him, he can be safely governed.
This distribution of power is not enforced, but guaranteed by a “cove-
nant” (205, 208) between the individual and the sovereign: the sovereign
governs, the individual interprets.22 The “true aim of government is liberty”
(259), and liberty is now understood as (that is, limited to) freedom of
interpretive judgment. Reason, rights, interpretation, individuality, the
Bible, even the government—all are accepted as natural. “In a democracy
(the most natural form of government . . .) everyone submits to the control
of authority over his actions, but not over his judgment and reason” (263).
The emancipation of interpretation is guaranteed by an interpretive under-
standing of emancipation—an understanding that limits it to areas of
knowledge and belief. A few decades before the Tractatus appeared the
greatest pupil of Erasmus, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), in his De jure belli
ac pacis (1635), founded the system of human rights not on divine revela-
tion but on the natural law of reason and social contract of state. He also
abolished the medieval distinction between lex naturae and lex divina
by showing that they can both be based on reason. Spinoza extended the
contract to include, in addition to choice of government, the exercise of
interpretation. They both sought new grounds for strong governmental au-
thority during the period of the Thirty Years’ War after the feudal order
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collapsed and a need arose for an international order in the emerging Eu-
rope of nations.
This is the civil covenant to which they contributed: when one submits
to authority, one becomes a subject—an individual who has the right to
interpret (the Bible) and is entitled to his private opinion (about it). The
idea of the self, the independent person, implies that “society is consti-
tuted of autonomous, equal, units, namely separate individuals, and that
such individuals are more important, ultimately, than any larger constitu-
ent group. It is reflected in the concept of individual private property, in
the political and legal liberty of the individual, in the idea of the individ-
ual’s direct communication with God” (Macfarlane 1978: 5). In the theo-
logico-political treatise, interpretation is liberated when it escapes the
control of theology and enters the civic world. In order to save the Bible,
Spinoza frees interpretation from the law (of theology, faith, court, and
tradition) while making it the new Law, the rule of the textual experience
of divine meaning—the law of Kant, Kierkegaard, Kafka, and Derrida. This
is the order which Auerbach saw in decline and tried to invigorate by re-
turning to the fundamentals of interpretive faith. The problem is that such
a return runs against the highest principle of interpretation, the autonomy
of understanding. Spinoza’s initiative was based on this principle: an au-
tonomous understanding does not need any outside guidance or supervi-
sion because it is self-governing; interpretation is the secular law. How wise
was it, however, to limit the quest for autonomy, the supreme project of
modernity, only to the emancipatory promise of interpretation?
HEBRAISM AND HELLENISM
Until the end of the thirteenth century, the Western Church remained the
central, all-powerful, unified and unifying institution of its society: religion
and church were one, the study of doctrine and the study of the Bible
identical. The New Testament was considered the exclusive foundation of
the faith, and interest in the Hebrew Bible was limited, as Auerbach has
explained, to explorations of prefiguration. By the early fourteenth century,
however, preachers and scholars started challenging the exclusive power of
the church by questioning its explanatory authority and appealing directly
to the Bible itself.23 “Those scholars and preachers and demagogues (Mar-
silius of Padua, Wyclif and the Lollards, the Hussites, for example) who
challenged the authority of the Church as it was then institutionally consti-
tuted, held up the authority of the Bible in its place and argued that the
interpretation of Scripture was no matter for the Church to regulate if by
the Church was meant the Pope and his cardinals. Instead, the individual
must read for himself under the guidance of the Holy Spirit” (Evans 1985:
7). The aim of this new belief was “to challenge the Church both as official
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interpreter of the Bible and as having authority to decide questions of doc-
trine” (9). There were also practical considerations dictated by social devel-
opments. “On the intellectual level, by the end of the fifteenth century,
theology needed a new tool. It had to go back beyond the scholastics and,
almost more importantly, beyond Augustine. It had to be evangelical and
it had to make the Christian religion correlative to human moral needs”
(Levi 1987: 117). As a result, Christians were encouraged to explore per-
sonal exegesis, to exercise their own judgment in reading the articles of the
faith. Such positions advocated “a devaluation of the collective existence
represented by sacraments, saints, and the ‘unwritten’ tradition of the
Church, in favor of a naked confrontation with the scriptures” (Bossy 1985:
97). Similar challenges, based on an increasing attention to the sacred
texts, culminated in the Reformation.
With the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, the Church
ceased being a unified body of pious believers and became a congregation
of attentive readers. Faith, it was determined, not institutional religion,
came first; and true faith could only be founded in the Bible. The principal
dogma consecrated at the Diet of Worms (1521) was that of sola scriptura:
“For the reformers the important principle is that the Bible is not only its
own witness through the Holy Spirit, but also its own interpreter, proving,
judging, illuminating itself” (Evans 1985: 32).24 The study of the Bible was
the road to salvation. Interpretation became a religious duty, and the exer-
cise of personal judgment in private study was actively pursued. A dramatic
change, from the ecclesiastic to the interpretive use of the Bible, made
possible the Protestant conception of the text: “As the reformers began to
dispute hitherto unquestioningly accepted ways of administering grace and
truth and power, as the infallible institution of papacy, the rule of car-
dinals, bishops, and priests, together with the immense power of the con-
fessional was tottering, the most basic levels of religious legitimation were
shifted away from the collective bodies and rituals of the Church toward
what, in the strength of the personal faith of each believer, was an al-
together new emphasis on the reading and interpretation of Scripture as
the divine locus of a finished revelation” (Weimann 1986: 452). As the
liturgical context disappeared and the institutional support withered, the
interpretive imperative provided the only credible religious axiomatic in a
world that felt for the first time the experience of popular upheaval as a
social problem. At the same time, when the colonial West sought to pro-
tect and justify its embarrassing riches, the interpretive imperative became
probably the first explicatory technique and regulatory mechanism to teach
the European merchant the wealth of his soul and the rewards of his
vocation.
In charting the translation of Western Christianity into the Reforma-
tion, three major points of transition may be discerned (Bossy 1985): the
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shift from a conception of life centered on kin and the social realm to
another centered on the individual and his family; the replacement of the
ethical code of the Seven Deadly Sins by the Ten Commandments and the
rule of their law; and, most importantly for our discussion, the shift from
the ritual and symbolism of the Sacraments in a community of kin to the
meaning and truth of the Word in a civil society. The Reformation empha-
sized religious experience, evangelical piety, and moral commitment, while
raising questions of the authenticity of faith and ethics. Privacy and inter-
pretation (that is, the depth of interiority) were the enabling conditions of
subjectivity, of bourgeois individualism as it emerged in the sixteenth cen-
tury; and the site of askesis for subjectivity (desert, abyss, or purgatory) was
the text of the Bible itself. With this secular soteriology, not only did sin
turn into a personal problem, but also reading became a matter of salvation
as an integral part of what Max Weber called “worldly asceticism.” The
new type of reading reconstituted both reader and the object of his devo-
tion. The practice of close (and silent) study brought into relief the charac-
ter and integrity of the text—its constitution as a series of books and as a
unified whole, which its use in church had obscured by making its different
parts serve different functions in the service.
Also the split of theology into speculative and exegetical branches during
the early twelfth century had taken on dangerous proportions, as by the late
fifteenth century the former was following the direction of logic and the
latter of grammar, both cultivating a threatening positivism under the
strong influence of scientific reasoning. The Reformation brought the two
branches together again into the cooperative study of the Bible and gave
them a common task: the elucidation of logical and semantic contradic-
tions in the text, and the search for what Huldrych Zwingli called, in his
treatise of 1522, the “Clarity and Certainty or Power of the Word of
God.”25
Thus literalism, as this new kind of study became known, was a reaction
to nominalism (1350–1500), the dominant trend of late scholasticism, and
its rejection of universals. Literalism was offered as the respectable equiva-
lent of naturalism in physics. Its emergence can be traced as far back as the
twelfth century, when a “new interest in the literal sense and a new respect
for it altered an old balance in favor of the ‘spiritual’ senses, the allegorical,
tropological and anagogical, which had led some of the fathers to regard
certain passages as having no literal sense at all” (Evans 1985: 40). At this
time, though, literalism was more than just a return to the text—it was the
invention of the autonomous, self-justifying and self-explanatory (sacred)
text: “ ‘that word’ which was in the beginning with God, which was the life
and light of men and shone in incomprehensible darkness, was not a per-
sonal but a literal word; it was ‘it,’ not ‘him,’ instinctively conceived as the
word written. It was certainly not the ritual word . . . but the vehicle of
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truth; and not the social word, but objective, transcendent, addressed to no
one and everyone, like the Ten Commandments which were to replace
statues and images behind the altars of English churches” (Bossy 1985: 99).
The Protestants rejected any interpretive and ecclesiastical tradition that
did not agree with the message of the Scripture. With Biblical literalism,
the “letter” of the text became more important than the “spirit” of the
church.26 And as the text achieved its independence from the church, the
congregation changed into a community of interpreters. The autonomy of
the text and that of its readers were mutually authenticating. That was the
import of Luther’s “priesthood of all believers.”27
In the late fifteenth century there were two developing directions of edu-
cational reform: the Renaissance humanism of Italy and England, and the
Evangelical humanism of Germany and the Low Countries. Humanist edu-
cational reforms and Protestant religious reforms often assisted each
other.28 Humanists were the first group to support the Reformation, which
they saw as an ally in the struggle of their academic movement against
scholasticism (Holeczek 1975). The Protestants saw in humanism the in-
terpretive system that would help them win theological debates: “The hu-
manities became for Protestant theologians what Aristotelian philosophy
had been to late medieval Catholic theologians, the favored handmaiden of
theology” (Ozment 1979: 147). In a sense, the Reformers were scholastics,
but of the word, not the argument; hence their literalism of doctrine. “Al-
though the Protestant reformers replaced scholastic dialectic with the rhe-
torical ideals of humanism when they reformed university curricula . . . ,
they continued to share the preoccupation of medieval theologians with
the definition and defense of church doctrine, albeit on a more homiletical
than theoretical level, that is, they were more interested in preaching doc-
trine than in contemplating it” (136). Still, the two trends together created
what the Western university has known until today as Liberal Arts—the set
of practices of Protestant interpretation. As Hegel wrote in 1816: “Prot-
estantism is not entrusted to the hierarchical organization of a church, but
is, rather, found only in a general intelligence and a general culture. . . . Our
universities and our schools are our churches” (quoted in Derrida 1986:
27).29 The object of worship in these churches has always been the secular
scripture.
In the history of Western secular writing, the reader became priest long
before the poet (say, William Blake or Vladimir Mayakovsky) became
prophet. The language of the service was reduced to a single text, and
communal praying was replaced by individual study. The study of that text,
though, was the first (universal and, later with Spinoza, civil) right of Man.
Conversely, Man’s first self-constituting action was that very study. Thus
Man (the bourgeois subject), the book (the self-authenticating, self-regu-
lating written document), and interpretation (the search for hidden mean-
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ing and intent) came into existence together and supported each other in
the Protestant use of the Bible outside the jurisdiction of the Catholic
church.30 “Hence, this new mode of self-authorization, involving as it does
some radically different standards of ‘knowledge of the truth,’ must neces-
sarily situate itself in and bring forth new forms of institutionalization.
Within and throughout these, the new forms of authority, for all the em-
phasis on faith and inwardness, cannot do without—in fact they help to
constitute—an increased amount of historical activity. This activity results
from the newly sanctioned Protestant text that in the process of its transla-
tion, circulation, and reception in the vernacular requires a reading which
presupposes and, at the same time, promotes some greater and more highly
subjective range of understanding and appropriation. In the crucial years
around 1525, the climax of the German peasant revolt, the previous mo-
nopoly of the Church in controlling the exegesis of Scripture explodes into
everyman’s Protestant freedom to write, read, and think about the Bible
himself. The new evangelical sources of spiritual authority are dissociated
from office, ritual, confessional. They are planted ‘in the heart, in faith and
love,’ that is, in newly active ways of feeling and believing, in some more
nearly self-fashioning modes of emotional, intellectual, and political activ-
ity, through which alone the Protestant access to the biblical text achieves
its supreme power in the lives of the faithful” (Weimann 1986: 460). The
Bible in vernacular translation “effectively crushed the unscriptural world
of ‘good works,’ of saint-cults, pilgrimages, purgatory, pardons and minor
sacraments” (Dickens 1982: 449).
The new authority was the bourgeois soul and its contact with a personal
(printed) copy. If personal Biblical reading was the first act of church dis-
obedience, it was also the first act of civil obedience31—the declaration of
individuality. In interpretation, a new technology of the self emerged: the
interiorization and privatization of meaning. From another viewpoint, it
may also be said that in interpretation a new technology of governance
emerged: the self as the depth of secular meaning. In both cases, the prac-
tices of interpretation, succeeding the rituals of exegesis, promise the
emancipation of knowledge from the coercion of outside authority to the
extent that it can earn its independence—to the extent that knowledge can
achieve its autonomy by judiciously governing (and guarding) itself, by
scrupulously observing the rules that it has itself chosen to follow. The law
of immanence which rules the secular order—“the perfect law, the law of
liberty” (James 1.25)—is the regime of truth that characterizes modernity.
As a subject of continuous and fierce contention, this law is claimed at
different times by various political paradigms, from rationality to aesthetics
and from empiricism to communism. Its presence, however, in the require-
ment of intrinsic understanding and the promise of liberation is unmistak-
ably manifest.
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The emergence of a linguistics of Christian faith was the distant begin-
ning of a debate about the legitimacy of meaning that culminated in Spi-
noza’s politics of interpretation. It raised questions of textual authenticity
and authority that shook the foundations of corpus Christianum and
changed its modes of historical understanding. Between the flock and the
Kingdom, the abyss of mediation opened, threatening any attempt at insti-
tutional conciliation. Lowth resolved these problems by applying a consis-
tently stylistic approach to the besieged Bible: his answer was criticism as
textual anabaptism. This anabaptism of faith was not in the message, but
in the grace and harmony of the text: its quality, its structural coherence
and perfection would guarantee the required authenticity and authority.
Literalism questioned not just the established, church-authorized signif-
icance of the text but its very authenticity. For the first time since the
Middle Ages, the reliability of St. Jerome’s Vulgate (ca. 404) was disputed
and “the break in the covenant between word and world” (Steiner 1989)
occurred. Signification became an issue not when the infinite interpreta-
bility of the text was discovered, but simply when the Scripture and the
Vulgate were no longer seen as the same, and the latter no longer regarded
as a monument. To document this inadequacy, the Reformists turned
their attention to the original languages of the Bible, Hebrew and Greek,
and the discipline of their study, humanist textualism. Here again human-
ists and reformers joined forces early. “The art or technique of understand-
ing and interpretation developed along two paths, theological and literary
critical, from one analogous impulse. Theological hermeneutics, as Dilthey
showed, from the reformers’ defence of their own understanding of scrip-
ture against the attack of the Tridentine theologians and their appeal to
the essential place of tradition; literary critical hermeneutics as a tool of the
humanist claim to revive classical literature. Both involve a revival of some-
thing that was not absolutely unknown, but whose meaning had become
alien and unavailable. Classical literature, though constantly present as cul-
tural material, had been completely absorbed within the Christian world.
Similarly, the bible was the church’s sacred book and as such was con-
stantly read, but the understanding of it was determined and—as the re-
formers insisted—obscured by the dogmatic tradition of the church. Both
traditions are dealing with a foreign language and not with the universal
scholar’s language of Latin middle ages, so that the study of the tradition
in its original source made it necessary to learn Greek and Hebrew as well
as to purify Latin. Hermeneutics claims to reveal, by specialised tech-
niques, the original meaning of the texts in both traditions, humanistic
literature and the bible. It is significant that the humanistic tradition be-
came united, through Luther and Melanchthon, with the reform” (Gada-
mer 1979: 153–54). The exegetical authority of the Catholic church was
challenged, its foundations rejected. “Moreover biblical humanism went
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on to maintain that an individual interpreter of the Bible armed with the
new critical tools in both Hebrew and Greek was entitled to challenge old
interpretations of the Scriptures made by popes and other mere office-
holders, people ignorant of Greek and Hebrew, who at best had hitherto
laid down the law by a blind reliance upon the Latin Vulgate” (Dickens
1982: 497). The fight was over texts and words, origins and sources.
The Reformation was the first modern battle of the books: it raised ques-
tions of exegesis, canonicity, interpretive authority, tradition, originality,
textuality. (Its arguments about textual legitimacy were rehearsed in the
first decade of the sixteenth century, during an earlier battle over the Jew-
ish books which the convert Pfefferkorn, with support from the scholastics,
wanted to suppress while some humanists under Reuchlin, Europe’s lead-
ing Hebraist, struggled successfully to preserve.) During that period, He-
brew and Greek studies emerged as integral components of humanist edu-
cation. “As a result of the pro-Biblical atmosphere of the Reformation to-
gether with the interests of Renaissance humanists, the study of Hebrew
became part of the necessary equipment of every enlightened scholar. Con-
tinental humanists like Ficino, Pico, and Reuchlin were accomplished he-
braists who furthered the study of Hebrew for Gentiles and defended the
freedom of pursuing Hebrew studies” (K. Cohen 1975: 13). For example,
although Hebrew became part of the university curriculum in the four-
teenth century, before 1500 there was no Hebrew grammar available to the
interested scholar. Johannes Reuchlin (1455–1522) published De Rudibus
Hebraicis (1506), a grammar and lexicon in three volumes which compared
the Vulgate to the original Old Testament and launched Hebrew studies.
With the growth of the school of Christian Hebraists, following at the
footsteps of Reuchlin, an increasing number of grammars and translations
appeared. In the sixteenth century, Henry VIII established Hebrew chairs
at Oxford and Cambridge. “In the course of the 17th century, Hebrew
language and literature came to be taught in most of the universities of
Western and Central Europe, and even the New Testament was inter-
preted in connection with talmudic teachings” (Ettinger 1961: 204). Its
place beside Latin and Greek as a language of faith and culture was estab-
lished. After Reuchlin showed the need to return to the Hebrew original,
Lorenzo Valla (1405–57) and Erasmus (1466–1536) did the same for the
New Testament. The Erasmus edition of the New Testament made it uni-
versally accessible in the original for the first time, with 1,200 copies
printed. The Novum Instrumentum (1516) was published in two parts: the
first contained the Greek text and Erasmus’ Latin translation in parallel
columns, and the second contained the Annotationes in Novum Testamen-
tum, explaining his deviations from the Vulgate by making extensive use of
Greek. Luther used this edition as the basis of his German translation of
1522. Erasmus, who in 1505 had designated the translation of the Scripture
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as “the task of the philologists” rather than the theologians, was now urging
theologians to learn the holy tongues of Hebrew and Greek. He compared
the Bible favorably to the classics (Baroway 1933: 465–66; Markish 1986:
29), acknowledging the higher authority of Hebrew but attributing more
scholarly importance to Greek. The new independent churches observed
these trends with some apprehension and suspicion: although the move-
ment to give the Bible to laymen through the vernacular had the advantage
of side-stepping the authority of Latin (and of the educational system that
supported it), it manifested an uncanny awareness of the differences
among languages, periods, and cultures. Nevertheless, scholars of Hebrew
and Greek were clearly indispensable, if the interpretive credibility of the
Catholic church was to be undermined. The Scripture had to be read in its
original languages. Hebrew and Greek, as two areas of linguistic and textual
study, developed in parallel for some one hundred fifty years, serving the
Reformist construction of the Bible.
The Reformation became a popular movement within the sphere of civic
life in the urban centers of the North and the South. Their utopia was
religious, not democratic; classical Athens was not their model. “The image
of the city of God, aroused by scores of familiar Biblical texts, had been
revivified by those triumphs of municipal independence and cohesion
which form one of Europe’s greatest legacies from the later middle ages.
The city of God, the new Jerusalem, now developing into a concrete aspira-
tion for this world, shines forth as the constant factor throughout all the
Protestant Reformations: in the Hussites of Prague and Tabor, in Savana-
rola’s godly programme for Florence, in the cities large and small of Lu-
ther’s Germany, in Zürich under Zwingli and Geneva under Calvin, among
the rebellious Dutch Calvinists and the Huguenots with their cities of ref-
uge” (Dickens 1982: 499). It was the Biblical model of the religious com-
munity that inspired the newly endowed classes in their search for auton-
omy and the rule of immanent law. “Among the Reformed Churches the
Old Testament loomed larger also because it served to provide a framework
for the constitution of a Holy Commonwealth” (Bainton 1963: 17). The
law was a serious problem for the Reformers from Erasmus to Calvin and
from Martin Bucer to the Antinomians. “The formalism of the Puritan
ethic is in turn the natural consequence of its relation to the law” (Weber
1976: 258). In contrast to the apparent cynicism of Niccolò Machiavelli
(1469–1527) and the historical republicanism of Il principe (published in
1532, written in 1512), the Reformers sought a new order in the rules of
interpretive faith. Luther distinguished between the local law (such as the
Jewish one contained in parts of the Bible and applying only to Jews) and
the universal law (which has the validity of the natural one). “For those
who believe in the possibility of a holy commonwealth, there must be some
rules for governance. This would apply particularly to Müntzer, Zwingli,
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and Calvin. And where should those rules more appropriately be found
than in the sacred writings which the reformers were endeavoring to reha-
bilitate?” (Bainton 1963: 35) The importance of the model persisted to the
time of Bodin,32 Hobbes, and Spinoza. “The Old Testament became to
political philosophers of the seventeenth century what the ‘exemplaria
Graeca’ were to Horace, and what Horace in his turn became to English
Augustans” (Magnus 1928: 491). Thus the first politics of modernity was
the textual politics of faith.
The catechetic intent and the concern over governance were accompa-
nied by a complementary interest in civility (Riley 1986). Protestant lit-
eracy (Gellner 1988) created for the first time that civic force known as
public opinion (Habermas 1989a). A concern about the more general edu-
cation of the new masses, the Bible readers, is manifest in a special empha-
sis, not so much on elegance, as on clarity and accuracy of eloquence. In
nominal reaction to the obscurity and complexity of Renaissance scholasti-
cism, Reformation rhetoric turned to Greek in search of a model for the
persuasive public argument, the argument for the negotiable, common
good. In works like Melanchthon’s Oratio (1549)—probably the first major
statement which “sets out a comprehensive case for the precedence Greek
ought to take over Latin on all fronts” (Evans 1985: 80)—there is a distinct
sense that knowledge is becoming socially accountable, and learning
should be differentiated from training. That was the educational dimen-
sion of textual humanism: the new scholarship was a political project too.
If Hebrew was the language of the new exegesis, Greek was that of the new
rhetoric; if Hebrew was the language of interpretation, Greek was that of
eloquence; if Hebrew was the language of morality, Greek was that of civil-
ity. Greek was the path to the secular. This is how the private morality of
faith and the public eloquence of civility were supported and propagated.
Thus, in the philological study of the two Testaments by the Reformists,
we find the first comparisons of the Hellenic and the Hebraic. The return
to the origin through the original (ad fontes) drew attention to the two
ancient languages and their distinct worlds of meaning and culture. The
analysis of the New Testament made possible an awareness of the duality
of the classics and a differentiation of Greek from Latin. At the same time,
“the notion of Hebrew language and culture as rather different from the
Church forces that ‘corrupted’ it—as, specifically, ‘ancient’ and ‘oriental’—
took hold” (Kugel 1981: 208). As the Testaments started competing for
priority, so did the contributions of the two old civilizations to Western
Christianity.33 The comparison was part of the Hebrew and Greek study
from their very beginning.
Scholars often believe that the Hebraism-Hellenism comparison is a Ger-
man discussion of the nineteenth century. They acknowledge that “a
greatly improved practice in Old Testament exegesis became general,
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partly through increased knowledge of Hebrew and the influence of Jewish
exegesis. In these and other ways it may reasonably be claimed that the
Reformation produced a greatly increased Hebraic influence within the
Church” (Barr 1966: 42). They have not noticed, though, that the origins
of the Hebraic-Hellenic contrast can be traced to Reformation hermeneu-
tics. After the decline of scholasticism and the arrival of print culture, two
models of language competed for authority over philosophical grammar:
the speech-centered humanist and the text-centered Hebraic models
(Elsky 1990). Later, in the work of Erasmus and some Erasmians like Wil-
liam Tyndall (ca. 1494–1536), we discover the beginnings of a comparison
on rhetorical grounds that would evolve into stylistic contrasts by the time
of Lowth and philosophico-political ones in the work of Hamann and
Herder. Traditional views place the beginnings of the discussion at the
time of the latter, arguing that “though Romanticism is not anti-Greek for
the most part, it is within Romanticism that the cultural concepts which
have been applied to the Hebraic and later set against the Greek were fos-
tered” (Barr 1966: 44). The comparison between the Judaic and the Greek
heritage, however, started almost as soon as the Reformist persuasion
looked at their semantics for a better grasp of its faith and for stronger
arguments against Catholic dogma. Understanding the fundamentals of
the two languages and the basic operations of the Jewish and the Greek
mind was as important to Melanchthon as it was (for obviously different
reasons) to Auerbach or Boman.34
The comparative approach was an entirely new development. From Ter-
tullian (ca. 160–ca. 230) to Erasmus, occasional comparisons of the Judaic
to the Greek were made in the dominant context of the Christianity-
paganism opposition and with the additional standard assumption that the
Greeks could not even compete in value with the Romans. The real com-
parison was between the Christian faith and the ancient tradition. The
discussion certainly goes back to the Gospels and Paul, where the relation
between Jews and Gentiles, given the prospect of their Church member-
ship, became an important question. Even in the work of a purist like Ter-
tullian, who was probably the first to pose explicitly the choice between
Athens and Jerusalem and who, in his most militant moments, seemed to
reject the classical heritage altogether, the terms of the opposition are es-
sentially Christian and pagan. This was also the case with the other Fathers
of the faith: “no effort was made to solve problems through an overt rejec-
tion of the Greek mind in favor of the Hebraic. The origin of the modern
Hebrew-Greek contrast thus did not lie within the theology of the early
Church” (Barr 1966: 41). Early Church Fathers like Justin (ca. 100–ca.
165), Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150–ca. 215), the Syrian Tatian (fl. ca.
172) and Origen (185?–254?), believed that Greek literature and learning
had been “borrowed” or “stolen” from the Hebrews.35 Augustine (354–
430), like his mentor Ambrose (333–397), thought the same of Platonic
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and Pythagorean philosophy. “Probably the most widespread theory pro-
posed by the fathers to account for the truth in paganism was the sugges-
tion that it had come from the Old Testament. Here they were following a
precedent set by Jewish apologists” (Pelikan 1971: 33). Indeed the depend-
ency theory was common in Hellenistic synagogues. “The roots of this no-
tion are pre-Christian: it was a Jewish bulwark against the inroads of
Hellenization, but one that at the same time helped Jews to accept Greek
learning without conceding it priority or even originality” (Kugel 1981:
143).36 Jewish intellectuals versed in Hellenistic thought, like Aristobulus
and Philo, were the first to argue that the Scriptures were older than Greek
philosophy, which knew and used them. “Between the antique-pagan and
the patristic poetics, the Hellenized Judaism of the two last pre-Christian
and the first Christian centuries represents an intermediary which came to
exercise a far-reaching historical influence. The Judaeo-Hellenic culture
developed a highly conscious propaganda which did not stop at literary
forgeries (Sibylline oracles, verses attributed to Orpheus). ‘One of the
Chief tools of this propaganda was the attempt to show the correspon-
dences between the Jewish law and religion and the teachings of Greek
philosophy’ [Otto Stählin]. To this end, the system of allegorical exegesis
developed by the Stoa was taken over. In connection with it appears the
so-called ‘authority of antiquity’: the sacred writings of the Jews are far
older than those of the Greek poets and sages, who had known them and
learned from them. Thus Josephus, in his treatise against Apion, proved
that the Greek philosophers were dependent upon Moses. All these ideas
were taken over by the early Christian apologists” (Curtius 1953: 446). The
tradition continued well into the new era. “Judaeo-Christian apologetics
and, later, the Alexandrian catechumenical schools taught that the Old
Testament was earlier than the writings of the Greek poets and sages; that
the latter had known the Old Testament and learned from it. This led to
the establishment of parallels between the teachings of the Bible and pagan
myths” (219). This was only one strategy of the large effort to harmonize
Judeo-Christian teaching with Greek thought. Although later Latin theol-
ogy abandoned the effort when it had no need for it, the comparison was
still occasionally employed, from the sixth to the eleventh centuries, by
poets who used the parallel to defend the idea of the poeta theologus.
Isidore of Seville (ca. 570–636), for example, believed that, since Moses was
the first poet, poetry had not begun with the Greeks (Dyck 1977: 33). Com-
parisons of the Bible with Roman and Greek poetry in the fourteenth cen-
tury served further explorations of the relationship of theology and poetry,
and also served the justification of imaginative writing on the basis of the
presence of allegory in pagan classics and the Scriptures. That was the time
when allegory was recognized as the fundamental mode of poetry, and ty-
pology was widely accepted. In the early sixteenth century, this led to stud-
THE R ITES OF INTERPRETATION 35
ies of Biblical style which pursued two main themes: “the attempt to iden-
tify in the Bible tropes and figures such as existed in classical rhetoric; and
the imputation of classical meters to those songs and books identified as
Biblical poetry” (Kugel 1981: 226).
Still, the meaning of the comparison had drastically changed by the time
Erasmus started employing the image of the Jew in his religious teachings
and using Judaism as a moral category applicable to the contemporary
Christianity, even though he was still talking about “the Jews of books, not
the Jews of life” (Markish 1986: 6).37 Curtius has called this transition “the
passage from ‘Biblical’ to ‘theological’ poetics.” A new structure of under-
standing emerges: “Under the influence of Humanism, theology strives for
a new basis and method. From arguments addressed to reason it turns to
the arguments of authority and tradition; from scholastic dialectics to
study of the original sources; from the ‘speculative’ to the ‘positive’
method” (Curtius 1953: 552). French, German, and Spanish Humanisms
are all part of “the trend toward philological and historical studies which
also include the language of the Old Testament. On the one hand, a turn-
ing away from Scholasticism; a conjunction of Hebrew, Greek, and Latin
philology on the other—that is the position of Christian Humanism in the
first third of the sixteenth century.” This trend is the expression “of a uni-
versal, harmonizing attitude of mind which seeks to exploit the intellectual
stock of pagan Antiquity too for a Christian philosophy of culture” (553).
That was the moment when, in the course of a philological search for the
origins and sources of European religious tradition, the Jews, together with
the Greeks, were invented, were taken for real people, with their own his-
tory, and started gradually becoming objects of interest and study.
Although the first Western interest that focused on ancient Israel and
Greece stemmed from religious exigencies and had an exegetical character,
its philological methodology did not disappear with the triumph of the new
churches. On the contrary, it increased in importance as its interpretive use
(which we saw in Lowth’s analysis) and propaedeutic role (the training in
civility mentioned earlier) were needed more and more for the education of
the first independent readers, the bourgeoisie. One example is the forging,
in the century following the Reformation, of the Dutch national identity,
which was heavily dependent on the use of Biblical analogies (Schama
1987). An earlier and more important one is British Israelitism, the belief
that the English people were a remnant of the Ten Lost Tribes (Hine 1871)
and today’s true Israel. England merits special attention, as it was strongly
influenced by a political understanding of predestination, the so-called Is-
raelitism. “The English have had a long romance with the Jews, the min-
gling of their histories not least significant in our own time. But the con-
joining in modern history can be dated precisely with the emergence of
Elect Nation in the sixteenth century. At first, the analogue was part of an
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effort to establish a reformed church; sixteenth-century Protestants sought
the authority of Scripture, the language of covenant and election, to chal-
lenge Rome. But the language did not remain ecclesiastical. The Protestant
agenda broadened to a national program. By the 1640s it was right to speak
of something like national election” (Zwicker 1988: 38). The Reformed
classes appropriated the privileged destiny for themselves as they were ad-
vocating the bourgeois covenant of rights.38 Autonomy was blessed. “The
religious aristocracy of the elect, which developed in every form of Calvin-
istic asceticism” (Weber 1976: 131), was to pursue its destiny in secular
realms too. “From about 1570 onwards, the theme of ‘election’ came to
dominate Reformed theology, and allowed an easy identification of the
Reformed congregations and the people of Israel. Just as God had once
chosen Israel, so he had now chosen the Reformed congregations as his
people. From this moment onwards, the doctrine of predestination begins
to assume a major social and political function. . . . The form which this
theology took in England—Puritanism—is of particular interest. The sense
of being the ‘elect people of God’ was heightened as the new people of God
entered the new promised land—America” (McGrath 1988: 92). British
Israelitism was a radical form of Puritanism which laid great stress upon
“the divine sovereignty in election, as expressed in the decretum abso-
lutum” (McGrath 1986: 168).
There was a fervent tradition of religious dissent supporting that belief.
It was in England first, long before the Reformation, that the question of
the vernacular translation of the Scripture acquired political significance,
as was the case with Wyclif and the Lollard Bible of the 1380s (Hudson
1988). In the sixteenth century the miracle-working painted or sculpted
image lost its eminence to the written word, an iconoclasm (Aston 1988)
best known from Milton’s “Eikonoklastes” (1649) (Loewenstein 1990) that
again goes back to the Lollard critique of late medieval iconolatry. With
the Protestant return to the sources, Hebrew studies flourished and the
centrality of the Hebraic model for the nation’s self-understanding was
widely accepted. “The newly-emergent nationalistic and religious royalties,
in particular, gradually transplanted the destiny of the chosen people from
its Biblical context to that of the people of England” (Patrides 1972: 79).
The sense of a new covenant invigorated the zeal of the destined classes for
a secular mission. “Nowhere in the Christian world did the Old Testament
receive such a warm reception or penetrate so deeply into the lives of men
as in England” (Kugel 1981: 221). Karl Marx, in The Eighteenth Brumaire of
Louis Bonaparte (1852), indicates the extent of its influence when he ob-
serves that, a century before the French Revolution, “Cromwell and the
English people had borrowed speech, passions and illusions from the Old
Testament for their bourgeois revolution” (Tucker 1978: 596). Indeed “the
Old Testament was the book of the Puritan elect. The triumph of the He-
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brew spirit was the triumph of parliament and the rule of Oliver Cromwell”
(Zwicker 1988: 39). Furthermore, in what may be called “critical” Israel-
itism, it was not uncommon to find the opposition to the Hellenic recur-
ring in explorations of the Hebraic, for example in treatises that compared
the Bible to Homer, such as Homerus Hebraizon sive, comparatio Homeri
cum scriptoribus sacris quoad norman loguendi (1658) by Zacharus Bogan;
Homeri, poetarum omnium seculorum facile principis, gnomologia, duplici
parallelismo illustrata (1660) by James Duport, and later Homeros Hebraios
sive Historia Hebraeorum ab Homero Hebraicis nominibus ac sententiis con-
scripta in Odyssea et Iliade (1704) by Gerard Croese.39
John Milton (1608–74) was the first writer to lay claim on authorial pre-
destination—to translate the dogma of the “elect people” into the position
of the elect poet, the recipient of the “inspired gift of God, rarely be-
stowed,” and to use the authority (Guillory 1983) of the prophetic voice as
an artistic one. The argument of the superiority of the Hebraic over the
Hellenic played an instrumental role in this strategy. The syncretism of the
opening of Paradise Lost (1667) is aggressive: the author invokes Urania,
the “heav’nly Muse” who inspired Moses, from Oreb or Sinai or the Sion
hill to help his song “soar / above th’ Aeonian mount” (I, 6–15) Helicon. In
this comparison between Sion and Helicon, the city of David and the sanc-
tuary of the Muses, and the corresponding originary sources of inspiration,
a constitutive tension between the Hellenic and the Hebraic enters West-
ern poetry. Torquato Tasso had also begun his Gerusalemme liberata
(1580) by rejecting the ancient Muse and the laurels of Helicon, but in-
stead he invoked the Christian Muse from Paradise. Milton adopts rules of
the epic tradition but spiritualizes its heroic virtue in order to confer to his
Biblical epic a higher authority, that of religious truth and stylistic sublim-
ity. He was writing a poem “doctrinal and exemplary to the nation.” Show-
ing that Sion supersedes Helicon both philosophically and artistically was
an important way of justifying the character of his own project.40 The argu-
ment that the Greeks derived their “artful terms” from the Hebrews is part
of his self-authorization and the authorization of his poetry as a kind of
artistic Israelitism. As he did explicitly in “The Reason of Church Govern-
ment Urged against Prelaty” (1642), Milton compares himself to the an-
cient Hebrew writers. The art and inspiration of the divine poet transcends
the secular tradition and its myths by returning to the principles and mes-
sages of prophetic speech.41
It was on Rome and not the Elect Nation that the English political elites
during Augustanism chose to model their country. “To put the case as
simply as possible, in 1650 the central book of English culture was Scrip-
ture; by 1700 the texts men chose to talk about themselves were those of
Roman history and Roman politics. By 1700 it was Juvenal, not Jeremiah,
whom satirists invoked; the Roman senator, not the Mosaic lawgiver, em-
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braced as parliamentary ideal; commercial empire, not the end of time, for
which ministries toiled; Roman virtue, not Hebraic righteousness, that de-
fined civic morality” (Zwicker 1988: 37). This signals “the decline of right-
eousness as a moral code and prophecy as a political agenda” (37). After
1660, there was a need for defusion of religious acrimony, for negotiation
and reconciliation. “The biblical language of correction and humiliation is
an essential facet of Protestant spiritualism, and as a language of personal
discipline, Scripture endured. But as a language of public correction, Scrip-
ture was undercut both by the failure of spiritual politics and by changes in
those public institutions that needed correction” (41). With the Roman-
ization of English literary and political culture, the validity of the sacred
model declined.42 When it was time to build a public life on honor, integ-
rity, and prudence, the Republican mode served to demystify the politics of
prophecy and revelation. After the Civil War, politics used the language
of classical Republicanism—the vocabulary of Roman virtue and civility
(Pocock 1986). “Rome could authorize republic and empire, monarchy and
aristocracy. It could provide the history of valor and the history of luxury;
it could authorize the rule of the strong sovereign and the inviolability of
the senate. . . . It could provide authority for the conduct, the celebration,
and the censure of public life in a nation bent on or being bent toward
bloodless revolution, commercial empire, and the rage of party politics”
(Zwicker 1988: 47). This trend continued, for some for a century and a half,
for others until the end of the nineteenth century.43
The lesson of this transition from visions of iconoclastic eschatology to
plans for progressive history is an important reminder: in modernity, in the
urban landscapes and markets of post-Reformation northern capitalism,
scriptural figuralism or messianism is the discourse of the sacred politics of
community; while imperial republicanism or caesarism is the discourse of
the civic politics of the state. Community politics negotiates identity on
the basis of the Hebraic model, while state politics administers order on the
basis of the Roman one.44 The Roman mode, however, has been far less
efficient and important (and therefore rarely contested) for many reasons,
among them its association with both the Catholic world and the feudal
system. The main agent and vehicle of order has been another mode—not
a mechanism of imposed administration but the technology of freely cho-
sen self-regulation: the autonomy of cultivation. This is the path to eman-
cipation offered by the Hellenic.
While the Middle Ages had no historical understanding of antiquity
(Herren and Brown 1988) and the Renaissance felt only a certain distance
from its old models, the Reformist return to original texts, and especially
the prominence it gave to the Hebrew Bible, brought an acute sense of
division between both the two parts of the Scripture and the two levels of
experience, the present and the past. With the erosion of feudal and
THE R ITES OF INTERPRETATION 39
church power, and concomitant advances in astronomy, colonialism, and
trade, the harmony of religious and secular spheres collapsed and the possi-
bility of alternative world orders gained in appeal. After the great crisis of
theological and political authority from the mid-fourteenth to mid-six-
teenth centuries, the success of the Protestant churches and the achieve-
ment of Renaissance humanism gave the seventeenth century the sense of
a new order (civic life) and a new beginning (modernity). The symbolic (if
not figural) value of the Hebraic-Hellenic opposition in defining this break
in time and hierarchy was paramount. The Hebraic was proposed as a
model for a better understanding of community politics and morality. In
Milton, for example, it represented cultural (including moral) excellence,
while in Spinoza human reason and rights. The fate of the Hellenic was
more complicated and would not be fully determined before a major intel-
lectual conflict, the Battle of the Books in France and England at the end
of the century.
The Modern defined itself in opposition to an irrevocable past and an
exhausted tradition—in opposition to History.45 After the Reformation up-
heavals, “seventeenth-century society found itself at the crossroads of the
two types of history. On the one hand, historical discourse tended to repro-
duce religious discourse; it was a secular variant of the Bible. On the other
hand, the contradictions undermining it, added to the effects of ‘the Euro-
pean crisis of consciousness,’ were paving the way for a new history. In
other words, at the end of the age of Louis XIV, thinkers were just about to
grasp what Vico was to formulate clearly—the idea that history is made,
not by gods, but by men. Our modern notion of historicity is a result of this
discovery” (Apostolidès 1982: 63).46 The sense of a new beginning was com-
plemented by that of an end, and of an alienation from that which ended.
That whole experience had both a linguistic and a chronological mean-
ing. The linguistic one involved “the split between explicative sense and
historical reference, and between narrative depiction or form and its mean-
ing or subject matter” (Frei 1974: 42) evident in Spinoza’s Tractatus.
Before the Reformation, the identity of meaning and text, or text and
faith, or faith and church was not questioned. “In a precritical era, in which
literal explicative sense was identical with actual historical reference, literal
and figurative reading, far from contradicting each other, belonged to-
gether by family resemblance and by need for mutual supplementation.
Later on, when explication and reference became separated, the two kinds
of readings would not only separate but clash” (28). With the emphasis of
Protestant interpretation on literal reading and the grammar of meaning,
medieval exegesis came apart and its two parts took their separate ways:
“Realistic, literal reading of the Biblical narratives found its closest succes-
sor in the historical-critical reconstruction of specific events and texts of
the Bible. . . . Figural reading, concerned as it was with the unity of the
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Bible, found its closest successor in an enterprise called Biblical theology,
which sought to establish the unity of religious meaning across the gap of
historical and cultural differences” (8).
As for the chronological meaning of the Modern, it involved an acute
sense of separation (as opposed to the Renaissance distance) from the past,
specifically from antiquity. This historical sense was the belief in an ancient
and extinct integrated civilization (like that idealized by Lukács) which was
usually identified with Hellas. With this nostalgic belief, a long process,
which had begun with the removal of the Scripture from the purview of the
church for the bourgeois reader’s personal edification, was completed some
one hundred years later: as the modern state won the battle of the Book
against the church in the name of the individual, the past (of both state
and individual) was declared History and called Greek, while the present
was proclaimed Modern and defined as Judaic.
Until the Reformers’ return to the original language of the New Testa-
ment expanded to include questions of cultural signification, there was no
interest in Greece, no understanding of Greek civilization, no notion of a
real, historical Greece. “It cannot be emphasized enough that, just as to
Shakespeare the Ancient Greeks were quarrelsome Levantines, not demi-
gods, the Italian Renaissance scholars, artists and patrons identified them-
selves with Greeks but were not centrally concerned with the Greece of
Homer or Perikles, or even with the Olympian gods. They were interested
in picking up from pagan Antiquity where it had left off” (Bernal 1987:
151). The Hellenic played no part in any comparisons either: “The possibil-
ity of pitting Greeks against the Egyptians, Chaldaeans and others, in the
defence of Christianity, did not occur until the Renaissance” (193). When
comparisons began, they presented the Greek as derivative, and therefore
secondary: “Thus no one before 1600 seriously questioned either the belief
that Greek civilization and philosophy derived from Egypt, or that the
chief ways in which they had been transmitted were through Egyptian col-
onizations of Greece and later Greek study in Egypt” (121).
The credibility and urgency of the Hellenic were established around the
mid-seventeenth century, with the decline of the Reformation textual poli-
tics of faith and the emergence of a fully secular bourgeois culture. By the
time Spinoza presented the Modern as Biblical (in terms of both reading
and governing), the Hebraic and the Hellenic were becoming the poles on
the basis of which modernity would, until today, comprehend its nature
and reckon its options. In the transition from the uses of ancient fable in
ornament and eloquence (Seznec 1953) to the establishment of the science
of (Greek) mythology in the 1720s we can observe, on a small scale, the
secular triumph of interpretation as historical criticism; and in the shift of
interest from the “learning” of Bacon (The Advancement of Learning, 1605)
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to the “understanding” of Spinoza (Treatise on the Improvement of Under-
standing), Locke (“Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” 1690) or of
Leibniz (“New Essays,” 1704), we can see further how knowledge was trans-
formed from a religious to a human category—that is, how interpretation
turned from personal to private, and from Biblical to Hebraic. If the six-
teenth century created interpretation and its reader, the seventeenth uni-
versalized these fundamental concepts of the bourgeoisie and invented
autonomous understanding and the human together, arguing that under-
standing is human while anything human is related to understanding. The
autonomy of interpretation was justified anthropologically.
THE EXERCISE OF REASON
With the emergence of human understanding, the religion of reason suc-
ceeds the reason of religion. “As the dogmatic content of Protestantism
began to yield in importance to the ethical, and as the correctness of a
belief began to seem less significant than its sincerity, so doctrinal respect-
ability became a less impressive claim to liberty than moral and social in-
tegrity and political loyalty” (Worden 1989: 610). Because of its respect for
the (self-disciplined) individual and its understanding of historical and
cultural difference, this age of reason was anxious to exhibit its support for
(religious) toleration. English tracts were already defending it in the 1620s
(Roth 1964: 150–52), Spinoza pleaded for it, John Locke wrote his Epistola
de tolerantia (written in 1666, published in 1688) and took a clear stand on
the Jewish right to equality, Diderot (1713–84) published his Traité de la
tolérance, Voltaire his Traité sur la tolérance (1763), Lessing (who had al-
ready written the play Der Jude in 1754) dramatized it in Nathan the Wise
(1779), and other Deists preached it.47 Writing in the wake of the Revolu-
tion, the advocates of toleration opposed the Calvinist doctrine of predesti-
nation and advocated liberty of conscience. “It was in the century after
Milton, the century from Bayle to Voltaire, that the intellectual victories of
toleration were won. . . . The wake of the Glorious Revolution produced
the Toleration Act of 1689 and the end of the licensing of press in 1695”
(Worden 1989: 610). Toleration was made possible by the interiorization
of knowledge, the new focus of government studies: difference in beliefs
could be tolerated so long as personal motives and social integrity could be
controlled.
The emergence of the Hebraic as the internal other, i.e., the double, of
the West can be placed at the time when the status of Jews in society was
first debated—at the time of philosophical discussions of toleration, in-
cluding the right of Jews to equality, and practical discussions of naturaliza-
tion, of allowing foreigners, like the Jews, to immigrate to Britain. Here
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theological, millenarian, missionary, civic, and mercantilistic interests con-
verged. One cause of the debates was the fact that certain people from a
particular ethnic group had started identifying themselves as Jews, had
started “imagining” (Benedict Anderson) themselves as inheritors of the
Biblical nation the Protestants admired so much. It was probably first in
England that the West met “real” Jews, that it heard personal claims about
Jewishness. “The English developed an identity as Elect Nation in virtual
ignorance of the Jews; the fantasy of election came from a book. The meta-
phor took shape in a world without Jews; perhaps such are the conditions
for metaphors of national identity: Israel, Arcadia, Arthurian Britain, all
were safely remote. And while it remained unlikely for Englishmen to meet
Arthurian Britons, they did in fact begin to meet Jews in the 1650s. No
longer were the Jews simply history, and though the history remained, the
remnant was not so easily romanticized as the history. And the perception
of that history and its application to national life began to change at a time
when the Jews became a subject of contested inquiry. The sudden atten-
tion came with the agitation in favor of and unofficial re-entry of the Jews
into England in the early 1650s” (Zwicker 1988: 42). Books of Jewish apolo-
getics published in Italy, France, Germany, or England in the first half of
the seventeenth century covered the entire range of issues, from theology
to law and from economy to philosophy. Finally, in 1714 the deist John
Toland (1670–1722) published anonymously the pamphlet Reasons for
Naturalising the Jews in Great Britain and Ireland on the Same Foot with all
Nations; Containing also a Defense of the Jews against All Vulgar Prejudices
in All Countries, where for the first time he “applied a central principle of
European rationalism—the essential oneness of all human nature—to the
case of the Jews” (Katz 1964: 9). His treatise “appears to be an amplified
continuation of the Hebraist-Judicial trend which admired the Jewish Law
as a model for a political constitution, which respected the Jewish past, and
appreciated the social ability of the Jewish people” (Ettinger 1961: 218).
By that time, however, the Elect Nation model had been made redun-
dant by the mechanisms of republican administration of the modern state.
It was also becoming obvious that the rule of the Mosaic code over morality
was incapable of controlling the new reading public. The private ethics of
the merchant and the industrialist had to be justified in a different way—
one that hopefully would also educate the masses of the bourgeois metrop-
olis. The supervision of the bursting public sphere was eventually entrusted
to taste, a technology of conduct rather than belief. This is how the transi-
tion from the politics of faith to that of culture began. This is also how the
legitimacy of conduct and the validity of taste were tested—by applying
these (presumably universal) criteria to those who appeared to be the work-
ing Protestants’ double: those claiming Biblical continuity for themselves,
the Jews.
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Contemporary Jews appeared on the scene of history when, among the
modern adherents of the Jewish faith, certain merchants and intellectuals
started identifying themselves with the people of the Bible, telling Chris-
tians that they were the descendants of the Hebrews. This argument
greatly appealed to the Protestant admiration for the ancient Israelites,
especially their society and morality. At the same time, it made quite ap-
prehensive those Christians who considered themselves the true (and
therefore elect) inheritors of that legacy. The response to the Jewish initia-
tive was correspondingly ambiguous: the promise of assimilation as secular
redemption—acceptance into the secular society as delivery to a worldly
Promised Land. This response enabled the bourgeoisie to achieve two
things: prove their tolerance as well as test its limits. They could prove it by
promising to accept fellow bourgeois of a different religious persuasion;
and they could test it by observing the possible extent and effects of assim-
ilation. The financially emancipated Jewish middle class provided an ideal
test case—that of the other who was already inside, the different but not
the stranger (say, non-European, Muslim, or black). Now the Protestants
discovered in the Jews their double, and started exploring the possibilities
of identity. Could the modern Hebrews overcome their otherness and join
the civilized classes? Could they conduct themselves in a civil manner? If
they could, all the universal claims (about human rights and reason) would
be justified, and would be applicable to, if not mandatory for, everybody
else, from the lower classes to foreigners. This is how Hegel described the
promise of assimilation in 1798: “The subsequent circumstances of the
Jewish people up to the mean, abject, wretched circumstances in which
they still are today, have all of them been simply consequences and elabora-
tions of their original fate. By this fate—an infinite power which they set
over against themselves and could never conquer—they have been mal-
treated and will be continually maltreated until they appease it by the spirit
of beauty and so annul it by reconciliation” (Hegel 1971: 199–200). Secular
redemption would come through the reconciliation that only beauty could
bestow. The Jewish question, the question of civility, was originally one of
tasteful conduct—an experiment in the universality of reason and taste
that would unify the public of the capital above any considerations of pri-
vate interest.
Tolerance, the morality of the conduct of reason, extended the meaning
of interpretation into public lifestyle. “Tolerance is not a particular postu-
late of philosophy, but rather an expression of its principle; tolerance is of
the very essence of philosophy. It expresses the affinity of philosophy and
religion” (Cassirer 1951: 169). What was to be tolerated was the individual
as interpreter, scholar, member of the polity, and Jew; what was not to be
tolerated was imitation (specifically, repetition) of the Greeks. When the
struggle for authority over the normative approaches to tradition moved
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from the Scripture to the rhetorical and artistic uses of language, the late
seventeenth century proceeded to challenge the eminence of the Ancients,
primarily in oratory and poesy, and the Battle of the Books erupted (Rosen
1989).
The onslaught started in France with the first volume of Charles Per-
rault’s Paralleles des ancients et des modernes en ce qui regarde les Arts et les
Sciences (1688–97, 4 vols.) and Fontenelle’s Digression sur les Anciens et les
Modernes (1688). The whole Battle was waged in critical writing, and
through this bellicose exercise the “autonomy of criticism” (Gay 1966: 304)
was achieved. Fontenelle (1657–1757), in his Digression, exemplifies the
confidence of the historical sensibility: essentially we are all equals, he
argues—Greeks, Romans, French; once the Romans were Moderns, one
day we shall be Ancients. “The position of the Moderns, which finally won
out in official circles, elaborated a new relation with the past: the model
was to be no longer Rome, but Paris itself. Louis XIV’s contemporaries
even went so far as to declare themselves classics. Around 1685, they in-
vented the mythology of the ‘Age of Louis XIV,’ to which we subscribe even
today in spite of contemporary historical studies. In doing away with the
obligatory references to Antiquity, the intellectuals of the seventeenth cen-
tury modified their perception of the past: Rome was no longer an essence
that France must reincarnate, but a society of the past which could there-
fore become the target of objective knowledge. Antiquity was transformed
from allegory into knowledge” (Apostolidès 1982: 67). With the same con-
fidence, Richard Bentley (1662–1742), another Modern, would systemati-
cally apply the historico-philological method to a classical text in his A
Dissertation upon the Epistles of Phalaris (1699) and launch classical philol-
ogy by using only internal evidence to prove that an alleged classical docu-
ment was forgery.48 In a parallel development, at the end of the seven-
teenth century Latin was abandoned as a common language of learning,
and the use of ancient genres denounced. The Moderns’ initial interest in
fable turned to the composition of contemporary fables (later to be chris-
tened “novels”) while the discipline of myth took shape as Fontenelle
published De l’origine des fables (written 1690–99, published 1724) and
Perrault the first full-length translation of fairy tales (1697). Thus when
Marcel Detienne asks: “Why is to speak of mythology always, more or less
explicitly, to speak Greek or to be influenced by Greece?” (1986: xi; see also
115, 123), the answer is as follows: because during the Battle, fable turned
from Latin into Greek (namely, myth), as writing was transformed from
classical to Hebraic (namely, literature).
The Battle was proclaimed, defined, and won by the Moderns (who, by
the way, assigned to their opponents the position of the Ancients). While
their argument took the form of philosophy versus taste in France and that
of science versus faith in England, their greatest success on both fronts was
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the substitution of art and literature for piety and faith. In the Battle of the
Books—the first conscious and open conflict in the West of Old and New,
tradition and modernity—the ancient past emerged as past history. Litera-
ture and the arts appeared as modern, and intrinsic interpretation was
deemed the right approach to them while poetics gradually lost its norma-
tive character. Social issues were examined in the context of culture, which
now became of central importance, and the theory of progress was applied
to it; inquiries were made into its operations as questions of education and
creativity centered on the imaginative contributions of literature. Histori-
cal sensibility was on its way to its aesthetic destination. In the aftermath
of the Battle, the Moderns concentrated on new forms of writing that
would evolve toward the discourse of literature (Simonsuuri 1979: 24), and
the Ancients interested themselves more with the scholarly study of antiq-
uity. Paradoxically “not until men had disavowed servitude to the dogma of
Hellenism did the spirit of Hellas reappear” (Burlingame 1920: 194). Once
the dogma of classicism was discredited, the “anastomosis of antiquity,
especially Greek antiquity, with a later age in another country” (Ellmann
1977: 567) became not only possible, but an empowering proposition for
fledging European classes, professions, and nations.
Toleration and its faith in the autonomy of individual reason went
through different phases and tones of relativism: Pierre Bayle’s Diction-
naire historique et critique (1695, 1697; 2 vols.), George Berkeley’s A Trea-
tise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Giambattista
Vico’s Scienza nuova prima (1725; seconda, 1729–30; terza, op. posth.
1744), David Hume’s Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understand-
ing (1748), and Voltaire’s Traité sur la tolérance (1763) represent the
major ones (Kilcullen 1988). From Locke’s “Discourse on Miracles” (1702)
to Hume’s “Of Miracles” (contained in the above collection), the last ves-
tiges of the dogma of revelation were destroyed during the English Deism
controversy of the 1690s, which coincided with the Battle of the Books
(Burns 1981). “The term ‘Deism’ is used to refer specifically to the ‘En-
lightenment philosophy of religion’—the belief that there exists a natural
religion prior to and taking precedence over all religions of revelation,
which declares to man the objective conditions conducive to his happiness,
and in whose observance lies his salvation” (McGrath 1986: 199).
The Deistic critique of revelation, which marked the beginning of mod-
ern theology, was the development of seventeenth-century rational theol-
ogy and was based on the twin pillars of scriptural coherence and natural
reason. Initially the Deists were against religion as a mystery, and tried to
establish Christianity upon a firm pragmatic foundation by demonstrating
its complete rationality. They developed the idea of natural and universal
religion, the religion of reason (Byrne 1989), and defended the absolute
sufficiency of reason as the foundation of all certitude. Since true religion
46 CHAPTER ONE
is natural religion and not any particular one (for example, Christianity),
they felt that each individual can attain truth by the free exercise of his
private judgment, and consequently strongly advocated religious tolera-
tion.49 These positions became more and more liberal. “Although Deism
initially regarded scripture as confirmed by reason, the later Deists sub-
jected scripture to such a devastating critique on the basis of their rational-
ist presuppositions and methods that it became regarded as at best super-
fluous, and at worst open to the superstitious interpretations of the clergy
which had done so much to further their own interests and hinder the
republication of the religion of nature” (McGrath 1986: 202). Between
Locke’s The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures
(1696) and Anthony Collins’ A Discourse of Free-thinking, Occasion’d by
the Rise and Growth of a Sect call’d Free-thinkers (1713), both Scripture
and tradition had been invalidated as sources of authority.
As we have seen, in the socio-political reality created by the Revolution
of 1688, not just new forms of government were required but a new regime
of governance, one that would cultivate a “sensus communis” (to use
Shaftesbury’s title of 1709), an ideology of shared sensibilities (rather than
beliefs) and consent (Herzog 1989). The code of conduct as a self-con-
trolled public expression of refined taste was created to play that supervis-
ing role. For persons of letters as well as journalists “the cultivation and
training of Taste was . . . a problem of great social significance, a proper
understanding of which would lead to saner relation-patterns among the
various members and groups of society” (Aronson 1946: 229). There was a
simultaneous emphasis on harmonious personality and stable social struc-
ture. “The problem of Taste, indeed, was to them an essentially human
problem which most vitally concerned the common man’s attitude to so-
cial conduct and his integrity of character. Problems related to behaviour
were, throughout the eighteenth century, morally determined and Taste
was no exception to the rule” (236).
This development signalled the Hellenization of culture that would last
for about two centuries. Taste thwarted political activism, conduct blunted
antagonism. If the Hebraization of social life worked as atonement for
material concerns (and successes), the Hellenization of culture worked as
redemption of political necessities. We can discern in the latter “an evolu-
tion representative of eighteenth-century thought, from the Augustan em-
phasis on external form, polished conduct, and urbanity, to philosophical
speculation and an increasingly analytical approach to moral problems.
This evolution also coincided with a shift in the social structure of En-
gland, from aristocratic behaviour-patterns . . . to middle-class ideals of
life, their new insistence on the innate moral qualities in man, their hu-
manitarian religion and ‘chearfulness’” (228). In the early eighteenth cen-
tury Joseph Addison and the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury expressed the new
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values of feeling and “moral sentiment,” fully aware that “the new polite-
ness advocated by middle-class writers and journalists demanded not only
external polish, but also sincerity, uprightness, and a realization of positive
social values in human relationships” (229). Taste was here the crucial no-
tion: “It not only became a regulating principle of conduct, but also a moral
obligation” (233). Taste also helped differentiate the sophisticated classes
from those abusing wealth or character. “Not only noblemen were accused
of this lack of ‘true’ Taste, but the common people as well. And that is
quite in the nature of things; for just as the middle classes rediscovered for
themselves the true meaning of Politeness, Good-breeding, and Wit, so
they also took possession of Taste as their sole property” (231). What they
rejected was both “the ‘vulgar’ taste of the ‘multitude’ and the ‘artificial’ or
‘false’ Taste of the aristocracy” (232).
Taste, on which the (Hellenic) community of shared feelings was based,
created the first culture—the culture of characters. Once that was fully
tolerated, the religious authority of interpretation seemed in serious doubt:
how could faith be guaranteed in the public sphere? After the Deist cri-
tique of miracles and mysteries, Spinoza’s project to save the Bible through
enlightened, impartial, personal interpretation could not continue without
a concrete goal different from intuitive faith. Following Hume’s critique,
Biblical reason was dead. An alternative, more rewarding reading had to be
applied, transcending the disciplined restrictions of empiricism or rational-
ism on understanding. Thus the search for intrinsic validity turned from
credibility to beauty: the modernity (and therefore continuing relevance)
of the Bible had to be defended on artistic grounds. The Moderns first
claimed the literary by comparing their works to the ancient ones. The
same had to be done with the Bible, if guaranteeing its authenticity was the
major goal: authority should now become a matter of intrinsic quality. Reli-
gious conservatism ushered aesthetic liberalism as a defense against Deism.
Critical interest in the Bible as literature has been traced to at least the
second half of the seventeenth century: “Robert Boyle’s Some Consider-
ations touching the Style of the Holy Scriptures (1663); Jean Leclerc’s Essai
. . . où l’on tache de montrer en quoi consiste la poésie des Hébreux . . .
(1688); William Nichols’ Conference with a Theist, Part IV (1699); Robert
Jenkin’s Reasonableness and Certainty of the Christian Religion, Book II
(1700); several papers in the Spectator . . . (1712); Henry Felton’s Disserta-
tion on Reading the Classics (1713); The Creation. A Pindarick Illustration
of a Poem, Originally written by Moses. With a Preface to Mr. Pope, concern-
ing the Sublimity of the Ancient Hebrew Poetry (1720); Charles Gildon’s
Laws of Poetry (1721); Fénelon’s Dialogues Concerning Eloquence (1718);
Calmet’s Dictionnaire . . . de la Bible (1722–24); A. Blackwell’s Sacred Clas-
sics defended and illustrated (1725)—these were but a few of the many
works known to English readers in which . . . the style of the Scriptures was
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analyzed, its Oriental character demonstrated, and its superiority to the
classical style proclaimed in no uncertain terms” (Crane 1922: 33–34).50 As
the search for the fundamentals of beauty gradually jelled into the inquiry
of aesthetics, the discourses of interpretation, relieved from the burden of
textual concerns which philological scholarship was happily assuming, took
the form of literary criticism. It all happened in a relatively few years, fol-
lowing the storm over Hume’s “Of Miracles”: Robert Lowth’s De Sacra
poesi Hebraeorum . . . (1753), Alexander Baumgarten’s Aesthetica (1750,
1758; 2 vols.), Johann Winckelmann’s Thoughts on the Imitation of the
Painting and Sculpture of the Greeks (1755), and Edmund Burke’s A Philo-
sophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beauti-
ful (1756). If the qualities of the new writing style, literature, were first
defended in comparisons with ancient works, the principles of the new
interpretive approach, the discipline51 of literary criticism, were first tested
on the Bible.52
Lowth is credited primarily with the discovery of parallelism, the struc-
turing principle of Biblical meter, which he examined in terms of intrinsic
consistency (rather than Renaissance scansion or Augustan diction, as was
the current practice) and presented as the essence of the poetic dialectic
between thought and expression, words and sense, structure and mean-
ing.53 His was a very attractive picture of the text: “In the post-Lowthian
revival of Hebraism . . . the dialectical pattern of the Bible became central
to Romantic theories of inspiration” (Prickett 1986: 178). Approaching the
Bible as poetry was the epistemological shift that made Lowth’s insight
possible: the search for literary qualities always recovers distinctive fea-
tures. Neo-classical taste had found much to admire in the Bible. “The
loftiest form of praise, the tribute of stylistic superiority to or parity with
classical literature, is affirmed repeatedly” (Baroway 1933: 465).54 But
Lowth was the first to treat the Bible as literature (and probably to write
the first work of both literary criticism and literary history) by construct-
ing, according to the “Preface” of the English translation, “a system of
criticism” and a “compendium of critical science,” complete with all “THE
GREAT PRINCIPLES OF GENERAL CRITICISM.”
The system was based on the first systematic philological comparison of
Biblical and Greek writing, and the expressive economy of the two lan-
guages. Lowth rejected the rhetorical approach to the Bible and analyzed
its style, rather than tropes and figures, moving from typology to poetics.
He avoided theological and factual questions, and concentrated on formal
analysis and aesthetic merit. He also appropriated prophecy for poetry by
showing, in some of the best discussions of parallelism, the artistic charac-
ter of the prophetic books and arguing that they were divine poetry. Con-
versely, poetry was the natural form of prophetic expression. In his book,
Biblical criticism moved from revelation to poetry, from rhetorical analysis
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to literary study. “Lowth’s work inaugurated a critical revolution. Not
merely did the Bible give a new authority for the prophetic status of the
poet as the transformer of society and the mediator of divine truth, but it
was also stylistically taken as a model both of naturalness and sublimity”
(Prickett 1986: 110). By the time William Blake (1757–1827) outlined his
idea of “Genius,” the Bible as model for poetry and the role of the poet as
prophet were fully established.
Lowth, though, was still devising rules of taste and virtue, thinking, like
many of his contemporaries (for example, Rollin in the first volume of his
studies), in terms of the importance of poetry for religion and exalting it
because its true “office and destination” was serving God. A certain reli-
gious polemic informed his entire project. It is therefore important to note
that “Lowth’s concentration on the literal meaning of the text as a docu-
ment from a particular concrete historical situation can be seen as less an
attempt to abolish the old style of typological and mystical readings, than
to put such readings on a sounder scholarly basis—to combat Deist attacks
on the authenticity of the Bible in general” (124–25). Between his parallel-
ism of syntactical units and Herder’s “parallelism of heaven and earth” (in
The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry), the intervention of Winckelmann contrib-
uted to the complete liberation of the aesthetic. For Winckelmann, the
aesthetic did not serve or promote religion—it was the new religion; and it
was also (like History and myth before it) Greek.55
Developments in Germany, “the belated nation” (Helmuth Plessner),
where the socio-political circumstances of emancipation were very differ-
ent, followed another path. “The experiential fervor of the German Refor-
mation had given way to a Protestant orthodoxy in which assent to truth in
propositional form was the primary trait. Faith in revelation meant assent
to statements which had been given in an infallible form in Scripture. At
the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, this orthodoxy was
under attack from two directions, Pietism and the Enlightenment” (Tal-
bert 1970: 4). The former emphasized personal commitment, living faith,
piety, and the saving power of grace. “At its best, the movement generally
known as pietism may be regarded as a reaction on the part of a living faith
against the empty formulae of [Lutheran] Orthodoxy” (McGrath 1986:
169). It saw the community of the faithful as a “priesthood of all believers,”
the visible church of the elect, with a sense of social responsibility. More
than just a religious credo, “Pietism meant simply the penetration of me-
thodically controlled and supervised, thus of ascetic, conduct into the non-
Calvinistic denominations” (Weber 1976: 132). Under the Calvinist
Hohenzollerns, it became the official Prussian faith (Hsia 1989).
While Pietism stressed personal inwardness and experience, placing the
individual above dogma and authority, the German Enlightenment too
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questioned the validity of revelation for natural theology. Under the influ-
ence of the former, the latter became much more conservative than the
English Deism or the French natural religion, seeking to establish the tran-
scendental foundation of religion. German Deism was dominated by the
Leibnizian doctrine of harmony and the Wolffian principle of similarity
between revelation and reason (Cassirer 1951: 175–76). “The German The-
ists started from conscience and tried to prove the Deity by the inward
revelation of the moral law as it speaks in the bosom of men; and they
invoked the authority of Cartesianism as developed by Leibniz, and set
forth and commented upon by Wolff, which appealed to the innate idea of
a Deity as the strongest proof of its existence” (Karl Hillebrand, quoted in
Pelli 1979: 15), thus protecting the character of Lutheranism. They often
defended the Bible from French and English Deist criticisms, since their
purpose was to support and strengthen, not discredit or destroy it. “Indeed,
German Enlightenment did develop a scientific school of biblical criticism
whose intentions were serious and constructive” (Pelli 1979: 16). Attacking
the law of positive religions, they concentrated on morality instead. For the
German Deists (as for Kant later), religion is the recognition of human
duties as divine commands.
In its German Deist appropriation, reason was transformed from a theo-
logical into a philosophical category. “There appears to have been a general
and unquestioned assumption that man’s higher consciousness is a con-
stant quantity. In other words, reason was assumed to be a constant, un-
varying and universally distributed conglomerate of moral and spiritual
convictions, essentially independent of the historical and cultural situation
of the rational individual” (McGrath 1986: 209). This principle found its
most comprehensive expression in Wolff’s philosophy of “sufficient rea-
son.” In his Theologia naturalis methodo scientifica pertractata (1739),
Christian Wolff (1679–1754) tries to show that the claims of reason and
revealed religion are absolutely compatible and mutually supportive,
adopting Leibniz’s teleology of harmony. “In the system of Christian Wolff
there is no sharp differentiation between the content of faith and that of
knowledge, between revelation and reason. The claims of both are to be
carefully balanced and exactly determined” (Cassirer 1951: 175). Despite
this effort, philosophical reason was no longer investing in an unshakable
faith. “Wolff had indeed succeeded in reconciling faith and reason for his
generation and in making traditional Christian insights relevant once
more. At the same time, however, he had shifted the ultimate criterion of
the validity of religious insights from revelation to reason; he had substi-
tuted a natural ethic for a revealed ethic; and he had virtually transformed
man’s interest in eternal salvation into mere desire for temporal happiness.
Theology had, in fact, become anthropology, and in the process whole
areas covered by traditional Christian theology had been set aside as irrele-
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vant and meaningless for modern man. In the course of German theologi-
cal development it was the so-called Neologists who adopted this radical
alternative, disseminating their theological reductionism from lecture halls
and pulpits alike” (Stoeffler 1973: 238–39). A revisionary trend was chal-
lenging the principles of belief, again on a textual basis.
The interpretation of the Bible was an integral part of the project of the
German Enlighteners. Under pressure from English empiricism and later
inspired by Spinoza’s Biblical criticism, and caught in the often violent
clash between orthodox Lutheranism and Pietism, they established Biblical
hermeneutics as a discipline, sometimes known by the name attributed to
it by its opponents: Neologism. “They attempted to resolve the conflict
between reason and revelation by historicizing both. The name of the
movement derisively called Neology was to free the study of religion from
its subservience to either dogmatics or coherent analysis. The Neologists
incorporated many of the rationalist critiques without sacrificing Chris-
tianity” (Reill 1975: 81–82). They emphasized the collective, historical, and
cultural origin of the Bible as a collection of books; they examined acts of
composition, understanding, and transmission; they dealt with the Scrip-
ture as sacred poetry, and highlighted its moral authority (81–87); and they
also traced in it historical origins of human customs and institutions. It was
the rise of Neology that made Pietism harden its position in the second half
of the eighteenth century, and even ally itself with the declining Orthodoxy
to oppose what they both saw as an Enlightenment threat against the in-
tegrity and authority of revelation. The rationalists’ emphasis on practical
reason, natural ethic, and conduct seemed to destroy the fabric of a theol-
ogy based on grace and redemption. Pietism reacted strongly to the pursuit
of secular rewards by the new classes. “Its leaders, supported by the remain-
ing Orthodoxists, now stood resolutely against the autonomy of the human
spirit and for biblical revelation as final authority for faith and life; against
a natural ethic and for a revealed ethic; against the reduction of Christian
theology to reasonable principles of human conduct and for the biblical
affirmations about God’s redemptive activity; . . . against the shallow eu-
daemonism which had begun to dominate Western man’s private and cor-
porate life and for the reality of the eschatological dimension of human
existence, which makes happiness the ultimate, not the immediate, goal of
the salvatory process” (Stoeffler 1973: 242). Some intellectuals tried to rec-
oncile reason with (Shaftesbury’s) sentiment, especially friendship (phila-
delphic Pietism). Despite these reactions, however, fears were exaggerated,
since the German Enlightenment was never radical enough to undermine
belief with skepticist arguments. After all “secularism, antithetical to or-
thodoxy as well as theocracy, is itself a religious category derived from bib-
lical values” (Zelechow 1990: 35). As Marx and Nietzsche would complain
later, for specific historical reasons German secularism never overcame its
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religious identity. “That the Aufklärung developed in a theological manner
to an extent absent from its English counterpart is generally considered to
reflect the different political situations in the two countries. In England,
the movement of free inquiry had assumed a political nature which was
impossible for its German equivalent, so that the movement was obliged to
assert itself in the field of literature and the humanities. Thus the common
ideas which found political expression in England could only find cultural
and religious expression in Germany. The Aufklärung is particularly nota-
ble for its transference of this political understanding of the nature and
function of the secular State to the religious context (i.e., God), so that
God was effectively ‘modelled’ on the newly-emerging understandings of
the State” (McGrath 1986: 213). The Germans were the first Protestants to
experience the challenges of belated modernity: they modernized without
having either the discourse or the institutions that guarantee the rites of
interpretation, the civil covenant of the bourgeois regime of truth. Identity
and unity, rather than cohesion and stability, were their major concerns.
The works of Georg Friedrich Händel (1685–1759) and J. S. Bach (1685–
1750), in their contrasts of structure and function, show how different
these concerns could be.
The Aufklärung was a bürgerlich movement of professionally and cultur-
ally prominent groups which sought to reform the body politic by working
within the system and without destroying the Ständestaat tradition. It may
be characterized as “an intellectual movement formed by the conjunction
of three elements: the legacy of Leibnizian philosophy, the Ständestaat
tradition, and the Protestant religious revival generated by the appearance
of Pietism. Primarily it was bourgeois in spirit, critical of absolutism, op-
posed to attitudes associated with the court, but not revolutionary in na-
ture. Its intellectual center was the university and its leading proponents
were drawn primarily from the professional classes” (Reill 1975: 7–8). Its
members abhorred revolution, and wanted simultaneously to liberalize the
corporate order and rescue religion from bankruptcy. “The German En-
lightenment did not produce an Adam Smith, a Montesquieu, a Rousseau.
It read these authors but its most original contribution to social theory lay
not so much in economics and politics as in, surprisingly, aesthetics.
Where English and French thought concentrated on the study of civil soci-
ety and the state, German thought concerned itself with the life of con-
sciousness” (Feenberg 1973: 41). It sought the independence and salvation
of the individual, whom it placed above society (but not the government),
and it envisioned a science of humanity where the disciplines of religion,
history, and aesthetics would prevail. “The notion of redemption as intel-
lectual liberation is characteristic of the Aufklärung” (McGrath 1986: 225).
Redemption from sin does not come through faith but through moral
perfection.
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Within this bourgeoisie there existed a group which was unique in West
European countries: the Bildungsbürgertum—the cultural bourgeoisie
with a university education who held privileged positions within the state
apparatus and the institutions of national culture. The classical education
of Bildung distinguished the cultural from the industrial bourgeoisie.
Since culture was the highest expression of German identity, the Bildungs-
bürgertum was the cultural aristocracy of the nation, and its mission above
all patriotic.56 This bourgeois group dominated the public sphere but was
dependent on state office (including education apparatus). The identifica-
tion of the “unfree professions” (Jarausch 1990) with the German ideology
was too close to allow them to create any other social alliances or espouse
liberalism like the progressive intelligentsias of France and England.57
What distinguished their social project was the increasing importance of
aesthetic considerations: “Except for the most unabashed proponent of
modern superiority, the problem of excellence of ancient art, to say noth-
ing of the meaning of Holy Scripture, called for a study of the relation of art
to science, of the understanding each conveys, and of their connection with
the milieu in which they were formed. This became a historical problem
touching the core of the triad past-present-future. Aesthetics was forced to
incorporate historical problems into its scope. If aesthetics is given its most
general meaning . . . then the affinity between history and aesthetics be-
comes apparent. The Aufklärers were aware of this affinity, as well as of the
importance of both disciplines for the study of religion, and combined
ideas drawn from all three disciplines; all three—history, aesthetics, and
religion—showed a deep concern with the questions of the meaning of
language, poetry, myth, metaphor, and artistic representation” (Reill 1975:
59–60). They believed in the possibility of progress and education for the
nation and the human race through art and knowledge. It was in their
discourse that moral considerations changed to artistic appreciations, that
the objects of taste rather than its practices assumed greater importance,
that the critical rather than the emotional faculties gained priority. The
German “taste-bearing stratum” (Levin Schücking) had no use for rhetoric
or the public contests of eloquence and character. They historicized reason
and revelation, strongly emphasizing the importance of individual auton-
omy and national uniqueness. “The plea for freedom for the creative
human spirit to develop to its full range is one of the outstanding preoccu-
pations of eighteenth-century Germany. If the form it took tended to be
generally cultural, this does not make the ideal any the less politically and
socially relevant. It does not seem to be out of harmony with the idea of
reform from above, but it is accompanied by a strong distaste for social
disorder and upheaval. The idealist and non-revolutionary path was the
one taken, to a greater or lesser extent, by most major German thinkers”
(Menhennet 1973: 20). Envisioning a “beneficent revolution” (Wieland)
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through persuasive reason and non-violent constitutional transformation,
they desired a republican form of government. Reformists, those civil ser-
vants who were liberal, well-educated, and cultivated, and who aspired to
protect the Ständestaat by transforming it into a Bildungsstaat, competed
among themselves over who understood Spinoza best and who liked Jews
most.
Although the Deists often presented Biblical religion as a local law whose
validity was limited to its ethnic constituency and time, when they drew
similarities with their gospel of morality, they still honored this national
religion more than others for its prefigurement of the natural religion of
reason. German maskilim, the Westernizing intelligentsia who were look-
ing for ways of combining their traditional heritage with the secular de-
mands of modernity, recognized a great potential there: “Affiliated in one
way or another with Jewish tradition—this applies especially to the Hebrew
enlighteners—they considered deism as a new movement aiming at a re-
vival rather than the destruction of religion. In it the maskilim saw religion
coming to terms with the demands of the new era of the European Enlight-
enment, an era based on reason and science, and dedicated to tolerance”
(Pelli 1979: 18). This development could solve many internal conflicts be-
tween tradition and modern life within their own society.58 Like those pro-
ponents of the German Enlightenment who hoped to liberalize the rule of
the state through the law of the nation, the maskilim hoped to moderate
the law of tradition through the rule of culture. The historical compromise
was reached in the work of Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86), who sacrificed
revelation in order to preserve the cultural specificity and communal au-
thority of the Law. Confident in its deeper enlightened character, he ra-
tionalized orthodox Judaism, assuming that, while law was its determining
principle, conduct was the essence of all religion. The philosopher whom
Heine called the “Socrates of our time” was the great cultural mediator.
“Mendelssohn attempted to build a bridge between the Jewish culture,
which seemed to be declining in Germany, and the powerful, influential,
and tempting general culture of the time, the latter playing a decisive role
in the eclipse of the former. It was a two-way bridge” (20). Jews could feel
more comfortable with Gentile culture, and the Enlightenment could un-
derstand its Jewish character better. The way to achieve this was to sacri-
fice ethnic particularity for a universal claim—to argue that the mission of
Judaism was to teach the whole world the natural religion of the God of
reason. Mendelssohn’s translation of the Pentateuch into German, a repe-
tition of Luther’s founding gesture, was only one of his many moves in this
direction.
Mendelssohn had to deal with strong feelings of unease and impatience
within his own community. “Already in 1771 there was published [in Lon-
don] the first demand to change the Jewish law according to the conditions
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dictated by time and place” (27).59 Internal discussions on reform revolved
around halakhah, the Oral Law which regulated community life: What was
the proper relation between Oral and Written Law? (Was it possible to
save the Written as an expression of reason and then sacrifice the Oral as
something local that has been superseded? Or was it possible to preserve
the Oral simply as an ethnic law?) What was the correct connection be-
tween tradition and revelation, reason and practice, religion and education,
faith and culture? Two centuries later, Derrida would blame the antino-
mies of these questions on Hellenic thought.
The maskilim, like the Deists, concentrated on moral reform; but unlike
the Deists they could not afford to ignore the dimension of experience,
since the legal system of Judaism was closely connected with daily life. For
them, questions of law, authority, and governance had double urgency,
both internal and external. They pursued them passionately in magazines,
schools, salons, intellectual societies. Thus they were confronted with the
highest stakes in modernity, the subject of all debates in the cultural spaces
of the public sphere—the relation between interpretation and emancipa-
tion: What is the liberatory promise of the independent and enlightened
reason? What are the rules of understanding? What are the confines of
individual ethical action? What is the nomos of autonomy? “When the
change came, therefore, at the close of the seventeenth century it was a
total ‘philosophical revolution which changed the whole concept of Nature
and its operations,’ initiating modern ‘rationalism’ and rejecting biblical
fundamentalism. The final victory that liberated nature from biblical fun-
damentalism came on the one side from German pietists and English
deists (the heirs of the Protestant heretics of the seventeenth century), and
on the other from Descartes and his universal ‘mechanical’ laws of nature”
(Tambiah 1990: 90). The capitalist solution to the quest for autonomy was
the differentiation of society, the creation of separate spheres of feeling
and activity with their own relative independence. It was the sphere of
public morality, inheritor to the visions of community, that adopted the
Hebraic as its model, while the sphere of culture, the successor of the prac-
tices of taste, proclaimed its Hellenic aspirations.
AESTHETIC FAITH
A discussion entitled “Hebrews and Hellenes,” which introduces the first
chapter of the first volume of an “interpretation” of the Enlightenment,
defines as follows the period’s dualist view of history: “As the Enlighten-
ment saw it, the world was, and had always been divided between ascetic,
superstitious enemies of the flesh, and men who affirmed life, the body,
knowledge, and generosity; between mythmakers and realists, priests and
philosophers. Heinrich Heine, wayward son of the Enlightenment, would
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later call these parties, most suggestively, Hebrews and Hellenes” (Gay
1966: 33). This may not be an inappropriate exaggeration. During the sec-
ond half of the eighteenth century, and while the last part of the Battle of
the Books was belatedly taking place in Germany, the middle class for the
first time began to debate explicitly and at length its mission and options
in terms of the Hebraic-Hellenic polarity. Heinrich Heine (1797–1856)
discovered the polarity in Ludwig Börne (1786–1837); his contemporary
Samuel David Luzzatto (1800–65) considered Abrahamism (or Judaism)
superior to Atticism; together they gave universal meaning to the old com-
parison of (Greek) flowers with (Jewish) fruit (Judah Halevi).60 The emer-
gence of classical scholarship, following the triumph of the Moderns and
the invention of History at the turn of the seventeenth century, made pos-
sible a systematic and concentrated interest in Greek culture itself. With
the opposition of Rationalism and Pietism to ancient thought,61 however,
Greek writing and art had remained subordinate to Latin or ignored
(Trevelyan 1941: 1–12), with only the manuals of fables for artists and the
handbooks of mythology for versifiers available as sources of information
about the period. “Greek literature was generally considered inferior to
Latin; in German schools and universities Greek was studied primarily as
the language of the New Testament” (Hatfield 1943: 3–5; see also Hatfield
1964: 8). At the same time, after the Battle of the Books distanced antiq-
uity from the present, historical knowledge (primarily of Greece) became
an attractive project for the exploration of the origins of Western identity.
In short, the possibility of Greece, of its “discovery” as a real place, was
there, but nothing guaranteed that it should happen. The philological skills
required for this exploration, already in use in Biblical studies, did not
flourish in England. “Although Bishop Lowth’s De sacra poesi Hebraeorum
and his commentary on Isaiah exercised some influence, they did not suc-
ceed in establishing a historical or literary-critical tradition of the Biblical
writings in the author’s native land” (Frei 1974: 151).62 The reason may be
sought in the factual direction that Deism gave to the question of Biblical
historical accuracy: the ensuing search for external evidence that would
prove the truth of the text had no use for the close analysis of textual
meaning. Philological skills found a much more fertile ground in German
Neo-humanist scholarship (Gesner, Ernesti, Christ, Caylus).
Reactions to the excesses of late baroque and the artificiality of French
rococo were fired by the enthusiasm over the excavations at Herculaneum,
Paestum, and Pompeii. In response to calls for a revival of the Greek archi-
tectural orders in the first half of the eighteenth century, David Le Roy
published Les ruines des plus beaux monuments de la Grèce (1758). The rule
of ornament was challenged by the order of style. Now balance was deemed
more conducive to civility than elegance. In the second half of the century,
British fascination with the reality of the historical Greece began, espe-
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cially after the success of The Antiquities of Athens, Measured and Deline-
ated (4 vols., 1762–1830), where James Stuart and Nicholas Revett pub-
lished the drawings of Greek remains they produced during their expedi-
tion to the country (1751–53). The famous expedition was sponsored by
The Society of Dilettanti (established in 1732), a group of young aristo-
crats who had made the Grand Tour. What attracted the British to Hellen-
ism was travel and a taste for cultural exoticism. The Tour could now be
extended to include a new, more ancient (if not alternative), unexplored
territory.
Indeed, the recovered treasures, from architectural models to the Elgin
(Parthenon) Marbles, put on public display in 1807, did not disappoint
anyone. But British interest did not extend much beyond experiments in
taste. “Meanwhile the Germans were approaching the shrine by a different
road. Like the English, they enjoyed speaking of Hellas in religious lan-
guage, but in the manner less of pilgrims than of visionaries” (Jenkyns
1980: 13). They turned to the Hellenic ideal with such exultation that they
refused to taint it with any experience. Winckelmann, Schiller, Hölderlin,
Hegel, and Nietzsche never visited Greece, while Lord Charlemont, Robert
Wood, Byron, James Flecker, and John Symonds, like Gérard de Nerval,
Alphonse de Lamartine, Théophile Gautier, Gustave Flaubert, and Le Cor-
busier from France, and Americans from Herman Melville to James Merrill,
did. (In general, it is also interesting how few novels are set in Greece,
ancient or modern. Bourgeois interiority has not found the land hospita-
ble.) During his visit to Italy, which provided him with his first direct expe-
rience of Greek art, Goethe “received a proposal from the Duke of Waldeck
which affected him as a threatening temptation: a visit to Greece. Goethe’s
reaction was by no means a serene one; he even expressed terror when he
wrote: ‘Once one takes it upon oneself to go out into the world and enters
into close interaction with it, one has to be very careful not to be swept
away in a trance, or even to go mad. I am not able to speak a single word at
the moment’ (28th March 1787). Walter Rehm was the first to realise that
this holy terror of Greece—a kind of prohibitive fear of contact—was a
typically German phenomenon at that period. Whereas the French and the
English were more and more eager to get to Athens, scarcely one of the
German philhellenes set foot on Greek soil. This is not only true of Goethe,
Humboldt and even Hölderlin, but also of the German architects. . . .
Rehm comments on this shying away from direct contact with Hellenic
reality which had been idealised and mythicised to the point of refusing to
visit the place: ‘One has the impression that all of them had willingly made
this strange renunciation’” (Vogt 1986: 172). It took a businessman’s literal
reading of Homer in the 1870s, monumentalized in Heinrich Schliemann’s
recovery of Troy from the hill of Hisarlik, to make the Germans consider
the possibility of an encounter with the place.
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In Germany, the theological need for ever-richer Biblical comparisons in
the early eighteenth century encouraged the literary-historical quest that
would eventually develop into the parallel fields of hermeneutics and aes-
thetics. “Hermeneutical developed together with historical-critical litera-
ture” (Frei 1974: 158). The synthesis of the two must be credited to the
discipline of philology, the science of the antiquity of texts. “In the Ger-
man states in 1770–1810, we witness a profound turn away from the Altphi-
lologie as a discipline of text criticism and restoration and the emergence
of a genuinely hermeneutic, interpretive philology as a comprehensive dis-
cipline aiming at the disclosure of a historical, cultural totality” (Leventhal
1986: 248). If literary criticism tutored secular reading in discrimination,
philology undertook to authenticate and integrate its objects of study. “In
the beginning, there was philology. As the keystone of law and ethics, and
also of history and the history of art, stood the study of language and of
literature. Never has further-reaching importance been attributed to liter-
ary texts, especially to founding literary texts. . . . And never has literary
commentary appropriated with such confidence the right to apply its con-
clusions to other domains, even to assume that textuality was at the center
of all knowledge. The philological science, as it was defined by its founders
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was an intellectual
totality, a world unto itself, the study of language redefined to give philolo-
gists access to the essence of nations. In particular, philology was the sci-
ence of antiquity, the tool German scholars would use to rehabilitate an-
tiquity and reveal the Greeks as the standard for beauty, grandeur, and
national genius” (DeJean 1989: 203–4). Philology is the branch of Protes-
tant interpretation which, once emancipated from theology, turned to the
study of a new object of knowledge, (pagan) antiquity. In it, the original
exercise of reading reached the systematic articulation of a field.
German Hellenism both defined and served bourgeois cultural ideals in
a comprehensive way: it portrayed a land of pure Western descent; it coun-
tered Pietist asceticism with Puritan stoicism; it provided an antidote to
French skepticism and British empiricism; it integrated leisure in Protes-
tant morality; it counterproposed democratic enjoyment to aristocratic
taste; it outlined the conditions of healthy individualism; and it ennobled
the project of a national culture. It is this last ideal that held the greatest
urgency. What has been said about literature can be generalized about all
the arts: “The movement of German authors in the eighteenth century to
found a German national literature becomes, as the century enters its sec-
ond half, increasingly a battle they are obliged to wage on two fronts at
once: for beyond the need to establish a basis for works distinctively na-
tional in character, it appears in addition that some way must be found to
create literature at all” (Morton 1982: 41). The national and the cultural, as
they are still understood today, were produced together, verifying and sup-
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porting each other. It is in Germany that culture becomes a conscious
project, a means of resistance as well as legitimation, of national differenti-
ation as well as superiority. When it came to internal understandings of
community life, the Biblical model was still the most meaningful; but when
it was time to “imagine” a national culture, intellectuals looked at Greece.
“The intense concern with Greece can usefully be understood as a response
to a German crisis of identity. The century from 1660 to 1760 saw the rise
of France as a ‘new Rome’ apparently capable of absorbing all Europe”
(Bernal 1986: 14). France could proudly exhibit the glories of its court, arts,
and reason. In order to surpass the Latinity of these royal codes, German
poets, critics, and historians concentrated increasingly on Rome’s prede-
cessor. “Thus while Germany could not become a new Rome she could be
a new Hellas” (14). If the Reformation had moved above the Catholic es-
tablishment back to the originals of religion, the Aufklärung returned
above the Latin system to the origins of art. And if the Reformation played
Jerusalem opposite to Rome’s Athens, Germany now was ready to play
Athens opposite to France’s Rome.
Both the bourgeois ideals and the national aspirations found their most
eloquent defense in the work of Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717–68),
who defined the “humanity of the Greeks” and advocated it as a cultural
model. Winckelmann constructed a complete, total picture of Greece: he
made of it a coherent, luminous, organic whole—an aesthetic ideal incor-
porating moral, cultural, and political elements. To this effect, he scruti-
nized artworks with minute care and historical sensitivity. He understood
questions of origin, growth, change, and decline in terms of stylistic evolu-
tion: “Winckelmann’s most significant and lasting achievement was to pro-
duce a thorough, comprehensive and lucid chronological account of all
antique art—but chiefly sculpture—including that of the Egyptians and
the Etruscans. No one had done this before” (Haskell and Penny 1981:
101). While his predecessors in the first half of the century had re-pre-
sented Greece, Winckelmann narrated it, gave it a story of development.
He classified artworks by date, rather than iconography, according to (in-
trinsic) stylistic criteria, and established for the first time successive stages
of art. Although he analyzed mainly sculpture, his approach was primarily
literary: for example, he discussed mythology as an intricate web of allego-
ries, bringing allegory back from typology into aesthetics and inaugurating
a critical interest in it that was still paramount for Walter Benjamin, Paul
de Man, or Stephen Greenblatt.63
His was a major reinterpretation of antiquity. In Germany, before
Winckelmann, differentiating between Roman and Greek was an insignifi-
cant concern: they belonged together to humankind’s ancient past. Not
only did he distinguish between the two, but also defended forcefully the
overwhelming superiority of the latter. Until then, the ancient appeal was
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moral and juridical; the new Greek inspiration became aesthetic. More im-
portantly, he established the Greek difference in all respects, not only from
the Roman but also from the contemporary world. “It was Winckelmann
who first insisted that Greek sculpture of the finest period was a product of
the very highest excellence, brought about under geographical, political
and religious circumstances which could never be recreated” (104). A sense
of irrevocable separation was again effected: “As reverence for the Greeks
increased, so too did awareness of our distance from them” (104). This was
already obvious to Friedrich Schlegel, who noted in 1798: “The systematic
Winckelmann who read all the ancients as if they were a single author, who
saw everything as a whole and concentrated all his powers on the Greeks,
provided the first basis for a material knowledge of the ancients through
his perception of the absolute difference between ancient and modern”
(Schlegel 1971: 181).
Winckelmann treated art as a social phenomenon, and its style as the
expression of a specific culture. Like Lowth, he connected art and culture,
style and society organically. In his work, the independent aesthetic found
its first full articulation and justification. The project of interpretation out-
lined by Spinoza reached here an apolitical conclusion: criticism was ap-
plied to secular, not religious, beauty; and that beauty did not serve religion
but constituted (a new) one. This love of pure beauty, however, was not
just a cult of “a noble simplicity and tranquil grandeur” but also an exuber-
ant celebration of the leisure deserved for the cultivated few. From Winck-
elmann’s celebration of ecstatic delight in his “Essay on the Capacity of
the Perception of Beauty in Art” (1763) to Roland Barthes’ self-consuming
hedonism in The Pleasure of the Text (1973), leisure has been perceived as
a typically Greek vice and (effeminate) privilege, scolded and envied by the
Protestant work ethic. Winckelmann interconnected ethical and aesthetic
judgment, subordinating religious experience to aesthetic revelation. Thus
interpretation matured in the worship of autonomous beauty when the
independence of the aesthetic was consecrated in/as Greek culture. Where
Spinoza saw Hebrew polity as a community, Winckelmann treated the
Greek polis as an organism; whereas the former described a community of
interpreters, the latter depicted the Greeks as the aesthetic people—the
ones to be interpreted.
And interpreted they were, and still are. “The German Enlightenment
looks rather to Greece, an interest which follows from the aesthetic con-
cerns of its philosophy. The integral community, which increasingly
emerges as a lost utopia in the bourgeois era, is reflected artistically in its
happiest form in Homer. The epics of ancient Greece are the epiphany of
a civilization perfect of its kind, a civilization of a total man and the har-
monious community, not yet touched by the corrosive forces of division
of labor and commercialization. In analyzing this epic world, German
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thought goes far beyond the narrow concept of virtue to lay the basis for a
dialectics of consciousness. . . . The theory of epic literature develops as a
reflection on the conditions and nature of human community, a reflection
which corresponds in the Germany of the time with an increasing anxiety
over the consequences of the unleashing of private self-interest by capital-
ism” (Feenberg 1973: 42–43). The Greece of Winckelmann is the inte-
grated civilization of the lost Eden which inspires Lukács’ nostalgia, as well
as the idolatrous threat haunting Auerbach’s vision of the promised read-
ing. (It was Winckelmann, after all, who in 1755, with his Thoughts on the
Imitation of the Painting and Sculpture of the Greeks, made mimesis, Auer-
bach’s topic, a central concern for aesthetics.) Eutopia or dystopia, Hellas
has remained the Alien (as opposed to the Hebrew Other or the non-Euro-
pean Barbarian) of modern (that is, post-Reformation) thought: the pres-
ence of the past, the periphery of the center, the leisure of culture, the male
of the female, the physics of metaphysics, the polis of politics.
The imitation of the Hellenic in Hebraic modernity soon became the
central educational concern of the period. Even by the time of Heidegger’s
reading of the Presocratics or Auerbach’s interpretation of Homer, the
question had not lost its urgency: If the gap of History is understood in
terms of the ancient (Hellenic) and the modern (Hebraic), what is the
burden of that past on the responsibility of this present? If interpretation
is Biblical, what are the limits of the emancipation it promises? Who or
what deserves autonomy in an emancipated world? What is the difference
between imitation and assimilation (Gombrich 1966)? Winckelmann’s
contemporaries were already alarmed by the appeal of his artistic hedonism
among the bourgeois.64 The Hebraic opposition to his proposal for a secular
democratic faith in humanism was soon articulated. The theologian Frie-
drich Gottlieb Klopstock (1724–1803) aspired to become the “Christian
Homer” by writing, along with Biblical dramas, Messias (1748–73), the
pietist epic of the life of Christ in Greek hexameters; he outlined his plans
for a German intellectual elite in Die deutsche Gelehrtenrepublik (1774), a
treatise intended to counter what he perceived as the growing Helleniza-
tion of the upper middle class.
The young Hegel, in Part Two (1795–96) of “The Positivity of the Chris-
tian Religion,” still felt the importance of the ultimate question for na-
tional rejuvenation raised by Klopstock in his ode “The Hill and the Grove”
(1767): “Is Achaea, then, the Teutons’ fatherland?” He responded that
“what the poet cried to his people in relation to Greek mythology could be
said both to him and his nation with just as much right in relation to the
Jewish; they could be asked: Is Judaea, then, the Teutons’ fatherland?”
(Hegel 1971: 149). The dilemma had attracted his attention since his uni-
versity years, as indicated by the paper “On Some Advantages which the
Reading of Ancient Classical Greek and Roman Writers Secures for Us”
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(1788): “The first hint of an explicit contrast between the two heritages of
Achaea and Judaea in his mind is to be found in his claim that, in virtue of
the constancy of human nature, the study of our classical heritage will en-
able us ‘to explain more naturally and make more comprehensible a great
deal of the culture, the habits, the customs, and the usages of the people of
Israel, who have had, and still have, so much influence upon us’” (Harris
1972: 77). In a society losing its faith to materialism, the Hellenic path
seemed an appropriate training in the respect for morality and a better
understanding of its socio-cultural basis. As Mendelssohn had already sug-
gested in his Jerusalem (1783), the study of the ancients could serve a bet-
ter understanding of Israel. Until his last college year, “Hegel remained true
to the programme of using classical sources to enlighten the study of the
Judaic tradition, which he announced at the outset of his university stud-
ies” (117). His later philosophy is full of revisions and sublimations of this
project.
The use of Hellenism for modernity also occupied Friedrich Hölderlin
(1770–1843), who in the late 1780s, together with Hegel and Schelling,
attended the Seminary at the University of Tübingen as a student of theol-
ogy with the intention of becoming a minister. In 1790, to obtain the de-
gree of magister philosophiae, he wrote two papers: one influenced by
Herder, “Parallels between Solomon’s Proverbs and Hesiod’s Works and
Days,” and another influenced by Winckelmann, “History of the Fine Arts
among the Greeks” (Montgomery 1923: 202–7). The Hebraic-Hellenic
comparison had become by that time very common. Hölderlin’s position
on the subject was fully expressed in the late 1790s, when he started dis-
tancing himself from Greece by painting it as Oriental (with an “aorgic,” as
opposed to organic, element) and opposing it to “Hesperia,” the Western
and modern world. The distinction between Greek and Hesperian art first
appears in the famous letter to C. U. Bohlendorff (1801), where the differ-
entiation relieves Hölderlin “entirely of that imitation of antiquity which
Winckelmannian classicism had made obligatory for him, and at the same
time it allows him to see the reason why the Greeks are nevertheless ‘indis-
pensable’ for him. Hölderlin overcomes classicism without turning away
from the classical” (Szondi 1983: 262). This is what he calls the “salvaging
of the Greek for Hesperia.”
Hölderlin was not the only one to see the Greeks in an Oriental light. His
British and German contemporaries often surmised Oriental influences on
Greek culture. Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829), for example, who aspired to
become the “Winckelmann of Greek Literature” and was the first to detect
an ecstatic element in drama and to derive comedy from Dionysian rites,
changed his interests, after his conversion to Catholicism in 1808, from
Greek to Sanskrit (at that time explored by Wilhelm von Humboldt’s com-
parative philology), from aesthetic to moral values, and from ancient sculp-
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ture to Nazarene painting. He too emphasized the Oriental ancestry of
Greek wisdom and art, which the Greeks forgot or repressed. But Hölderlin
went further than anyone else before him in deciding to correct, so to
speak, Greek art by emphasizing its presumed Eastern origin. His plan is
captured in a telling passage: “Greek art is foreign to us, but I hope to
represent it to the public in a more lively manner than is customary,
through national convenience and through errors, with which it has always
helped itself along: I would emphasize more greatly the oriental element
which it denied, and improve upon its artistic error where it occurs”
(quoted in Szondi 1983: 270). Thus, after he abandoned in 1799 his drama
The Death of Empedocles, partly modeled on Sophocles’ Oedipus at
Colonus, Hölderlin translated Antigone and Oedipus Tyrannus, and pub-
lished both in 1804 as Die Trauerspiele des Sophokles, with “Notes” ap-
pended to each play. He hoped to correct the “errors” which he believed
the Greek poet had been forced to make by virtue of his time and place in
history. The hermeneutic violence of these translations has often been dis-
cussed and admired—although never, to my knowledge, compared to their
most audacious successors, Ezra Pound’s renditions of Elektra (1949) and
Women of Trachis (1954) by Sophocles; it even influenced German mod-
ernism from philosophy (Heidegger) to poetry (Celan) and music (Carl
Orff). The corrective dimension of the project, however, the attempt to
rectify, repair, remedy the Greek original has not been sufficiently noted,
although it permeates the poet’s accompanying commentary. The impor-
tant distinction between Greek and Hesperian modes and natures returns
in the Notes. The origin of the former lies in “fire from heaven” and “sacred
pathos” and “warmth,” of the latter in “sobriety” and “precision and effec-
tive flexibility.” He identified as the unsurpassable virtue of the Greek na-
ture the “Homeric presence of mind and talent for presentation,” a virtue
he would later present as the first, the “natural” or “naive” tone of poetry.
Given the similarities between this depiction and the portrayal of the Ho-
meric in Mimesis, the debt of Auerbach (who was familiar with studies of
the Bohlendorff letter by Rosenzweig, Heidegger, Adorno, and Benjamin,
among others) to Hölderlin’s Hellenism is obvious.65
Among Winckelmann’s contemporaries, Klopstock and Johann Georg Ha-
mann (1730–88) were the eminent writers who, with their uncompromis-
ing religious commitment, rejected his theories completely. Opposing rea-
son from the Pietist side and preaching “salvation by the Jews,” Hamann
offered a new concept of faith which refers to moral conviction, rather than
religious belief. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81) responded with his
own theory of imitation in Laoköon (1766), subtitled “On the Limits of
Painting and Poetry,” a semiotic defense of modernity; and later Men-
delssohn proposed a different cultural politics in Jerusalem: On Religious
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Power and Judaism (1783), where the philosophical identity of Deism and
Judaism was developed. Reaction to Winckelmann’s politics of aesthetic
appreciation, however, was not expressed in religious opposition or philo-
sophical disagreement as much as in the form of a new articulation of the
Hebraic, the discovery of Spinoza. The great respect of the Aufklärung for
Spinoza is understandable in the context of the ideological tendencies of
the movement. Interest in his work was revived in Germany during the
furor accompanying Lessing’s printing of extracts from Apologie oder
Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes, an unpublished attack
on Christianity by the Deist Professor of Hebrew Hermann Samuel Rei-
marus (1694–1768), which appeared anonymously under the title Frag-
ments of an Anonymous in 1774 and 1777–78. The intensity of that elite
interest came to the open when the famous “Wolffenbüttel Fragmente”
controversy (Bell 1984: 71–96) over Lessing’s alleged Spinozism erupted
between Friedrich Jacobi (1743–1819) and Mendelssohn under the watch-
ful eyes of Goethe, Kant, and Herder (Beiser 1987). To an extent that has
yet to be fully comprehended, the debate was about the primacy of Less-
ing’s debt to Winckelmann or to Spinoza. The Hebraic-Hellenic compari-
son appeared later in Lessing’s The Education of the Human Race (1780),
which established an analogy between revelation and education by dealing
with the religious education of the Hebrews (sections 9–53) and suggested
a perspectival approach to religious truth by showing how it necessarily
manifests itself in history. In his anonymously published treatise, “Lessing
countered Reimarus’ attack on the revealed character of the Old Testa-
ment with a relativistic conception of revealed religion, whereby each reve-
lation is seen as a historically conditioned accommodation to the commu-
nity to which it is addressed” (Allison 1966: 149). This constitutes a basic
hermeneutic principle, since “it means that each historically conditioned
revelation contains a relative perfection or partial truth” (149). In its use of
the Leibnizian concept of theodicy in the new understanding of the past,
“Lessing’s view of religion as a divine plan for the education of humanity is
nothing but a theodicy of history, a justification of religion not through a
being which has existed from the beginning of time but through religious
growth and the goal of this growth” (Cassirer 1951: 192). Thus Lessing
tried to save revelation by fusing it with Winckelmann’s idea of historicism
and ideal of Bildung into moral autonomy, effectively combining Hebraic
faith and reason with Hellenic culture and education. Contemporary critics
could not agree on the importance of each element for his thought. Before
this could be resolved, though, the focus of interest had shifted to the work
of Spinoza itself. As a consequence, the immediate appeal of Winckel-
mann was largely diminished.
Nowhere else was the Hebraic-Hellenic opposition debated and negoti-
ated as intensely as in the work of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803),
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the thinker who after Lessing and before Schiller came to redefine the ex-
perience and the tasks of modernity in a major way. Despite his respect for
the ideals of the Aufklärers, Herder never trusted their faith in reason, their
search for universal truth, or their cosmopolitan leanings. Neither did he
approve of Hellenism: he was afraid of Goethe’s classicism and Schiller’s
paganism. “Whereas in his Bückeburg period he felt compelled to combat
Enlightenment narrowness and self-assuredness, he became subsequently
much less polemical, until in his last decade he felt that philosophy and
theology had taken a wrong turn with Kantian criticism, and that Goethe’s
and Schiller’s classicism was harmful for the development of German liter-
ature and culture in general. And thus he rose again in grim determination
to defend his wide theocentric universe against what he considered to be a
narrow anthropocentric dogmatism” (Koepke 1982a: 152–53). Above all,
he conducted a life-long battle with Winckelmann, praising him for histor-
ical insight but asking for more specific cultural detail that would make the
imitation of Greece impossible as an ideal. He would even defend Oriental
despotism in order to show that Winckelmann’s negative evaluation of
Egyptian art was unjust, as he did in the essay “Auch eine Philosophie der
Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit” (1774). The same struggle is also
obvious in the memorial essay “Monument of Johann Winckelmann”
(1778). During much of this single-minded campaign, he sought inspira-
tion and support in the work of Spinoza. His interest in the Dutch philoso-
pher developed continuously after the late 1760s, when he “consciously
gives an interpretation of Spinoza’s system as a whole. It is the first full
interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy undertaken in Germany and is
based on a sympathetic understanding of certain fundamental Spinozist
concepts, which are also congenial to Herder’s own outlook. God—A Series
of Dialogues (1787) presented to the public a Spinoza hitherto unknown
except to independent individuals like Lessing and Goethe” (Bell 1984:
174). It was in God that Herder proclaimed Spinoza more divine than
St. John.
As his polemical choice of Spinoza over Winckelmann shows, Herder’s
ardent cultural nationalism was wholly permeated by the Hebraic-Hellenic
opposition, and he regularly argued along these options, as, for example, in
his essay “On the Effect of Poetry on the Mores of the Peoples in Ancient
and Modern Times” (written in 1778 and published in 1781) or in his Ideas
on the Philosophy of History of Mankind, 1784–91, 4 vols.). Already in Crit-
ical Woods (1769) he rated the Old Testament writers better than the clas-
sical ones. The most extensive comparison of the two, however, was his
return to Lowth’s grand subject in The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry: An Intro-
duction for Lovers of the Same and of the Most Ancient History of the Human
Spirit (1782–83, 2 vols.), a history of Hebrew literature. This book is what
remains of the aborted project “Archaeology of the Orient.” It is divided in
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two parts, one dialogic and one expository. In the dialogue, Alciphron, a
representative of the radical Enlightenment, is convinced by Euthyphron
that the Old Testament is of great poetic and historical value. The second
part is a literary evaluation of the same book. It contains scores of detailed
comparisons of the Hebrew Bible with Greek poets. (Herder even sug-
gested parallelism as the basic structure of Greek meter.) The book owes its
importance and widespread influence partly to the fact that here the epis-
temological value of poetic language is recognized and the identity of po-
etry and religion admitted (Clark 1955: 297–98). Essentially the impor-
tance of Winckelmann’s aesthetics is recognized, while art is asked to serve
faith.
The influence on Herder of Lowth’s book, which Mendelssohn had en-
dorsed in an influential review, is heavy. Lowth too looked for the origin of
poetry in religion and popular imagination but classified Hebrew poetry
according to technical categories derived from neoclassical usage. Herder,
a superb Hebraist himself, found this formalistic. The intent of his ap-
proach was to turn “the Bible, and divine revelation with it, into the fullest
expression of the one human spirit under the educative guidance of divine
providence” (Frei 1974: 185). Herder, who detested Rationalism and
Deism, was influenced by Hamann’s Pietism.66 In a market of capital de-
sire, though, he could not afford to present faith as its own reward. “Unlike
the Pietists, Herder wrote at a level naturally combining an aesthetic stance
with that of a historical relativist; but he shared the Pietists’ conviction
that the unitary content of the Bible is the history of saving events, self-
differentiated into a sequence of temporal stages” (200). He protected the
Bible from the philological criticism of the Neologists by trying to ground
it historically: his genetic-historical epistemology explains revelation as a
historical event. Thus he was able to see the Bible as “the history book of
mankind, written by humans, for the purpose of expressing in poetic-
historical terms the ways of God through the course of human history”
(Koepke 1982a: 145). He defended its unitary meaning, and therefore its
theological authority, on historical and aesthetic grounds. “Figuration
changes for him from the connectedness of two temporally widely-sepa-
rated specific occurrences to a slowly accumulating and general sense of
anticipation reaching a climactic fulfillment” (Frei 1974: 193). For Herder,
as for Lessing, history is education and revelation. “In human fashion must
one read the Bible; for it is a book written by men for men: Human is the
language, human the external means with which it was written and pre-
served; human finally is the sense with which it may be grasped, every aid
that illuminates it, as well as the aim and use to which it is to be applied”
(quoted in Frei 1974: 184). By making history the time where humans are
educated in revelation, and therefore by consecrating reading-in-history, he
contributed more than anybody else to the idea, which prevailed in late-
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eighteenth-century Germany, that “a free and self-conscious self-position-
ing toward the world is an independent and indispensable factor in shaping
the depiction of that world with its bearing on the self” (201). This princi-
ple may still be one of the best definitions we have of autonomy—“the idea
of absolute being grounded in itself, that is to say of freedom” (Schiller
1965: 61)—as the project of modernity.
The great problem of autonomy has always been where the ground of its
nomos is, what source of authority justifies the auto-claim. The post-
Lutheran contribution sought a transcendental ground, in an attempt to
guarantee, rather than oversee, the function of that nomos. (Hence the
importance of law for thinkers from Kant to Schiller, and of order for com-
posers from Haydn to Beethoven.) The locus of the source could have been
one among many things—to use the terminology inherited from Herder’s
solution, social, ethnic, historical, personal, economic, and so on. But the
rejection of rhetoric, the fear of skepticism, the lack of important bourgeois
institutions, and the emphasis on national construction made the tran-
scendental path, the one dispensing with a factious public and competing
parties, the most viable one. During the eighteenth century, the “age of
control” (Menhennet 1973: 21), the reason of the polity (like its mass-
reading habits) could not be trusted. In his essay “What is Enlighten-
ment?” (1784), Kant, after distinguishing between revolution, which he
rejects, and Reform, which he seeks, proposes that the requirement for en-
lightenment is the least harmful freedom of all—the freedom of using in
public one’s power of reason, of public expression, and more specifically,
the freedom of the writer who is addressing a Publikum. The writer is aware
of his role as a latter-day Reformist. More than self-referential, autonomy
should become self-reflexive, and Herder was determined to devise its con-
stitution—the grammar of nomocracy.
Knowledge is determined by language and not reason; language is
pneuma, “God’s breath,” the spirit of God communicated to humankind.
Herder thought that the Hebrew language, the speech of Adam and the
Tower of Babel, was the Bildersprache of the human race in its infancy, and
that its poetry remains the best ever made. In taking this position, while
suggesting that the Greeks failed to achieve maturity, he was comparing
not only languages and literatures but also social systems. His political
ideas, based (like those of Spinoza, Lessing, Mendelssohn, Eichhorn, and
later Coleridge) on the model of the Hebrew polity, had national identity
as their true scope. Indeed, Herder, whose fragmentary work may arguably
be considered in its entirety as a Tractatus aesthetico-politicus, took a reso-
lutely cultural approach to politics.67 At a time when a collective sense of
German identity was just emerging, he insisted that the foundation of na-
tional identity be a common, shared culture—replacing in his system the
negotiable social contract (Barnard 1989)—where individual and collective
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identity become one.68 The state does not operate like a machine but de-
velops like an organism: to the political machinery is opposed the or-
ganic State—and to the political/mechanical, the cultural/organic. The or-
ganic State is the state of national tradition and culture, of a coherent
ethnic community—the Volkstaat. In it, power does not emanate from
a sovereign but from an impersonal, immaterial, invisible government—
nomocracy, the law inherent in Volk. This government is an internal part
of the social and national existence, and takes the form of aristo-democ-
racy. For Herder, the ethnic community, the Volk, the nation, and the state
should ultimately become one indivisible unity and independent entity,
preserving its social cohesion and self-determination.69 The aristo-demo-
crats (cf. Berdyaev’s “aristocracy of freedom”), who will be overseeing the
nomocracy in this (natural rather than political) entity, will be the intel-
lectuals originating from dem Volk der Bürger: “Intellectual and cultural
activity has its source in the middle class” (quoted in Barnard 1965: 76).
They will also be in charge of education, which equals humanization. Thus
Herder’s ever-so-appealing (to modernist sensibilities) principle of lan-
guage-creating man, Volk, and culture was only part of the larger bourgeois
effort to discredit the knowledge and manners of the nobility and gain
power by making nationality, rather than heredity or class, the sustaining
force of government. Patriotism, Humanität, and Bildung are closely inter-
connected in this system.70 Education humanizes and cultivates, preserv-
ing the continuity of Volk and culture: for the individual, it is a right and
a duty; for the nation, it is the road to its growth, progress, and perfection.
Herder believes that culture and philosophy should serve the rejuvena-
tion of society. “He develops a conception of literature as an exemplary
representation of the (in this case, endless) effort of man to create a coher-
ent expression of himself, and thereby to realize himself as a whole being”
(Morton 1982: 56). This is also how the nation realizes itself. “In this,
Herder anticipates a characteristic feature of German Romanticism,
namely its belief in the possibility of effecting political-national renewal in
the sphere of cultural activity (preeminently through the medium of poetic
art), and thus of bringing about a revitalization of community through
cultivation of individuals toward personal self-realization” (63). Respond-
ing to fears of lawlessness and revolution, Humanität was the political prin-
ciple that provided Herder, especially during his last period, with an ideal
of emancipation. “Humanität is that which gives to individuals their hu-
manity, and at the same time that which recalls nations to their human
destiny” (Knoll 1982: 10). With it, emancipation takes on the eschatologi-
cal promise of fulfillment. No longer a question of interpretation, charac-
ter, taste, or conduct, Humanity is the liberation of emancipation itself
from its narrow, interested, hence selfish, ideals. Historicist sensibility and
its canonic readings were born at this juncture of the particular and the
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universal. “As the many-faceted reality of human existence, Humanität en-
compasses all human qualities and capabilities;—as the goal of human-
kind, however, it is potential rather than actuality. It is the divine calling
which summons humans to rise above their state of nature. Humanität
thus embraces that religiosity which pervades all of Herder’s thought and
writings” (11). This is his political imperative of self-controlled freedom
(Bauman 1988a).
Intellectuals brought different ideas back from their travels to Italy.
Winckelmann, the Prefect of Papal Antiquities in the Vatican, reconciled
the ethical and the religious in the aesthetic, the Hellenic ideal; Herder, the
Superintendent of Schools, Chief Pastor, and Court Preacher in Weimar,
reconciled the social and the aesthetic in the national, the Hebraic vision.
He showed that the Bible surpasses the Greek classics, attacked Graeco-
mania, and declared Greece dead. Preoccupied, like his predecessor and
many of his contemporaries, with the rise to power of the middle class in a
secular state, he adopted Winckelmann’s view of Greece in his organic
theory of history but derived the concept of Volk from Judaic tradition.
Herder had a remarkable historical sense which helped him question the
constancy of human nature, reject the universality of race, and even doubt
the superiority of European culture. “Each age, he believed, must be
judged by its own standards; each national culture has its unique, incompa-
rable value. Life on this planet is a triumphant progress—‘the movement of
God through history’—toward the highest possible development of man’s
total powers, his Humanität” (Hatfield 1964: 45). At the same time, his
revulsion toward the theology of the English and the politics of the French
Enlightenment point to the cultural traditionalism of the “Hebraic hu-
manism” (Kraus 1956: 114–32) he (like Hamann) was advocating. For ex-
ample, he treated all Biblical poetry as Oriental and proposed it as a model
for German literature, calling to arms the “German-Oriental poets.” For
Herder, the nation was neither a republic (France) nor a kingdom (En-
gland) but a nation—a community of people with a shared language, cul-
ture, and tradition. The culturally integrated Hebrew community became
his normative example. “Herder presented a picture of the Hebrew genius
as a cultural phenomenon; he moved away from the older supernaturalistic
pattern, and gave Hebrew culture a place on its own merits in the history
of civilization” (Barr 1966: 44). He praised the Hebrews as the best example
of Volk and Bildung, and even defended the ethical significance of “Orien-
tal despotism” (as represented, for example, in Moses’ legal code). Indeed,
the Mosaic Law was his model when he rejected the notion of natural
individual rights, defended the idea of an invisible government, and de-
fined the territorial community of his Volk-State (Barnard 1959; 1965: 62–
67; 1966). In this he was not alone. The reaction against Latinity included
a rejection of Roman administrative methods. “In eighteenth-century Ger-
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many many still called for the institution of Mosaic law to cleanse the body
politic, and an even larger number felt that Mosaic law justified some of the
gorier and more extreme forms of eighteenth-century punishments” (Reill
1975: 196). In general, there are three basic categories in his thought: the
individual (whose life-long task is Bildung), Volk (and its culture), and hu-
manity; and they all are portrayed as independent, irreducible, self-regulat-
ing units fashioned after the homologous ideas of the organism, the art-
work, and the Hebrew nation. Herder is a paradigmatic modern figure in
that he turned his attention to those types of discourse that had been re-
cently associated with the aesthetic, and completed the definition of the
project of modernity by aestheticizing the public as national culture.
We saw earlier that the sense of a remote, irrevocable past, which first
developed in the seventeenth century, and the identification of that past
with History and Greece, entered the discourses of religion and knowledge
through treatises comparing the Bible to Homer. Indeed, since the four-
teenth century, when he was read again in the original language, Homer,
although regularly discussed, had been the subject of disappointment (in
the fifteenth century because of his inferiority to Virgil), condemnation
(for example, by Joseph Scaliger71 in the second half of the sixteenth cen-
tury), and finally rejection (by the Moderns). Still, major English literary
translations in the second half of the seventeenth century (Chapman,
Hobbes, Dryden) and advances in scholarship (like Bentley’s discovery of
the Aeolic consonant digamma) responded to and cultivated the demands
of a dilettante taste for the more exotic aspects of the Western tradition.
Interest in Greek epic increased in the eighteenth century, when the
Northern bardic tradition was discovered, bringing the exotic back home,
and the notion of genius (Murray 1989) was associated with the epic. Mid-
eighteenth-century England read epic as the most representative product
of its culture and started giving priority to Homer over Virgil for his fuller
representation of the national soul: in the Homeric epic the ethnic quali-
ties of the bardic, genius, and originality seemed to converge. This percep-
tion made Homer a focal point of many debates about national identity,
idiom, and creativity. At that time, comparisons of the Biblical to the Ho-
meric were revived. After myth was isolated from history, the epic was seen
as historical account of real events. It was also compared (by Lowth, Heyne,
and Herder) to the Hebrew Bible in terms of language, style, religion, and
society. The interpretive fate of the two canons was intertwined. In addi-
tion, the Bible seemed to allow for creative freedom against eighteenth-
century neoclassical standards: “Whether for or against the rules or simply
oblivious of them, all the critics agreed on the great merit of Hebrew poetic
style. . . . One of the marks of this recognition of the greatness of Hebrew
literature is the comparison made with the Greek and Roman, invariably to
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the advantage of the Hebrew” (Freimarck 1952: 513–14). Since literary and
philological criticism of the epic developed along the course set by Biblical
studies, Homer’s interpretation was influenced by that course. Before the
end of the century, both the Hebraist Johann David Michaelis (1717–91)
and the classicist Christian Gottlob Heyne (1729–1812) were comparing
him to Moses. They both taught at the University of Göttingen (estab-
lished in 1734), where the influence of Winckelmann was felt most. The
Göttingen school of philology developed “source criticism” (Quellenkritik)
under both Heyne, who first distinguished myth from the poetry in which
it was contained, and Michaelis, his colleague in Oriental Languages, who
did the same for Biblical studies and annotated Lowth in German. In the
scholarship of their school, where Homer was rehabilitated, the epic was
often seen as the Bible of the Greeks, although nobody argued that the
Bible was the Hebrew epic. Greek influence on the Hebrews was quite in-
conceivable.
Following in the footsteps of Enlightenment Higher Criticism, the study
of Homer achieved scholarly sophistication and recognition in the 1780s
until it triumphed with F. A. Wolf’s Prolegomena ad Homerum (1795).72
Herder, who also published that same year the essays “Homer und Ossian”
and “Homer, ein Gunstling der Zeit,” had already talked about the collec-
tive folk origin of Homer. In this, he was again adopting Spinoza who, in his
Tractatus, had declared the Bible a product of many hands, subject to can-
onic composition and interpolation.73 Herder’s aesthetics had also inspired
directly, through their regular correspondence, the Biblical hermeneutics
of Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (1752–1827), the Professor of Oriental Lan-
guages who put the study of the Bible on a solid scholarly basis in his
Introduction to the Old Testament (1780–83, 3 vols.). Still, philology, his-
toriography, and aesthetics, the three major disciplines that grew out of
Biblical interpretation in the 1750s and 1760s, had never before been com-
bined in such a masterful demonstration of analytical skill. Friedrich Au-
gust Wolf (1759–1824), a student of Heyne, modeled his Prolegomena on
Eichhorn’s Introduction, adapting principles of Biblical scholarship (espe-
cially The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry) to the study of the epic, and, like him,
often proceeded through a comparative treatment of Homer and the Bible
(e.g., Wolf 1985: 223–26).74 “Although there is little evidence that in writ-
ing the Prolegomena ad Homerum Wolf had intended to imply questions
about the historical credentials of the Bible, his methods and the kinds of
questions he posed were cut from the same cloth as contemporary German
criticism of the Scriptures and the critical discussions of biblical mythology
that had originated with Heyne” (Turner 1981: 142). The success was spec-
tacular:75 the Homeric question (or what Alan John Bayard Wace has called
the “Higher Criticism of Homer”) became (and persists in being) central to
many philological problems (Critical Exchange 1984); classical studies
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gained unprecedented prominence in the German intellectual climate; and
the Greek classics started playing an instrumental role in the humanistic
disciplines and education.76
In 1795, when Herder and Wolf were taking Homer apart, fragmenting
(Winckelmann’s) Greek world, and Goethe published the Bildungsroman
Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship, the epic of the cultivation of the artistic
self, Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) printed his Letters on the Aesthetic Ed-
ucation of Man and the first two parts of On Naive and Sentimental Poetry
(1795–96). These works mark the completion of the intellectual course
traveled by the Reformed classes from trade to industry, from the Bible to
Art, and from reading (sixteenth century) to learning (seventeenth) to un-
derstanding (eighteenth) to educating (nineteenth). In Schiller’s system,
education (whose urgent political necessity became acutely apparent after
the French Revolution) found its concrete direction: education of pleasure,
through beauty, for ethical leisure. The means of this education, as well as
its goal, is aesthetic taste.77 Taste moderates, shapes, and cultivates the
individual: “All those material inclinations and brutal appetites, which op-
pose with so much obstinacy and vehemence the practice of good, the soul
is freed from through the aesthetic taste; and in their place, it implants in
us nobler and gentler inclinations, which draw nearer to order, to harmony,
and to perfection; and although these inclinations are not by themselves
virtues, they have at least something in common with virtue; it is their
object” (Schiller 1902: 130). Taste is socially useful because it gives the soul
a direction which disposes it to virtue. Morality may dictate the rules which
distinguish good from bad. “But the aesthetic sense governs the will by the
feeling and not by laws” (132).78 In contrast to the imposition of laws by
outside systems or necessity, the aesthetic is the autonomous principle of
taste and feeling. Morally and physically unconstrained, independent of
rational and sensuous determination, the aesthetic is the true free disposi-
tion. “In the midst of the awful realm of powers, and of the sacred realm of
laws, the aesthetic creative impulse is building unawares a third joyous
realm of play and of appearance, in which it releases mankind from all the
shackles of circumstance and frees him from everything that may be called
constraint, whether physical or moral. If in the dynamic state of rights man
encounters man as force and restricts his activity, if in the ethical state of
duties he opposes him with the majesty of law and fetters his will, in the
sphere of cultivated society, in the aesthetic state, he need appear to him
only as shape, confront him only as an object of free play. To grant freedom
by means of freedom is the fundamental law of this kingdom” (Schiller
1965: 137). Herder’s self-reflexive autonomy reaches in Schiller the celes-
tial harmony of a tautology: it is not word and thing but act and law that
become one here.
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Schiller’s Fifth Letter contains a critique of his time which indicts both
low and high classes for corruption and immorality: “Man portrays himself
in his deeds, and what a form it is that is depicted in the drama of the
present day! Here barbarity, there enervation: the two extremes of human
degeneracy, and both of them united in a single period of time! Among the
lower and more numerous classes we find crude, lawless impulses which
have been unleashed by the loosening of the bonds of civil order, and are
hastening with ungovernable fury to their brutal satisfaction. . . . On the
other hand, the civilized classes present to us the still more repugnant spec-
tacle of indolence, and a depravity of character which is all the more shock-
ing since culture itself is the source of it” (35). In addition to the dissolu-
tion of the civil bonds that used to safeguard meaning and order in society,
Schiller laments contemporary fragmentation. In contrast with integrated
life in ancient Greece, he sees modern society as “an ingenious piece of
machinery, in which out of the botching together of a vast number of life-
less parts a collective mechanical life results. State and Church, law and
customs, were now torn asunder; enjoyment was separated from labour,
means from ends, effort from reward. Eternally chained to only one single
little fragment of the whole, Man himself grew to be only a fragment; with
the monotonous noise of the wheel he drives everlastingly in his ears, he
never develops the harmony of his being, and instead of imprinting human-
ity upon his nature he becomes merely the imprint of his occupation, of his
science” (40).79 According to Schiller, there is a double socio-political prob-
lem: lawlessness, on the one hand, and fragmentation, on the other; both
externally and internally, the center of public life is disintegrating. “Like
Herder before him, who had inveighed against a condition in which men
had become ‘half thinkers, half feelers’ and ‘no single member partakes of
the whole any more,’ Schiller portrayed the central predicament of his pe-
riod as consisting in man’s being divided against himself, both as an indi-
vidual and in his relations to his human and natural surroundings” (Gar-
diner 1979: 39).
The Jacobin Johann Benjamin Erhard (1766–1827) had just published
On the Right of the People to Revolution (1795), where he defined the moral
right to civil revolution, presenting this revolution as the end of a people’s
development, and enlightenment as the end of humanity. The Aesthetic
Education, Schiller’s response to Erhard, finds that neither revolution nor
religion can provide the answers: history and faith are bankrupt. Schiller’s
answer is that “we must indeed, if we are to solve that political problem in
practice, follow the path of aesthetics, since it is through Beauty that we
arrive at Freedom” (Schiller 1965: 27). Neither the French citizen nor the
Prussian patriot seem to know where to seek independence. “Training of
the sensibility is then the more pressing need of our age” (50), he argues,
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and proposes “an education for taste and for Beauty. This last has as its aim
the cultivation of the whole of our sensuous and intellectual powers in the
fullest possible harmony” (99). This is the new civic religion. Herder’s na-
tional culture is not enough, since the national bonds do not reach deep
into the individual’s desires and interests; neither is Kant’s ethical impera-
tive (although free from the heteronomy of religious commands) adequate
for (not just controlling but also) shaping feelings and beliefs. The new
civic religion must be a cultural imperative—the aesthetic faith: “Religion
is love of Beauty” (Hölderlin 1984: 91). Schiller acknowledges that “it is an
obligation for us to seek the salutary bonds which religion and the aesthetic
laws present to us, in order that during the crisis when our passion is dom-
inant it shall not injure the physical order. It is not unintentionally that I
have placed religion and taste in one and the same class; the reason is that
both one and the other have the merit, similar in effect, although dissimilar
in principle and in value, to take the place of virtue properly so called, and
to assure legality where there is no possibility to hope for morality”
(Schiller 1902: 135). The superiority of the aesthetic is that it can train
sensibility, mold conduct, and prepare a new social structure. “The aes-
thetic is the missing mediation between a barbaric civil society given over
to pure appetite, and the ideal of a well-ordered political state” (Eagleton
1990: 106).
Schiller proposes what Hegel would later call, writing about Athenian
politics, “an aesthetic democracy” (Hegel 1900: 254). His ideal, like all aes-
thetic ideals before Modernism, is Hellenic. The Greeks, whom Winckel-
mann saw as artistic, Schiller portrays as aesthetic: out of their games he
produces the idea of play80 that would transform the pains of labor (Kain
1982: 13–33): “[T]his play impulse would aim at the extinction of time in
time and the reconciliation of becoming with absolute being, of variation
with identity” (Schiller 1965: 74). The object of the play impulse (as well
as the realm of reconciliation) is Beauty. “Man shall only play with Beauty,
and he shall play only with Beauty. For, to declare it once and for all, Man
plays only when he is in the full sense of the word a man, and he is only
wholly Man when he is playing” (80). Beauty is the freedom to play (with)
freedom.
Schiller opposes the aesthetic condition to toiling and compares it to the
Greek city experience, while proposing that the aesthetic remaking of mod-
ern man would reconcile him with the state by making him one with it.
“Whereas in England and the Romance countries the idea of the sensus
communis is not even today just a critical slogan, but is a general civic
quality, in Germany the followers of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson did not,
even in the eighteenth century, take over the political and social element
contained in sensus communis. . . . The concept of sensus communis was
taken over, but in the removal of all political content it lost its real critical
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significance. Sensus communis was understood as a purely theoretical fac-
ulty, theoretical judgment, on a level with moral consciousness (con-
science) and taste” (Gadamer 1979: 26).81 In Germany, sensus communis
became a matter not of civic quality but of personal attitude. Bildung un-
dertook to interiorize taste, since beauty was the politics of the soul. In his
article on the meaning of Enlightenment (1784), Mendelssohn defined the
meaning of the words Enlightenment, Kultur, and Bildung, which he found
interrelated, proposing that Bildung consists of Kultur and Enlightenment.
The first is more practical, and includes morals, manners, taste, senti-
ments, and habits—in a word, cultivation; while the second is theoretical,
and includes knowledge and reason. People as citizens need the former, as
individuals the latter. Like the Greeks who had both, a modern nation, too,
needs both. Therefore Luther’s community of readers would now be
trained to develop into a public. The individual would no longer be a reader
(of the Bible), an interpreter of religion, or a private character but a (pub-
lic) attitude, an outward declaration of inwardness. “Though need may
drive Man into society, and reason implant social principles in him, Beauty
alone can confer on him a social character. Taste alone brings harmony into
society. . . . All other forms of communication divide society, because they
relate exclusively . . . to what distinguishes between one man and another;
only the communication of the Beautiful unites society, because it relates
to what is common to them all” (Schiller 1965: 138). Mozart (1756–91) had
already volunteered to write the sym-phonies for that audience, the scores
of the harmonization of the cultivated public.
In exchange for abandoning political engagement, beauty promised pure
independence, Schiller’s “Heautonomie.” In an effort to reconcile freedom
and law, Kant had already formulated, in the Groundwork of the Metaphys-
ics of Morals (1785), the principle of autonomy, “in which he made tran-
scendental freedom a postulate of practical freedom but claiming, at the
same time, that we are free only through our consciousness of standing
under a moral law” (Leidner 1989: 181). The project of the Critique of Pure
Reason (1781) reaches here its completion. “Human freedom was por-
trayed by Kant as involving a capacity to act independently of the prompt-
ings of desire or inclination. It was, moreover, closely tied to morality
through the notion of autonomy: Kant implied that it was only in so far as
a man chose to make his actions conform to principles which he himself
prescribed as binding upon all rational beings that what he did could prop-
erly and in the full sense be described as free” (Gardiner 1979: 28). Devel-
oping this principle further, Schiller proposes that the aesthetic disposition
“is what first gives rise to freedom” (Schiller 1965: 124) on the condition
that social interests be abandoned. “Thus at the basis of the aesthetic rec-
onciliation of the Kantian dualism of being and moral obligation there is a
more profound, unresolved dualism. It is the prose of alienated reality
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against which the poetry of aesthetic reconciliation must seek its own self-
consciousness” (Gadamer 1979: 74). Against what Hegel in the Aesthetics
called “the prose of the world,” the impossibility of literature promises the
absolute book, the impotence of the fragment preaches the incarnation of
writing, the broken tablets of art annunciate the divinity of the secular
scripture. “Art emerges in the second half of the eighteenth century as a
privileged space of cultural activities; it is increasingly viewed as a realm of
reconciliation and redemption that is able to suspend the negative side-
effects of the functional and social differentiation of society” (Schulte-
Sasse 1989: 86). The aesthetic attitude is the fundamental exercise—both
ascetic (in that it achieves self-consciousness by denouncing interest, in-
cluding moral obligation) as well as hedonistic (in that it plays with itself).
In it, the paradox which links doing and renunciation, becoming “the as-
cetic basis of the bourgeois style of life” (Weber), is transcended. The pro-
ject of autonomy, the modern task of self-grounding, reaches its limit with
the aesthetic because the aesthetic is pure differentiation:82 in a function-
ally differentiated society, the aesthetic functions not only as the separate
sphere of art but above all as the self-thematization of differentiation itself.
“It practically defines aesthetic consciousness to say that it performs this
differentiation of what is aesthetically intended from everything that is
outside the aesthetic sphere. It abstracts from all the conditions of a work’s
accessibility. This kind of differentiation is itself a specifically aesthetic
one. . . . It is the capacity of aesthetic consciousness to be able to make this
aesthetic differentiation everywhere and to see everything ‘aesthetically’”
(Gadamer 1979: 77). The aesthetic politics of differentiation seeks auton-
omy for autonomy’s sake and requires “a disinterested free appreciation of
pure appearance” (Schiller 1965: 132) where the synthesis of knowledge
and morality, taste and feeling, labor and leisure is achieved as the other-
worldly is thoroughly naturalized into the secular.
In the ascetic realm of the disinterested devotion to the material, beyond
any work requirements, capitalist greed and social competition are exoner-
ated as they finally turn into the aesthetic ethic, and human rights are
fulfilled in that they are justified according to an entirely tautological tele-
ology: “Everything in the aesthetic State, even the subservient tool, is a free
citizen having equal rights with the noblest; and the intellect, which forci-
bly moulds the passive multitude to its designs, must here ask for its assent.
Here, then, in the realm of aesthetic appearance, is fulfilled the ideal of
equality which the visionary would fain see realized in actuality also; and if
it is true that fine breeding matures earliest and most completely near the
throne, we are bound to recognize here too the bountiful dispensation
which seems often to restrict mankind in the actual, only in order to incite
him into the ideal world” (140). The disinterested aesthetic does not just
compensate—it also rewards with cultural capital. Now both artist and
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reader are involved in “an engagement thus voluntarily contracted” (as
Wordsworth wrote in the “Preface” to the Lyrical Ballads of 1800), and
they expect to profit.83 For the reader, the aesthetic is the accumulation of
an attitude, of a capital that can be invested in the market of any differenti-
ated sphere. At the same time, the aesthetic, as auto-formation, is the high-
est realization of autonomy because “it combines in itself all the conditions
of its origin and of its continued existence” (103). That is why beauty is
both means and goal, object and condition, form and life. “In a word, it is
at once our state and our act” (122). Thus the aesthetic became not only
interpretive but social norm, too: aesthetic education as the training for an
aesthetic life (and state)—the humanistic training in the contemplative,
disinterested disposition. “The aesthetic state, in short, is the utopian
bourgeois public sphere of liberty, equality and democracy, within which
everyone is a free citizen. . . . Taste, with its autonomy, universality, equal-
ity and fellow-feeling, is a whole alternative politics, suspending social
hierarchy and reconstituting relations between individuals in the image of
disinterested fraternity” (Eagleton 1990: 111). Spinoza’s covenant with
sovereign authority and Herder’s nomocracy of the invisible government
found here their technology of the interpretive regiment of emancipation
fully articulated in the artistic self and the aesthetic regime.
The essay on the Naive and the Sentimental complements the exposi-
tion of Aesthetic Education by sharply defining, on the basis of the opposi-
tion in its title, the cultural moment and the ideological identity of moder-
nity against its Greek History. Here there is no effort to reconcile or balance
the two poles because the historical difference is considered to be beyond
any mediation: the Hebraic takes over the Greek by making it its totally
Other—by contrasting Spinoza’s community of interpreters with a city of
(consenting) players. The ancient world emerges as the exemplary product
of Hebraic historicism: wholly separate and in supreme harmony with it-
self, without contradiction or conflict. When Biblical scholarship and liter-
ary criticism saved the authority of the Bible by detecting in its textual
constitution a unique combination of the moral and the artistic, Hellas was
designated as the locus of the pure aesthetic. The possibility of the classical
in modernity was of great concern to German Romanticism. “More partic-
ularly, and because the philosophy of history will emerge precisely from a
critical problematic of imitation (throughout the last years of the [eigh-
teenth] century), it involves doing better or more than Antiquity: at once
surpassing and fulfilling the unfinished or incomplete aspects of Antiquity,
wherever it failed to effectuate the classical ideal it envisaged. This
amounts, in the end, to performing the ‘synthesis’ of the Ancient and the
Modern—or, if you like, to anticipate the Hegelian word (although not
the concept), to sublate, aufheben, the opposition of the Ancient and the
Modern” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1988: 11). Alas, the aesthetic, as
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Schiller already knew (and Hölderlin and Hegel were soon to realize) was
by (its theological) definition (a) ancient and pagan; (b) old and alien; and
(c) elsewhere or over. The aesthetic cultivation was an educational program
for the refinement of the Hebraic morality of the bourgeoisie—a training
in the invisible government of self-discipline.84 Schiller, expanding the clas-
sical-romantic contrast so popular in his time, monumentalized the divi-
sion of the opposite worlds, outlining the basic aesthetic (and ethical)
choices of the West for the next two centuries: “All poets who are truly so
will belong, according to the temper of the times in which they flourish, or
according to the influence upon their general education or passing states of
mind by fortuitous circumstances, either to the naive or to the sentimental
poets” (Schiller 1985: 191). The work of the young Lukács (Congdon 1983)
was still part of the same discussion, as the obvious correspondence of his
“integrated” and “problematic” civilizations to the naive and sentimental
shows, and contributed the last ideal of the auto-formation of the bour-
geoisie—the messianic drive for totality (Jay 1984).85 Lukács later felt, how-
ever, that aesthetic training, as dramatized in the Bildungsroman, had
failed, and reoriented his educational interests toward the Bildung of the
proletariat in History and Class Consciousness (1923).
THE THREAT OF PAGANISM
The ideal of the aesthetic attitude was translated into a pedagogical project
by Wilhelm von Humboldt with the aim of bringing national unity, social
cohesiveness, and cultural identity to the state, while liberalizing its auto-
cratic structure. Ancient Greece was used as a model culture and a period
where the aesthetic prevailed, influencing every aspect of life. “[Hum-
boldt] and his friends saw study of ‘Antiquity in general and the Greeks in
particular’ as a way in which to integrate students and the people as a
whole, whose lives they saw as being fragmented by modern society. More
immediately, Humboldt and the others saw the study as a way of promot-
ing an ‘authentic’ reform, through which Germany could avoid revolution
of the type that so horrified them in France. From the beginning, then,
Altertumwissenschaft in Germany—like its equivalent, Classics, in En-
gland—was seen by its promoters as a ‘third way’ between reaction and
revolution. In actuality, however, its effect was to shore up the status quo.
The educational institutions and the Classical Bildung that infused them
became pillars of 19th-century Prussian and German social order. At the
core of Altertumwissenschaft was the image of the divine Greek, both artis-
tic and philosophical” (Bernal 1987: 282). The pedagogical project, though,
did achieve its nationalist goal. “By the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury Germans were convinced that they were the ‘intellectual instructors of
mankind’ [Baron Bunsen]. This self-assessment was accepted by most ‘pro-
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gressive’ Europeans and North Americans. German philosophy and educa-
tion provided a middle way between bankrupt traditions and French revo-
lution and atheism” (Bernal 1986: 37–38). As Schiller had planned it, the
aesthetic did indeed mediate between the reactionary traditions of nobility
and revolutionary tendencies of skepticism, providing an alternative path
to emancipation: the autonomy of self-cultivation and the privileges of
culture. Aesthetic critique made interpretation a question of attitude to
the world, rather than position in society.
Educated Germans saw themselves as the modern Greeks, the inheritors
of ancient culture. “And yet, when it came to scholarship and historical
research it was to Roman history rather than to Greek history that the
German genius made the most important contributions” (Yavetz 1976:
279). Although it was the invention of History that made the construction
of Greece possible, the study of Greek history was still limited to culture
since nobody found its politics attractive. “Is not the unification of Italy
and the conquest of the Mediterranean a sounder ideal than what was
scornfully depicted by E. Drerup as ‘die athenische Advokatenrepublik’?”
(283). This scholarship developed after the defeat of Jena by Napoleon in
1806. “An awakening Germany could not find consolation any more in
Greek beauty and in morbid Greek politics, but a young, vigorous, patriotic
and optimistic Roman ‘Bauerngemeinde’ could be set up as a model to be
admired” (290). The Roman social order served as a model for nineteenth-
century Germany (Whitman 1990). In the Romans, Germans found
health, strength, order, nobility, right. The historical Greeks were discov-
ered elsewhere.
Interest in Greek history commenced on a significant scale in the late
eighteenth century, when the Greeks were perceived as a useful negative
model. “The eighteenth century saw the beginnings of a great change in
the way history was written; historians, once concerned almost entirely
with political and military events, began to investigate such things as com-
merce, religion and social habits” (Jenkyns 1980: 163–64). Until then, all
models were Roman since history served the instruction of the aristocracy.
“Although Greek philosophy had influenced some Renaissance writers and
Aristotelian categories still informed science and logic, until the late eigh-
teenth century most educated Europeans regarded their culture as Roman
and Christian in origin, with merely peripheral roots in Greece. Europe had
a Roman past, and European civilization was congruent with Latin Chris-
tendom. . . . Roman law and Roman literature, as well as the Latin church
fathers, had dominated Europe’s cultural experience. . . . In contrast to this
visible, tangible, and pervasive Roman influence, the Greeks simply had
not directly touched the life of Western Europe” (Turner 1981: 1–2). Until
then the study of Greek history was almost unknown everywhere. When
Greek political history was first studied, the result was a very negative pic-
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ture, one of instability and anarchy. “Eighteenth-century and early nine-
teenth-century political commentators had consistently pointed to Athens
as a key example of civic lawlessness, political disorder, and the absence of
personal security” (189). The same is true about English historians of the
eighteenth century, such as John Gillies (The History of Ancient Greece, Its
Colonies, and Conquests from the Earliest Accounts till the Division of the
Macedonian Empire in the East Including the History of Literature, Philoso-
phy, and the Fine Arts, 1786) and William Mitford (The History of Greece,
1784–1810, 10 vols.) who, writing the first histories which were at the same
time political treatises, warned against the perils of democracy. Rome re-
mained the true model. When there was some praise for Greece, it was for
Sparta. “In the view of these writers, as in that of more important Conti-
nental authors, among them Montesquieu and Rousseau, Sparta appeared
as a strong, stable polity immune from the political unrest, party factions,
and turbulent leadership that had marked Athenian political life” (189–
90). When greater interest arose, it came again from the conservative side.
For example, most educated Germans in the nineteenth century (as well as
the twentieth, like Gottfried Benn in his essay “Doric World”) considered
the Dorians the real Greeks, the most Germanic ones.
“But during the last quarter of the century the American Revolution, the
radical movement for reform in Parliament, and later the French Revolu-
tion awakened a new interest in the Athenian experience on the part of
defenders of the political status quo” (192). As a result, during the time of
William Mitford, “there emerged a conservative polemical strategy of por-
traying the ends of the American revolt and of the Yorkshire Association
reform movement as democratic in character and then decrying democracy
through enumeration of the disasters and crimes of Athens” (192). But by
doing that, they made Greek history a legitimate medium for discussing
government and politics. “Just as concerns with the Bible determined the
nineteenth-century criticism of Homer, the problems of contemporary po-
litical debate shaped the writing of Greek history. In nineteenth-century
England Greek history would always mean political history that was as pro-
foundly involved with the present as with the past” (194). Positive views of
Greece did not emerge until the History of Greece (1835–47, 8 vols.) by
Connop Thirlwall, Bishop of St. David’s, and A History of Greece (1845–56,
12 vols.) by the banker turned radical MP George Grote.86 In his History of
Greece (1785–1810), written at the suggestion of Edward Gibbon, “Mitford
had condemned modern liberal democratic politics by equating it with the
lawlessness of ancient Athens. A half-century later Grote reversed the anal-
ysis. He vindicated democratic Athens by arguing that it had achieved the
kind of stability and constitutional morality that the British liberal state
enjoyed in the mid-Victorian age” (216). At the same time, even during the
first half of the nineteenth century, no major general history of Greece
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appeared in Germany, France, or Italy. And when such histories were writ-
ten in these countries, the phenomenon lasted for only fifty years. “After
1900 the decline of creative work on Greek history became evident. The age
in which practical politicians and moralists were interested in Greek was
ushered out by Wilamowitz on the one hand and by John Ruskin on the
other” (Momigliano 1966: 67). Literary and anthropological studies be-
came more attractive. Greece had no political relevance and an overview of
Greek history was not important, even though scholarly work (in papyrol-
ogy, philology, or archaeology) continued. An eminent historian could
complain in 1952 that “the study of Greek political ideas has become in-
creasingly divorced from the study of political events and institutions”
(69). The Hellenic, after losing its monopoly over culture, has been identi-
fied in the twentieth century with the dreaded political element and per-
ceived as a threat, symbolizing the danger not of lawlessness but of the
barbarism feared by Auerbach.
Positive views of Greek political history, even before the appearance of
British revisionary studies, were affected by another development. Inspired
by the adoration of Greece in the second half of the eighteenth century, a
number of diaspora writers and merchants, who had often been Ottoman
subjects, began seriously reconsidering their identity and political role. “In
a bold geopolitical calculation Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians of the
Ottoman Empire decided in the eighteenth century to orient their ethnic
community to a new point of reference—the West. Realizing that the
power center was no longer the Ottoman Empire, nor even the Russian
Empire, they sought access instead to the expanding capitalist states of
Europe. The Greek intellectual and mercantile elites, located throughout
central and Western Europe, took a gamble on achieving modernization by
means of nationalism. . . . They raced to modernize their ethnic commu-
nity by introducing into Greece the features emblematic of Western Euro-
pean societies. Chief amongst them was a secular culture, a realm of shared
experiences which would replace the ethno-religious identities of the Otto-
man Empire and act as a new source of bonding. It would offset local loyal-
ties and linguistic variations by harmonizing them in an imaginary realm of
national community” (Jusdanis 1991). It seems that the diaspora elites ini-
tially considered three options: staying with the declining Ottoman Em-
pire, joining the rising Russian (Orthodox) one, or adopting the capitalist
enterprise of parliamentary democracy. The majority soon embraced the
last option, and the Hellenic fervor naturally emerged as a potentially major
force of legitimation. Thus the diaspora bourgeoisie, in cooperation with
its many contacts on the Greek mainland, decided to claim the Hellenic for
itself. This is how modern Greeks invented themselves as Hellenes and
appeared on the scene of history, causing a tremendous stir in the liberal
artistic and intellectual imagination of the time. “By tapping the current of
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philhellenism they strove to bring modern Greece to European attention.
Their enterprise was successful to the extent that modern Greece was and
is regarded as a special case in comparison with other countries on the
margins of Europe. The declaration of the War of Independence of 1821,
for instance, initiated the most fashionably international cause of the cen-
tury, a pan-European phenomenon rivaling that of the Spanish Civil War
in the following century. The passion with which liberal Europeans sup-
ported the struggles of the Greeks may be contrasted to the indifference
they showed to the revolts of the Serbians, Bulgarians, and Armenians.
None of those ethnic groups could elicit the same concern, let alone the
logistical aid of the Europeans; unlike the Greeks they could not relate
their own nationalist designs to the core of European identity. The dis-
course of European Hellenism allowed Greeks access to Europe unavailable
to other nations. The only other people to make a similar appeal to the
West were the Zionists. While Greeks laid claim to the cultural and secular
roots of Western civilization, the Zionists exploited the foundational role
of the Hebrew Bible in the Judeo-Christian tradition” (Jusdanis 1991).87
For a brief period, during no more than the first thirty years of the nine-
teenth century, people around the world who had been inspired by the
watersheds of the American and French revolutions saw with exhilaration
nothing less than the eternal Hellas rise from the ashes and break the
shackles of slavery. Thus it was “the philhellenic movement which, in the
19th century, occupied what might be called the ‘radical wing’ of the Ro-
mantic movement. Philhellenism tended to share the Romantic rejection
of urban industrialization, the universalism and rationality of the Enlight-
enment, and the French Revolution. On the other hand, while the main-
stream of Romanticism turned towards the medieval past and Chris-
tianity—especially Catholicism—Philhellenes were sometimes religious
sceptics or atheists, and political radicals. As young men, for instance,
Hegel and Friedrich Schlegel loved the Greeks, but as they grew older and
increasingly conservative they turned to Christianity” (Bernal 1987: 289).
Almost any politicization of the intellectuals involved (or sometimes was
even inspired by) the Greek revolt.
Not that the progressives were completely enthusiastic about the Greeks
they began encountering. “The Philhellenes were more concerned with the
Classical Greeks than with their heroic, but superstitious, Christian and
dirty ‘descendants,’ whom some tried to explain away as ‘Byzantine Slavs’
[Jacob Philipp Fallmerayer]” (292). Most of them supported the Greek
struggle of independence believing that “the sacred theocracy of the Beau-
tiful must dwell in a free state, and that state must have a place on earth”
(Hölderlin 1984: 108), the one originally destined for it. In their eyes, liber-
ated Greece appeared as the incarnated artwork, art made life. All those
committed to the Hellenic model “approached their subjects less from an
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interest in the past for its own sake than from a firm conviction that what
they said about Greece would have an impact on contemporary political,
religious, philosophical, and moral discourse” (Turner 1981: 7). (That was
generally the case with humanistic scholarship before professional special-
ization.) Many Philhellenes, though, were more willing to include political
factors in their evaluation: “The modern Greek is the descendant of those
glorious beings whom the imagination almost refuses to figure to itself as
belonging to our kind, and he inherits much of their sensibility, their rapid-
ity of conception, their enthusiasm and their courage. If in many instances
he is degraded by moral and political slavery to the practice of the basest
vices it engenders—and that below the level of ordinary degradation—let
us reflect that the corruption of the best produces the worst, and that hab-
its which subsist only in relation to a peculiar state of social institution may
be expected to cease as soon as that relation is dissolved” (Shelley 1898:
99–100).
Above all, Greece was the symbol of the general revival of liberty—the
total, magnificent happening of emancipation. Shelley wrote in 1821, in
the “Preface” to his drama Hellas: “This is the age of the war of the op-
pressed against the oppressors, and every one of those ringleaders of the
privileged gangs of murderers and swindlers, called sovereigns, look to each
other for aid against the common enemy, and suspend their mutual jeal-
ousies in the presence of a mightier fear. Of this holy alliance all the des-
pots of the earth are virtual members” (100–1). It was during those years
that the Hellenic and the political converged for concrete historical rea-
sons, and again only for a brief period. Soon after the creation of the Greek
state in 1829, Prince Otto, the seventeen-year-old son of King Ludwig of
Bavaria, was offered the “hereditary sovereignty” of Greece and was dis-
patched with the task of re-civilizing the land of Homer. What has been
called “the tyranny of the . . . European experience over that of Greek an-
tiquity” (Turner 1981: 8) was firmly extended to the modern country as
well. Thus while Jews were challenged to modernize a tradition, overcome
ethnic differentiation, contribute to universal culture, and assimilate into
the dominant society, modern Greeks were challenged to modernize a na-
tion, define ethnic distinction, create national culture, and separate from
the empire. In both cases, the promise of emancipation was irresistible and
the interpretive labor spent enormous. (The tremendous cost for the two
peoples and the respective results, however, cannot be examined here.)
In the meantime, while Jews and Greeks were preoccupied with their
formidable struggles for recognition, another ideological development re-
defined the character and context of their effort almost before they had the
time to understand its implications: the fabrication of race. The Aryans and
the Semites, the archetypes of race, were invented in the late eighteenth
century. “With the establishment of the Indo-European language family a
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new concept emerged, that of two master-races, the Aryans and the Sem-
ites. These were seen in perpetual dialectic. The Semites had given the
world religion and poetry, and the Aryans manliness, democracy, philoso-
phy, science, etc.” (Bernal 1985: 68–69).88 According to the new historical
understanding, inspired by comparative linguistics, civilization was a dia-
logue between the two equals. “Thus as Humboldt and others created their
linguistic hierarchies, inflected Semitic was put on the same top rung as
Indo-European, which justified the widespread mid-nineteenth-century
view of history as a dialogue between Aryans and Semites” (Bernal 1986:
44). The poles of the Hebraic-Hellenic distinction were transformed into
two races—two categories rather than two modes, two natures rather than
two qualities. The two master races were considered equal for a long time,
as “the idea of a common origin for the Aryans and the Semites was still
acceptable in the 1840s. It became less acceptable as the century wore on,
but persisted until the climax of anti-Semitism in the 1920s and 30s” (Ber-
nal 1987: 255). Furthermore, from the beginning, the Aryans were different
from the Semites but modeled themselves on the other race (Olender
1989), competing with them for election by opposing providence to escha-
tology. At the same time, those who fully identified with the Aryans had
the worst contempt for both their contemporary Jews and Greeks alike,
whom they considered, for different reasons, degenerate. The author of the
Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines (1853–55, 4 vols.) is a representative
case: “For Gobineau saw Greek history as a struggle between the Aryan
Greek spirit based to the north of Thebes, and the Semitic spirit of the
south, both being reinforced by their racial cousins from outside the coun-
try. . . . It must be noted, however, that despite his enthusiasm for the
character and institutions of the Aryan Hellenes, Gobineau was convinced
that Ancient Greece as a whole had been thoroughly ‘blackened’ and
‘Semitized.’ He was among those who maintained that the modern Greeks
were so mongrelized that they could no longer be considered as descen-
dants of the Ancients” (Bernal 1987: 361–62). When the Hellenic Alien is
encountered in Greece, he is treated like any other outsider—as a Barbar-
ian. The German preference for the trip to Italy was based on a deep aver-
sion. As Victor Bérard wrote in 1894: “This European chauvinism becomes
a veritable fanaticism when it is not in Gaul, Etruria, Lucania or Thrace but
in Greece that we meet the stranger” (quoted in Bernal 1987: 379).
There is nothing especially paradoxical or immoral about the Eurocen-
tric biases of Philhellenism when examined in the socio-political context
which produced the truth of “Greece” to support specific narratives and
interests. “Although the Hellenic revival of the nineteenth century in-
volved an international community of scholars and writers, many of whom
appealed to the wisdom of Greece in terms of a universal human experi-
ence or some concept of uniform human nature, the study and interpreta-
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tion of Greek antiquity nonetheless occurred within the context of national
intellectual communities whose characters bore the distinctive imprints of
their respective political structures, university organization, and religious
confession. In each of these intellectual communities the exploration and
criticism of Greek life reflected the particular political, religious, and philo-
sophical preoccupations of the national culture” (Turner 1981: 8–9). (It
is the failure to recognize the constitutive operations of the Hebraism-
Hellenism dynamic that creates the dominant impression of an unblem-
ished, idolized Hellas—or a neglected, maligned Israel.) Auerbach’s essay is
a recent example in this long tradition. His Homeric-Biblical distinction
repeats the dialectical tension of other modern oppositions, like Schiller’s
naive-sentimental, Hölderlin’s Hellenic-Hesperian, Lukács’ epic-novel or
even Nietzsche’s Apollonian-Dionysian. Indeed, as Nietzsche’s model re-
minds us, the Hebraic-Hellenic polarity has even operated within the ideal
of Hellas itself, which is in turn split into a Hebraic and a Hellenic part.
This is the reason why so often, from Winckelmann and Hamann to Stefan
George (1868–1933) and Rainer Maria Rilke (1875–1926), two types of at-
titude and two forms of beauty—the serene and the ecstatic—have been
discovered in Greece. The invention of the Dionysian, for example, goes
back to Christoph Martin Wieland (1733–1813) and his work of the 1760s.
“Winckelmann, Hamann, and Herder had already discovered, compre-
hended, and formulated the concept of the Dionysian long before [Nietz-
sche]. Novalis and Hölderlin united it with Christian elements in the form
of poetic inspiration; Heinrich Heine and Robert Hamerling, a much-read
novelist in Nietzsche’s time, anticipated his famous antithesis ‘Dionysus
versus the Crucified One’; and in the research of the German Romantics in
the areas of mythology and classical antiquity the antithesis Apollonian-
Dionysian had been employed for decades. Friedrich Creuzer and Johann
Jakob Bachofen had written voluminous works in which they placed the
Greek, Egyptian, and Indian mysteries under the sway of Dionysus, and
approximately sixty years before Nietzsche, in the Philosophy of Mythology
. . . and the Philosophy of Revelation . . . , had described the development of
the Greek spirit on the basis of the concept of a threefold Dionysus and had
formulated the concept of the Dionysian, in contrast to the Apollonian, as
an unrestrained, intoxicated power of creation in the artist and the poetic
genius” (Baeumer 1976: 166). Especially through their theories of tragedy,
these authors seek to establish a new harmony—the reunification of gods
with Jesus, antiquity with Christianity, simplicity with passion, poetry with
religion. It is probably in Heine’s Gods in Exile (1854) that the picture
is for the first time entirely negative, the god terrifying and destructive:
“The synthesis Dionysus-Christ is transposed to the antithesis Dionysus-
Christian, which corresponds to Heine’s antithetical formulation Hellenic-
Nazarene” (174).89 For Auerbach too, who constructed his antithesis along
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Biblical lines, the Hellenic was clearly dangerous. His opposition was be-
tween the complex, inner, three-dimensional world of reflexive maturity
and historical experience, and the simple, outer, two-dimensional world of
innocent naiveté and mythical superstition. The danger inherent in the
second pole, he argues, became manifest again in his time, the time of
confusion and modernism, when the totalitarianism of order and hierarchy
came back to claim Western heritage.
Auerbach feels that this is an age comprising events of such quality and
magnitude that they are necessarily the material of history, not of legend,
and therefore they deserve the realistic treatment dictated by the Biblical,
not the mythical mode expressed in the Greek epic. In our time, he implies,
now that human experience has been invaded by raw history, the under-
standing of reality must change. His model of such understanding is Bibli-
cal interpretation, which he both applies to, and discovers in the literary
canon. Auerbach rereads the canon in order to change our understanding
of it, and ultimately, through a different grasp of the basic representational
modes, our sense of reality itself. His main argument is that our sense of
reality is still heavily influenced by the Greek model of genealogical leg-
ends, based on analytical observation of static representations of being, and
lacking in psychological depth, historical background, and dramatic com-
plexity. It is as if the success of literature has overshadowed the Bible, the
triumph of interpretation has made faith impossible. “The problem we
face, strangely enough, is not that we cannot define Scripture but that
having gradually redefined fiction in the light of Scripture we now find it
hard to distinguish between them” (Hartman 1986: 12). The same argu-
ment could be made about all literature. The method of figural interpreta-
tion, which discovers the prefigured fulfillment, can help recover the Bibli-
cal perspective by pointing to this alternative through its best (literary)
representations. “The patristic practice of typology, despite its frequently
anti-Jewish point, is absolutely continuous with midrash and pesher; that
is, it is rooted in the figure of Jesus as the sectarian midrashist who appro-
priates the sacred text, seeing its meaning in its application to himself”
(Bruns 1987: 635). Auerbach’s alternative reality to a world he accuses of
worshiping Greek idols is the Jewish experience of the faith in God and of
the prophetic interpretation of his Word.
In light of this project of the religious reeducation of mankind through
literary reading, the popularity of interpretation (in different critical
schools, from hermeneutics to deconstruction) during the last quarter of
the twentieth century appears as a not-so-recent intellectual phenome-
non.90 Auerbach already argued for the centrality of interpretation, calling
it “a method rooted in Jewish tradition” (Auerbach 1953: 48) and using it
as the proper critical approach, dictated by the Bible itself. According to his
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survey, early Christianity employed it to revise and appropriate the Hebrew
Bible. Later, the Church Fathers in the West developed it as a specific
method to ground the New Testament in Jewish prophecy and connect
Christian dogma with Biblical tradition. The Reformation signalled a new
return to it, whereby the Bible was recognized as the paramount expression
of Jewish history and law. Finally, in the nineteenth century its influence
reached deep into literature and its modes of representation, and gave us
realist fiction as a historical understanding of the world which itself de-
mands an interpretive approach.
As such a survey shows, in the Hebraic reading the book internalizes and
fixes everything. “Or it disappears entirely in favor of a pure and literal
recitation forbidding the slightest change, addition, or commentary. . . . Or
else interpretation survives but becomes internal to the book itself, which
loses its circulatory function for outside elements: for example, the differ-
ent types of coded interpretation are fixed according to axes internal to the
book; interpretation is organized according to correspondences between
two books, such as the Old and New Testaments, and may even induce a
third book suffused by the same element of interiority. Finally, interpreta-
tion may reject all intermediaries or specialists and become direct, since
the book is written both in itself and in the heart, once as a point of subjec-
tification and again in the subject (the Reformation conception of the
book)” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 127). Auerbach suggests that both our
understanding and our representation of reality must be based on the Bibli-
cal mode if we want to know ourselves historically, rather than mythically,
and order our world according to democratic and egalitarian, not hierarchic
and totalitarian, principles. The contribution of philology and literary criti-
cism to this project of emancipation is the interpretive method, the search
for universals in the historicity of texts, events, and phenomena.91 His de-
scendants agree: “The subtle tyranny of secularization theories has made us
forget till recently the analogy between criticism and theological discourse”
(Hartman 1980: 180). Many of them have been working to make this anal-
ogy of the two branches of Protestant interpretation explicit and central for
contemporary culture.92
The interpretive method has also been expected, at least since the avant-
garde attacks on the institution of art, to compensate for the loss of the
public cultural sphere at the time of World War I by transcending politics.
From the emergence of taste with British Neo-classicism through its apoth-
eosis in the Viennese culture of intellectual “circles,” it was possible to seek
bourgeois harmony in a world of shared feelings, positions, attitudes or
public spaces that redeemed the guilt of profit, pacified dissent, celebrated
intellectual liberalism, and discredited social unrest. With the disappear-
ance of the general cultivated public (and the emergence of the educated
masses), what is the “function” and “context” of criticism? The modernist
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and post-modernist writer, critic, or academic responds: “The simplest way
to put it is that it provides us with shared texts. We can’t live unmediated
with each other and, for the sake of the intellect as well as the imagination,
need passwords. Some are complicated exchanges. I myself—it may be my
own defect—cannot conceive of this taking place without the sharing of
texts. That’s enough of a social context for me, because as soon as you sit
around a table and share a text, you are within a social context. You may go
beyond that and say ‘Is it the Yeshiva kind of sitting around?’ or is it some
other kind, and then you do get to institutional analysis, but I think the
‘abc’ of it is that you agree to study texts together, you discover that these
texts are interrelated, that one text has been behind many things” (Hart-
man 1987: 94). For the Western artist and theorist, the only safe thing left
to share is the text, the practice of reading texts, the site created by inter-
pretation: “[W]e are all, still and always, aware of the Crisis, convinced that
‘interventions’ are necessary and that the least of texts is immediately ‘ef-
fective’ [‘opératoire’]; we all think, as if it went without saying, that politics
passes through the literary (or the theoretical)” (Lacoue-Labarthe and
Nancy 1988: 16–17). After the public covenant of interpretation collapsed,
only the contract of “sitting around” common texts, only the consensus of
commentary93 and the standpoint of redemption94 can provide mediation,
a sense of order, the possibility of community—a “textual community”
(Brian Stock). If that is achieved, if people consent to study (as opposed to,
say, demonstrate) together, then above this community of interpreters de-
scends the mystery of (no longer just shared but) interrelated texts, and
finally the one revealed text, the canonic book, like the one studied in “the
Yeshiva kind of sitting around” or promoted by Mimesis. Fulfilling its
promise (to Hebraic thinkers like T. S. Eliot, Edmund Husserl, Ferruccio
Busoni, or Viktor Shklovsky) to overcome politics, interpretation no longer
proclaims or prepares for emancipation but itself becomes the absolute
one.
We saw earlier that Auerbach’s survey of the literary canon serves two
major ideological purposes in the realm of philology: it portrays the canon
as the secular Bible of the Christian West, where a Biblical realism is an-
nounced and prefigured; and it presents Mimesis as the Bible of criticism,
which unfolds the drama of the verbal art. In Auerbach’s work for the first
time “criticism has usurped the place and character of the sacred Book”
(Needler 1982: 404) while claiming it is only serving the authority of that
Book. A third purpose of the survey is to outline a theological theory of
literature that shows the modes of Jewish religion opposing the tropes of
Greek idolatry. Auerbach composes the history of Western literature as a
theodicy, vindicating the justice of God in respect to Greek evil pleasures.
Our true reality is Biblical, he argues, because our world is God’s; we should
then comprehend and represent it Biblically; our literature too, as well as
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its understanding, should be Biblical. To read it is to interpret either the
word of God or the word of man about the works of God, and both acts of
interpretation must respect the reality represented therein (or its prefig-
urations). Auerbach does not mention the name of God: God himself is not
to be named or represented (as it is done in the Greek mode), only his
world. This representation, however, must be the appropriate one, respect-
ing human limitations: it must be Biblical, that is, historical, in the sense
of recording and reflecting the history of the people of God in his world.
Auerbach’s theory of literature (and language) is theological, theocentric,
and theocratic, stemming from (his understanding of) the Biblical inter-
pretive tradition. In it, Lukács’ anxiety over homelessness and belatedness
is effectively countered: while Lukács writes about the Fall, Auerbach
writes about the Promised Land. Still, for both critics literature is the
Book, criticism is interpretation, and aesthetics is theology: they are theo-
logians of the secular Word, attending to its sacred meaning in a faithless
age.95 “The accreted, promissory narrative we call Scripture is composed of
tokens that demand the continuous and precarious intervention of succes-
sive generations of interpreters, who must keep the words as well as the
faith” (Hartman 1986: 17). The covenant of interpretation protects the
authority of monotheism in a churchless world.
The impact of Auerbach’s treatise has been tremendous96 in that it
brought the historicity of Higher Criticism into the era of formalism by
reclaiming successfully the theological heritage of stylistics. Thanks largely
to its influence, the devotion of literary criticism to the Bible,97 since the
1940s, has taken three main directions: first, the analysis of aesthetic fea-
tures and qualities in the Scripture (Alter 1981, especially 127–30, where
mourning scenes from the Iliad and the David story are compared; also
Alter 1985), often with particular attention to relevant pedagogical needs
(Robertson 1977: 16–32 compares both Exodus 1–15, as a “comedy,” and
the Gospel of Mark to The Bacchae); second, the study of a specific literary
oeuvre, school, trend, or period on the basis of its Biblical inspiration and
resources (Damrosch 1985); and third, the exploration of large areas of the
Western tradition according to interpretive rules derived from the Bible
(Schneidau 1976).98 In many of these works the Hebraic-Hellenic compari-
son predictably influences the approach or the selection of texts. Its corre-
sponding presence in the (American, at least) curriculum seems to be
equally strong (as in the course “Humanities 1. The Foundations of West-
ern Civilization: Israel and Greece,” offered, according to its 1986 bro-
chure, by the Judaic Studies Program at the University of California, San
Diego). Given its pervasive nomothetic and educational influence, it is
only fair to say about Mimesis that “the book stands as a monument to that
postwar phenomenon that may be called ‘NATO humanism’ and that sur-
vives in the countless ‘Great Books’ courses of our curricula: the organiza-
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tion and teaching of a politicocultural view of the West as a continuous
and ultimately consistent body of thought and discourse, the hallmarks of
which are historical progress, democratic liberalism, a faith in individual
man, and a tolerance of multiple gods. In this context, Auerbach’s Mimesis
continues to do service as an immensely useful—indeed, uncontested—
pedagogic tool in this popular dissemination of literary high culture”
(Bahti 1985: 127). Thus even before a new wave of Puritanism took power
and office in the West in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the
anti-Hellenism of literary and humanistic studies in general, from Auer-
bach to Derrida, was preparing the ground for (and has contributed to) its
legitimization.
In order to be heard in a world suspicious of preaching after the depar-
ture of gods, the theology of secular writing needs to conceal its nature. So
it becomes Theory, and conjures up the spectre of a primordial otherness99
and the spectacle of a gigantomachy between good and evil, illumination
and darkness, freedom and slavery. The struggle for mastery over human
destiny is articulated and debated in terms of the Hebraism-Hellenism op-
position.100 In this Wagnerian spectacle, theory dramatizes its emancipa-
tory promise, the annunciation of autonomy as the independence (or, in
populist rhetoric, resistance) of interpretation, where interpretation means
aesthetic attitude as politics—both action and goal, praxis and redemp-
tion. Regardless of their specific function, the Hebraic is the Other of the
same, the other side of Western identity, the irreconcilable difference
which both questions and affirms this identity; while the Hellenic is the
alien element, the source of all alienation, the strange pharmakon which
disrupts the rites of interpretation as the latter is celebrating the commu-
nion of reading. Some fatalistically accept the gigantomachy: “There is,
then, no way of eluding the burden except by adding to it: by fighting the
Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns all over again in a historical chaos
where nothing is definitely obsolete. The practical critic may be blind to
what he is doing and the hermeneuticist too aware, but each interpretation
of a work of art is gained only by struggling with a chaos of texts that is
called, euphemistically, tradition or, more neutrally, literary history” (Hart-
man 1980: 239). Some reject it vehemently: “Our most famous critics—
Northrop Frye, Wayne Booth, Geoffrey Hartman, Hugh Kenner, Harold
Bloom—are promoters of religion. They do not, as is often claimed, make
literature a substitute for religion. Rather, they make religion a substitute
for literature. . . . Religion is the most potent repressive force in America
today, but teachers of literature do not raise their voices against it—think-
ing it irrelevant but all the while honouring the Hartmans and Fryes who
promote religious values and attitudes” (Culler 1984: 1328). Others boldly
contribute to it: Auerbach, for example, constructs, through his reading of
one passage from the Odyssey, a Greek model of representation (and a
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picture of the entire Greek civilization) on which he then proceeds to
blame all human excess, from ancient hedonism to contemporary fascism.
His survey remains throughout fraught with the haunting Hellenic back-
ground. The Homeric mode is the sheer negativity against which the Bibli-
cal acquires its apocalyptic power to save humanity from the sins of form
and pleasure.
The fabrication of the Hellenic serves this purpose: without its alienat-
ing function, without its radically extrinsic existence as Alien, the defense
of the Hebraic way would not be possible. By catastrophically invoking its
ominous promise of beauty and harmony, Auerbach suggests that it is
time for civilization to repent and seek atonement: paganism must be
abrogated. Scholars have praised Auerbach’s decision to start his book
with the comparison since they agree that “the contrast between the Bible
and Homer signifies two basic, though opposite, types of conceiving the
world—and the word. In the contingent world of Hebrew thought, one
must not look to nature for ultimate reality, but to the divine creative word
which simultaneously reveals and conceals the hidden God, and He is not
to be identified with nature, or any of its forms. The text claims an absolute
authority in Hebraic thought which it could not possibly possess for the
Greeks” (Handelman 1982: 30). Honoring that authority, explanation
should again become interpretation, which is representation, which is repe-
tition: we can repent by representing reality (our historical experience of
God), by reinterpreting the canon, by repeating the Book: the canon is our
history, the Book our reality. Mimesis, with its universal teaching (which
brings to mind the quietistic piety of Thomas à Kempis), is the Imitation
of Yahweh in the realm of literary studies. With it, the moderation of older
comparisons has been lost. It used to be possible to see the Hebraic and the
Hellenic as equal, even though priority was generally given to the former.101
After the Hebraization of the cultural sphere with Modernism, after
Scholem’s messianic history prevailed in Benjamin’s thought over Brecht’s
epic theater, the opposition could only be portrayed as a rivalry.102 The
“split between Greek cognition and Hebraic spirituality” is now perceived
as war and gives rise to strong feelings of Hebraic tribalism and triumphan-
tism: “Christian, Moslem, Jew, or their mixed descendants, we are children
of Abraham and not of Achilles” (Bloom 1986: 3). The battle of the books
has turned into a campaign of anti-Hellenism (sometimes driven by an
alarming, post-Nietzschean enthusiasm for Jacob Burckhardt’s antipathy
to democracy and admiration for aristocracy).
Consider Black Athena by Martin Bernal. Its first volume is a solid critique
of the ideology informing the field of classics. The author convincingly
exposes its Eurocentric bias and the political (national, racial, and colonial)
purposes it has served. At the same time, he revives the Hellenistic and
92 CHAPTER ONE
early Christian practice of arguing that the Greeks have stolen everything
from the Hebrews, or from the Orient in general. To buttress this idea,
Bernal resorts to sensationalism: he manipulates his terminology according
to audience demands;103 he plays the role of the pariah;104 he conjures up
enemies;105 he uses messianic language.106 Thanks to his rhetoric (as well as
the popularity of essentialist affirmations of difference), he has succeeded
where others failed:107 the reception of his book has been overwhelming108
(notably in Afrocentric high school and college programs). Nevertheless,
there are even more disturbing questions. Although Bernal complains that
in the past the positions of certain classicists were dismissed because they
were Jews, because people thought that those classicists had a “vested in-
terest” in the positions they defended (Bernal 1989: 19–20), he uses the
same criterion when he makes sure to identify the Jews among the scholars
he discusses. He cannot see that, like those he justifiably criticizes for dis-
crimination, he is connecting ethnicity and scholarship—with the only dif-
ference that, since he happens to agree with the rejected positions, Jewish-
ness for him becomes a positive quality.109
Bernal grants the Kuhnian principle that “at least in the humanities,
there is no scholarship that can stand outside the social and intellectual
paradigms held by the community or communities to which the scholar
belongs” (Bernal 1985: 66). Thus he is often able to place classicist inven-
tions in their historical context: “Increased [Jewish] self-confidence,
though largely reflected in Zionism and religious revival, has had as a
byproduct an attempt to restore the Phoenicians” (69). On the other hand,
the closer he comes to the time of his writing, the more he forgets the
impact of dominant discourses on his own project. Here is another point:
“It was not until the mid 1970s that Jewish scholars, notably Cyrus Gordon
and Michael Astour, who had begun to demonstrate the close and funda-
mental connections between the cultures of the Levant and the Aegean,
started to be taken seriously. Externally, they were helped by the rise of
Israel as a bastion of European culture in the face of the resurgent ‘Third
World’” (Bernal 1986: 54). Bernal does not seem to suspect that he may be
part of the same trend, since “Black Athena is essentially concerned with
the Egyptian and Semitic roles in the formation of Greece in the Middle
and Late Bronze Ages” (Bernal 1987: 22).
It is unfortunate that his effort to highlight the role of the Phoenicians
in the formation of Greece relies as much on the Hebraism-Hellenism op-
position as the anti-Semitic historiography he criticizes. He has indeed
admitted the Hebraic character of the project. When he was asked in an
interview about the movement to prove that the Phoenicians and the Ca-
naanites were the parents of the Greeks and by implication of the Europe-
ans, his response was revealing: “There is such a movement, it is true. It
started around the 1920s by some Zionists who reacted to Orthodox Juda-
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ism and tried to connect with the land of Palestine. . . . Now as far as I am
concerned, the person who influenced me most was a Jew but anti-Zionist:
Michael Astour. And I think that for him and in some way for me the
pro-Phoenician view is a way out to avoid religious Judaism and Zionism.
It is the third way” (Kiosse 1987: 63).110 As a critic had to remind him,
though, the third way, the way of culture and scholarship, does not have to
lead into Hellenic territory: “The forces of Israeli and Black American self-
assertion, championing Semitic and Pharaonic legacies, lie behind his proj-
ect of historical revision. These two causes are even less readily compatible
than the Chinese and Vietnamese combination where his interests started”
(Anderson 1987).111 There is obviously an emancipatory promise in all
this—a liberal vision of a fair world: “The political purpose of Black Athena
is, of course, to lessen European cultural arrogance” (Bernal 1987: 73). Ber-
nal appeals to his colleagues’ sensitivity toward racial issues when he argues
that “the scheme set out in Black Athena is better on ethical grounds, that
it is more congenial to our general preferences—to the general liberal pref-
erences of academia—than that of the Aryan Model” (Bernal 1989: 25). His
own treatment of Greek civilization, though, lacks even a requisite aca-
demic respect for cultural specificity.
Bernal almost never takes into account the ancient Greek socio-political
context: reading factual statements empirically in Greek texts, he cannot
discern the operative discourse.112 He therefore takes texts at face value and
assumes that the authors indeed believed what they said. “The analysis of
context that Professor Bernal has provided so ably in his consideration of
modern historiography he has neglected to do for his ancient sources. Pro-
fessor Bernal has removed the production of his literary texts from their
social setting” (Green 1989: 59).113 The reason for this neglect is his viru-
lent anti-Hellenism. During the period of “fabrication” he surveys, from
the 1780s to the present, he sees every expression of interest in Greece as
a position for or against the Ancient Model that he thinks had prevailed
until then. It is as if every Western view of Greece has been determined by
one’s view of a Near Eastern civilization—Egyptian, Phoenician, Turkish,
etc. The possibility that certain Westerners chose to look at Greece be-
cause that culture appealed to them more than others (rather than because
they were looking for ways of denigrating the others) is never enter-
tained.114 He might have considered, for example, “simply the sociological
gap between the citizen polis as an institutional form—that which made
Greek civilisation truly distinctive in a world-historical perspective—and
either the Phoenician towns, coastal variants of a millennial line of Meso-
potamian city-states, or the Pharaonic empires of Egypt. What was ‘classi-
cal’ about classical Greece, after all, was not its language or its religion—
Athena white, black or brown—but its politics, philosophy and art. To set
Greek history in its proper Near Eastern context is a necessary antidote to
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all miraculism; but to resolve it into that context would be a no less implau-
sible reductionism” (Anderson 1987). But Bernal has no patience with any-
thing that may distinguish Greece. In his scenario of conspiracy, the story
of Greece was fabricated by racist Romantics and post-Romantics who be-
lieved in progress and used it to justify their devaluation and colonization
of Semitic cultures. This point is made particularly clear in his dismissive
treatment of the revolution against the Ottoman Empire. Bernal describes
the Philhellenic fever that responded to the Greek War of Independence in
1821 in this way: “In such an atmosphere of hysteria there was no room for
the Egyptians as founders of civilization. Continental feelings became still
more intense. Turkish rule in Greece and the Balkans began to be seen as
unnatural” (Bernal 1986: 25). Should it have continued, perhaps, to be seen
as natural, so that the Egyptian reputation could be preserved? Similarly,
when he claims, disregarding its radical tradition he has acknowledged else-
where, that “Philhellenism has always had Aryan and racist connotations”
(Bernal 1987: 387), isn’t he condemning support for a liberation movement
comparable to those contemporary ones he seems to espouse?115 It is cer-
tainly true that in the eighteenth century Greece “benefited from racism,
immediately and in every way; and it was rapidly seen as the ‘childhood’ of
the ‘dynamic’ ‘European race’” (189). But it also happens to be true that
Greece benefited from the revolutionary convictions and politics of the
time, aligning itself with the cause of liberation that had not been com-
pletely subsumed under Schiller’s contract of aesthetic education.
It is exactly in exchange for giving up direct political engagement that
Western readers have been granted aesthetic (or disinterested interpretive,
i.e., self-policed) autonomy.116 Over the centuries of modernity, the possi-
bilities of public engagement have taken diverse political directions and
have been repeatedly controlled, less often by coercion than by concessions
of increased social autonomy. The force that had to be contained over and
over again is power—the interests of autonomy. It was finally with the
Hellenic contract of humanism that the Hebraic politics of community
succeeded in completely separating quests for autonomy from questions of
power. “By humanism I mean the totality of discourse through which
Western man is told: ‘Even though you don’t exercise power, you can still
be a ruler. Better yet, the more you deny yourself the exercise of power, the
more you submit to those in power, then the more this increases your sov-
ereignty.’ Humanism invented a whole series of subjected sovereignties:
the soul (ruling the body, but subject to God), consciousness (sovereign in
a context of judgment, but subjected to the necessities of truth), the indi-
vidual (a titular control of personal rights subjected to the laws of nature
and society), basic freedom (sovereign within, but accepting the demands
of an outside world and ‘aligned with destiny’). In short, humanism is
everything in Western civilization that restricts the desire for power” (Fou-
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cault 1977a: 221). The humanities has educated the masses of readers in
acting as an audience, namely, in docility, through the aestheticization of
emancipation. Marx’s infamous dictum makes arguably better sense if we
replace religion with its modern secular equivalent: “〈The aesthetic〉 is the
general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in
popular form, its spiritual point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanc-
tion, its solemn complement, its universal basis for consolation and jus-
tification. It is the imaginary realization of the human essence, because the
human essence possesses no true reality. . . . 〈The aesthetic〉 is the sigh of
the oppressed creature, the feeling of a heartless world and the soul of
soulless circumstances. It is the opium of the people” (Marx 1971: 116).
At the same time, the “culture of critical discourse,” of the specialists
of interpretation, with its self-grounded claims to authority, has achieved
a high level of “context independence” thanks to its “theoreticity” (Gould-
ner 1979), its capacity to turn those claims into norms of “good speech,”
into rules of autonomous reflexivity.117 The problem remains, though, that
the aesthetic ideal, interpretation elevated from exercise to attitude,
“grants Modernity its autonomy only on the terms on which Modernity
accepts Antiquity” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1988: 50) as its model and
rival, relative and stranger, resident and alien. The result is autopathy. The
neurosis of History. The anxiety of emancipation. Hebraization of culture:
“Western revisionism. Or that large subject we haven’t got a name for, that
has to do with both the glory and the horror, not only of Western literature,
but of Western culture: which is the deep split between the fact that its
religion and its morality are Hebraic-Christian, and its cognition and aes-
thetics—and therefore its dominant imaginative forms—are Greek”
(Bloom 1987: 68). Fortunately this is not the case for everyone in the world,
as the polarity would have us believe: the Iliad can still be read as a Carib-
bean epic (Walcott 1990) without the help of distinctions between “bibli-
cal narrative based on resentment and mythical narrative based on desire”
(Gans 1985: 203) which ultimately rely on figurae and universals. But to
those who are happy to be explained, emancipated, assimilated into the
civil rites of interpretation, anyone not sharing the aesthetic communion
appears uncivilized and threatening.
The issue acquires great urgency during periods of multiculturalist and
tribal ideals (Maffesoli 1988), when separatist trends (from pan-Arabism to
Central Europeanism, and from “black planet” to “queer nation”) adopt
the morality and rhetoric of “Otherness” to fashion a distinct identity and
to claim recognition. As the semiolytic genealogy of Hebraism and Hellen-
ism shows, the difficulty with this strategy is that, so far as the post-Refor-
mation West is concerned, the model for the Other is always Hebraic: the
essential Other is the Jew who has to pass the test of proficiency in Hellenic
culture in order to be emancipated into the civil society of interpretive
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rights. The advantage of the Hebraic strategy is that it places the party
concerned in the position of the Jew, of “the outsider as insider” (Gay
1968a), of the one who is already part of the dominant identity, although
he remains at the safe distance of “difference” from hegemony. In other
words, (self)proclaimed difference can benefit from its intrinsic relation to
sameness granted by dialectics, the metaphysics of Protestantism. On the
other hand, the Hellenic test can only be passed through failure since it is
commonly acknowledged that the Greeks both cannot and should not be
imitated. It is exactly because they cannot be repeated that the test must
be, so that the promise of emancipation may remain alive and the impe-
rium of modernity may reproduce itself.118
A typical example of the self-defeating enterprise of interpretation is the
response of the Orient to Orientalism. The discourse of Orientalism, which
emerged much later than that of Hellenism,119 defined its object from the
beginning in counter-Hebraic terms. It is no accident that “one of the im-
portant impulses toward the study of the Orient in the eighteenth century
was the revolution in Biblical studies stimulated by such variously interest-
ing pioneers as Bishop Lowth, Eichhorn, Herder, and Michaelis” (Said
1978: 17). The Orient presupposes the Hebraic because the Orient signifies
the non-Western East, the East that is other-than-Hebraic, the Semitic
which cannot be recognized as target of anti-Semitism (27). “Orientalism
is premised upon exteriority” (20), but it is its concrete exteriority to He-
braism, rather than the Occident in general, that defines it. Consequently,
a critic of Orientalism ought not to defend the historical specificity of the
Orient by using the morality and rhetoric of Otherness, since the Other is
always a Hebraic model, the figura of the emancipated Jew of modernity, of
the virtuoso of the culture of atonement, and will therefore lead to formi-
dable Hellenic tests. The “contemporary Manichean theologizing of ‘the
Other’” (Said 1983: 291) can only lead to universal assimilation. An
alternative understanding of independence and pursuit of liberation is nec-
essary, especially in times when the ideals of freedom and revolt attract
little enthusiasm. If the covenant of autonomy, as supported by the twin
discourses of Hebraism and Hellenism, instead of delivering people from
oppression has led to the aesthetic theocracy of interpretation, it may be
time to abandon the two disabling discourses and question not the source,
auto- or hetero-, but the monotheism of nomos itself.
Chapter Two
THE CULTURE OF ATONEMENT
The Gods depart, in sorrowing token
That happy childhood is outgrown;
The leading-strings at length are broken,
The ungrateful world can soar alone.
All lovely form with them was taken
To grace the home whence erst they came;
So was the world by Art forsaken,
And Beauty left us but her name.
—Friedrich Schiller
Like everything today is conscious of being looked at,
looked at by something else but not by God,
and that’s the only way anything can have its own form
and its own character, and . . . and shape and smell,
being looked at by God.
—William Gaddis
THE DIALECTIC OF CAPITALISM
The direction of the project of autonomy, the ultimate project of moder-
nity, depended on its definition of governance: If praxis (including knowl-
edge) aspired to move away from church and court authority, and to
achieve independence, how was it to govern itself? What kind of laws
should it devise and follow? Undertaken by the Reformation, the interpre-
tive approach responded with the law of immanent understanding: if to be
free was to interpret freely, the rules of governance ought to be sought in
the holy orders of reading and the order of holy texts. According to this
approach, the precondition of autonomy was the civil liberation of inter-
pretation. “But it is necessary to note, what has often been forgotten, that
the Reformation meant not the elimination of the Church’s control over
everyday life, but rather the substitution of a new form of control for the
previous one. It meant the repudiation of a control which was very lax, at
that time scarcely perceptible in practice, and hardly more than formal, in
favour of a regulation of the whole of conduct which, penetrating to all
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departments of private and public life, was infinitely burdensome and ear-
nestly enforced” (Weber 1976: 36). Gradually, as this notion of liberation
espoused the Hebraic ideal of emancipation and pursued civil rights, the
initial askesis of capitalist self-regulation evolved into the exercise of bour-
geois self-cultivation under the inspiration of the Hellenic ideal of the aes-
thetic. This became the basis of the social contract of (high) culture: au-
tonomy of self-cultivation as completely differentiated from other spheres
of activity.
This new meaning of freedom demands the absolute grounding of being
in itself according to the law of aesthetic immanence. “What is thought in
the concept is the law of what is real itself. The concept of freedom has
reality when being free as a manner of Being belongs together with the
nature and essential ground of Being. If this is correct, the concept of free-
dom is no longer an arbitrary one. Thus the question of freedom becomes
essentially fundamental. If freedom is a fundamental determination of
Being in general, the project of the scientific world view as a whole in which
freedom is to be comprehended has as its true goal and center ultimately
nothing else than precisely freedom itself. The system to be constructed
does not also contain the concept of freedom among many others, but
freedom is rather the central point of the system. The system itself is ‘the
system of freedom.’ The essential delineation of the fact of freedom founds
the system of philosophy on its real ground” (Heidegger 1985: 21). Hence
the principle of the aesthetic seeks autonomy for autonomy’s sake. When
interpretation becomes disinterested (that is, aesthetic), autonomy is
happy to protect its purity by policing itself. The aesthetic signals the tran-
sition from self-regulated (-controlled) independence to self-supervised
(-disciplined) liberty.
Emancipation succeeded, gaining socio-economic self-sufficiency at the
cost of abandoning historical effectiveness. Meanwhile, aesthetic auton-
omy, the absolute one, allowed for interpretive liberty only. It never learned
to adapt to, or even survive in, a world of heteronomous interests; it never
learned the language of political claims to freedom. Finally, during the
twentieth century, when politics began to adopt aesthetic modes of manag-
ing and policing, aesthetic autonomy discovered, to its despair, that its own
precious liberty too could be desecrated. If the aesthetic character of au-
tonomy can be defiled, is nothing sacred? This is the question raised in
another response to that Novalisean elegy on the homelessness of the aes-
thetic sensibility, Lukács’ Theory of the Novel. The work under question is
contemporary with Mimesis and, like it, takes the Odyssey as representative
of a basic mode of thought. If Auerbach worked with philology, stylistics,
and literary history, this book relies on philosophy, cultural theory, and the
history of ideas. What distinguishes the Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944),
however, from other well-known critiques of modernity1 is neither its apoc-
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alyptic tone nor its elitist disposition but rather its devastating analysis of
what Max Horkheimer (1895–1973) and Theodor W. Adorno (1903–69)
perceive as the entwining of the mythology of reason and the reason of
mythology: this unresolvable tension, this fundamental dialectic, inexora-
bly seals the fate of the human race (which, from their perspective, is lim-
ited to the West).
Older surveys of decadence, like Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the
West (vol. I: 1918; vol. II: 1922), traced a rise and a subsequent (though
not unavoidable) decline. In contrast, Horkheimer and Adorno present the
course of Enlightenment as one of doom and damnation from the start,
because of its inherently contradictory character. Their book is a general
critique of (Western) civilization, which concentrates on the predicament
of contemporary “man” and traces its origin in the ancient past. It outlines
the emergence, development, and final collapse of the project of Enlight-
enment, and is primarily meant as a severe indictment of modern culture,
whose rampant barbarism and totalitarianism illustrate the perils inherent
in this project.
In broad terms, the Enlightenment is defined as the long-range move-
ment of human liberation from fear and myth through reflection and rea-
son, which achieved mastery over the world but also led to alienation and
exploitation. Self-consciousness, the authors argue, procured both proud
independence and destructive autocentrism, as attested by its ultimate
product, bourgeois subjectivity. In the plight of the modern individual, the
self-defeating logic of Enlightenment can be observed at work in all its
irrational excess and pathos. Auerbach, like Lukács, concentrated on the
dialectic of literary style in the narrative. Horkheimer and Adorno conduct
an anatomy of bourgeois culture as the debasement of style itself—as the
collapse of the artistic dialectic into mass consumption under capitalism.
Art and society are closely connected in their study as they attempt to
expose the aesthetics of politics.
The inherent contradictions of rationality are explored in the first chap-
ter of the book, “The Concept of Enlightenment.” The authors begin with
a broad definition of the autonomy project: “In the most general sense of
progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating
men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. The program of the En-
lightenment was the disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of
myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy” (Horkheimer and
Adorno 1972: 3). As the primary force in humanity’s course during the
historical period, the Enlightenment opposes knowledge to myth, trying to
overcome superstition through inquiry, belief through exploration—to un-
derstand the world with informed reason, not impotent imagination; to
comprehend, and not just perceive. The main focus is on the contradictory
dialectic of the whole movement and the disturbing irreconcilability of its
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polar terms. What interests (and fascinates and harms) the authors is the
inherent impossibility of the project, due to its self-destructive nature.
They attempt to show why Enlightenment fails as soon as it succeeds—
what interrupts its progress and aborts its completion. Their description of
the fatal interplay of liberation and domination, which constitutes the dia-
lectic character of Enlightenment, concentrates on four main problems:
subjectivism, objectivism, positivism, and totalitarianism. These beset the
program and throw it back to its dark origins, mythical thinking.
By privileging Man (Weigel 1990), Enlightenment has allowed the indi-
vidual to emerge as Self, as an independent and autonomous social entity.
“The social work of every individual in bourgeois society is mediated
through the principle of self” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972: 29). This is
the fallacy of self-reliance, whereby individuality turns to individualism, as
man puts himself at the center of the universe and estimates everything
according to his interests. The inhumanity of the subject is that it views
society only as a struggle among selves, and is therefore bound to partici-
pate in that struggle.
The self, the autarchic individual, also objectifies the world: he separates
himself from it and makes it an object of observation and potential exploi-
tation. “Men pay for the increase of their power with alienation from that
over which they exercise their power” (9). This is the solitary task of knowl-
edge: it makes what man comprehends alien to him, and what he com-
mands foreign; it distances and it abstracts things. The original ideal was to
achieve rational understanding and real power over nature; but under-
standing separates and power alienates.
Enlightenment distances, abstracts, and quantifies too: it turns things
into observable objects and quantifiable entities. Positivism is the fallacy of
immanence, “the myth of things as they actually are” (x). The principle of
immanence operates with standards of equivalence which invent relation-
ships of identity. Although the project of the unique individual, Enlight-
enment is not interested in the particular but in the general: “its ideal
is the system from which all and everything follows” (7). It works with
rules, numbers, and equations, measuring and calculating things and
phenomena.
Finally, in seeking power over nature, reason totalizes the world into a
coherent, abstract, manageable system. “Enlightenment is totalitarian” (6)
because it strives for complete independence, full understanding, and total
control. Its absolutist goals and strategies subject everything to its rules and
domination. Totalitarianism is not the aberration of reason but the tri-
umph of legitimized rationality “objectified as law and organization” (37).
Thus the program of the Enlightenment failed because of its inner con-
tradictions. The grandiose enterprise that was launched to liberate human-
ity from the grip of mythological thinking has collapsed into a new mythol-
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ogy, which is all the worse, since it is still mesmerized by delusions of
power. Horkheimer and Adorno seek the cause in the constitutive, morbid,
cacophonous dialectic, and discover the problem of secular faith: “In the
enlightened world, mythology has entered into the profane” (28). Before,
people were paralyzed by the mythology of superstition; now the reign of
reason has produced its own mythology, rationality. In a sense, we have
come full circle back into unconscious belief; in another sense, we are even
more helpless now, having been deceived by our best potential.
This is the discordant dialectic of Enlightenment between reason and
domination, knowledge and power, understanding and authority, self-re-
flectiveness and self-destructiveness. The project is obviously doomed to
fail since “for enlightenment the process is always decided from the start”
(24). It is the reason of myth that blinds its course. “Mythology itself set off
the unending process of enlightenment in which ever and again, with the
inevitability of necessity, every specific theoretic view succumbs to the de-
structive criticism that it is only a belief” (11). The inevitable necessity is
activated within the project by its very origins, which predetermine its cir-
cular trajectory. “Just as the myths already realize enlightenment, so en-
lightenment with every step becomes more deeply engulfed in mythology.
It receives all its matter from the myths in order to destroy them; and even
as a judge, it comes under the mythic curse” (11–12). The adventures of
reason are inescapably influenced by the vile character of their starting
point, and they are condemned to repeat it again and again. The authors
state this deterministic position in the “Introduction” with an aphorism:
“myth is always enlightenment; and enlightenment reverts to mythology”
(xvi). The rhetoric and the fatalism of the verdict illuminate the title of
their book from another angle: the fundamental conflict is not between
myth and reason, but rather mythology (the power of domination) and
Enlightenment (the force of liberation). Since the forces of myth are not
generated by the movement itself, but have been inherited from the previ-
ous state of things, they are not exactly intrinsic to Enlightenment, but
represent a power from the past that persists unabated. The myth-reason
dialectic is only a reactivation and reenactment inside Enlightenment of
the prior and much more fundamental dialectic between Enlightenment
and mythology, which has not disappeared but rather has been (unwillingly
and inevitably) interiorized by the new project.
Given the direction of this critique, the choice of the term “mythology”
(which the authors never explain) is quite interesting. By using this word
(rather than, say, “ideology” or “faith”), Horkheimer and Adorno indicate
that their greatest worry is the persistent survival of the pagan element.
The real problem is not superstition, deception, or ignorance but myth, the
pagan account of things. They are appalled to discover that Enlightenment
has not overcome idolatry, that reason has not restored true faith. The God
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of Mendelssohn and Jacobi has not prevailed over the gods of Schiller and
Hölderlin. As Heidegger’s “turn” shows, the search for a third alternative to
Schelling’s mythology and revelation has failed.2 If the myth-reason dialec-
tic survives within Enlightenment, emancipation from mythology is impos-
sible. As Schönberg’s Aron conceded, the language of idols may be the only
one accessible to human understanding.
It appears, then, that mythology is the constitutive element in the con-
flict—not because of its priority but because of its unassailable negativity:
although he speaks it, man can never understand it since, as soon as he
wants to know, he is engaged in the project of emancipation. Mythology is
thus the basic element because the thinking man can conceive it only in
negative terms, in terms of what he/it is not, although it is again itself that
allows, through its (temporary) suspension, for the movement of thought.
According to the anti-positivistic, counter-Hegelian logic of Horkheimer
and Adorno, this pole of the opposition is the more important one for the
development of reason. They find that Enlightenment invariably makes
people aware of mythology, the domineering thought which quantifies, ho-
mogenizes, absolutizes, and totalizes. Enlightenment resists belief and its
rationalist sublimation, abstraction, by keeping the possibility of liberation
open as it tries to be the critical self-consciousness of mythology. Unfortu-
nately, because of its parasitic dependence on mythology, it fails: anticipa-
tion of liberation has been repeatedly frustrated since rationalism finally
takes over reason, subjectivism confounds the subject, and positivism in-
vades the positive. Its alert self-criticism remains the only human hope:
“the Enlightenment must consider itself, if men are not to be wholly be-
trayed” (xv). So far, though, it has succeeded only in drawing attention to
its dialectical opposite, mythology; but once this is done, it grows ensnared
by prospects of authority and forgets itself completely, thus abandoning
critique for the immediate gratification of power.
Enlightenment is therefore the liberating operation of reason, impaired
and eventually canceled by the lures of domination: power corrupts auton-
omy. Horkheimer and Adorno see it as the unavoidable fall into knowledge,
with mythology representing the forces of temptation.3 The story they tell
is a populist version of the “mythic curse,” the expulsion from Paradise.4
Since man has chosen to ask and know, he has liberated himself from the
world of identity, from the perfect coincidence of name and thing, but he
experiences this independence as a different form of domination: this is his
gain and his punishment. There is no point in entertaining either hopes for
a return to Eden or illusions of a complete emancipation. Levinas would
later ask for a complete denunciation of the “answer,” the will to know
which sent us into exile in the first place, reserving for humans only the
right (indeed, the duty) to ask (the question of responsibility to God).
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Likewise, Horkheimer and Adorno propose a hygiene of knowledge which
diets on non-answers, on responses which work more as markers of a path
(like Abraham’s to the sacrifice) than solutions to a problem.
Paradoxically, even though the authors utilize secularization as the narra-
tive of the fall into knowledge, when they give an account of the fatal temp-
tation, instead of following their Biblical model, they turn to a story from
the Greek epic. This approach is similar to Auerbach’s, who utilized a
Greek counter-example to make his interpretive model credible. It is worth
exploring what necessitated such an approach in this case. The basic dialec-
tic is examined from the side of mythology in the chapter “Excursus I:
Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment” through a discussion of the Odys-
sey, “one of the earliest representative testimonies of Western bourgeois
civilization” (xvi). Their model of the fallen hero of knowledge is not Adam
but “the figure from the Inferno that can most readily be associated with
the idea of curiositas: the figure of Odysseus in the twenty-sixth canto”
(Blumenberg 1983: 338).5 The king of Ithaca is presented as the first adven-
turer of reason who defied divine will. “In the Paradiso, Dante can ask
Adam about the essence of the first sin, and it is explained to him as trans-
gression of the sign (il trapassar del segno). Odysseus is the still unre-
deemed heir of the original sin that had been the transgression of the limits
set for man: he transgresses the sign of the inhabitable world that is ‘as-
signed’ to man so as to penetrate into uninhabitable regions” (339).6 Al-
ready in their first, general chapter, “The Concept of Enlightenment,”
Horkheimer and Adorno include in their comments on mythology refer-
ences to the Greeks, mentioning the names of Homer, Xenophanes, Par-
menides, Plato, Aristotle, as well as the Pre-Socratics, the tragedians, and
Athenian democracy. They also include a discussion of the Sirens episode
in the epic, where they detect elements of the Enlightenment in allegorical
form. But in the Excursus they undertake a systematic interpretation of the
dialectic in the Odyssey, contending that “there is no work which offers
more eloquent testimony of the mutual implication of enlightenment and
myth than that of Homer, the basic text of European civilization”
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1972: 45–46). This is where, they believe, the first
and severest confrontation of the two main forces in Western tradition
took place, and its final outcome was decided.
The authors try first to debunk “the usual identification of epic and
myth” (43). Their cryptic and elliptic dialogue with Lukács begins here
and runs throughout the chapter. They agree with him on a major point
articulated in The Theory of the Novel: “The epic is the historico-philo-
sophic counterpart of the novel, and eventually displays features approxi-
mating those characteristic of the novel” (43–44). They differ, however, on
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a fundamental level: “Philosophical criticism shows that the usual identifi-
cation of epic and myth . . . is wholly illusive. Epos and mythos are two
distinct concepts, and indicate two stages in an historical process” (43).
Lukács saw the epic as the consummate reflection of an unproblematic
archaic age and its mythical thought, where unity, wholeness, and totality
found definitive expression. Horkheimer and Adorno are determined to
undermine this idyllic conception. The epic is not a reflection of mythol-
ogy but rather the first clear indication of its dissolution. “The Homeric
spirit takes over and ‘organizes’ the myths, but contradicts them in the
process” (43), exposing their artificiality and conventionality. The poem,
along with its mythical content, has a strong anti-mythological character
which makes it the first announcement of the Enlightenment. Commenta-
tors, the authors suggest, have missed two prominent features: that myth
and epic belong to different stages of intellectual (and artistic) develop-
ment, and that they share a tendency toward “domination and exploita-
tion” (45). The epic is both the promising and the bitter beginning of the
end of the Enlightenment because it is a false, perverse start, polluted with
lust for total power. With this explanation “Adorno reverses Lukács’ reduc-
tion of novel to epic: he makes Odysseus into a picaresque character”
(Donougho 1981: 29). The Dialectic leaves the impression that Lukács, in
his unreserved admiration for and unqualified glorification of complexity
in completeness, was unable to perceive that the epic is actually about what
can no longer be celebrated—a faith that is shrinking, an order that is dis-
solving.7
Horkheimer and Adorno outline the false Enlightenment initiated by
the epic hero along lines strongly reminiscent of the four main problems
which they discern in the dialectical constitution of the Enlightenment in
the first chapter. Thus the hero’s portrait can be described in terms corre-
sponding to the categories of subjectivism, objectivism, positivism, and
totalitarianism.
Odysseus is the “knowing survivor” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972: 47),
and the poem of his praise records the (trans)formations of his subjectivity.
“The eventful voyage from Troy to Ithaca is the way taken through the
myths by the self” (46). He wanders, he suffers, he loses himself in order to
create a self and justify it. “The self represents rational universality against
the inevitability of fate” (58). His most typical (if not archetypal) charac-
teristic is cunning, and the greatest (self)affirmation of his intelligence is
the radical transvaluation of sacrifice. “Odysseus acts as sacrifice and priest
at one and the same time. By calculating his own sacrifice, he effectively
negates the power to whom the sacrifice is made. In this way he redeems
the life he had forfeited” (50). Thus he invents himself by deregulating the
ritual. To the extent that it deprives the ritual of its magic and turns the
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sacrifice into a role that can be individually appropriated, this is anti-
mythic thinking, based on the intelligence of the subject.
“Cunning is only the subjective development of the objective untruth of
the sacrifice that redeems it” (51). With its employment, any manipulation
becomes possible. “The deception in sacrifice is the prototype of Odyssean
cunning” (50). At the same time, it is the first major statement of defiant
individualism exploiting conventions to its own benefit, regardless of their
public status. The individual pursues his own goals and seeks the freedom
to attain them. “The entanglement of myth, domination, and labor” (32),
however, begins here, since with one irreverent gesture Odysseus both
claims autonomy and alienates himself from the surrounding environment.
After denouncing his home and his origins, from now on he is on his own,
and he must himself provide the goals and the support. “The history of
civilization is the history of the introversion of sacrifice. In other words: the
history of renunciation” (55).8 To put it in terms of the underlying Biblical
model, by eating from the tree of knowledge, people voluntarily exiled
themselves from their original motherland. With the transformation of
sacrifice into subjectivity begins “a denial of nature in man for the sake of
domination over non-human nature and over other men. This very denial,
the nucleus of all civilizing rationality” (54), objectifies nature and alien-
ates man. Cunning exploits the distinction between word and fact, name
and thing, discovering their conventional relationship and showing that it
is arbitrary. With the rhetorical dimension of language emphasized, any-
thing can be objectified, separated from the knowing subject—troped and
abstracted.
Odysseus is also the “homo oeconomicus” (61). He quantifies the world,
measures things according to his selfish reason, and pursues his atomistic
interests. His utilitarian thought rejects the traditional system of the com-
munal economy. He feels independent and irresponsible enough to partici-
pate in different exchanges by any means that help him procure the desired
dividends. His calculations and moral indifference make him the first true
bourgeois, and a particularly successful one. Finally, his overall attitude of
independence and superiority expresses an unmistakably totalitarian dis-
position. As the first individual to venture beyond the familiar confines of
nature and to construct an absolute and insatiable self, an autocratic and
implacable subject, Odysseus carves for himself a position of demand, if
not power, from which he negotiates with gods, heroes, common people,
nature, the past, even death. In the successive triumphs of his rationality,
his totalizing calculation and execution of strategies, moves, and opera-
tions are completely justified.
Like Auerbach, Horkheimer and Adorno place their work within the ur-
gency of the present historical moment. While they diagnose in the mythic
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world of the Odyssey a system of negative forces besieging the project of
Enlightenment from its inception,9 they point to the Nazi persecution of
the Jews as the lowest point ever reached by civilization and the most atro-
cious expression of the impasse created by the adventures of its rationality.
In the last chapter of their book, “Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of
Enlightenment,” they seek to determine the basic causes and dimensions
of the drama that brought the project of Enlightenment to its exterminat-
ing conclusion. Here they define anti-Semitism as a complex phenomenon
which has been motivated by a variety of forces—economic, social, ideolog-
ical, religious, and psychological.
To begin with, they suggest that “bourgeois anti-Semitism has a specific
economic reason: the concealment of domination in production” (Hork-
heimer and Adorno 1972: 173). The Jews, who for a long time were denied
access to the means of production, have a history of involvement with the
circulation sector, and have often found themselves blamed for misfor-
tunes they never caused. They were those who “carried capitalist ways of
life to various countries and drew upon themselves the hatred of all who
had to suffer under capitalism” (175). They did not choose that role:
“Commerce was not their vocation but their fate” (175). They paid for the
economic success they pioneered by becoming the scapegoats whenever
lower classes revolted: they were the first to spread capitalism, and they are
again the first to suffer its consequences.
On the social level, anti-Semitism serves to define and control rational
(and especially national) idiosyncrasy. Civilization has outlawed spontane-
ous, free, adaptive mimesis, and has channeled it into certain behavioral
patterns, so that personal expression can be effectively controlled. That
which does not abide by the current mimetic rules is immediately per-
ceived as different and alien. Surrounded by obedience and uniformity,
“the Jews automatically stand out as the disturbing factor in the harmony
of the national society” (185). Their attitude provokes the intolerance of
idiosyncrasy which demands total conformity because it stems from a re-
versed and perverted mimesis.
The ideological forces inciting anti-Semitism aim at pacifying the urge
of the masses for equality. The ruling clique uses the Jews as a diverting
spectacle, deflecting attention from the real problems. The people who
suffer discrimination may forget their own grievances by watching others
suffer—an experience that provides the reassuring feeling (as well as the
intimidating example) that no one is exempted from the hardships of life.
The masses are happy to see the Jews sharing the common lot.
Anti-Semitism has its religious origins in Christianity. “The reflective
aspect of Christianity, the intellectualization of magic, is the root of evil”
(177). The attempt to overcome primitive fear reached here the heights of
blasphemy, as the new religion humanized God and deified the sorcerer in
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one and the same person, Christ. By projecting itself as/in the man-god,
rationalization went well beyond the need for self-preservation, and estab-
lished the realm of the sacred as separate from that of the profane, with the
result that one was rendered to Christianity, while the other to the darkest
secular powers. “Worldly authority is confirmed or usurped, and the Chris-
tian faith acquires the rights on salvation” (178). These rights had to be
safeguarded and defended against the predecessor of Christianity, so that
the spiritual and the intellectual could be kept apart, with their respective
jurisdiction over human activities intact.
Finally, the psychological persuasiveness of anti-Semitism stems from
false projection and ensnares the drives of repressed mimesis. The projec-
tion is false because it is unreflective and manic, and therefore paranoiac.
The paranoiac will insist on rationality and equality only to the extent that
the two may justify his pursuits. This pathology is promoted and manipu-
lated by totalitarian systems, which know how to take good care of con-
sciousness by strictly prescribing responsibilities. When such systems point
to the Jews as a natural target, paranoia, as reversed mimesis and perverted
desire, turns wishfully against them: the half-educated masses direct their
hostility at those who appear to threaten their freedom.
The combination of these motivating forces behind anti-Semitism re-
veals the bankruptcy of a civilization in which mind cannot always protect
itself from its own constructs, in which the liberating power can all too
easily decay into authoritarianism. Furthermore, the essay continues its
descent into man-made hell when the authors propose that “there are no
more anti-Semites” (200). The uniformity of the age, with its stereotyped
thought, has made even this form of barbarism redundant. Paranoia has
taken over contemporary culture, and nobody is exempt from its paralyzing
influence. “The Jewish masses themselves are as prone to ticket thinking as
the hostile youth organizations” (207). The omnipresence of tyrannical
reason has precipitated the extinction of reflexivity. “In late industrial soci-
ety, there is a regression to illogical judgment” (201). The individual pur-
sues his self-serving interests while committees take responsibility for deci-
sions and tasks affecting society. It is as if today, everybody, including the
Jews, has become anti-Semitic. In these lean years, anti-Semitism is no
longer directed solely against the Jews, who seem themselves assimilated
into the structures of power, but rather against humanity as a whole: “The
ticket mentality as such is as anti-Semitic as the anti-Semitic ticket” (207).
In their condemnatory Zeitdiagnose, modeled (Habermas 1982) on
Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic (1887), Horkheimer and
Adorno universalize anti-Semitism as a sickness which, even when not de-
vouring the Jews, exemplifies the ultimate corruption of Enlightenment.
At its most flamboyant, arrogant, and despotic, Enlightenment is anti-
Semitism, because it turns against itself and strives for domination, even-
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tually destroying the project of emancipation and imposing a slavery of
higher order.
Thus the authors see Enlightenment as the movement of emancipation
which in their time stands trapped in its false logic and condemned for the
barbarity of anti-Semitism, since it failed to achieve authentic liberation
and instead created its own enslaving myths. The reasons for this failure
should be sought in its mythic origins, from which it was never completely
disentangled. The original delusion was the arrogant belief that such a dis-
entanglement was truly feasible, a belief which deceptively opposed its uto-
pia of self-crowned reason to the world of myths: by totally opposing that
world, it forced itself to the other extreme, creating its own myth and blind
faith. The ambition to dispose of mythology simply by a determined act of
comprehensive self-conscious rejection was founded on illusions of auton-
omous reason. Mythology, however, can be overcome (rather than aban-
doned) only through acts of revision and transformation. In an age of utter
despondency, the last human hope may still lie here. As they wrote in the
“Preface to the New Edition” (1969): “Today critical thought (which does
not abandon its commitment even in the face of progress) demands sup-
port for the residues of freedom, and for tendencies toward true human-
ism, even if these seem powerless in regard to the main course of history”
(ix–x). This is the penitent sagacity that Adorno (1974) later called “melan-
choly science”—the ascetic practice of dialectical humanism in the face of
despair.10 Against Nietzsche’s “gay” or “joyful” science, the authors coun-
terpropose the sad wisdom of a noble perseverance reckoning and surviving
the futility of praxis. “Our conception of history does not presume any
dispensation from it; nor does it imply a positivistic search for information.
It is a critique of philosophy, and therefore refuses to abandon philosophy”
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1972: x).
The position outlined by Horkheimer and Adorno is essentially the project
of faith in a godless world, of piety in the age of desacralized ritual. They do
not propose it explicitly and they do not offer it in a positive manner. To
preserve the resistance of their para-logical dialectic against positivist epis-
temology, they apply the tactics of negative understanding not by directly
affirming a value or principle but rather by working their indirect way to
truth through a critique of presence, fullness, and givenness. As they put it:
“The task of cognition does not consist in mere apprehension, classifica-
tion, and calculation, but in the determinate negation of each immediacy”
(27). Thus they do not pose, describe, substantiate, elucidate their own
program; they oppose it to the dominant one of mythology, which wrecked
the prospect of Enlightenment, and let it be read in the interstices of their
critique. They only allow some of its qualities to shine through undefined,
and yet they leave no doubt about its character: the driving force of their
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program is the same power which is taken to represent self-conscious, non-
totalizing reason—the enduring spirit of Judaism. At the same time, by
refusing to name it, they seem to conform to the negation11 they attribute
to it: “In Jewish religion, in which the idea of the patriarchate culminates
in the destruction of myth, the bond between name and being is still recog-
nized in the ban on pronouncing the name of God. The disenchanted
world of Judaism conciliates magic by negating it in the idea of God” (23).
The name of the hope, the program of the true faith, are not mentioned
so that they can be protected from the erasure of dialectical critique.
Horkheimer pointed out in an interview that he and Adorno “no longer
spoke about God but about the ‘longing for the Other’” (Horkheimer 1970:
81). Admitting that this was part of Jewish inheritance, he continued: “In
the same way, this utter caution [in the use of God’s name] has entered our
social theory which we called Critical Theory. . . . The pious Jew attempts
to avoid whenever possible the word ‘God’; he does not write it but uses an
apostrophe. So Critical Theory calls cautiously the Absolute ‘the Other.’
What moves me is the theological idea applied to a rational theory of soci-
ety” (81).12 The idea is part of Hegel’s view of God: “He is not One as
against an Other already existing, but is himself the Other in the form of
determinateness, which, however, because He is only One, exists outside of
Him as His negative movement” (Hegel 1895, vol. II: 176). Critical Theory
brings this idea into the social domain so that theology may offer a dialecti-
cal critique of modernity from the standpoint of Judaism. In Horkheimer’s
mind, “and perhaps in that of certain of his collaborators, the Jews became
the metaphoric equivalent of that remnant of society preserving negation
and the non-identical. Indeed, Horkheimer came to argue that underlying
the Frankfurt School’s refusal to describe the utopian alternative to the
present society was the traditional Jewish taboo on naming God or pictur-
ing paradise” (Jay 1980: 148). As a result of this homology between God
and Jew, “at least in Horkheimer’s case, the Critical Theorist was under-
stood as ‘the Jew’ of the administered society. And conversely, anti-Semi-
tism became a model of the totalistic liquidation of non-identity in the
one-dimensional world” (149).
If Horkheimer and Adorno are explicit and thorough in their analysis of
mythology as the evil part of the dialectic, their reluctance to define the
positive pole is consistent with their theological policy.13 However, their
extensive descriptions of mythology, and especially their depiction of anti-
Semitism as not just its cancerous excess, but ultimately its very essence,
indicate that the thesis of the outlined antithesis, the element undermined
and negated by the abuse of reason, is the Jewish spirit, Judaism itself. This
impression is supported by a special dimension of the authors’ careful argu-
mentation. Throughout the essay on anti-Semitism, and while presenting
the absolutist trends conspiring in it, Horkheimer and Adorno also provide
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sporadic hints about the Jewish people—who they are, what they believe
in, how they developed a tradition. In scattered notes toward an anthropo-
logical ontology, despite their admission that “race is not a naturally special
characteristic” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972: 169), the authors endow the
Jews with a number of distinct racial (although not exactly native) features.
This indirect portrait, sketched between the lines interrogating anti-Semi-
tism, should be taken as the starting point for an inquiry into Judaism as
the positive dialectical element in Enlightenment.14 Indeed, it is against
some “essence” of Semitism that the failure of reason and its aftermath are
measured.
According to this elliptical portrait, the Jews have a “patriarchal religion”
(175), the total faith in one God. “The oldest surviving patriarchate, the
incarnation of monotheism, they transformed taboos into civilizing max-
ims when others still clung to magic . . . : they defused magic by its own
power—turned against itself as ritual service of God. They did not elimi-
nate adaptation to nature, but converted it into a series of duties in the
form of ritual” (186). In their faith, religion and ritual were closely allied to
facilitate mimetic adaptation. Like the great Asian faiths, “Judaism was
hardly distinguishable from national life and the general drive toward self-
preservation” (178). It rationalized the pagan sacrifice on the basis of the
organization of the labor process, and in response to fundamental personal
and social needs. “Among the primitive peoples, the attempt to overcome
immediate fear led to the organized ritual and became the sanctified
rhythm of family and national life in Judaism” (178). Thus a moral code
was formed, in which reflexivity did not impose its rules on experience but
rather rationality emerged out of the social rules. Religion and society
molded and produced one another. “The god of Judaism demands his due
and calls to reckoning those who do not give it. He entangles his creatures
in the net of guilt and merit” (177). In this way, religion prevailed naturally
as a social mechanism of order and control.15
In their religion, the Jews “proclaimed individualism, abstract justice,
and the notion of the person” (175). On these principles they built their
lasting national unity, with great respect for both the organic coherence of
the community and the individuality of each member. “Reconciliation is
the highest notion of Judaism, and expectation is its whole meaning”
(199). The outcome of this communal consensus and effort was a tolerant
society which nurtured the hope of a better world. Its members were inde-
pendent, dynamic, innovative. “The Jews were the colonizers for progress”
who looked at the future and “always wanted to be first” (175). Their indi-
viduality and cultural independence have been attracting hostile attention
to their different tradition. “The existence and way of life of the Jews throw
into question the generality with which they do not conform. The inflexi-
ble adherence to their own order of life has brought the Jews into an un-
THE CULTURE OF ATONEMENT 111
certain relationship with the dominant order” (169). By insisting on self-
determination, they have challenged the conventional wisdom of various
regimes of power and at the same time have drawn themselves into a con-
frontation of incompatible definitions. For a long time, in the face of crawl-
ing insecurity, they championed social change and political adaptation
without too much compromise. “From the time when, in their capacity as
merchants, they helped to spread Roman civilization throughout Gentile
Europe, they were the representatives—in harmony with their patriarchal
religion—of municipal, bourgeois and, finally, industrial conditions” (175).
In recent times, however, they are paying dearly for their services to civili-
zation: “They are now experiencing to their own cost the exclusive, particu-
larist character of capitalism,” they are punished for their pioneering con-
tributions and are “degraded to the condition of a species” (175).16
With the vicissitudes of Jewish history representing the self-criticism of
reason, the apparent complexity of the dialectic is reduced to a good vs. evil
polarity: the conflict between Jewish spirit and Greek intelligence. Like
Auerbach, Horkheimer and Adorno feel that the Homeric, pagan element
is about to take over. Judaism is depicted as the creative and liberating
force of Enlightenment which is threatened with extinction by contempo-
rary barbarity but was first and foremost attacked by the mythic rationality
represented in the Homeric epic. According to this schematic explanation,
the fallacy of the Enlightenment was inaugurated by Odyssean cunning
and destroyed by anti-Semitic paranoia: these are the two landmarks that
have tainted Western intellectual inheritance. All this amounts to a rather
tidy distribution which takes the form of various dichotomies. Anti-Semi-
tism is the absolute evil in both a narrow and a broad sense—both because
it discriminates against the Jews, and above all because it annihilates the
Jewish spirit of criticism. In the Dialectic (as in the entire Western tradi-
tion of interpretation and assimilation), “the Jew, with his pre-Christian
rites and physiognomy, represents the ultimate incarnation of Otherness at
the heart of European modernity” (Wolin 1990: 37). The Jewish spirit is
the inspirational, reflective, conscious force in Enlightenment; but when
Enlightenment turns against itself and becomes blind, suicidal, and para-
noid, it is transformed into the monster of anti-Semitism; and when it
destroys its possibility, it abrogates its Jewish identity.
In this picture, the Hellenic is portrayed as vicious and sterile, while the
Hebraic is benevolent and creative. This absolute distinction makes the
Hellenic not only evil but also anti-Semitic. In the argumentation of Hork-
heimer and Adorno, the Greek spirit is accused of plotting world dom-
ination and conspiring against the Enlightenment. The Satanism affecting
the positions of Auerbach and Lukács develops here into a vehement con-
demnation of those who revolted against the will of God. There is a major
difference in strategy, though, between their work and that of the other
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theorists with regard to historical demarcations: Lukács saw two distinct
periods, those of the integrated and the problematical civilizations; Auer-
bach (and Bakhtin too) distinguished two different modes of understand-
ing and writing which coexist in continuous competition. Horkheimer and
Adorno introduce an absolutization, insisting that all thought, in its domi-
nant forms, has been Greek, and presenting its Jewish counterpart as its
unrealized, repressed difference. To show the continuous, exterminating
impact of mythology, they intersperse their analysis with massive general-
izations which, in their all-encompassing claims, one is forced to call myth-
ical: “From Homer to modern times” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972: 31)
or “from the transition to Olympian religion up to the Renaissance, Refor-
mation, and bourgeois atheism” (31). There are also references to “rulers
from the cunning Odysseus to the naive managing directors of today” (36)
and to passages where “the hero of the adventures shows himself to be a
prototype of the bourgeois individual” (43). There is no paucity of apho-
risms either: “Unity is the slogan from Parmenides to Russell” (8). “Since
Odysseus’ successful-unsuccessful encounter with the Sirens all songs have
been affected, and Western music as a whole suffers from the contradic-
tion of song in civilization” (60).
The authors go even further when they blame modern totalitarianism
and its most hideous offspring, anti-Semitism, directly on Greek reason. It
all started, they argue, with its separation of magic from ritual, sign from
thing, man from nature: “The irrationalism of totalitarian capitalism . . .
has its prototype in the hero who escapes from sacrifice by sacrificing him-
self” (55).17 And it all culminated in the Nazi administration of terror: “The
phony Fascist mythology is shown to be the genuine myth of antiquity,
insofar as the genuine one saw retribution, whereas the false one blindly
doles it out to the sacrifices” (13). This last pronouncement completes the
picture: the only difference between the Greek and the Fascist mythology
is that the first is genuine while the second is phony; but they both belong
to the same category, the same cultural system, and the one is the unavoid-
ably disastrous conclusion of the other. The verdict is unambiguous: the
Greeks were the proto-Fascists—a position consonant with Popper’s cri-
tique of Plato’s historicism in his contemporary work The Open Society and
its Enemies (1945). Under different guises, they reiterated this idea else-
where. For example, they assert: “The bourgeois . . . is already virtually a
Nazi” (155). This is obviously as much a comment on Odysseus as it is on
the capitalist, the first member of whose class was the Greek king, accord-
ing to Horkheimer and Adorno. The authors believe that the bourgeois
spirit was historically present before its class terms. “Adorno pushes capi-
talism back to include the epic world of ancient Greece. He locates the
roots of bourgeois individualism as far back as the Greeks’ ideological as-
sumption that man has subjugated nature” (Donougho 1981: 28). Another
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statement asserts: “Polyphemous and the other monsters whom Odysseus
tricks are already models of the evolving line of stupid devils of the Chris-
tian era up to Shylock and Mephistopheles” (Horkheimer and Adorno
1972: 67). Here the implication by indirect equation is this: what Odysseus
did to Polyphemus, Christians (including Fascists) tried to inflict upon
Shylock, the Jewish representative of the circulation sector.
At first glance, bold conclusions like these look surprising, since Hork-
heimer and Adorno profess a strong historical sensitivity and aversion to
generalization and simplification—from authors who claim early on to
maintain “a theory which holds that the core of truth is historical, rather
than an unchanging constant to be set against the movement of history”
(ix). But they are far from rare. In fact, statements of a reductionist general-
ity and indiscriminate inclusiveness abound in the book: “For centuries
society has been preparing for Victor Mature and Mickey Rooney” (156). It
might be more accurate to say that decades of aestheticism have been pre-
paring for quietist philosophy of this kind.18 Drawing on the anti-heroic
novel Naissance de l’Odyssée (1925) by Jean Giono (1895–1970), Hork-
heimer and Adorno have no patience or tolerance for the vicissitudes of
history: in their hands, it turns into a homogeneous pattern of contrapun-
tal processes. Their advocacy of dialectic is falsified by their totalizing un-
derstanding of historical development. “As far back as we can trace it, the
history of thought has been a dialectic of enlightenment,” Adorno (1973:
118) would later declare. Wherever they look, all they discern is the cancel-
lation or abortion of Enlightenment by its Greek origins—an endless series
of failures, a structural inability for progress. Their survey of thought is
basically ahistorical and, according to their own criteria, totalitarian, since
they quantify it by reducing it to one dichotomy (namely, Hebraism vs.
Hellenism), objectify it by distancing it into an abstraction, and naturalize
it by attributing its course to an inescapable necessity. The survey also
adopts cunning, a distinct feature of the Jewish stereotype since the nine-
teenth century, for its portrait of Odysseus polumetis.19 Furthermore, the
negative thinking of the book is marred by a fundamental inconsistency:
although Judaism is credited with the self-criticism of reason, it is mythol-
ogy that is presented as the constitutive element of the myth-reason dialec-
tic. Thus, if “dialectics aims at what is different” (Adorno 1973b: 153),
Judaism cannot represent otherness. It is the positivity which depends
parasitically on what can only be conceived negatively, namely, mythology.
One has to conclude that either the understanding of the Greek in
Horkheimer and Adorno is Hebraic (as it is in Auerbach) or that philoso-
phy has no other language than Greek (as Levinas always complains).
The explanatory Hebraism-Hellenism opposition is the myth of the Dia-
lectic. Lukács depicted Greek civilization as the edenic stage of primordial
innocence and bliss, and modern culture as the fall into philosophy (and
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theory).20 In revising his archaeology of original sin, Horkheimer and
Adorno insist that the Greeks are responsible for the fall into knowledge,
and consequently for evil. The history of thought, they argue, is one of
conflict between reason and myth (as initiated by the epic)—or one of the
knowledge of evil. The crucial issue for them is the “fallen nature of mod-
ern man” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972: xiv); and they trace the after-
math of the fall through stark landscapes of darkness, corruption, desola-
tion, sickness, loneliness, and horror—the whole romantic imagery of the
sublime which fills their pages. They see the epic as the first document of
the fall. Here the fall follows man’s aspiration to abandon the home of
nature, the Garden of Eden, and embark on unknown adventures on his
way to Troy and in search of an independent self. After many years, he will
conquer the foreign land and return home. But this new Ithaca is no Para-
dise; now, as a subject, he will introduce numbers, abstraction, labor, capi-
talism, domination, and exploitation, and become a tyrant. The original sin
of the Greek hero is his venture beyond the world of animistic faith, sacrifi-
cial ritual, and mythic thought, and the use of his cunning intelligence to
create a culture of instrumental and self-sufficient reason.21
The philosophical project of Horkheimer and Adorno is a theological
history of (Western) thought. While they apologize for its fragmentariness
(xi, xiii), the whole book betrays signs of well-balanced planning: it opens
with an essay on Enlightenment and reason, and it closes with one on my-
thology and barbarism; in between come three parts on the impact of En-
lightenment on knowledge/science, morality, and art; the whole is framed
by an “Introduction” and a sketchy epilogue. Despite modernist appear-
ances of discontinuity, a rational symmetry prevails. The book chronicles in
highly evocative tones the fall of human intellect from the grace of nature
and God, and explores the possibility of overcoming (Nietzsche’s) “bad
conscience” (20, 177), the “guilt” (41) of Christian faith, and of achieving
atonement. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the project is “nothing less than
the discovery of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly human con-
dition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism” (xi). They extend an urgent
invitation to Enlightenment to consider critically its sins and its crimes,
and repent: “The task to be accomplished is not the conservation of the
past, but the redemption of the hopes of the past” (xv).
The authors do not believe, as Auerbach does, in a Judeo-Christian syn-
thesis. Christianity, in its moral bankruptcy, appears sometimes to be the
immediate and visible target of the Dialectic of Enlightenment: “Anti-
Semitism is all that the German Christians have retained of the religion of
love” (176). Hatred and aggressiveness, however, are not attributable pri-
marily to the heretic status of the new religion in relation to its predecessor,
but have deeper roots in its impure descent. Christianity is a regression to
myth, sacrifice, and superstition, and ultimately to Greek paganism. As
THE CULTURE OF ATONEMENT 115
evidenced by the barbarism of modern times, it has been overpowered by
Hellenism, which simply completes the ancient Enlightenment and seals
the fall of man.22 Thus the main target and the arch-enemy of the book is
Greek thought and its devilish survivals: as long as these influence our civi-
lization, man is condemned to the freedom, the knowledge, the exile, the
labor, and the abyss that he originally chose. Yet, the authors have an alter-
native to suggest, one last dim possibility: only Judaism, the religion of
expectation, may redeem the hopes of the past through reconciliation with
the world (of God).23 Their verdict on their age is entirely negative; but to
the (self)destructive dialectic of the Greek Enlightenment, they counter-
propose their philosophy of secular reconciliation24—a vision that would
later be articulated by Adorno as the (melancholy) science of atonement,
based on the “theory of the melancholy disposition” (Benjamin 1977:
142–58),25 and revised indignantly by Derrida as the (festive) science of
grammatology.
THE COVENANT OF EMANCIPATION
The questions raised by the Dialectic are: In a world infested with pagan-
ism and overtaken by barbarism, is there anything sacred left? If “moder-
nity is pagan” (Lyotard and Thébaud 1985: 16), what is the position of the
sacred at a time of spiritual regression? What happens to the divine in a
secular age infatuated with its illusionary independence? These questions
may have a theological function but they should not be examined on the
basis of traditional secularization theories since they are not exactly theo-
logical themselves. They attempt to (pre)occupy answer positions which
may (or may not) be left vacant by the bankruptcy of Protestantism in a
manner comparable to the success of the Reformation in taking over medi-
eval church authority. It is to the Reformation, therefore, that the inquiry
into the legitimacy of autonomy needs again to refer. “The Middle Ages
came to an end when within their spiritual system creation as ‘providence’
ceased to be credible to man and the burden of self-assertion was therefore
laid upon him” (Blumenberg 1983: 138). A new foundation had to be
sought for the rightful place of humans on earth, a certainty that did not
need to be guaranteed by the doctrine of the office. The possibility of a
self-sustained knowledge seemed within the mind’s grasp. “The sole crite-
rion of church doctrine for the whole ordering and forming of truth and
knowledge breaks down and yields to the growing predominance of seeking
founding itself. The criteria get turned around. The truth of faith and
faithful knowledge are now measured in terms of the self-certainty of pure
thinking with regard to its correctness. . . . But when the ecumenical office
loses the sole power as the first and real source of truth, the total realm of
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beings as it was formed by Christianity does not disappear from view. On
the contrary, the order of beings as a whole—God, the creator, the world of
creatures, man, belonging to the world and destined for God—these beings
as a whole thus experienced now especially demand a new assimilation on
the foundation and with the means of knowledge founding itself” (Hei-
degger 1985: 31).
Without the law of providence, autonomy, with its law of immanent
understanding, emerges as the legitimate quest in a world that people must
learn to order and inhabit on their own. “The element of cura [care] in
[Augustinian] curiositas now becomes the very root of its meaning, which
legitimizes the cognitive appetite as the attentiveness that is provoked by
the world. The modern age began, not indeed as the epoch of the death of
God, but as the epoch of the hidden God, the deus absconditus—and a
hidden God is pragmatically as good as dead” (Blumenberg 1983: 346). In
Heidegger’s words: “Being itself withdraws into its truth.”26 Left without
providence, without pro-vision, people start engaging in the construction
of their own vision: theoria—a comprehensive, independent, and lofty view
of the world.27 “[T]he progress of thought at the beginning of the modern
age rests essentially on the fact that one began to make assertions about the
absence of order and to ascribe to that absence (without the intervention
of a transcendent factor) a law of self-regulation” (220). With the with-
drawal of the transcendent and the disappearance of cosmic order, both of
which culminated in the Nominalist critique of Scholasticism (Luft 1988:
743), the historical position of the divine creative power, no longer ade-
quately occupied by theological explanation, was functionally reoccupied
by the secular idea of autonomy.28 Thus “the age transformed epistemology
into anthropology and made truth a function of creative activity” (Luft
1987: 10).29 In counterdistinction to the thesis (supported by Karl Löwith
and Carl Schmitt) which, stressing continuity, believes in the transposition
of theological concerns into secular principles, the reoccupation thesis em-
phasizes that “the modern age does not have recourse to what went before
it, so much as it opposes and takes a stand against the challenge consti-
tuted by what went before it. This distinction . . . makes worldliness the
characteristic feature of the modern age without its having to be the result
of secularizations” (Blumenberg 1983: 75). Thus the priesthood of all be-
lievers becomes a community of interpreters.
Here it is important to draw a distinction between two directions of
autonomy, one that seeks a ground and another that offers a reason. Ac-
cording to the reoccupation thesis, “the Romantic attempt to discredit the
Enlightenment, and the continuation of this attempt by Nietzsche and
Heidegger, confuse a justified criticism of the Enlightenment’s attempt at
‘self-foundation’ with an unjustified criticism of its ideal of self-assertion”
(Rorty 1983: 4). This distinction also helps identify the ideological (as op-
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posed to, say, Horkheimer and Adorno’s philosophical) dialectic of Enlight-
enment, as well as its counter-theological origin. “The absolute certainty
founded on human thought itself, which Descartes seeks, is not the ‘secu-
larization’ of the certainty of salvation, which is supposed to be guaranteed
in faith, and its nuda fiducia [naked trust], but rather its necessary counter-
position, which is theologically demanded and (unexpectedly) legitimized
by Luther’s thesis [on antidivine self-deification]. . . . If one proceeds from
the assumption that human autonomy can henceforth articulate its posi-
tive character only outside the Middle Ages, then it becomes clear that only
two fundamental positions remain open to it, if it wants to throw off its
supposedly ‘natural’ role: hypothetical atheism, which poses the question
of man’s potential under the condition that the answer should hold ‘even
if there is no God’; and rational deism, which employs the ‘most perfect
being’ to guarantee this human potential—the ‘most perfect being’ that is
functionalized by Descartes as the principle of the deduction of the
dependability of the world and of our knowledge of it. The double face of
the Enlightenment, on the one hand its renewal of a theological optimism
and on the other its inclination to atheism, loses its contradictory character
if one places it in the context of the unity of the onset of human self-
assertion and the rejection of its late-medieval systematic role” (Blumen-
berg 1983: 179). It is in hypothetical atheism that Horkheimer and Adorno
see the pagan evil, the idolatry of mythology, and it is in a critical (and
obviously post-rational) deism that they invest their hopes for an assertion
without the self, for a covenant without nomos—namely, for a secular (and
therefore rationally impossible) faith; or (what with Modernism amounts
to the same), for a Hebraic culture.30
The specific moment of rupture—which Hebraic Modernism and Post-
modernism from Lukács to Derrida are attempting to repeat through rever-
sal—is the reoccupation of faith as an answer position by taste after the
Battle of the Books. The moment of the positive quality of taste signals the
emergence of a reading public in England and France.31 This independent
community of interpreters read in a secular manner: they no longer be-
lieved but they discriminated. The civil liberation of interpretation, how-
ever, did not mean the loss of its theological heritage, which was now re-
functioned differently. This explains why “the vantage point, the defining
concept, and the distinctive vocabulary of art-as-such” did not first appear
in eighteenth-century art theory—“indeed they were very old and familiar
commonplaces; they had functioned, however, not in the traditional phi-
losophy and criticism of the arts, but in alien realms of metaphysics, and
especially theology. These ancient commonplaces were imported into, and
specialized for, the theory of fine art—they achieved, that is, a radical nov-
elty of application—only when the new social role of the various arts in-
vited and fostered concepts of a requisite sort” (Abrams 1989: 153).
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A typical example is the writings collected in the Characteristicks of
Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711, 3 vols.) by the third Earl of Shaftes-
bury (1671–1713), “the chief bridge by which the theological term ‘con-
templation,’ together with the ethical-religious term ‘disinterested,’
crossed over into philosophical analysis of the way we apprehend beautiful
objects, including works of fine art” (91). Shaftesbury’s main concern is the
style of life appropriate to a gentleman, especially the requisite training of
sensibility. Although the question is a moral one, the writer, who believes
that the connoisseur should become a virtuoso of manners, “transforms
Neo-Platonic religious ideas into a secularized religion of aesthetics. The
universe for him is a continually changing work of art whose Creator is
manifest in formal beauty. Thus human knowledge of moral truth (virtue)
must be mediated by aesthetics and transformed by the moral artist, a
young male who has been educated in a non-institutionalized manner and
who has been divinely inspired during states of enthusiastic contempla-
tion. . . . In this manner the moral artist transforms his own life into a work
of art and becomes a ‘virtuoso’” (Cocalis 1978: 401). For Puritanism, the
“religion of virtuosos” (Weber 1958b: 332), virtue was always a matter of
virtuosity.32 Now virtuosity changes into a question of public performance,
rather than personal askesis. The mark of the new virtuosity is taste, which
becomes “the basis of all that one has—people and things—and all that
one is for others, whereby one classifies oneself and is classified by others”
(Bourdieu 1984: 56).
Shaftesbury redefines virtue when he introduces the idea of disinterest-
edness. In his polemic against the Hobbesian account of self-concern in the
dialogue “The Moralists: A Philosophical Rhapsody” (1709), he speaks of
“the disinterested love of God,” an absolute love that stands above all per-
sonal interest and is completely unselfish. Hobbes’ “exemplary situation”
(Nauta 1985: 368), from which he derived the features of the individual,
was the capitalist market. The concept of “interest” was particularly impor-
tant in debates on ethics, and initially signified a positive quality. “For
Shaftesbury, as for his contemporaries, it designates the state of well-being
or the genuine and long-range good” (Stolnitz 1961–62: 132). He starts
rejecting it when he criticizes selfishness: “The opposite of ‘interestedness’
begins to appear in Shaftesbury’s polemic against egoism in ethics and
instrumentalism in religion” (132). In this context, disinterestedness
means lack of selfishness: the proper moral attitude inclined toward the
“contemplation” of virtue. Here in the realm of religion, we have the first
appearance of the aesthetic attitude as a distinct mode of experience: a
disinterested view (that is, contemplation) of God above self-regard and
consequences. This is the new form of faith, faith for its own sake. Shaftes-
bury’s concern is simultaneously with morals and manners, action and
character. The regard of God, no longer anticipatory, is “a mode of atten-
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tion and concern” (133). The person of modernity, the virtuoso of the gaze,
the theorist, emerges in Shaftesbury’s description of “the virtuous man as
a spectator, devoted to ‘the very survey and contemplation’ of beauty in
manners and morals” (133). The ideal of the “spectator” (the title of Ad-
dison’s periodical in the 1710s) is pure regard, since “disregard for posses-
sion or use is only an inference or a specification of the broader proposition
that the aesthetic spectator does not relate the object to any purposes that
outrun the act of perception itself” (134). Disinterestedness becomes the
distinctive feature of the aesthetic experience when the experience is
treated in its own right.33 During early eighteenth-century English icono-
clasm, which broke “idolatrous” art and remade it through the new creative
procedure of aesthetics (Paulson 1990), Addison took the next step of mak-
ing aesthetic perception the foundation of aesthetics, and disinterested-
ness the requirement for good taste—making aesthetic perception a way of
looking not only at moral responsibilities but at the entire world; not only
a way of believing but also of being. “Thus, the aesthetic disposition is one
dimension of a distant, self-assured relation to the world and to others
which presupposes objective assurance and distance. It is one manifesta-
tion of the system of dispositions produced by the social conditioning asso-
ciated with a particular class of conditions of existence when they take the
paradoxical form of the greatest freedom conceivable, at a given moment,
with respect to the constraints of economic necessity” (Bourdieu 1984: 56).
It is the emancipation from interest and the renunciation of use that makes
the gaze contemplative and freedom aesthetic.
During the century of Samuel Johnson (1709–84), when a reading public
appears in England, “it is the reader of poetry who firmly occupies the
centre of interest between the death of Dryden [1700] and the publication
of the 1800 preface to the Lyrical Ballads. The Man of Taste is king: the
consumer, at last, has won his right of choice. In theoretical criticism—and
the eighteenth century is overwhelmingly the age of critical theory—the
issue is now joined not on conformity to precept . . . but on the reader’s
response. . . . How is true taste to be defined? And if a democracy of taste,
a mere counting of heads, is not sufficient, what does constitute true taste
in reading? These are issues which Dryden never once raises; and Pope
raises them for professional critics only. Addison, in the Spectator essays
[1711–12], raises them for all polite society” (Watson 1962: 68).
What matters in the democracy of taste is not the position of the maker
but of the perceiver; not the process of making but the finished product;
not the craft of the execution but the perfection of the result; not the
construction of the work but its contemplation. In the claims of polite
society to cultural superiority we witness “the tendency of a contemplation
theory of art to recuperate aspects of its original context in religious devo-
tion” (Abrams 1989: 156). This functional reoccupation endows the new
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class with the right of an interpretive approach to the whole world as it
makes understanding a question of self-fulfilling learning (taking the re-
quired time and aptitude for granted34). “The new critical language, ac-
cordingly, does not envision a product of art from the traditional point of
view of its expert constructor or maker, but from the point of view of the
connoisseur, who confronts the work as a completed product which he
attends to as an isolated thing, for the sake of the satisfactions that doing
so yields” (151). The reoccupation of faith by taste coincides with the bour-
geoisie’s appropriation of taste from the court through consumption: taste
is consumption distinguished by discrimination. Within court culture,
taste was invested in ritual—in hierarchy and order—and therefore invisi-
ble. In the public society of capitalist leisure, it became a cultural invest-
ment, one sought by everyone adept in the open market. “In the seven-
teenth century taste . . . was still an expression of the aristocratic life style,
and to the extent that it was applied to artworks, it was the prerogative of
court culture, which articulated itself in the patron’s judgement. The
court’s claim to cultural leadership was first shaken when bourgeois critics
were able to appeal to the taste of the public. This took place in England
. . . and in France. . . . In these countries, the bourgeoisie’s demand for
equality proclaimed itself, mediated by the judgment of taste” (Berghahn
1988: 40). Just as faith turned everybody into an interpreter during the
Reformation, with the Enlightenment taste transformed everyone into a
noble person.
The situation in Germany was very different from England and France,
where taste could serve the political claims of the bourgeoisie by galvaniz-
ing its claims of status and participation. German Enlightenment aspired
to shape through criticism a homogeneous public, literary but above all
civil. That never happened. “In France, what had begun with the weapons
of criticism was carried to its end by the Revolution; in politically splin-
tered Germany, where counterrevolutionary preventive measures sharp-
ened the censorship, republican-minded forces couldn’t even carry the
day in the literary public sphere” (77–78). The reason is the absence from
Germany of conditions that would allow for an articulate public sphere.
The public did not yet exist: together with the republic of taste, it had
to be formed. The universalism of citizenship “was lacking in Germany
where there was not even a suitable concept to designate a ‘citizen.’ The
term Buerger had altogether different connotations. It signified a Stand
(an estate) or rather the tax-paying subject of an authoritarian state whose
government would presumably protect the citizens’ rights, but did not
regard them as the ultimate source of its own authority. The distinc-
tion between ‘citizen’ and ‘burgher’ . . . did not exist in Germany. Likewise,
the nation was not conceived in politico-moral, but in racial terms. One
was a German if one belonged to the Volk” (Lichtheim 1968: 327). Under
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these premature circumstances, “in Germany social progress and national
development did not mutually support and promote one another as in
France, but rather stood in opposition to each other” (Lukács 1978: 9).
Furthermore, the intelligentsia was able to offer little more than a philo-
sophical definition of judgment in defense of secular understanding. The
question of governance arose only in relation to the legitimacy of inter-
pretation.
Moses Mendelssohn, for example, tried in the 1750s to orient aesthetics
toward questions of reception. “For Mendelssohn the unity of the arts is
grounded in the powerful effects they exert upon an audience—in the ca-
pacity they exhibit to move us. He believes that the central task of a general
theory of the arts is to explain this fact of experience” (Woodmansee 1984:
27). With the Enlightenment, Winckelmann’s neoclassical “principle of
imitation” is succeeded by the “principle of pleasure.” By the 1780s, how-
ever, the tremendous expansion of the book market, although welcome by
the intelligentsia, had distressing effects for those who wished to influence
the public sphere. In just a few decades, too many people were reading and
writing, too many books and periodicals were circulating for the Enlighten-
ers to control the flow of culture. Pleasing this audience seemed more like
satisfying its appetite rather than fulfilling its intellectual needs.
The reason why there seemed to be an audience but not a public is
because “German absolutism greatly retarded the formation of a middle
class—and, hence, the very preconditions of an energetic world of arts and
letters. The creation of these conditions was in large measure the work of
a few hundred civic-minded literati—philosophers and poets from Leibniz
to Lessing—who divided their time between ‘their work’ and a variety of
projects aimed at extending literacy in the broadest sense: the establish-
ment of theaters, the founding of reading societies and periodicals, and so
on” (36). In certain respects, such as the secularization of the book market
and the development of writing in the vernacular, these efforts were suc-
cessful. But they did not anticipate that training might turn into entertain-
ment, or education into a Kulturindustrie, with the result that “the prag-
matic aesthetic worked out by the generation of Mendelssohn, in which the
excellence of a work is measured by its capacity to affect an audience, was
felt to be incompatible with artistic integrity” (39–40).
The taste of the audience and the interest the book market took in satis-
fying its demands seemed to defeat the Enlightenment project, or to put it
crudely, to justify other people’s writing.35 The reaction of the intellectuals
was to revile the publishers who commercialized their trade by exploiting
the lower interests of the audience for their own profit. At the same time,
intellectuals criticized the audience for simply wanting to be moved and
entertained. The intellectuals’ supreme strategy, though, was to turn their
artistic standards, which had failed, into an aesthetic, into an entire atti-
tude which did not simply have its distinct morality but was in itself a
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higher morality. Thus, while they seemed to reject the audience, in fact
they made themselves more desirable to the part of the audience which
aspired to distinction. The professional writers who could not compete in
the free market created a new one whose commercial character was made
invisible when they denounced interest. They argued that, instead of mar-
keting to public taste, they were “the hierophants of an unapprehended
inspiration” (Shelley) who communicated divine messages—prophets and
legislators of a new, higher order. They did not promise diversion but
redemption.
They achieved this in two complementary ways: first by taking over the
Humanities at the University, which they elevated to the highest realm of
learning, the foundation of all others; and by constructing a theology of art
offering them “both a convenient and a very powerful set of concepts
with which to address the predicament in which they found themselves—
concepts by which (serious, or ‘fine’) Art’s de facto loss of direct instrumen-
tality could be recuperated as a (supreme) virtue” (46). By claiming that art
stands above exchange and interest, redeeming all market concerns, they
created an alternative market, that of the aesthetic (as opposed to the
work) ethic—an autonomy grounded on the contemplation of immanence.
“Art, strictly speaking, is liberal or free, its production must not enter into
the economic circle of commerce, of offer and demand; it must not be
exchanged” (Derrida 1981a: 5).
According to the laws of this differentiated economy, “the ideal of ‘pure’
perception of a work of art qua work of art is the product of the enunciation
and systematization of the principles of specifically aesthetic legitimacy
which accompany the constituting of a relatively autonomous artistic field.
The aesthetic mode of perception in the ‘pure’ form which it has now
assumed corresponds to a particular state of the mode of artistic produc-
tion” (Bourdieu 1984: 30). They effected this by reoccupying Pietist faith
with the aesthetic attitude, the new bourgeois piety.36 “The relationship
between a religious ethic and art will remain harmonious as far as art is
concerned for so long as the creative artist experiences his work as resulting
either from a charisma of ‘ability’ (originally magic) or from spontaneous
play. The development of intellectualism and the rationalization of life
change this situation. For under these conditions, art becomes a cosmos of
more and more consciously grasped independent values which exist in their
own right. Art takes over the function of this-worldly salvation, no matter
how this may be interpreted. It provides a salvation from the routines of
everyday life, and especially from the increasing pressures of theoretical
and practical rationalism. With this claim to a redemptory function, art
begins to compete directly with salvation religion. . . . As a matter of fact,
the refusal of modern man to assume responsibility for moral judgments
tends to transform judgments of moral intent into judgments of taste (‘in
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poor taste’ instead of ‘reprehensible’)” (Weber 1958b: 341–42). This is the
end of the path that led from the grim asceticism of the Reformation to the
emotional religiosity of the late seventeenth century to the secularized no-
tions of sentiment in the eighteenth (Campbell 1987). With the aesthetic,
the reoccupation of faith by taste, which has now developed into creative
imagination, is complete. The contemplative attitude appropriate to God,
Shaftesbury’s “disinterested love,” becomes the purest, most moral dispo-
sition. At the same time, pleasure does not disappear but is incorporated
into the higher purpose. That is why the aesthetic attitude is transformed
from moral askesis into a system of interpretive exercises.
The Romantic generation of the 1790s was the first to recognize the failure
of the politics of taste. “The disintegration in the last quarter of the eigh-
teenth century of the Enlightenment project to establish a bourgeois pub-
lic sphere . . . reached its apex in Romanticism, where the notion of a bour-
geois public sphere completely relinquished its regulatory power over the
practice of politics and literature. Disturbed and sensitized by the experi-
ence of a mass literary market and repelled by the development of a new
bourgeois ethos grounded in economics, the Romantics retreated more and
more into an aesthetic praxis, which still claimed to be socially critical but
held that a meaningful social critique could be made only from the un-
alienated position of what proved to be an increasingly esoteric aestheti-
cism” (Schulte-Sasse 1988: 99). The aesthetic turn of modernity took place
in Germany when the education of Lessing’s “humankind” (namely, the
bourgeois public) was abandoned in favor of critique, and may be precisely
dated from 1787, when Kant abandoned the early title of his third critique,
“Critique of Taste.” Justification of judgment now took precedence over
the “education of taste” (Kant). “The Romantics thought of their analysis
of social totality not in terms of institutions and system theory but in cate-
gories that were essentially epistemological or concerned with a critique of
the nature of knowledge” (140). Interest in effects was succeeded by in-
quiries into assumptions. The French Revolution and the threat of social
unrest made the inward turn of emancipation even more unavoidable in
the eyes of the intellectual elite which was despairing of its public influ-
ence: “Under the pressure of dominant social relations, the function of
criticism also changed after 1789: it lost its bourgeois-enlightening impe-
tus, shook itself free of all practical ties to life, and became aesthetically
immanent. Thus began the ‘art period’” (Berghahn 1988: 78), the period of
aesthetic autonomy.
The so-called Romantic period is the age of critique, that is, of self-
reflective, self-corrective, and above all self-disciplined criticism—of a crit-
icism that relinquishes its public function and is interested only in social
legitimacy, in claiming the moral higher ground by appearing disinter-
124 CHAPTER TWO
ested.37 “The concept of critique emerged in the West at the same time as
political economy and, as the quintessence of Enlightenment rationality, is
perhaps only the subtle, long-term expression of the system’s expanded
reproduction” (Baudrillard 1975: 50). Critique is the highest form of bour-
geois self-assertion. “The bourgeoisie is the first self-critical class in history,
the first class to measure itself by the standards of history” (Feenberg 1973:
42) and to discover its universal superiority precisely in its capacity for
self-examination. At the same time, critique (for example, Critical Theory)
functions as the system’s “bad conscience”: “For this reason, the culture of
capitalism, to the extent that it truly existed, could consist in nothing but
the ruthless critique of the capitalist epoch” (Lukács 1970: 26). Critique is,
by its constitution “reformist” (Lyotard), a Reformation by other means; it
is the right to interpretation systematized in the exercise of rights, theory
elevated to emancipation. “Even historically speaking, theoretical emanci-
pation has a specifically practical significance for Germany. For Germany’s
revolutionary past is theoretical, it is the Reformation. Once it was a
monk’s brain in which the revolution began, now it is in the philosopher’s.
Certainly Luther removed the servitude of devotion by replacing it by the
servitude of conviction. He destroyed faith in authority by restoring the
authority of faith. He turned priests into laymen by turning laymen into
priests. He liberated man from exterior religiosity by making man’s inner
conscience religious. He emancipated the body from chains by enchaining
the heart” (Marx 1971: 123). Critique is criticism that no longer aspires to
intervene or interact, criticism that is purified of interests38 (namely, itself
aesthetic), and hence superior even to creativity.39
In all areas of culture critique becomes the cardinal activity, and hastens
to write the epitaph of contemporary art: “We may well hope that art will
always rise higher and come to perfection, but the form of art has ceased to
be the supreme need of the spirit” (Hegel 1975a, vol. I: 103). According to
Hegel’s notorious formulation in the Aesthetics: “ ‘The science of art is thus
in our time much more necessary than in times in which art for itself as art
provided complete satisfaction.’ Aesthetic theory, therefore, emerges for
Hegel at the time when aesthetic praxis is no longer vital to the articulation
of truth” (Bowie 1990: 135). Everything seems to exist in order to elevate
itself to (self)criticism.40 Critique converted the regime of autonomy to the
regimen of autoscopy.41 Above all, it was the individual who was instructed
to discipline herself (Petschauer 1989) through this exercise, banking on
the anticipation not of a society of characters distinguished by taste but of
a community of individuals cultivated through Bildung—expecting, that is,
not a public of common sentiments and beliefs but a nation of shared
attitudes and judgments. “The quest for harmony was basic to the concept
of Bildung in a Germany touched by the industrialization of Europe, fright-
ened by the French Revolution. The aesthetic was the keystone of that
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harmony, linking the intellectual and the moral” (Mosse 1985: 6). Hölder-
lin, for example, hopes that it will create a community free from political
strife. “He envisages an education through beauty which will fit men for
communal harmony” (Reed 1980: 202). While abandoning his three frag-
mentary versions of The Death of Empedocles (1798–99), he talked about
the “ästhetische Kirche” (1799) where the highest reconciliation and unity
would reign. “The mainstay of a social renovation for Hölderlin therefore
can only be a new religion, a new church” (Lukács 1978b: 140). Thus the
(aesthetic) question of social harmony as national unity formed the central
bourgeois issue. Consequently, in Germany “a national literature could de-
velop only as a bourgeois revolutionary literature of combat against the
culture of the petty courts which copied Versailles and impeded national
unification” (Lukács 1978a: 115).
The philosophical interest in the project of the Enlightenment which ani-
mates the Dialectic had been a major concern for German thought for at
least two centuries, since the time of Lessing and Mendelssohn, when mo-
dernity was left without the support of historical prefigurement. The pur-
suit of this project was closely associated with the seminal ideal of Bildung,
of personal organic growth.42 The development of the Bildung ideal found
fertile ground in the discourse on pedagogy created by the congruence of
printing and Lutheranism in north German states (Luke 1989). Writers
like Winckelmann, Herder, Humboldt, and Schiller, for example, explored
the educational potential of art, science, philosophy, and literature for the
cultivation of an individual’s unique character. Horkheimer and Adorno,
however, show no interest in this ideal: they seem to believe that in their
time Bildung has been denigrated to bourgeois individualism. In their por-
trait of Odysseus, what is left of Bildung is only self-serving, cynical cun-
ning; their Odyssey is the epic of egoistic expansion, not personal develop-
ment. Its model is The Worker (1932) by the conservative anarchist Ernst
Jünger, with its portrait of the self-disciplined working man. Humanist
education has collapsed; private interest and corrupt taste have tainted the
nobility of Bildung and have undermined the possibility of a public consen-
sus on the liberating power of Enlightenment.
Bildung was from its inception a hegemonic43 ideal that sought super-
vision through the practices of self-cultivation and education. It was an
administrative project that set out to codify bourgeois principles of devel-
opment and power. While the revolutions of the late eighteenth century
were dealing the final blow to the aristocratic order, it proposed the quest
for inner harmony as an alternative solution to social problems. “Bildung
was created by philosophers and belletrists who aestheticized religious and
philosophical notions under the aegis of the Hellenic revival. It emerged
with the neo-humanism in the 1790s and became Protestant Germany’s
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secular social ideal. Bildung corresponded to the needs and experiences of
those segments of the bourgeoisie and enlightened aristocracy that had
superseded the estate structure, providing an alternative social ideal to the
otherworldly Christian, on the one side, and the courtly galant-homme, on
the other. The gebildeter Mensch was held to have achieved individual per-
fection through self-cultivation and refinement that was tantamount to
virtue if not salvation itself” (Sorkin 1983: 66). Bildung therefore repre-
sented a promise that the new culture would respect each and every person,
and would help her develop a well-rounded, balanced character. The prom-
ise was democratic and the invitation open: anybody could claim individu-
ality and attain her own character. There would be no discrimination
against the self.
The goal of this pedagogical enterprise was modelled on the basic princi-
ple of the recent philosophy of beauty, the aesthetic and its integrated
autonomy. Like that autonomy, the envisioned character was unique,
beautiful, coherent, harmonious, and independent. Bildung was basically
an aesthetic education—the training in private conduct through the aske-
sis in the disciplines and pleasures of the aesthetic disposition. In an era of
religious skepticism, it provided the middle class with the equivalent of a
secular faith, where the intellectual (true), the moral (good), and the aes-
thetic (beautiful) were separated and combined as the main spheres of
human experience. When the feudal hierarchy and court ritual lost their
authority, these spheres found their profane articulation in a set of inter-
pretive and artistic practices applied to the (bourgeois) self and known by
the collective name Bildung. This driving principle of the faith in (wo)man
as disinterested interpreter (of the Bible as novel) and artist (that is, as
aesthetic self) served the middle class for numerous purposes: to establish
a common bond and tradition among its members; to counter the privi-
leges of the aristocracy with an egalitarian ideal; to take the power of train-
ing away from the guilds and the artisans in general; and to inspire a sense
of inner balance and higher purpose during the socio-political upheavals of
the time by promoting respect for, and contemplation of the self as a
deeper reality.44 The artists of Bildung, all volunteers and virtuosos of sub-
jectivity, taught the philosophers of the Enlightenment and their victori-
ous class that the mastery of the world first requires a new form of gover-
nance—voluntary control over one’s self.
The chapter on the Odyssey in the Dialectic follows the conventions of
the Bildungsgeschichte but deplores its standard conclusion, suggesting
that the fall into knowledge and division was an unfortunate one since
it could never recover integration and unity: the inescapable fate of self-
realization is alienation (Rotenstreich 1989; Schacht 1970). The origins of
Bildungsgeschichte as a literary genre may be traced to the Christian prac-
tice of confession and the allegory of the journey of life. The romantic plot
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of the circuitous journey in quest of an earthly consummation is a “secular
version of the fortunate fall” (Abrams 1971: 208) “from self-unity and com-
munity into division, and from contentment into the longing for redemp-
tion, which consists of a recovered unity if a higher level of self-awareness”
(246). It tells the story of an educational journey of self-formation from
alienation (division and exile) to reintegration (new self-unity). “Most Ro-
mantic versions of the educational journey . . . incorporate a displaced the-
odicy, in which error and suffering are justified as indispensable to the
self-formation and self-realization of the mature individual, in a span of
reference coterminous with his life in this world” (244). Life in modern-
ity is no longer a pilgrimage or an exploration of new lands: it becomes a
personal adventure (Loriggio 1988; Nerlich 1987). Thus the Bildungsge-
schichte, as a theodicy of private life, “translates the painful process of
Christian conversion and redemption into a painful process of self-forma-
tion, crisis, and self-recognition, which culminates in a stage of self-coher-
ence, self-awareness, and assured power that is its own reward” (Abrams
1971: 96). The world is neither discovered nor denounced: it is simply af-
firmed as the stage of individual drama. The chronicle of the education of
the human race is replaced by the narrative of the cultivation of character.
The journey of the fallen/prodigal individual is best represented by the
fate of the post-Revolution intellectual/artist. The thinker as bard and
prophet is the most concentrated expression and experience of the self—of
the autonomous individual who is now encouraged to seek in this world
redemption as a progressive self-fashioning, as the artistic fashioning of a
self (Kelly 1987; Nehamas 1985). “In this process the redemptive goal of
the history of mankind was shifted from the reconciliation and reunion of
man with a transcendent God to an overcoming of the opposition between
ego and non-ego, or a reconciliation of subject with object, or a reunion of
the spirit with its own other, and this culmination was represented as oc-
curring in the fully developed consciousness of men living their lives in this
world: the justification of the ordeal of human experience is located in
experience itself. Accordingly, the history of mankind, as well as the history
of the reflective individual, was conceived not as a probation for an other-
worldly heaven but as a process of the self-formation, or self-education, of
the mind and moral being of man from the dawn of consciousness to the
stage of full maturity. . . . The course of human life (in the economy of
statement made possible by German compounds) is no longer a Heilsge-
schichte but a Bildungsgeschichte; or more precisely, it is a Heilsgeschichte
translated into the secular mode of a Bildungsgeschichte” (Abrams 1971:
187–88). For the haunted wanderer45 of modernity (the Wandering Greek
of the Dialectic or the Wandering Jew of Ulysses), the sacred and the
historical (Gnuse 1989) are reconciled in the narrative of aesthetic
self(re)cognition.
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Quite often, what makes the journey circuitous is its goal: the return to
an ancestral home. Redemption becomes repetition: an origin, a beginning,
a homeland, an identity are repeated (but this time authentically reconsti-
tuted) at the end of a quest: “Idealism in any form must transcend itself in
one way or another, in order to be able to return to itself and remain what
it is” (Schlegel 1968: 83). According to this narrative (which one is tempted
to call libretto), the script of history is not the scripture of human progress
but the epic of individual revelation—“a book of epiphanies” (Joyce). In
Bildung, the (public) process of enlightenment turns into the (private) ex-
perience of illumination. At this point, the neo-classical interest in the Iliad
gives its place to the romantic fascination with the Odyssey, as the disci-
plines of Man turn attention away from social questions of conduct to the
aesthetic pursuit of attitude. Odysseus polutropos is perceived as the hero
of an attitude that shapes the world according to its own disposition. This
change in interest is more than a difference of taste between Pope and
Wordsworth: it signals the different experience of alienation after 1789.
Thus, when Auerbach or Horkheimer and Adorno criticize the cunning of
Odysseus, they enter a discussion that goes back to Hegel and Schelling (as
well as Hamann’s epiphany in London46) as they are attempting to debunk
the greatest mythical figure of high modernity.
Although ideas about the education of the individual were an integral
part of the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on the capabilities of in-
formed reason, they lost their social dimension as their political relevance
seemed to dwindle. Despite pedagogical egalitarianism, the unruly crowds
in the streets of the metropolitan city made the ideal of the education of
the human race look less and less feasible. After the watershed of the
French Revolution, the program of Bildung emerged as Enlightenment
without politics: centered on the autonomous individual and her organic
development, it was a private task practiced for its own sake and taking the
form of an “aesthetic education” and a “biographia literaria.” Repudiating
the “present-day prosaic conditions” (Hegel), it ceased to be civic and be-
came poetic.
From Shaftesbury to Schiller, interest in “the formative development of
an adolescent nobleman or bourgeois into an artist or virtuoso” (Cocalis
1978: 407) was paramount as the need arose to train the bourgeoisie not
in personal self-control (as the faith of Reformation did) but in character
conduct—in private ethics and public manners. Rational conduct on the
basis of the idea of the calling, a fundamental element of modern culture,
was born from the spirit of Calvinist asceticism. “The God of Calvinism
demanded of his believers not single good works, but a life of good works
combined into a unified system. . . . The moral conduct of the average man
was thus deprived of its planless and unsystematic character and subjected
to a consistent method for conduct as a whole” (Weber 1976: 117). The
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idea of calling dictated a thorough rationalization of behavior for the sake
of the world beyond. “The alert self-control of the Puritan flowed from the
necessity of his subjugating all creaturely impulses to a rational and me-
thodical plan of conduct, so that he might secure his certainty of his own
salvation” (Weber 1963: 255). Adopting this lifestyle, “the Puritan literally
works out his interiorized religious disposition” (Whimster 1987: 263).
Since calling turned into an enormously profitable enterprise in the seven-
teenth century—in other words, as works paid too well—the socio-eco-
nomic success of rationalization undermined the systems of askesis and
brought about the practices of self-control.
Now it was again time to develop a new technology of the self, one ade-
quate to the emerging realm of interiority. The transformation of taste into
a practice of the inner self, into self-cultivation, began with Winckelmann
and Wieland, who introduced “Bildung into German intellectual life. Both
men equated Bildung with the Greek ideal of kalokagathia, i.e., with being
beautifully formed, well-educated, and morally good. But whereas Winck-
elmann conceived of Bildung as an ideal state of being, such as that im-
mortalized in classical art, Wieland interpreted it as a formative process”
(Cocalis 1978: 402). While the question of taste concerned the acquisi-
tion of a characteristic, the goal of Bildung was the formation of a charac-
ter. In both cases, the importance of cultivation was central. “In contrast
to Shaftesbury, however, who was writing from an aristocratic standpoint
about the education of young gentlemen, the Germans extended the scope
of Bildung to include the middle class” (403). Less than a matter of style
and status, Bildung was also a quest for legitimacy and distinction. Its pur-
suit became a vehicle for orderly social reform, an investment in the prom-
ise of self-discipline to eschew protest and unrest. Social status should be
determined by intellectual achievement rather than blood. In his theory of
culture, Herder “sets that ideal in explicit opposition to the political status
quo, positing it as a peaceful alternative to revolution” (404–5). When
Herder calls: “Awake, German nation!” he advocates “purely cultural self-
determination” (Berlin 1976: 182) from an anti-political position. Sub-
scribing to this social ideal, the intelligentsia dedicated itself to the mission
of criticism, hoping to contribute to the creation and preservation of a
public realm that would make exchange and negotiation possible and
peaceful.
This move was particularly visible in the area of writing. “The literature
of the Enlightenment supplied the bourgeoisie with meaningful entertain-
ment and moral orientation in the world, and it was this bourgeoisie that
made up the public; literary criticism . . . mediated between works and the
public on whose behalf it spoke; in its permanent discussions and debates
it constituted a literary-bourgeois public sphere” (Berghahn 1988: 95). The
new community of interpreters was supposed to be constituted by faith in
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the individual, the (self)creator, and the omnipotence of reason (Bromwich
1989). The institutions of criticism supporting the public function of art
promulgated enlightenment of judgment as the civil Reformation. The op-
timism, however, did not last long. “It had been self-evident during the
Enlightenment that literature had a moral-social and critical-emancipative
function, one that could permanently influence the life practices of the
readers or audience. During Weimar Classicism a momentous change oc-
curred: art separated itself from life, aesthetics detached itself from ethics,
and an elite distanced itself from the real public” (Berghahn 1988: 85). The
younger generation realized that the efforts of Wolff, Lessing, and Herder
to educate an informed, discriminating audience were failing, despite the
success of their campaign against courtly imitations of neoclassicism, be-
cause they fell short of influencing the lifestyle and the consumption taste
of the new public. The rules of the market were defeating the principles of
the Bildung community (Campbell 1987). “Anxiety at the power of com-
modity circulation to disperse individual identities moved the Romantics
again and again to reflect . . . on the possibility of an unconstrained, un-
alienated form of identity within modernity. In their assessment of what
art and being an artist should mean in an age of commodity exchange, they
were led to a valorization of the individual characteristics (das Charakteris-
tische) of artists and artworks: the characteristic is that which remains
identical with itself” (Schulte-Sasse 1988: 122).
The Romantics did not have in mind the autonomy of the consumer
when they advocated the independence of individual taste. Faced with so-
cial irrelevance, they retreated from shared community goals into the defi-
ant isolation of the intellectual coterie (like Rahel Varnhagen’s salon, Mal-
larmé’s Thursdays, or Balázs’ Sundays)—Bildung as lifestyle. “Criticism
thus became a conversation about art, conducted within a literary elite, a
‘literary association’ that defined the taste ideals of the epoch in contrast to
the needs of the public” (Berghahn 1988: 90). Philosophical reasoning took
precedence over political debate, and historical reality was denounced. All
forms and exercises of criticism were subsumed under critique, the theory
(and consciousness) of discipline.
This momentous change includes two stages: the aestheticization of au-
tonomy by Kant and the aestheticization of the political by Schiller. After
the style of taste and the distinction of Bildung, it is the (private) ethics of
disinterested contemplation that becomes the model disposition—not a
position in modernity but for the first time an attitude toward modernity.
“The aesthetic legitimation for such a depoliticization of art and for its
turning away from reality is delivered by Kant’s concept of autonomy,
which now gathers effect: what is beautiful is that which pleases generally,
in a disinterested manner. Or, in Schiller’s words: ‘Art is absolved from
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everything that is positive or that has been introduced by human conven-
tion.’ This declaration of art’s autonomy is Schiller’s answer to the histori-
cal crisis following the French Revolution. He distances himself from both
the ‘barbaric constitution of the State,’ which allows for no cultural re-
newal, and from the dominant culture, which is characterized by division
of labor, specialization, and alienation—all of which threaten the totality
of the human being. Finally, this declaration of autonomy is directed
against any state or religious control over art” (88). Emancipation is identi-
fied with the liberation of art from interest and of culture from labor,47
namely, with the ethics of contemplation. This is the political economy of
all post-revolutionary theory: with critique, alienation becomes a moral ad-
vantage rather than a social disadvantage.
It should not be assumed that all intellectuals were in favor of the aes-
thetic turn. The reformation in taste fought against two cultural fronts.
The first was what Horkheimer and Adorno called the “culture industry,”
the “mass-deception” of the public (Brantlinger 1983). As Schelling wrote
in his Philosophy of Art (1807): “Serious theoretical instruction in art is all
the more necessary in this age of the literary Peasant War being waged
against everything elevated, great, theoretical, yes, even against beauty it-
self in poetry and art” (quoted in Schulte-Sasse 1988: 149). The compari-
son with the sixteenth-century revolt indicates the intellectuals’ fearful
sense of siege. The second front was what in the 1790s seemed as “plebeian
tendencies in literature”: “Goethe and Schiller presented their idealistic art
program in opposition to the ‘literary sansculottes’” (Berghahn 1988: 86).
Those were the writers who remained committed to the Enlightenment
plan for the education of the public while substituting political for philo-
sophical arguments. To the eyes of the literati, they were little more than
pamphleteers, making unconscionable compromises to the expectations of
the audience. “To the suppressed (and repressed) past of German literary
criticism belongs the republican and Jacobin journalism that decisively
pushed for a political public sphere and a public opinion. As political jour-
nalism, it would be the counterpart to the apolitical and aestheticized liter-
ary public sphere of Weimar Classicism. That it could not prevail vis-à-vis
the Classic-Romantic criticism has less to do with its intrinsic quality than
with the fact that the political conditions, the censorship, and the domi-
nant aesthetics delayed its reception” (449). Opinion lost out to critique,
social concerns to Bildung, action to contemplation, the political to the
aesthetic.
Bildung originally included a civic role as part of its goal: the social pres-
ence, if not always involvement, of the enlightened individual was under-
stood as greatly contributing to (indeed, as a prerequisite for) citizenship.
A Pietist moral imperative linked the private task with public responsibil-
ity. The elevation of the aesthetic disposition to the aristocratic mark of
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the bourgeoisie, its effective egalitarian substitution for blood or rank, sig-
nalled “the triumph of constitutional Recht over imperial Macht, of secular
culture over religious faith” (Schorske 1980: 31). Commitment to Bildung
meant commitment to reason and art, to bourgeois Recht and Kultur
(Frykman and Lofgren 1987). The liberal creed of the middle class sought
a primarily cultural hegemony: constitutionalism, federalism, the bureau-
cratization of government, or the parliamentary system were much less
important than the promotion of art and scholarship. “The democratiza-
tion of culture, viewed sociologically, meant the aristocratization of the
middle classes” (Schorske 1980: 296). The generation of Hegel, Beethoven,
Hölderlin, and Wordsworth (all born in 1770) was probably the first to reap
fully the benefits of that democratization.
With the functional differentiation of art and the creation of the aes-
thetic realm, the critic no longer tries to mediate between culture and its
public but begins to defend the former against the indiscriminate prefer-
ences of the latter (which have made taste a bad quality). “Undoubtedly,
the Classical authors use the autonomy postulate to defend the highest
level of art against the market-dominated entertainment literature and the
crudity of the public taste. But they thereby alienate themselves more and
more from the real public. Indeed, over time they exclude the real public
from the enjoyment of art” (Berghahn 1988: 89). At the same time, at least
for some ten years before and after the turn of the century, they still hoped
to create within culture a counterspace with its own public, based on ex-
changes among those trained in the exercises of Bildung—individuals in-
volved in creating their lives and acquiring a biography, like Byron, Jean
Paul, Goya, Foscolo, Chateaubriand, Turner, Paine, Kleist, Scott, or de
Staël. Not unlike the members of the Frankfurt School, “at least the early
Romantics intended (and in so doing they could be regarded as the first
avant-garde movement in art) to reconnect art with life: that is, to return
art to the realm of experience. . . . [T]he represented modes of communi-
cation were supposed to be present, to be acted out, in Romantic groups.
. . . For in the eyes of the Romantics, communication through art was the
only form of praxis able to free itself from the reified relationships of soci-
ety” (Schulte-Sasse 1988: 140).
Schiller is again a case in point. After the French Revolution, when he
abandoned his belief in direct political change, he concentrated increas-
ingly on Bildung as social engineering. “He did not seek to cultivate the
features of modern life which contain something public, but attempted
rather to create by artistic means an artificial milieu in which the purely
private realm is inflated idealistically into the public realm” (Lukács 1978a:
111). During his collaboration with Goethe, which began in the summer of
1794, the possibility of historical change was transposed into the realm of
culture—the process of aesthetic cultivation. “Furthermore, by stressing
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the aesthetic element of Bildung, Schiller grants art a self-sufficiency that
even Shaftesbury had denied it. For although art had become the principal
means of attaining knowledge of truth and virtue, it had always retained a
utilitarian function. Schiller, however, expressly posits that aesthetics
should be interchangeable with ethics and politics. Instead of mediating
virtue, the pursuit of aesthetics becomes a virtue in itself. Likewise,
Bildung could be regarded as a moral and political act, even in its most
individualistic forms, because it implied opposition to a barbaric political
system and because it offered its proponents an alternative to revolution
for realizing humanitarian goals” (Cocalis 1978: 405).
The liberation of the self, the odyssey of Bildung, the autonomy of art,
the independence of contemplation, the self-founding of critique—all
these are aspects of the aesthetic turn of emancipation, the moment when
interpretation placed the laws of meaning within itself and development
sought only its own process.48 “Consequently, Bildung, which Herder had
associated with specific political demands, becomes a goal in itself that
may or may not be shared communally. The apolitical nature of art, which
in a time of revolution had qualified art as a political tool, becomes neutral-
ized as soon as the immediate political provocation disappears and art can
then be used to sanction wholly individualistic pursuits, as long as they can
be called humanitarian” (406). Education becomes wholly internalized, as
the first disciplines of humankind, the humanities, prevail in the “conflict
of the faculties” (Kant) and acquire institutional authority. From now on,
thanks to the academic legitimacy and epistemological supremacy of cri-
tique, interpreters will legislate (Bauman 1987).
It is important to remember that “none of the major philosophers since
the Scholastics of the 1300s had been an academic. . . . The Idealist revolu-
tion represents the academizing of modern philosophy” (Collins 1987: 58).
The Idealists were professors who initiated a new university reform. The
main thrust of their movement was toward promoting philosophy to the
highest position among disciplines. “In 1798, Kant in his last book, Der
Streit der Fakultaeten, maintained that only the Philosophical Faculty rep-
resented rational free inquiry, and hence should be dominant over the
other Faculties. It was Kant’s program that Wilhelm von Humboldt put
into effect when he founded the University of Berlin; and it was Fichte,
who had proclaimed that the national greatness of Germany was due to the
intellectual and spiritual creativity of its philosophers, who was made its
first rector” (61). The victory of Philosophy over the higher Faculties of
Theology, Law, and Medicine was best expressed in Fichte’s defense of his
discipline as critique of all other languages of knowledge. “Kant’s ‘revolu-
tion’ was a powerful attempt to raise the new class of cosmopolitan Ger-
man intellectuals into positions of security and prestige. The outburst of
Idealist systems that followed in the 1790s went far beyond Kant in ambi-
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tiousness; where he had cut off all speculative Theology as inadmissable
efforts to discuss the ‘thing-in-itself,’ Fichte and his followers replaced
Theology with comprehensive Idealist systems. . . . Where Kant pressed to
raise philosophy to the level of a science, and to more or less abolish Theol-
ogy as a rival, Fichte and his followers confidently proposed to take over
Theology’s territory with a new metaphysical construction, which would
also serve as the basis for all other fields of knowledge, including science
and history. At their height, they even felt they were creating a new reli-
gion, based on rationality” (63). “The Oldest System-Program of German
Idealism,” with its apostolic ardor, is the earliest gospel of this religion.
In the writings of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), starting with
the Limits of State Action (1791–92), the aspiration of the Enlightenment
to reform the state through education was abandoned. Furthermore, all
trust in the state as a bureaucratic machine which could be properly regu-
lated was withdrawn, and hope was invested in the sovereignty of the culti-
vated individual. At best, the state should only protect her independence
and preserve the proper conditions for her Bildung. Self-education would
contribute to social harmony simply by being its own necessary condition
and sufficient goal. In this way, politics was turned inside out, or more
accurately it was given an inside, a depth, and was encouraged to turn
inward towards the experience of the self.
Systematizing Bildung into a pedagogical enterprise, Humboldt devises
“a coherent program of individual development. He proposes that the state
design new institutions that would enable an aesthetic education for any
citizen, assuming that whatever is good for the individual must also be
good for the state. Museums, art galleries, libraries, archives, and concert
halls should be created and opened to the general public. . . . Thus mem-
bers of the middle class could participate in the same formative develop-
ment once reserved for the aristocracy and they, as well-bred individuals,
could become eligible for posts in a reformed, meritocratic civil service
within the existing structure of an absolute monarchy. . . . [B]y involving
the middle class in the government, one would insure the stability of the
existing political system” (Cocalis 1978: 406–7). This marked the transi-
tion from the administrative politics of the Enlightenment to the individ-
ual’s exercise in managing her own self (Cain 1989; Landes 1988). Aes-
thetic education and status, though, were increasingly linked, as Bildung,
the “knighthood of modernity,” became more and more not just a sign
but also a justification of power. This development can be discerned in
two cardinal oppositions of the nineteenth century: high vs. low culture,49
and culture vs. politics. The first meant that the artistic creations of the
masses or the folk were by definition inferior to those of the individual
genius, which required for their proper enjoyment all the time (namely,
leisure50) one could afford. The second opposition legitimized culture as
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the guardian of morality and stigmatized politics as the origin of social
malaise. Commitment to Bildung, therefore, meant above all commitment
to the politics of High Culture; and the best sign of Bildung competence
(namely, mastery of the self) was interpretive proficiency (that is, mastery
of the canon) as contemplation (of secular scriptures like those studied in
Mimesis).51
Bildung emerged as a precondition for bourgeois politics when the polit-
ical was banished from the street and became a separate realm of activity—
when the practices of governance became the province of government. Fur-
thermore, “in Germany the eighteenth century was a period marked by an
increasing social disciplining of the populace in general. (In other coun-
tries, most notably Spain, the process had begun much earlier.) Under the
pedagogic influence of various social institutions, including the state, the
whole of a person’s life was regarded as a period of productive labor. . . .
Regarding leisure time as the necessary, regenerative side of the labor pro-
cess was part of the new relationship to time; historically speaking, the
emerging necessity of maintaining a productive balance between work and
leisure was a precondition for the functional differentiation of the aesthetic
realm” (Schulte-Sasse 1988: 170). The plans for the exercises of contem-
plation converged with other plans for such disciplining, and were used to
train people during leisure time. Thus the Romantics proved useful to the
capitalist system (which they detested) since the aesthetic became a model
for teaching people what kind of autonomy they should seek. Eventually it
was the larger regime of aesthetic creativity that would define the idealist
version of the state—the Nation as a community of culture (Volk).52
For the person of Bildung, society was either Volk or mass. The concept
of Volk was defined in broad opposition to modernity—to the present, to
industrialization, alienation, Enlightenment, reason, social discontent.
Thus it was very important for “the unifying element of the Romantic
movement in its principal manifestations throughout the key European
countries (Germany, England, France, Russia): opposition to capitalism in
the name of pre-capitalist values” (Sayre and Löwy 1984: 46). As an aes-
thetic concept, the folk represented an ideal community based on the pri-
mordial identity of nature and culture, morality and creativity. “The con-
cept of the folk expressed a political, antimodernist desire for national
harmony, because the idea was intended to overcome ‘the boundaries of
class with the help of a utopian preview of an intact community [Gemein-
schaft] composed of a synthetic union of citizens, who could communicate
with one another and understand each other, not just superficially through
the medium of the state but in an unmediated fashion through the system
of common language [Umgangsprache]’ [Manfred Frank]. . . . In the dis-
course of Romanticism ‘the people’ or ‘folk’ is primarily a historical cate-
gory; the concept refers to a time that predated the ‘fragmentation’
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brought on by modernization” (Schulte-Sasse 1988: 172–74). Its radically
organic portrait of the nation was the expression of an attempt to recover
from the abyss of history a sense of (lost but once possible) order, growth,
consensus, roots, collectivity, authenticity, wholeness, and uniqueness: au-
tonomy as autochthony. “National unity was conceived in cultural terms”
(Mosse 1970: 10) as culture seemed (first to Herder) the only possible basis
for a modern community, and Bildung promised membership to it. The
analogous aesthetic constructs of Volk and Bildung mapped the territory
and responsibilities of (middle class) culture until the end of Modernism.
Following the humiliation of the Prussian defeat in Jena (1806), treatises
like Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation (1808) de-
fended the supremacy of the nation. National, rather than personal, educa-
tion became a priority (Johnston 1989). Above all, popular nationalism
found a new attachment to the motherland, rather than culture, and
turned into a populist ideology, patriotism. After Napoleon, as far as the
middle class was concerned, Bildung was nationalized, becoming “an at-
tribute of those who could boast Germanic roots and who alone could ap-
preciate the good, the true, and the beautiful” (Mosse 1985a: 10). This
development led to two quite different conceptions. Intellectuals like
Humboldt (who headed in 1809–10 the Section for Religion and Education
in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior) rejected the idea of patriotic edu-
cation and chose to abandon considerations of the social relevance of culti-
vation rather than see Bildung serve the state. The lonely path of individu-
ality was the only decent course left to the man of modernity, the thinking
person who felt uprooted from his native Volk: “Individuality is precisely
what is original and eternal in man; personality doesn’t matter so much. To
pursue the cultivation and development of this individuality as one’s high-
est calling would be a godlike egoism” (Schlegel 1971: 247). As for the rest
of his class, now fully entrenched in positions of state control, Bildung
degenerated into norms of respectability and codes of decorum. The as-
cetic training in civilization was reduced to “ritual competence” in civility.
An indispensable tenet of the project of autonomy was the self-definition
of the modern age as a distinct era, which meant that the age was histori-
cally autonomous too. “The modern age was the first and only age that
understood itself as an epoch and, in so doing, simultaneously created the
other epochs. The problem of legitimacy is latent in the modern age’s claim
to carry out a radical break with tradition, and in the incongruity between
this claim and the reality of history, which can never begin entirely anew”
(Blumenberg 1983: 116). Ultimately the question of legitimacy could not
be answered foundationally simply because autonomy can only seek its
nomos in its own constitution, differentiating its own story from history:
there is no self-foundation. “It is impossible to circumvent the necessity of
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affirming the project of autonomy as the primary position, one which can
be elucidated but which cannot ‘be founded,’ since the very intention of
founding it presupposes it” (Castoriadis 1990: 84). The age understands
and asserts itself as an epoch. “Its self-understanding is one of the constitu-
tive phenomena of this historical phase in its initial stages. This makes the
concept of the epoch itself a significant element of the epoch” (Blumen-
berg 1983: 468).
Hellas was first identified with the ideal of autonomy when the dis-
courses of emancipation looked for an alternative to the system of Neoclas-
sical taste from which German society should free itself.53 She seemed to
present a model more Greek and more ancient than the French one, as well
as completely untainted by Roman-Catholic influence. Rejecting the cul-
ture of the petty courts, the Enlightenment embraced the new model of
organic integration, pursuing “the illusory perspectives which the flower of
bourgeois society, which German classicism set itself: realization of the
demands and results of the bourgeois revolution, that is, the revolutionary
and voluntary liquidation of feudal survivals, in a non-revolutionary way”
(Lukács 1978a: 134). An essential part of this pursuit was the creation of a
literary theory capable of shaping and educating the reading public. The
principles and values of this theory, of this pedagogical enterprise that con-
stituted the non-revolutionary politics of the intellectuals and profession-
als, were sought in ancient Greece. Thus what later became known as the-
ory was from the beginning a theoria, a view as well as account, of Hellas.
“Since the emergence of the bourgeois class, the development of the theory
of modern literature, the theory of its specific characteristics and their jus-
tification, has always been very closely related to the development of a
theory of antiquity. . . . The great period of bourgeois literary theory, which
terminated with the imposing world-historical synthesis of the history of
literature and art in Hegel’s aesthetics, is based entirely on the conception
of antiquity as the canon of art, as the unattainable model for all art and
literature” (101). As the independence of the aesthetic realm increased and
its population pursued more autonomy, the appeal of Greece incorporated
principles of social order as it expanded “into a contrast between the splen-
didly naïve moral ingenuousness of the Greeks and the empty, exaggerated,
and false conventions of bourgeois society” (106).
At the same time, Weimar classicism gradually found its Greek ideal less
accessible. “The development of young Hegel shows with the greatest clar-
ity how closely related to each other in Germany at that time were the two
complexes: on the one hand, approval of the French Revolution and the
cultural programme of renovating antiquity, and on the other, the Thermi-
dorean renunciation of revolutionary methods and the conception of antiq-
uity as conclusively past” (112). Eventually, the numbers of those who were
willing to pursue democracy in the public sphere dwindled. The Jacobins
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(Feher 1988) were the last to believe in creating a new, political Greece
again (Parker 1937). “If Greece—in particular the Greece of the pre-
Socratics—nourished a rightist imagination, certainly in Germany, there
was also a post-Socratic Greece which nourished a leftist imagination and
revolutionary philosophy, those of a democratic citizenry (especially in the
France of Rousseau to Jaurès)” (Goux 1989: 19). Before too long, though,
when they could not recreate the democracy of the polis, people lost faith
in the Greek socio-historical ideal.54
For about a century, the Hellenic lost almost all connection with politics.
“At the height of his own efforts on behalf of antiquity, Schiller thus
bluntly rejects the Jacobin renovation of Hellenism, regarding it as ‘Graeco-
mania’” (Lukács 1978a: 114). The poet of “The Gods of Greece” (1788)
denounces politics while elevating the art of the polis to the highest ideal.
“The conception of antiquity as past, as something irrevocably lost, is one
of the most important aspects of Schiller’s conception of history and thus
of his judgment of the present. We know with what decisiveness he placed
the irrevocably past character of Greek culture and art at the centre of his
philosophy of history, with what animosity he fought against the Jacobin
enthusiasm for a revolutionary renovation of antiquity” (132). The Roman-
tic apotheosis of the aesthetic explains why “the tragic transition from the
heroic age of the polis republic dreamed by Robespierre and Saint-Just into
capitalist prose had to be effected in a purely utopian and ideological man-
ner without a preliminary revolution” (Lukács 1978b: 137). The retreat
from the politics of the public sphere to the community of Bildung marks
the ascendancy of the Hellenic to the order of transcendental harmony—
the law of creativity.
Of course, Bildung had always been exclusively Hellenic: Greece had
been its land of remembrance, reverie, and return because it was presum-
ably there that the integration of character and citizenship, of private edu-
cation and public virtue, of morality and culture reached perfect balance.
The classical texts, artworks, and monuments were taken as a lasting and
inspiring testimony to that achievement. Bildung was not just a revival of
the ancient or the classical but specifically an adoration of the Hellenic: its
goal was not (Roman) order, as in baroque absolutism, but organic har-
mony. It constituted nothing less than the idealist appropriation of an-
tiquity that encouraged Enlightenment to replace the republican rule of
aristocracy with its own democratic control through culture.
Bildung both aestheticized pedagogy and gendered class. It made man-
hood a characteristic of the new gentility, as masculinity (Bordo 1987; Brit-
tan 1989; Pleck 1981) was defined in opposition to family and trade—to the
domestic (female) (Armstrong 1987; Ellis 1989; George 1988; Kelley 1984;
Poovey 1988a; Shevelow 1989; Suganami 1989) and the entrepreneurial
(male) spirit in the urban market. It is necessary to emphasize that “male
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dominance is intrinsic rather than accidental to classical capitalism, for the
institutional structure of this social formation is actualized by means of
gendered roles” (Fraser 1989: 128). Bildung was sexual division and division
of labor elevated to intellectual exercise—the consummate aesthetic and
homosocial involvement. Friendship became an integral part of this jour-
ney: there was always a real or imaginary friend who accompanied Shelley,
Leopardi, Pushkin, Hölderlin, or Whitman (or Edith Wharton) in their
quest (Koestenbaum 1989). For men and women alike (Faderman 1981;
Todd 1980), Bildung, perceived as an exercise in Socratic learning, assumed
and instilled a male identity (Theweleit 1987, 1988). It also desired the
physical beauty of the male body (Friedrichsmeyer 1983). It was only after
Bildung declined into training for respectability, and self-control into eti-
quette (Kasson 1990), that beauty was medicalized as health (Conrad and
Schneider 1980; Weeks 1981). Until then, until manliness became a norm
opposed to sickness (Mort 1987), masculinity as a state (rather than experi-
ence) was a major ideal of cultivation (Sedgwick 1985).
Thus the connection between Jews and homosexuals should be made on
the basis not of deviance or otherness but of the aristocracy of culture
(morality and taste, respectively) they represent. If culture is the eminent
quality of bourgeois aristocracy, then moral knowledge and artistic taste are
its main elements, representing its Hebraic and Hellenic dimensions. “Jews
and homosexuals are the outstanding creative minorities in contemporary
urban culture. Creative, that is, in the truest sense: they are creators of
sensibilities. The two pioneering forces of modern sensibility are Jewish
moral seriousness and homosexual aestheticism and irony. The reason for
the flourishing of the aristocratic posture among homosexuals also seems
to parallel the Jewish case. . . . Jewish liberalism is a gesture of self-legitimi-
zation. So is Camp taste, which has definitely something propagandistic
about it. . . . The Jews pinned their hopes for integrating into modern soci-
ety on promoting the moral sense. Homosexuals have pinned their integra-
tion into society on promoting the aesthetic sense” (Sontag 1966: 290).
Jews and homosexuals are but two cultural manifestations of the Hebraic
and the Hellenic. The care of Bildung is the combination of the two
senses—the aesthetic as moral, or sensibility as conduct.
Bildung, which succeeded as an invariably Hellenic ideal, was from the
very beginning prominent in discussions of the social, political, and philo-
sophical place of the Jew. Lessing’s Nathan the Wise (1779), for example,
the best-known play of the Enlightenment, has as its hero a Jew who incar-
nates a judicious combination of enlightened knowledge and cultivated
character. The problem of Jewish emancipation became a crucial one for
the theoreticians of bourgeois culture and virtue. It came to the fore of
public discussions in major countries like Germany, Austria, and France in
the late eighteenth century and was closely linked with the civil emancipa-
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tion of the middle class itself. The Jews, who had been invented during the
hermeneutic wars of the Reformation, provided the test case for the demo-
cratic/liberal project of the bourgeoisie: an old model and a contemporary
margin, a religious origin and an economic presence, a safe distance and an
attractive proximity, the Other who was an indispensable part of the
Same—all this presented a great challenge to promises of universal har-
mony: Was an organic integration through cultivation possible? Was it
truly open to any individual with the required credentials? Could a cultural
democracy abolish social distinctions and political inequality? In the period
between the recognition of the Jews as citizens by the French Revolution
and by Prussia (1812), the middle class engineered a miracle of liberaliza-
tion that made it feel legitimate and proud because it was not just its own.55
By 1807 Jews stopped being called a nation in Germany and were asked to
assimilate. The generosity of the new system to the person-as-character was
obvious: everybody was welcome to join the producers and/or consumers of
culture, even the Jews. Thus the Jew was invited to become the model
middle class subject and was endowed with all the bourgeois privileges
(that is, human rights). This interpellation was premised and based on a
secular contract: “emancipation was what the states were to grant, assimila-
tion what the Jews were to give in return” (Sorkin 1990: 18). Its specific
character was the Jews’ covenant with aesthetic culture.
While the bourgeoisie was confidently congratulating itself for its liberal
willingness to accept the Jews into the world of democratic rights, it was
also taking a number of self-protective measures: making culture a requi-
site for citizenship; establishing the aesthetic as the normative ideal of
identity (personal, national, sexual, etc.); creating the educational system
(from Gymnasium to the University) that would oversee the regular exer-
cise in Bildung; isolating the lower classes into the disorderly, uncultivated,
dirty crowd of the “masses” (Hamilton and Wright 1986; Mosse 1975);
above all, limiting access to the experiment to the Jews, the Other (of the
Same)—the true insider of the new dominant identity. The Jew was chosen
as the case most appropriate for the testing of this system: representative
of the financial territory claimed by the burghers, bearer of learned reason
and traditional morality, seeker of equality and tolerance—this (imagined)
person, as an educated individual, could potentially become the best exam-
ple of what the enlightened middle class promised to do for all people.
Not that the case had no troubling aspects—ideas of the Jew as anti-
Christian, Semite, untrustworthy, or different were often associated with
the specific ethnic group. At the same time, these very aspects made the
case safely challenging: the true potential of Bildung would be best exhib-
ited (to the aristocrats who were contemptuously watching the middle
class experiment with culture and learning, and to the lower classes which
seemed given only to greed and hedonism) in the cultivation and reforma-
tion of an Other (and yet not a foreigner or outcast)56 who had so far no
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part in it. This could prove that the ideal of Bildung was, in a truly egalitar-
ian fashion, available to anybody, as long as there was sincere commitment,
willingness to cooperate, and no desire for politics (like unreasonable de-
mands, demonstrations, or strikes). Culture through education and culti-
vation was an open, inviting, rewarding area. Within it, the Jew was used to
prove that the Hellenic was truly democratic (and not, say, aristocratic, like
the Roman). Thus the Jew, by becoming a respectable member of Kulturge-
meinschaft, was emancipated into a world of constitutionalism and liberal-
ism (Hodgson 1983) where the state assumed benevolent command of the
national life—into the bourgeois world of sweetness and light, art and sci-
ence, Bildung and reason, where culture provided the promise and the
means of integration into mainstream society. The Jewish Bildungsbürger
became the greatest achievement of the German Bildungsbürgertum.
The case of Moses Mendelssohn (also known as the “Jewish Socrates”),
the model of Nathan the Wise, exemplifies this achievement. He has been
hailed as the first modern German Jew in that he “was the first Jew to
identify himself with the cultural concerns of Germany and to make the
German tongue the medium of his literary creativity” (Altmann 1985: 18).
He seemed to excel in all intellectual pursuits that constituted the realm of
modern culture. In scholarship, he laid the foundations for what was later
to become the Wissenschaft des Judentums; in criticism, he worked with
Bishop Lowth’s principles in his Biblical analysis; in philosophy, he pro-
posed Judaism as the true religion of reason; in Bible studies, he translated
the Scripture into German; and in politics, he outlined the plan for a secu-
lar Jewish state. He acquired immense prestige: the most distinguished
figures of his time, from Lessing and Kant to Jacobi and Goethe, discussed
his ideas.57 The Enlightenment embraced and elevated him to a model and
a legend: his case proved that the Jew of reason was somebody with whom
one could reason.58 This Gentile invention defined the agenda for theorists
of the Hebraic almost until the age of Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945) and
Max Scheler (1874–1928). It was only with the generation of Rosenzweig,
Scholem, Buber, and Benjamin (with the decay of Bildung, the return to
mysticism, the new translation of the Bible, Zionism, and revolutionary
Messianism) that Mendelssohn’s exemplification of the Hebraic became
obsolete. The critique by Horkheimer and Adorno of the ideal of Ithaca is
an equally strong rejection of Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem—of the state of
rights and reason which for them was only another Hellenic myth. There
was, however, a single commitment which, precisely because of the success
of assimilation (called by Mendelssohn “civil acceptance”), remained for
them unalterable: the devotion to culture.
Although Jews were excluded for about another century from the sphere of
the mandarins and bureaucrats (which included areas like the state institu-
tions or the University), they were encouraged to excel in culture (arts,
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sciences, philosophy, journalism) and all the practices of (its) interpreta-
tion (beginning with scholarship). This is how the move “from economic to
intellectual vocations” (Schorske 1980: 149), “the so-called Judaicization
of all educated professions” (Theodor Herzl) by a cultivated class excluded
from state bureaucracy and exercise of political power, took place. The
projected Jewish cultural assimilation through interpretive proficiency was
the large-scale experiment in Bildung in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries. The experiment was to use the Greeks in order to educate
the Jews—to educate the Other in order to legitimize the knowledge of the
Same, the regime of aesthetic identity; and the condition was that Jews
become good citizens by showing commitment to culture, respect for polit-
ical authority, and faith to the total separation of the two. “The cultural
and the political were two different worlds, and Jewish emancipation was a
decisively cultural emancipation” (Mosse 1985: 70). The Jewish covenant
with the aesthetic was the supreme realization on a large scale of Schiller’s
idea of social engineering through culture.
The aesthetic covenant made the Jew first and foremost a critic. “Assimila-
tion and criticism are but two moments in the same process of emancipa-
tion” (Horkheimer 1974: 108). It was the impossible dream of assimilation
that made criticism a simulation of emancipation. The bourgeois insider
who was the political outsider was in the best position to practice culture
as criticism, to exercise critique. When the religion of virtuosos reached its
self-reflective state, seeking to purify nomos of all external support, it
found in its Others the specialists of secular guilt, of ambivalence over
emancipation. “What is more, critique was also the means of Jewish eman-
cipation from Judaism itself. It not only secured an urbane attitude and
worldly tolerance on the part of Christians; it also offered the philosophical
tool with which the grand self-dynamism of the Jewish spirit sought to
master its religious and social destiny. Jewish philosophy, in all its versions,
has remained critique” (Habermas 1983b: 27). Luring the Jews into the
dilemmatic logic59 of emancipation and assimilation, tradition and prog-
ress, identity and difference, the Hebraic and the Hellenic, modernity
could further experiment with a variety of questions, from survival of com-
munity to the authority of the law. At the same time, the guests (or hos-
tages) of modernization have not disappointed their hosts. “Those Dias-
pora Jews who survive and transcend alien cultures . . . are precisely those
who judge it. Critics, interpreters, summarizers of culture who are Jews can
at least breathe, if only transiently, in Diaspora” (Ozick 1970: 273). It is
again the principle of proficiency that prevails here, the need to earn recog-
nition by achieving distinction, by functioning as the conscience of the
reigning truth, its dialectic of enlightenment, its ever-vigilant critique.
The “Jewish Question” became the crucial issue for high modernity be-
cause it combined the problems of modernization, cultivation, and assimi-
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lation into a single civil right—that of emancipation. The term “emancipa-
tion,” first adopted in public debates in 1828, was a Jewish appropriation:
so far as the Gentiles were concerned, the rights of the Jew (specifically, the
right Jew) remained a question—the quest for cultural democracy. Eman-
cipation was “redemption-through-assimilation” (Bauman 1988: 56), and
its strategy was culture—excellence in Hellenic (aesthetic) pursuits, in
achievements that transcended national boundaries and peculiarities, and
reached into the common (Western) heritage. “Emancipation meant not
only the flight from the ghetto past but also from German history regarded
as an obstacle to integration. . . . The search for common ground tran-
scending history was one reason why Jews as a group tended to support
cultural and artistic innovation to a greater extent than did Gentiles. Jews
provided a disproportionate share of support for the avant garde and for
educational experiments as well. . . . Supporting cultural innovation not
only helped overcome a handicap of a separate past but also continued the
impetus of Bildung as a process of self-cultivation. But then, Bildung had
always concentrated upon culture and all but ignored politics and society.
Bildung furthered a cultural vision of the world. This . . . blinded those
committed to the primacy of the humanistic culture to political realities”
(Mosse 1985a: 14–15).
The “Jewish Question” became the only viable social project of Bildung
since it also expressed the moral responsibility of culture without raising
questions of political participation or struggle. Accepting individuality and
universality as the premises of assimilation, Jews willfully “followed the
precepts Goethe had proposed for the education of his Wilhelm Meister,
a novel that was to become the great model of middle-class education”
(Arendt 1968: 59).60 Assimilation was achieved instantly—as soon as the
conditions for emancipation were accepted (even though by definition
they could never be fully met). “ ‘Assimilation’ designated the status and
self-definition of post-emancipation German Jewry” (Sorkin 1990: 18). The
proposal seemed irresistibly egalitarian, requiring disciplined work and
achievement: “Emancipation, although granted to the Jews on clearly de-
fined terms, generous to the individual but intolerant of the group, offered
to the Jews economic opportunities and a civil status which their fathers
had not even dreamed of. They were, therefore, not only eager to accept
the terms but within a short time carried out most of the mental and phys-
ical adjustments their fellow-citizens had stipulated. They soon adopted
the views of the Germans about their own tradition together with the val-
ues and goals of German society” (Schmidt 1956: 39). This is how “Judaism
became Jewishness” (Cuddihy 1974: 14)—how social position became a
matter of personal identity, emancipation a matter of attitude, and moder-
nity the anxiety of belatedness. Any remaining political connotations dis-
appeared as the Bildung quest was further subjected to a moral codification
and turned into a search for respectability: the embourgeoisement of the Jew
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was eventually reduced to the “refinement of the Israelites,” as she strove
to forget her Yiddish and become raffiné.
The outcome of the experiment can be seen in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna, in
the Leningrad avant-garde, in Weimar Berlin, in the Paris salons, and in the
New York intelligentsia: it succeeded because (certain) Jews were culturally
integrated, becoming the best representatives of Enlightenment, assimila-
tion, and respectability. “The Jews who took the Enlightenment on its
word and identified emancipation with refinement of manners and, more
generally, with self-cultivation, had become cultural fanatics. In every
Western nation they were the ones who treated national cultural heritage
most seriously—in fact, more seriously than expected (mostly as means of
national mobilization and state legitimation). Trying to excel in the com-
plex and often elusive task ahead, they sung the praises of national monu-
ments and masterpieces of national art and literature, only to find that the
audience comprised mostly people similar to themselves. They read avidly
and voraciously, only to find they could discuss what they had read only
with other aspiring Germans or Frenchmen like themselves. Far from
bringing them closer to assimilation, conspicuous cultural enthusiasm and
obsessive display of cultural nobility set them aside from the native middle
class and, if anything, supplied further evidence of their ineradicable for-
eignness. . . . In many German or French cultural centers, symphonic con-
certs and theater premieres came to play the same social role for the assim-
ilated Jews as the weekly ritual of high church service played for the gentile
part of the middle class” (Bauman 1988: 53). By excelling in the Hellenic
exercises of Bildung, the Jews became the true Greeks, the modern vir-
tuosos of culture. It was their conspicuous distinction, their status as emi-
nent producers and consumers of culture, though, that kept them isolated
from the masses (including the Jewish masses), as Horkheimer and Adorno
bitterly observed. “The Jews, unlike the masses, reached for Bildung in
order to integrate themselves into German society. The Jews and the Ger-
man masses entered German social and political life at roughly the same
time, but the Jews were apt to reject the world of myth and symbol, the
world of feeling rather than reason. Through the process of their emancipa-
tion, they were alienated from the German masses” (Mosse 1985: 8).61
Where interpretive independence had shaped the meaning of liberation for
the classes of the Reformation, the ideal of Bildung reoccupied bourgeois
emancipation, and the Jewish intellectual, the typical self-sufficient and
cultivated bourgeois, became (from Heine to Lukács and from Adorno to
Alan Bloom) its custodian.62
This very success made his position politically precarious. In the nine-
teenth century, when culture was considered Hellenic and the guardians of
its educational value were considered representatives of Hebraic morality
(by people like Arnold or Disraeli), faith in the aesthetic religion and mem-
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bership in the congregation of culture were still relatively strong. But the
failure of liberalism early in the twentieth century brought about the iden-
tification of culture with the Hebraic, and of social anarchy with politics
and the Hellenic. Under this development, “the program which the liberals
had devised against the upper classes occasioned the explosion of the
lower. The liberals succeeded in releasing the political energies of the
masses, but against themselves rather than against their ancient foes”
(Schorske 1980: 117). The revolt of the craftsmen and the proletariat
against the inequalities created by laissez faire and free trade had spread
between the Napoleonic Wars and the Revolutions of 1848 in France, En-
gland, Germany, and Austria. Anti-Semitism also played a part in early
attacks against liberalism, statism, and capitalism (Lichtheim 1968).63 The
bankruptcy of the liberal ideal (as well as of the High Culture he defended)
left the Jew a victim, since for the peasant and the artisan “liberalism
meant capitalism and capitalism meant Jew” (Horkheimer and Adorno
1972: 118). The intertwining of anti-capitalist and anti-Jewish positions
has a history going back to the collapse of the ancien régime. “Anti-Semi-
tism in its secular form was no isolated phenomenon. It was closely linked
up with the opposition to laissez-faire capitalism and its forms of trade and
industry. It was later linked with resistance to liberalism and the growing
political power of the West, notably Great Britain and America. There is no
reason to assume that this was a purely German development. It could be
found in other Continental countries and was most prominent and effec-
tive among the intelligentsia” (Schmidt 1959: 59). No interpretive profi-
ciency or cultural eminence could provide protection under such condi-
tions of disaffection and unrest.
Emancipation and integration happened on the basis of the universalist
ideal of a shared humanity that underscored difference the more it advo-
cated equality and justice. The central requirement was the transcendence
of the political (socio-economic interest) through culture (Schopenhauer’s
disinterested “pure contemplation” of beauty and knowledge). This inte-
gration, however, was never satisfactorily achieved exactly because it was
never assumed to be political. “The commitment to culture as the guardian
of morality excluded overt political action; individual Bildung would in the
last resort solve all problems of life” (Mosse 1985: 33). Those who internal-
ized the liberal ideal of self-cultivation acquired rights and became inde-
pendent, but they were never politically free: they became the subjects of
culture. First of all, assimilation, like its code, Bildung, was an individual
affair: only individuals could be cultivated and assimilated. Assimilation
meant matching achieved economic status with comparable social accep-
tance through the mediation of style and attitude. Group assimilation was
by definition impossible. Thus “the experience of certain individuals not-
withstanding, the entrance of Jewry as a collective into the body of German
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society did not mean real integration into any part, stratum, or section of
it. It meant, rather, the creation of a separate subgroup, which conformed
to the German middle class in some of its characteristics” (Katz 1985: 85).
One of the conditions of voluntary (individual) assimilation was the aban-
donment of ethnic identity.
In this respect, Jewishness was an important negative qualification that
had to be overcome. Since autonomy was a matter of self-disciplined pri-
vacy, a question of cultivated character, only qualified individuals could be
admitted to the democracy of Bildung. “Exit visas were a collective matter,
whereas entry tickets had to be obtained individually” (Bauman 1988: 51).
Neither human reason nor equality of rights were sufficient for member-
ship in the nation of culture: the new allegiance presupposed a denuncia-
tion of collective destiny. “It appears to be only when the gifted Jew escapes
from the cultural environment created and fed by the particular genius of
his own people, only when he falls into the alien lines of gentile inquiry and
becomes a naturalized, though hyphenated, citizen in the gentile republic
of learning, that he comes into his own as a creative leader in the world’s
intellectual enterprise. It is by loss of allegiance, or at the best by force of
a divided allegiance to the people of his origin, that he finds himself in the
vanguard of modern inquiry” (Veblen 1964: 225–26). Jewishness was never
emancipated. On the contrary, the overcoming of a communal tradition—
in this case, observance of (the law of) Judaism—was part of the Bildung
exercises. “Indeed, one may argue that from Heine to Proust and Pasternak
many of the decisive moments in the modernist movement represent ma-
neuvers of rejection by Jews of their Jewish past” (Steiner 1976: 75).64 For
Judaism to become universal, one had to be Jewish individually. The result
was at least paradoxical: “The abandoning of traditional Jewish occupa-
tions, which from the assimilants’ viewpoint meant Entjudung (de-judaiza-
tion of ‘men as such’), appeared to the baffled native public more like the
process of Verjudung (judaization of heretofore gentile areas)” (Bauman
1988: 54). At the same time, by becoming the aristocracy of culture, Jews
became model “state-people.” “The new devotion to the state became
almost a substitute for their old religion” (Schmidt 1956: 43), as they
pledged unconditional loyalty to secular authority. “The ideology of eman-
cipation regarded the State, or rather the rule of law, as the highest level of
social life; it did not demand or exact any internal change beyond that
implicit in the legal system itself” (Rotenstreich 1959: 8). The virtuosos of
Bildung behaved like the religious virtuosos whose “genuinely mystic and
charismatic search for salvation has naturally and everywhere been apoliti-
cal or anti-political in nature” (Weber 1958b: 337). The virtue of this mod-
ern virtuosity was the purity, the disinterestedness of contemplation. The
aesthetic gaze could not compromise its integrity by paying attention to
(let alone dealing with) any law external to its theoretical constitution.
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In a certain sense, the situation was not new. “German Jews retained
their old timidity towards the authorities in power. As citizens they were
always ready to fulfill the behest of the state, to excel in the observation of
state laws and to collaborate with the government, even if that government
was anything but friendly towards them. . . . Even the open hostility of the
Nazi Era found German Jews reluctant to contemplate political opposition
as a group. The laws of the state were regarded as sacrosanct, often to the
bitter end” (Schmidt 1956: 42). Political power was rarely challenged: re-
spect for the moral authority of institutions prevailed as “most of the Ger-
man-Jewish leadership understood only too well the importance of respect-
ability for the cause of Jewish emancipation, and they were ready and eager
to accept its dictates of conformity, the more so as respectability provided
tangible signs as to how life should be lived in Gentile society” (Mosse
1985a: 7).
It is part of the aesthetic condition to believe that it has escaped institu-
tional control because it surveys matters untainted by purposeful consider-
ations, attending only to the freeplay of imagination and intellect, and con-
tributing to the re-enchantment of the world. “Thus the assimilating Jews
did not cheat or otherwise fail to play the game according to the rules. . . .
They could not challenge that authority without sapping the foundation of
their redemptive hopes. The project of assimilation turned out to be a trap.
Without control over the rules, it was impossible to win” (Bauman 1988:
56). It seemed as if, so long as they distinguished themselves in Hellenic
pursuits, this capital investment would provide both safety and superiority
(Wistrich 1989). “If the Viennese burghers had begun by supporting the
temple of art as a surrogate form of assimilation into the aristocracy, they
ended by finding in it an escape, a refuge from the unpleasant world of
increasingly threatening political reality” (Schorske 1980: 8).
Culture and manners, however, could not protect their practitioners and
soloists from the violence of discrimination which they had often sup-
ported, and even exercised, albeit only in intellectual and cultural affairs.
“Bildung and Sittlichkeit, which had stood at the beginning of Jewish
emancipation in Germany, accompanied German Jews to the end, blinding
them, as many other Germans, to the menace of National Socialism”
(Mosse 1985a: 15). As late as the 1920s, many defended themselves by
displaying their grasp of German identity: “In seeking the origins of Ger-
many, German Jews once more turned to those they deemed the origina-
tors of the search, the nationalists who could stand beside the internation-
alists like Lessing and Goethe. . . . This conception of Germany’s past and
tradition was proffered as the real one. To German Jews the Nazis were the
idealizers, the dreamers, seeking or creating a past that had never existed—
a past out of touch with reality” (Bolkosky 1975: 138). The disinfected
reality of culture still seemed the only worthy domain where dialectical
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conflicts could be debated and resolved, or where the uncivilized forces and
masses could be educated and tamed.65 Consequently, critique was identi-
fied with resistance. Nazi culture, however, despised by intellectual taste,
chose to contest the definition of collective identity by other means.66
The Hebraic rule over capitalist codes (such as money and the printed
word—which, of course, should not be confused with means, materials,
wealth, or power) achieved its full legitimacy in Budapest, Vilna, Frankfurt,
Vienna, Salonika, Zurich, and Paris. Ironically, in a total inversion of the
Romantic model, of the invitation to Bildung extended to the Jewish bour-
geoisie, by the time of Benjamin, Jakobson, and Lévi-Strauss Jewishness
had become a central metaphor for Bildung, and the “Man of Letters” was
succeeded by the “Jew of Culture,” by Benjamin’s “intellectual literary-
Jew” and “creative culture-Jew” (Rabinbach 1985: 99). Regarding the
Frankfurt School position, for example, “at least in Horkheimer’s case, the
Critical Theorist was understood as ‘the Jew’ of the administered society.
And conversely, anti-Semitism became a model of the totalistic liquidation
of non-identity in the one-dimensional world” (Jay 1980: 149).67 Already
before the end of World War I, culture had abandoned its Hellenic charac-
ter. The Hellenic had been identified with the (pagan and barbaric) politi-
cal: while Arnold tried to mobilize it to make culture more attractive (Lam-
bropoulos 1989), Buber attacked it because he saw it as a threat to culture.
In a parallel development, while in the era of Mendelssohn and Kant the
cultural transcendence of politics was the condition of emancipation, by
the time of Bloch and Zweig culture had produced the aesthetic ideal of a
transcendental politics. If Heine and Marx gave priority to praxis over the-
ory, at the Frankfurt Institute and in the theories of those “searching for a
socialism untainted by the demands of politics or the struggle for power”
(Mosse 1985: 57), the order was reversed, and at the end of the twentieth
century (in the writings on painting of, say, Hilton Kramer or Jacques Der-
rida), theory (deconstructionist or neo-conservative) is the only praxis
available.68
The European intellectual tradition reached its climactic end in the
work of the intellektuelle Linke of the interwar period, when the ideas of
totality (Dembo 1989; Grumley 1989; Jay 1984) and difference became
central to its aesthetic politics: totality as the overcoming of the frag-
mented modernity, and difference as the yearning for a messianic fulfill-
ment of time and language. Cultural leftism searched for a model of social
change untainted by politics and activism, and found it in a Kantian (Mar-
burg) or Hegelian (Frankfurt) socialism, which can be both subsumed
under what Lukács called in 1931 “Romantic anti-capitalism.”69 The for-
mer was more interested in ethics, the latter in aesthetics. The Kantian
trend explored the dimming prospects of Enlightenment, the Hegelian the
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dawning threats to Bildung. Both flourished in the Weimar Republic and
constituted, as extreme forms of Schiller’s social program, a last attempt to
revive the educational ideals of humanism. They expressed the hope that
political consciousness could be formed and directed either by an ethical or
by an aesthetic critique, and they scrupulously avoided politics, concen-
trating exclusively on theoretical investigations. “As for the working
classes, perhaps their sole function in the system of aesthetic positions is to
serve as a foil, a negative reference point, in relation to which all aesthetics
define themselves, by successive negations” (Bourdieu 1984: 57). The art-
ists of Bildung and the masters of art fought the last battle of aesthetic
emancipation, thinking that “culture was a liberal and left monopoly”
(Mosse 1985: 73), and defending Hebraic culture against Hellenic politics.
By that time, not only had culture become entirely Hebraic but also
assimilated Jews had identified with it. “A very high percentage of the
Weimar left-wing intellectuals combined all the characteristics repugnant
to the Germanic ideologists: Francophile, Jewish, Western, rebellious, pro-
gressive, democratic, rationalist, socialist, liberal, and cosmopolitan” (Deak
1968: 23). Most of them saw culture (or form-giving critique) as the only
resistance possible. Cultural theory became the left-liberal political prac-
tice with no connection to other political practices in the factory, the
street, the union, or the party. “Just as the Jewish bourgeoisie was increas-
ingly isolated within the German middle class, Jewish left-wing intellectu-
als were isolated within the workers’ movement. . . . The workers’ move-
ment and the socialist parties stood in the midst of the political and social
struggle, and it is no coincidence that the heirs of such left-wing intellectu-
als were idealistic and utopian middle-class university students and profes-
sors” (Mosse 1985: 67). Thus it was perhaps quite unavoidable for those
intellectuals to underestimate Adolf Hitler, the petty bourgeois painter
whose education in culture and power took place among the monuments
of the Ringstrasse in Vienna, since they were busy discovering the Young
Hegel and the pre-revolutionary Marx or criticizing the Hellenic origins of
capitalism and modernity. This is the heritage which the Frankfurt School,
combining aesthetic radicalism with political pessimism, was unable (and
did not even try) to overcome.70
From Mendelssohn to Adorno and from Hamann to Heidegger, all the ex-
aminations of modernity which considered the “Jewish question” its cen-
tral allegory made comparison to a Greek model the standard approach.71
There is a rare exception, however, which is also the most controversial
treatment of the subject: the essay “On the Jewish Question” by Karl Marx
(1818–83). A striking feature of his contribution is that it does not involve
the Hellenic at all: there is no mention of Greece, myth, polytheism, the
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epic, or the polis. There is no need for such comparison: Marx is the first to
write about the Jews not as people but as a historical construct which ex-
emplifies the spirit of capitalism.
The occasion for Marx’s essay was provided by The Jewish Question, pub-
lished by Bruno Bauer (1809–82) first in two articles (1842) and the follow-
ing year, in revised version, as a book. Bauer, Marx’s former collaborator
and an expert in New Testament Higher Criticism,was dismissed in 1842
from his chair of Theology at the University of Bonn because of his polem-
ical essay “Theological Shamelessness” (1841). Bauer and Marx, both
members of the generation Bauer called “the Reformation of the nine-
teenth century,” had announced in 1841 (the year of Ludwig Feuerbach’s
The Essence of Christianity) plans for a co-edited journal that never materi-
alized, Atheistic Archives, and began writing together a book called Trum-
pet of the Last Judgement on Hegel the Atheist and Antichrist (1841), which
Bauer completed and published anonymously. At that time, “the emanci-
pationist demand relied on the fact of religious reform. The advocates of
emancipation, especially the Jews, maintained that Judaism had already
undergone the process of internal reform that was a conditio sine qua non
of emancipation” (Rotenstreich 1959: 30). In The Jewish Question, Bauer
criticized the religion of Judaism as well as Jewish demands for emancipa-
tion, arguing that such demands could not be taken seriously because they
were based on a distinct religious identity: if Jews wanted emancipation,
they ought to emancipate themselves from their Jewishness first, since they
could not expect historical recognition while preserving a non-historical
faith. “Bauer was attacking the very principles of the emancipation and its
underlying ideology as it had crystallized in the movement for religious
reform. Bauer argued that Judaism was basically un-historical, i.e., impervi-
ous to change and immutable” (12). While taking the Jews as a metaphor
for humanity in his narrative of true liberation, he also rejected Chris-
tianity, which he presented as a continuation and extension of Judaism.
His ultimate target was the foundation of bourgeois society, the Christian
idea of privilege. While Feuerbach, though, had proposed the “resolution
of theology into anthropology,”72 Bauer brought out the connections of
emancipation with an issue often neglected among Gentiles but always
identified by enlightened Jews with the challenge of modernity: religious
reform.
For Marx even this approach did not go far enough. He responded in his
review of Bauer’s book, published in 1844 (the year of the Paris Economic
and Philosophic Manuscripts), and in The Holy Family: Critique of Critical
Critique; Against Bruno Bauer and Consorts (1845), his first book, which he
co-authored with Friedrich Engels (1820–95). According to Marx, al-
though Bauer analyzed the constitution of the Christian state and exposed
its structural flaws, his discussion of the political emancipation of the Jews
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was limited to religion. Marx’s complaint is that he “dealt with religious
and theological questions in the religious and theological way” (Marx and
Engels 1956: 149). Because he focused on the antagonism between state
and church, he did not offer anything more than a criticism of the Jewish
religion. Thus Bauer, whom the academic establishment had expelled from
its ranks as the “Robespierre of Theology,” is, in his critic’s eyes, “St.
Bruno”—a theologian who still adheres to a religious view. In The German
Ideology (1845–46), Marx and Engels would attack all Hegelians from the
same standpoint: “The Old Hegelians had comprehended everything as
soon as it was reduced to an Hegelian logical category. The Young Hegeli-
ans criticized everything by attributing to it religious conceptions or by
pronouncing it a theological matter. The Young Hegelians are in agree-
ment with the Old Hegelians in their belief in the rule of religion, of con-
cepts, of a universal principle in the existing world. Only, the one party
attacks this dominion as usurpation, while the other extols it as legitimate.
. . . It has not occurred to any one of these philosophers to inquire into the
connection of German philosophy with German reality, the relation of
their criticism to their own material surroundings” (Tucker 1978: 148–49).
In opposition to Bauer’s approach, Marx mounts a critique of emancipa-
tion itself, which extends to the practices of the political state, and bour-
geois society in general.
He sees as the basic presupposition of the political state, the modern
state that the middle class built, a sharp differentiation between the public
and the private person, which elevates the latter to a pure, independent,
capital essence: Man. The political state assumes the inviolable sovereignty
of each and every monad, of the individual. This Man is a member of the
civil society invested with “human” (namely, civil) rights: liberty, property,
equality, and security. Together these rights constitute his freedom of
man-as-monad, safeguard the preservation of person, and produce his sepa-
ration from other men. Thus the citizenship of Man amounts only to the
rights of the bourgeois individual which promise security but disappear
when the pursuit of freedom comes into conflict with political life. People,
therefore, were not freed but rather granted freedom of religion, property,
and trade. The Man of the civil society is natural, individual, and private;
the Man of the political state is unpolitical. Marx concludes that bourgeois
emancipation brought the dissolution of the feudal order but cost the abo-
lition of the political character of society. Human rights are but a new form
of control: behind the appearance of civil liberty, they limit freedom. Al-
though they are called rights, in opposition to the aristocratic privilege that
reigned before, they are a mechanism of political privilege which sup-
presses any challenge to the civil system. “Anarchy is the law of civil society
emancipated from disjointing privileges, and the anarchy of civil society is
the basis of the modern public system, just as the public system is in turn
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the guarantee of that anarchy. To the same extent as the two are opposed
to each other they also determine each other” (Marx and Engels 1956:
158).
Freedom of religion, for example, is one of the rights supported in the
Christian/civil state: individuals feel that they have been emancipated from
religion when their disposition toward it becomes a private matter. The
political state, however, can afford to take a democratic attitude and non-
religious posture because bourgeois emancipation leaves religion intact:
the right does not affect the ideology. “Precisely the slavery of civil society
is in appearance the greatest freedom because it is in appearance the per-
fect independence of the individual. . . . Right has here taken the place of
privilege” (157). After all, as proved by the secular rites of interpretation,
“religion develops in its practical universality only where there is no privi-
leged religion (cf. the North American States)” (156). In a related observa-
tion, Marx notes a consequence: “It is in the North American states—or at
least a part of them—that the Jewish question loses its theological impor-
tance for the first time and becomes a really secular question” (Marx 1971:
90). Freedom of religion, like the other human rights, is granted on the
provision that man accepts that he is human and not political. When,
therefore, the Jew demands civil rights in the civil state, he acts in a civil
manner: he demands his share of modern privileges. He does not realize
that he “has already emancipated himself in a Jewish manner” (110), and
that in addition he is already part of the dominant system.
Moreover, it is the mutually supportive pairing of Man and Jew that
needs to be noticed. “Hence, the political emancipation of the Jews and the
granting to them of the ‘rights of man’ is an act the two sides of which are
mutually interdependent. . . . The Jew has all the more right to the recogni-
tion of his ‘free humanity’ as ‘free civil society’ is thoroughly commercial
and Jewish and the Jew is a necessary link in it” (Marx and Engels 1956:
153). Without using the term, Marx proposes that emancipation is only
the civil dimension of Hebraization. “The Jews have emancipated them-
selves in so far as the Christians have become Jews. . . . Indeed, the practi-
cal dominance of Judaism over the Christian world has reached its un-
ambiguous, normal expression in North America” (Marx 1971: 111).
Emancipation has been successful not because it overcame differences but
because, by appearing to tolerate, even eliminate them, it made them
transparent. If, therefore, granting rights to the Jews is not an obligation
but a precondition of bourgeois society, it can be argued that “the politi-
cally perfect, modern state that knows no religious privileges is also the
perfect Christian state, and that hence the perfect Christian state, not only
can emancipate the Jews but has emancipated them and by its very nature
must emancipate them” (Marx and Engels 1956: 150). In claiming that
“the true essence of the Jew has been realized and secularized in civil soci-
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ety” (Marx 1971: 114) and that the whole world today “is Jewish to the
core” (Marx and Engels 1956: 148), the author is not referring to a libera-
tion or fulfillment of Jewish tradition: he shows how the image of the mid-
dle-class Jew has been produced in civil society as a true essence of his
destiny and its history.
If Marx does not introduce to his analysis any Hellenic elements,73 this
is because the historicity (rather than the authenticity, as is usually the
case) of Judaism attracts his attention—its political, rather than ethnic,
signification. Positing the “Jewish question” as the question of the Hebraic
(to use the terminology of this study), he approaches the “actual Jew”
(Marx 1971: 110) as a historical construct—a product, a model, and an icon
of the middle class and its civil state—and tries to extract his “imaginary
nationality” (113). He insists that “real, worldly Jewry and hence religious
Judaism too, is being continually produced by the present civil life and finds
its final development in the money system” (Marx and Engels 1956: 147). As
he puts it elsewhere: “From its own bowels civil society constantly begets
Judaism” (Marx 1971: 110). He looks at the Jew of the civil society, of the
human rights, of the free trade, and of the bourgeois culture—the Jew
produced by an emancipation that needed his independence for its own
legitimacy. Civil society, modern state, human rights, political emancipa-
tion, and Judaism are all interconnected and interdependent, and ought to
be examined together. For Marx, Jewish rights are not an issue at all. At the
time he wrote his review exposing the “Jewish question” as an ideology, he
was also engaged in his critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1821, 1833),
the introduction to which he published, together with the review, in the
same issue of Deutsch-französische Jahrbücher. As it is known from that
complementary piece, his understanding of “rights” was radicalized by a
socio-political questioning of modernity. While Bauer asked for the eman-
cipation of Jews from Judaism,74 Marx proposed the emancipation of soci-
ety from the Hebraic bourgeois regime, concluding his essay with the apho-
rism: “In the last analysis the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation
of humanity from Judaism” (110).
Although there were many Jewish and non-Jewish reactions to Bauer’s
position, apparently there were none to Marx’s written in that generation
(Rotenstreich 1959: 26).75 While his contemporary Heinrich Heine was de-
veloping the Hebraic-Hellenic opposition into a model of the options of
liberal culture (or the possibility of Bildung under Manchester capitalism),
Marx made a radical turn against Judaism as the most representative ex-
pression of bourgeois ideology. Seen in the Marxian context, the Dialectic
of Enlightenment emerges as a fierce rebuttal of his position. Here the de-
monization of Lukács’ Greece serves to invert Marx’s critique of modernity
as the Hebraization of the political by the bourgeoisie. Whereas Marx’s
essay portrayed the Jew as the hero of capitalism, Horkheimer and Adorno
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attribute this role to Odysseus, this time, in archetypal dimensions; where
he asked for emancipation from Judaism, they urge liberation from Hellen-
ism; where he traced capitalism to the construction of Judaism by the civil
society, they blame it on the invention of civil society by Hellenism; where
he wanted to liberate the political from the state (and later fought for the
Bildung of the working class), they entertain the possibility of liberating the
Enlightenment from mythology (and abandon the potential of Bildung).
As a consequence, where he demanded the abolition of the modern state,
they limit themselves to a critique of reason. What makes their position
ahistorical is their disregard for cultural specificity, which allows them to
traverse the centuries from epic to jazz without much careful differentia-
tion. In addition, by adopting the Hebraic-Hellenic polarity, they neutral-
ize Marx’s interest in politics,76 and support cultural criticism as resistance
to modernity. By so doing, they continue the Marxist aesthetic tradition
which “by no means adopts the view of art as ideology, and is concerned
with the resistance of art to ideological appropriation” (Bowie 1990: 217–
18). It is almost as if anti-Semitism were more a corruption of taste77 than
the perverse excess of a particular social order. By generalizing Judaism,
Marx discovered the Hebraic at the heart of capital; by universalizing anti-
Semitism, Horkheimer and Adorno eliminate its material reality. Where he
thought philosophy should abandon interpretation of the existing world
and engage in creating a different one, they find it is too late for such
change, and hope that at least a negative interpretation may make the
world more bearable. With the decline of Bildung into the narcissism of
adult melancholy,78 Marx’s political program becomes in their hands an
interpretive ethic: the moral purity and superiority of theoria.
The loss of the radical Marxian potential in the Dialectic of Enlighten-
ment becomes obvious when this book is compared with its contemporary
Réflexions sur la question Juive (1946), translated as Anti-Semite and Jew, by
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80), which also continues Marx’s discussion from
the standpoint of dialectic but adopts a very different historical perspec-
tive. Sartre defines man as a being in a real (historical, cultural, social,
biological, economic) situation which produces and contains the options of
his freedom. By applying this principle to the specific subject, he arrives at
this methodological starting point: “If I wish to know who the Jew is, I must
first inquire into the situation surrounding him, since he is a being in a
situation.” This condition determines identity. “The Jew is the one whom
other men consider a Jew” (Sartre 1948: 69). There is no ontological
grounding: identity is contingent. “Thus the Jew is in the situation of a Jew
because he lives in the midst of a society that takes him for a Jew” (72).
This emphasis on historical circumstance and social construction, which is
in agreement with Marx’s decision to look at the Jew of society, enables
Sartre to reject (or rather situate) the issue of authenticity. With all essen-
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tialist questions abandoned, he proposes that “it is not the Jewish character
that provokes anti-Semitism but, rather, that it is the anti-Semite who
creates the Jew. The primary phenomenon, therefore, is anti-Semitism”
(143). The Jew is a product of the capitalist society, and anti-Semitism a
collective bourgeois crime. The problem, as Marx insisted, is not one of
Jewish rights or emancipation. “The Jewish problem is born of anti-Semi-
tism; thus it is anti-Semitism that we must suppress in order to resolve the
problem” (147). Sartre is relentless in his criticism of complicity, insisting
that “anti-Semitism is not a Jewish problem; it is our problem” (152).
With his socio-historical approach, Sartre does not need to trace the
origins of anti-Semitism into the epic past or blame the perversity of reason
on myth; neither does he need to resort to comparisons with Greece. Steer-
ing away from questions of origin, he conducts an anatomy of the situation
of the anti-Semites. Most of them “belong to the lower middle class of
towns” (25) and have “a fundamental incomprehension of the various
forms of modern property” (23). They are culturally and politically the
victims of modernity. The Jew plays two main roles: he helps them realize
that they have rights (28) and establish “their status as possessors” (25).
Sartre calls anti-Semitism “a poor man’s snobbery” (26): the disaffected,
deprived, frustrated lower classes find somebody to blame for their predica-
ment. But the phenomenon goes deeper than that. In their racism, Sartre
discovers a misdirected hostility against the modern political system. “Any
anti-Semite is therefore in varying degree, the enemy of constituted au-
thority” (32). This person tries to resist an incomprehensible, rootless, and
chaotic modern world. “Anti-democratic, [the anti-Semite] is a natural
product of democracies and can only manifest himself within the frame-
work of the Republic” (33). In his thought, the Jew has been identified with
bourgeois institutions and authority. This point agrees with Marx’s depic-
tion of Judaism as the typical expression of the middle class ideology and
achievement.79
Sartre’s critique indicts not only the anti-Semites but also the rest of
society as accomplices. “Men are accomplices to that which leaves them in-
different” (Steiner 1964: 21). Even the democrat, who seems eager to pro-
tect the victim, in “his defense of the Jew saves the latter as man and
annihilates him as a Jew” (Sartre 1948: 56). Bruno Bauer’s condition for
emancipation is part of his attitude: he prefers to see people as individuals
who exist in independence and isolation, and does not accept that a Jewish
problem exists because he thinks there is (or there should be) no Jew.
While the anti-Semite “wishes to destroy him as a man and leave nothing
in him but the Jew,” Sartre notes at the conclusion of his critique, the
democrat “wishes to destroy him as a Jew and leave nothing in him but the
man, the abstract and universal subject of the rights of man and the rights
of the citizen” (57). This is the essence of liberal conviction.
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The critiques of Marx and Sartre are in many respects complementary:
the first exposes Judaism as the bourgeois ideology, and the second de-
scribes the actual Jew as the victim of that ideology. They agree on the
fundamental premise that the Jews were produced by the culture of the
middle class and should be discussed in this context. Because Sartre, like
Marx, looks at the historical situation and the socio-economic context, and
is able to see the Jew as a cultural (Christian, European, bourgeois) con-
struct, he requires no discussion of the Hellenic. For him, the Jew is the
bourgeois myth par excellence. For Horkheimer and Adorno, on the con-
trary, the Jew is a historical essence—the suspended positivity of secular
dialectics. This results in a difference of great significance in their respec-
tive positions: whereas for Sartre the Jew is a bourgeois myth, for
Horkheimer and Adorno myth is the evil of Hellenism. The former position
is consistent with Marx’s political critique of Judaism as the logic of capi-
talism; the latter belongs to the theological tradition of the hermeneutic
attack on myth, which was part of the Protestant rejection of miracles and
later found its disciplinary articulation in Higher Criticism. Horkheimer
and Adorno continued the same theological tradition, believing that “all
philosophy is the exegesis of the texts that sought truth” (Friedman 1981:
211). They applied historical readings to texts in order not to situate but to
shield them by showing that they constitute the true and only history.
Between Marx’s anatomy of the dialectic of bourgeois emancipation and
the attack on the false religion of Enlightenment by Horkheimer and
Adorno stands The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, a critique
of the faith position of modernity by “that bourgeois social philosopher . . .
who was neither the bête noire nor the bête blanche of the German intelli-
gentsia and yet remained its challenging inspiration even where his name
remained unspoken” (Fietkau 1986: 169). The Dialectic remains faithful to
the “re-theologizing of the issues” (173) in the work of Bloch, Lukács, Ben-
jamin, and Carl Schmitt, and systematically ignores Weber’s approach be-
cause the latter associates reason with the realm that Horkheimer and
Adorno were unwilling to criticize—the intrinsic Other of critique: reli-
gion. “The Protestant Ethic aims at demonstrating the intimate relation-
ship between the rationalization of modern life (with its resultant Ent-
zauberung, or desacralization, its transformation into an organized and
disciplined market system) and the development of the Lutheran or Cal-
vinistic notion of a Beruf, or religiously sanctioned vocation to live asceti-
cally within the world itself” (Jameson 1988: 19).
Whereas the authors of the Dialectic expose the myth of reason, Max
Weber (1864–1920) studies the religion of reason—the enterprise of faith
after its withdrawal from the church-controlled economy of other-worldli-
ness. Long before the Frankfurt School denounced instrumentalism, he
THE CULTURE OF ATONEMENT 157
had noted the loss of ritual and magic: “The fate of our times is character-
ized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the ‘disen-
chantment of the world.’ Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values
have retreated from public life either into the transcendental realm of mys-
tic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations”
(Weber 1958a: 155). In his view, it was the Puritan outlook that deter-
mined the development of a rationally controlled life, personal, economic,
or otherwise.80 The decisive feature of this outlook was “the valuation of
the fulfillment of duty in worldly affairs as the highest form which the
moral activity of the individual could assume. . . . The only way of living
acceptably to God was not to surpass worldly morality in monastic asceti-
cism, but solely through the fulfillment of the obligations imposed upon
the individual by his position in the world. That was his calling” (Weber
1976: 80). The conviction of calling provided an ethical teleology balancing
the sense of homelessness from the church. The individual acquired his
calling and his understanding of rights together: they reinforced each
other, giving the faithful the direction and dignity of personal duty. “The
process of sanctifying life could thus almost take on the character of a
business enterprise” (124). Life turned busy because it had to be not just
lived but run: the fulfillment of duty (that is, the response to the calling)
took the character of labor. “The treatment of labour as a calling became as
characteristic of the modern worker as the corresponding attitude toward
acquisition of the business man” (179). Weber discovers the theological
origins of the capitalist enterprise in this deal between soul and grace, the
marketing of eternity.
Puritans labored willfully under their own calling, profiting at the same
time from the ascetic tasks of life management, the business of salvation.
“The emphasis on the ascetic importance of a fixed calling provided an
ethical justification of the modern specialized division of labour. In a simi-
lar way the providential interpretation of profit-making justified the activi-
ties of the business man. . . . The whole power of the God of the Old Testa-
ment, who rewards His people for their obedience in this life, necessarily
exercised a similar influence on the Puritan who . . . compared his own
state of grace with that of the heroes of the Bible, and in the process inter-
preted the statements of the Scriptures as the articles of a book of statutes”
(163–64). The business of salvation, reoccupied from the church industry
of indulgence, has been succinctly described by the formula “the rational-
ization of ends . . . is to the religionalization of means . . . as the rationaliza-
tion of means . . . is to the ‘nonfinalization’ of religion” (Jameson 1988: 21),
and elucidated as follows: “This moment of the formula . . . does more than
to suggest that religion is not, as the vulgar Marxist analysis had it, some
mere reflex of infrastructural change. Indeed, it shifts the emphasis from
the relationship between religion and ‘ends,’ or conscious, superstructural
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values, and draws our attention to the effect of religious change on the
organization of the means themselves; . . . Thus paradoxically religionaliza-
tion becomes itself the principal agent in the process of secularization as a
whole” (21). The reoccupation of religious positions by new answers or,
more specifically, the reoccupation of exegetical positions by interpreta-
tion, amounts less to secularization than to deritualization. By pointing out
the interior spaces of the sacred, by describing the law of the command-
ments that succeeded the rites of the sacraments, Weber suggests that “the
transition from religion to Entzauberung, from the medieval to the modern
moment, is effected . . . not by making life less religious but by making it
more so. Calvin did not desacralize the world; on the contrary, he turned
the entire world into a monastery” (23). The sacralization of the world and
the sanctification of life effected by the Reformation federal theology
(Weir 1990), which produced the Puritan Lebensmethodik during the pro-
cess of rationalization, is the object of Weber’s work. It is the transfor-
mation of this calling from vocation to discipline (Hsia 1989) that would
result later in the ideal of Bildung (Goldman 1988) as well as the rational-
ization of work (Campbell 1989).
Without proposing a causal explanation, Weber is reacting to the crude
materialism of certain Marxist hypotheses. “Weber’s limited thesis was
merely that in the formation of this pattern of rationally ordered life . . . the
religious component must be considered as an important factor. . . . In
tracing the affinity between the bourgeois life pattern and certain compo-
nents of the religious stylization of life, as shown most consistently by as-
cetic Protestantism, Weber emphasized the gradual genesis of a psycholog-
ical habit that enabled men to meet the requirements of early modern
capitalism” (Fischoff 1944: 63). He studies the bourgeois revolution, like
Marx, using the model (or, in his terms, the “ideal type”) of rationalization
to highlight a particular dimension of historical change. In response to
economist explanations, Weber “rejected the idea that religious ideas were
only ideological manifestations of particular social conditions. Ideas for
him were, at least in part, autonomous entities with a power to affect social
changes” (Burrell 1968: 139–40). Thus he substituted the realm of ideas for
the economic one, trying to show the interaction among configurations of
meaning and structures of experience. His goal was to show through con-
crete analysis that ideas and principles, having their own role and power,
may contribute to historical formation. Commentators have increasingly
seen the compatibility of such a project with the Marxian approach (Anto-
nio and Glassman 1987; Wiley 1987). They have also recognized that his
affirmation of the materiality of values is more of “a reaction against his-
toricism, which tended to conceive of man as the more or less unwitting
tool of historical development” (Brand 1987: 50).
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Of special interest for this discussion is Weber’s understanding of the
“Jewish question.” In a chapter on “Judaism, Christianity, and the Socio-
Economic Order” in The Sociology of Religion, although he acknowledges
that “Judaism played a conspicuous role in the evolution of the modern
capitalistic system” (Weber 1963: 248), he observes that “the Jews were
relatively or altogether absent from the new and distinctive forms of mod-
ern capitalism, the rational organization of labor, especially production in
an industrial enterprise of the factory type. . . . Hence, neither that which
is new in the modern economic system nor that which is distinctive of the
modern economic temper is specifically Jewish in origin” (250). In his view,
there was nothing distinctly Jewish in the Puritan contributions to capital-
ist development. With this conclusion, he is rejecting the position of the
social theorist Werner Sombart (1863–1941), the author of The Modern
Capitalism (1902, 2 vols.), who in The Jews and Economic Life tried to do
for Jews what Weber’s Protestant Ethic did for the Reformation. “It was
Werner Sombart, at this time a close collaborator of Weber, . . . who
brought Jewry and Judaism into the circle of problems raised by the studies
on the Puritan spirit. He emphasized that all those features which Weber
had marked as relevant to the rise of capitalism, mainly the disciplined and
purposeful direction of life, must be traced back to Judaism. His book Die
Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben (1911) built a very broad argument around
this core, touching on various aspects in order to prove the prominence of
the Jewish contribution to the rise of modern capitalism. . . . For Sombart
the Jewish migration started by the expulsion from Spain began the new
epoch” (Liebeschütz 1964: 50). According to his main argument, “the im-
portance of the Jews was twofold. On the one hand, they influenced the
outward form of modern capitalism; on the other, they gave expression to
its inward spirit. Under the first heading, the Jews contributed no small
share in giving to economic relations the international aspect they bear
to-day; in helping the modern state, that framework of capitalism, to be-
come what it is; and lastly, in giving the capitalistic organization its pecu-
liar features, by inventing a good many details of the commercial machin-
ery which moves the business life of to-day, and by co-operating in the
perfecting of others. Under the second heading, the importance of the Jews
is so enormous because they, above all others, endowed economic life with
its modern spirit; they seized upon the essential idea of capitalism and
carried it to its fullest development” (Sombart 1951: 21).
Sombart believed that the same ideas shaped the spirit of Judaism and
capitalism: rationalism, the contract between God and his people, divine
bookkeeping, the conception of profit, and the like. Furthermore, he de-
tected “an almost unique identity of view between Judaism and Puritan-
ism. . . . In both will be found the preponderance of religious interests, the
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idea of divine rewards and punishments, asceticism within the world, the
close relationship between religion and business, the arithmetical concep-
tion of sin, and, above all, the rationalization of life. . . . Puritanism is Juda-
ism” (249). Judaism, Puritanism, Capitalism, Liberalism—all these sys-
tems were conflated in Sombart’s view of economic understanding, which
tended to look for sweeping parallels and disregard specific differences.
According to this narrative, the result of the rationalistic transvaluation of
economic values was nothing more than a repetition: “The homo capitalis-
ticus, who is closely related to the homo Judaeus, both belonging to the
same species, homines rationalistici artificiales” (238). Jews were simply
better placed, geographically and philosophically, to pioneer capitalism,
because they perfected Protestant ideas much earlier. Judaism has always
given Europe life: “Israel passes over Europe like the sun: at its coming new
life bursts forth; at its going all falls into decay” (13). Thus modernity is the
combined result of two complementary forces: “The capitalistic civiliza-
tion of our age is the fruit of the union between the Jews, a Southern
people pushing into the North, and the Northern tribes, indigenous there.
The Jews contributed an extraordinary capacity for commerce, and the
Northern peoples, above all the Germans, an equally remarkable ability for
technical inventions” (323).
Weber sharply disagreed with Sombart’s assessment of the Jewish role.
“Weber denied that the features characteristic of modern capitalism were
created by the Jews, who never before their assimilation into the life of
Western civilization had on their own account organised free labour with
the aim of controlling the production of saleable goods according to the
possibilities of the market. He agreed that Jewry had played an important
part in economic life over many centuries, but had done so by participating
in such activities as had existed in all types of advanced civilisation, with
money as means of exchange. . . . The considerable skill obtained in all
these specialised activities enabled them to become important carriers of
modern commerce when it was rising in the seventeenth century. But for
Weber their part in this initial period remained definitely different from
that of the Protestant middle class who contributed the driving force for
the industrial basis of the new enterprise” (Liebeschütz 1964: 51).
With their different but compatible approaches to ideology, Weber and
Marx contribute to an analysis of Hebraism on the basis of its Protestant
middle-class character that does not conflate it with the history of Jewry.
Ahistorical views like those suggested by Sombart or Horkheimer and
Adorno confuse the bourgeois uses of the Jew as model with the responses
of those who identified themselves as Jews, contesting the Hebraic posi-
tion, as historical essence, for themselves. Weber’s decoding of the Puritan
system of life management points to the emergence of conditions favorable
to the Hebraization of modernity. Before certain people started claiming
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Jewish identity and continuity for themselves, it was the religious styliza-
tion of bourgeois self-control (starting with the liberation of Scriptural in-
terpretation into textual immanence) that took Biblical Judaism as a secu-
lar model, the covenant as a prototype of capitalist contract. The modern
Jew was emancipated into middle-class culture, the only culture that ever
was. Civil society, human rights, secular understanding, the self, and the
other fundamentals of this culture—questions and ideals that were never
an issue in the rest of the (Christian or other) world—were all invented
under the regime of interpretation, the mode of legitimate self-governance
established when the Reformation successfully projected itself as the origi-
nary in Christianity, namely, the Hebraic in faith (and the Hellenic in
knowledge).
Weber’s interest in the importance of religion for socio-economic his-
tory goes back to the late 1880s. His exploration of Protestantism was part
of a seminal trend away from Dilthey’s Geisteswissenschaft, which has been
described as Kulturphilosophie (Simmel) and Kulturwissenschaft (Som-
bart): the socio-philosophical study of culture produced during and around
the first decade of the twentieth century (by authors born mostly between
1856–66) and including books that appeared between the publications of
Nietzsche and Lukács.81 The tone characterizing this voluminous produc-
tion (most of which was presented as research, rather than philosophy or
critique) on the eve of the artistic avant-garde was one of anxiety over a sick
culture, apprehension about its imminent collapse, yearning for an apoca-
lyptic rejuvenation, and a pervasive fear (shared by diverse writers like
Freud, Husserl, Vilfredo Pareto, Jane Harrison, and the early Weber) of
irrational forces that seemed to have eroded its foundations. In that cli-
mate, sociology (of culture) emerged as a universal discipline, psychoanaly-
sis as treatment of the bourgeois, the violent end of history as a question of
messianic fulfillment, and the cleansing of signification as a linguistic and
aesthetic concern. Sanitary measures were proposed, therapeutic proce-
dures devised, medicines and diets offered to a world which seemed to
suffer gravely from a social malaise that consumed the public organism
(Weindling 1989). In all these developments, the role of the Jew was an
issue of paramount importance. (Regarding its significance for the creation
of sociology, for example, see Mazlish 1989.) The twin enterprises of the
purification of the public sphere and the restoration of reason (or faith)
were launched at that time, and the administrative society was born. Since
personal temper (which in the past had been assigned to character, taste,
or Bildung) could no longer be trusted with Puritan ethic, society as a
whole, and not just individuals, were to be managed. The ideal of Kantian
criticism returned with a vengeance—critique as exorcism. There was a
gnawing suspicion that the Greek spirit of culture had turned suicidal, if
not malevolent, that the Faustian pact with Greek pleasure had to be de-
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nounced. The Puritan administration undertook one of its largest projects
so far, the treatment of culture for irrationality. The target of all the disci-
plines of public order became the irrational, most often represented by
myth—the old enemy of anti-Hellenic forces like the Moderns, the En-
lighteners, or the Left Hegelians.
THE SCIENCE OF MYTH
If there was a product of civilization that the bourgeoisie detested, it was
myth. If there was a category of thought they renounced, it was myth. If
there was one kind of story they found alien to logic, it was myth. Its con-
tinuing appeal seemed utterly puzzling. “Nothing surprised the promoters
of the Enlightenment more, and left them standing more incredulously
before the failure of what they thought were their ultimate exertions, than
the survival of the contemptible old stories—the continuation of work on
myth” (Blumenberg 1985: 274). Myth, the presumed structure of the pre-
modern or the savage (ancient, Oriental, African, Asian, Latin American)
mind, was the single belief the enlightened class did not tolerate. Discredit-
ing it seemed vital to the superiority of the modern world view. The bour-
geois who relied on his analytical reason, his informed knowledge, his un-
erring self-control, knew with absolute certainty that myth was false and
found it a major obstacle to progress (Daniel 1990; Hübner 1983: 229–45).
Thus, during the colonization of the Hebrew Bible and of the New Worlds
in the sixteenth century, Protestant scholars began creating a number of
disciplines to study and stigmatize myth. It took them much time, proba-
bly until the late eighteenth century, to admit that the people of Europe
had myths too; but then those were called folktales and their study helped
in the discovery of national identity.
Myth, of course, has always been posited as fundamentally Hellenic. Hei-
degger accepted that “myth itself is Greek,” and Derrida conceded that
there may be no non-Greek mythologies (Derrida 1981: 167). When
Horkheimer and Adorno condemn archaic Greece for its creation, they are
only repeating (although transposing to the realm of ideology) a blame that
is as old as the study of the topic.82 Ever since exegesis became interpreta-
tion at the dawn of the modern era, and the hermeneutic gaze turned from
the allegories of the (Roman/Ovidian) fable to the symbols of the (Greek/
Homeric) myth—partly in order to explain the heathenism in New Testa-
ment miracles by reference to Greek antiquity—myth has been inseparably
associated with the Hellenic. Any advocacy of enlightenment presupposes
an assault on the gods of Olympus. To return to the question: “Why is to
speak of mythology always, more or less explicitly, to speak Greek or to be
influenced by Greece?” (Detienne 1986: xi),83 the answer is, because myth,
as a subject of systematic knowledge, has been inextricably associated with
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Greece, and at the same time because after the Renaissance and even be-
fore the Battle of the Books, the Greek first appeared connected with the
mythological. In fact, the Ancients lost the struggle once they granted that
they were merely defending false stories. By the time of Fontenelle’s De
l’origine des fables (1724), a science of myth was already in place.
Through its Homeric articulations, myth became the first non-Biblical
subject of hermeneutics. The concept itself emerged quite late, only after
it separated itself from the constellation of mythology and the concerns of
theology. “To begin with, it must be stressed that the word ‘myth’ was not
used in English until the nineteenth century. The word does not occur in
eighteenth-century dictionaries or encyclopedias. When a single myth was
referred to, it was always as a ‘mythological fiction,’ a ‘poetical fiction,’ a
‘tradition,’ a ‘poetical history,’ or, most commonly, a ‘fable.’ Sometimes
this last was further refined to ‘mythological fiction’ in order to prevent
confusion with other eighteenth-century uses of ‘fable’ to mean apologue
or modern fable (such as Aesop’s or La Fontaine’s) and plot or story line.
Almost everything relating to what we now think of as myth came, for the
eighteenth century, under the heading of the word ‘mythology.’ This word
did not then mean primarily a collection of myths or fables; it meant, first
of all, an explanation or interpretation of myths. . . . [T]he most common
eighteenth-century meaning of mythology is ‘pagan theology,’ and . . . reli-
gious concerns constitute the usual context in which mythology was dis-
cussed. From a Christian point of view, then, mythology is the opposite of
true or Christian theology. It is false theology or pagan theology” (Richard-
son 1978: 10–11). Initially, its study was an examination of the scandalous
(or foolish, barbaric, irrational, absurd), where the Hellenic served as an
example of corruption and decadence. For some one hundred fifty years,
myth (meaning falsehood and idolatry) was explicitly opposed to reason,
debunked and rejected.
When theological interest in myth was not denouncing it for corruption,
it was detecting Hebrew influences in the origins of ancient thought, and
especially religion. “To the orthodox Christian view . . . pagan mythology
was thus to be reduced to the context of the Scriptures. The deities and
their exploits were more or less disguised or distorted derivations from Bib-
lical revelation and history, and they were meaningful only in so far as they
could be traced to Scriptural testimony. In the orthodox conception all
religions originated in the one true religion” (Kuhn 1956: 1101). It was this
position that Deists from Toland to Bentley attacked, proposing that the
work of reason could be discovered even in primitive religions, and further-
more that, before idolatry, there existed a simple, natural, pure faith shared
by all people. “For them the myths of the pagans and those of the Old
Testament represented an original religion which was at once more reason-
able and more catholic than Christianity. Christianity was not the one reli-
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gion; it was one among many which at basis were united in a core of simple,
natural, and universal truths” (1115). In this approach, as well as in Scienza
Nuova (1725, 1730, 1744) by Giambattista Vico (1688–1744), ancient reli-
gion gained credibility for the first time. “By showing the similarity be-
tween a Greek myth and a biblical story, the deists could turn the orthodox
attack on myth back on orthodoxy itself” (Richardson 1978: 12). Thus what
mythology really proved was not the superiority of Christianity but the
existence of a common origin for all religions, which was taken to be the
true, historical revelation. Mythography did not accord Greek myth any
special importance. It was the Egyptians and the Orientals (as well as na-
tive Druids) who benefited from comparisons in the second half of the
eighteenth century, while the antiquity of the Hebrew Bible suffered.
In response to the Deist challenge, Higher Criticism judged the Bible by
the ordinary standards of secular history, seeking its defense in a historical,
rather than typological, justification. The acceptance of a historical Jesus
justified faith in the kerygmatic Christ. “A rationalist and skeptical ap-
proach to myth was also evolved by those biblical critics who sought to
bolster Christianity not by exalting the whole of the Bible over pagan be-
liefs and traditions, but by purging it of its mythical elements in order to
arrive at a pure and trustworthy historical core that could command belief
in a rationalist age. This movement, usually called the higher criticism and
most marked in Germany, used an historical-critical approach to the Bible
and may be traced back to the same roots as the deists and the rationalist
French mythographers. From Bayle, Spinoza, and Richard Simon down
through Jean Astruc to Lessing, Reimarus, Eichhorn, and eventually D. F.
Strauss, this historical approach to the Bible depended upon the clear op-
position of history and myth. The new criticism was textual, critical, and
historical and . . . it reversed a long tendency in theological studies toward
typology, that technique—also called ‘figural realism’ or ‘phenomenal
prophecy’—which, from St. Paul on, interprets the events and figures of
the Old Testament as historical prefigurations or prophecies (types) of
New Testament events and persons (archetypes). . . . Anything not ratio-
nally acceptable or corroborated by external evidence was relegated to the
category of myth. . . . The critical historical view of the Bible was intended
by the higher criticism as a defense of Christianity, by the deists to defend
‘pure’ religion, and by atheists to attack both of these; it was used by no one
to defend or affirm the value of myth itself” (21–22). Myth was no longer
the superstition of belief but the seduction of reason, and thus epistemol-
ogically, rather than theologically, discredited.
At the same time, during the eighteenth century, attention to myth in
other areas grew much less moral and practical, and much more artistic and
spiritual. As criticism defeated theology in the battle for interpretation of
the Protestant text, emphasis shifted gradually from the empirical logic of
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the argument to the expressive strength of the style—something that the
person of taste could appreciate and savor. Myth started speaking to people
of letters less about sin, more about pleasure; less about idolatry, more
about the absolute. Eventually, it liberated itself from theology and en-
tered the aesthetic sphere of contemplation. “Just as the case against myth
was made by both Christian and anti-Christian writers, so the eighteenth-
century argument in favor of myth had two sides, both having a strong
literary element from the start. One affirmation of myth stemmed from an
interest in Homer and the other from a literary interest in the Bible” (25).84
In the 1730s, Thomas Blackwell sought in myth the explanation of Homer’s
greatness and discovered in it primitive wisdom—social as well as poetic.
Two decades later, Lowth protected the Bible from rationalist criticism by
suggesting an intrinsic reading, one based on its literary qualities.85 On the
one hand, myth is appropriated through aestheticization by literature and
philosophy; on the other, it is appropriated through theologization by Bib-
lical interpretation.
Two kinds of myth emerge: the false one (which is bad history) and the
authentic one (which is the narrative of contemplation). Authors from
Herder to Coleridge were fascinated by the discovery of its expressive po-
tential: “These writers and critics perceived the affirmative thrust of the
higher criticism to be an effort not to destroy the authority of Scripture
but to shift it from a reliance upon the historical accuracy of certain events
to a reliance upon the mythic truth of the narratives” (35). Syncretic
mythography, a popular movement among scholars, churchmen, and con-
noisseurs which flourished from the 1770s to the 1830s, contributed to this
reconsideration. Finally, myth appeared to be endowed with truth of a spe-
cial order. “What to the Augustans had been preposterous ‘fictions’ and
outworn ‘machines’ became, through the influence of syncretic mythogra-
phy, imaginative truth which could express a system of values or ultimate
reality as the particular poet might conceive it to be. . . . And it was from
this background of mythography that such Romantic poems as Blake’s Jeru-
salem, Shelley’s Adonais, and Keats’s Hyperion—as well as a host of lesser
poems—drew inspiration, material, character, and form” (Kuhn 1956:
1097). Myth was recognized as an alternative mode of comprehension,
promising new vistas to the theoretical view of the world.
It was Romantic literature and philosophy that elevated myth to a privi-
leged status, the aesthetic and the absolute. “The historical interest created
by the [German] scientific mythologists combines with the poetical inter-
est which is the product of the attitudes of the Romantic poets to make the
province of Greek mythology completely respected by the middle of the
nineteenth century” (Zwenderling 1964: 456). Idealism, and especially aes-
thetics, discovered in myth a primary orientation and even an articulation
of the spirit of beauty (Winckelmann) or history (Hegel). The Romantic
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awareness of mythology and its potential (narrative or symbolic) in an age
deprived of religious faith was intense as the artists, primarily the poets,
discovered in myth a means of addressing modern problems they consid-
ered spiritual. “The Romantic concept of myth first of all occurs in re-
flections on the history of poetry: modern art’s confounding chaos and
detachment, freed from all confining genres, was attributed to the lack of
a collective foundation (which the Romantics considered necessary for
poetical freedom) such as that given to Greek art in ancient mythology”
(Menninghaus 1988: 295). Furthermore, Romantic scholarship, following
the precepts of philology, introduced two cardinal distinctions to the un-
derstanding of the Hellenic: the Greek with the two heads, the mythologi-
cal and the philosophical; and the opposition between mythology and his-
tory which obsessed the Left Hegelians (but also Kierkegaard, Nietzsche,
and Heidegger). As a result, what was anathema to the Enlightenment
(Pépin 1958: 34–41; Starobinski 1989)—the irrationality of myth—became
the archetype for Romanticism through its justification by aesthetic coher-
ence and symbolic power.
To be sure, myth was not an alternative to religion but the vision of a
higher religion (which the higher criticism of reason had not delivered).
For the Romantics, “the separation of myth and belief was not a necessary
feature of modernity, but an ill to be remedied if a true culture of commu-
nity and conviction was to come about. They foresaw a new birth from the
pangs of revolution and war which Europe was suffering; revolution was to
be, in Friedrich Schlegel’s phrase, an ‘Inzitament der Religion.’ They strug-
gled back towards religion—a new one such as the young Schlegel dreamed
of, or the old one to which numerous Romantics converted—as a binding
force for the imagination. Sometimes they talked of creating a mythol-
ogy—from modern physics, Indian philosophy, Shakespeare, Cervantes,
Spinoza” (Reed 1980: 194), investing absolute knowledge or beauty with
ethical significance and hoping to replace dogmatic theology with sublime
revelation. For a while, the potential of myth seemed limitless and its re-
sources inexhaustible: “With fresh Indic and Nordic materials, with the
example of Osian to show what could still be done in modern times and in
an era of new nationalism, modern writers began to wonder if indeed it
might be possible for a poet-prophet to write heroic, perhaps even sacred
poetry for the modern age. In Germany, Friedrich Schlegel and in America,
Emerson put this aim explicitly as a call for a new mythology” (Richardson
1978: 33). This goal appeared as the first (counter)revolutionary project of
the autonomous aesthetic—a revolution of the free spirit: “What, then,
does the artist who sees his or her work in terms of the need for a new
mythology do in the meanwhile, in a society which seems to be moving
further and further away from the integration sought in the new mythol-
ogy? . . . Widely divergent approaches are possible to this dilemma. The
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artist may have to give up art altogether, as Hölderlin suggested, in the
name of political praxis. In the case of Wagner, art really is supposed to
become the mythology of the present” (Bowie 1990: 103). Wagner’s Ge-
samtkunstwerk may well be the most comprehensive realization of the
project of mythology, as it surveys (a bankrupt) world history and an-
nounces a new beginning. Together with Zionism, advanced by Theodor
Herzl (1860–1904) in the 1890s,86 it is also the most grandiose response to
the mandate “We need a new mythology” (Hölderlin 1988: 155) of the
so-called “Oldest System-Program of German Idealism” (1796?), published
by Rosenzweig in 1917 and variously attributed to Hölderlin, Hegel, and
Schelling (Hansen 1989).
Klopstock, the “German Milton,” had already made “an effort to found
a new Protestant mythology to set up against the Greek” (Shaffer 1975:
311). The “System-Program” is a critical one in that it represents the major
expression of the crisis associated with the project of mythology, the crisis
of autonomy after Kant and the Revolution. It is the program of a transcen-
dental aesthetics, of an aesthetic philosophy that aspires to become art and
overcome both critique and politics. Philosophy may achieve that only by
transforming itself into art (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1988: 27–37). The
very possibility of autonomy is at stake here. The plan is ambivalent toward
Kant: “It wants to re-unify the world that has been split up by Kant’s radical
critique of traditional metaphysics, at the same time as hanging on to
Kant’s insistence on our capacity for self-determination” (Bowie 1990: 45).
It is equally ambivalent toward the revolution, as it wants to see the revolu-
tionary potential materialized by other means. While the System is still
concerned with what Hölderlin was calling in 1795 “public education” and
Schelling in 1796 “national education,” it announces an ethics of aesthetics
and a mythology of reason, promising the re-solution of contra-diction. It
preaches complete emancipation from “the entire miserable human con-
struct of state, constitution, government, legislation” (Hölderlin 1988:
154) as well as from the superstition of “a moral world, divinity, immortal-
ity” (155), demanding this ideal: “Absolute freedom of all spirits who carry
the intellectual world within themselves, and who must search neither God
nor immortality outside of themselves” (155).
Finally, it proclaims the ultimate reconciliation, asserting that “truth
and goodness are united as sisters only in beauty” (155). Beauty is not only
synthesis but also the total depth, the essence of self-founding autonomy.
The new mythology, the mythology of reason, is an aesthetic one in that it
seeks its laws only within itself. “If, in Idealism’s fundamental myth, only
the form of a myth is now meant to be put into effect, with abstract names
and in conscious unsurpassability, then this myth has its point in the repre-
sentation of autogenesis, of the subject’s self-production” (Blumenberg
1985: 269). At the same time, this mythology is the religion of autonomy—
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the cult of self-rule, the apotheosis of the rule of autonomy: “Monotheism
of reason and of the heart, polytheism of the imagination and art, those
are what we need!” (Hölderlin 1988: 155). The religion of mythology, the
monotheism of polytheism, the reason of beauty, the law of autonomy—all
these are variations on the ultimate promise of interpretation (of the effort
“to explain something hierarchically lower from something higher,” as Karl
Mannheim wrote in his review of The Theory of the Novel): emancipation as
the incarnation of scripture, atonement as the literalization of the spirit—
in other words, the Hebraization of Hellenism. “A higher spirit, sent from
heavens, will have to found this new religion among us; it will be the last,
the greatest achievement of mankind” (156). This is how myth will redeem
history.87
It is the search for a new mythology88 that organizes the program
and makes the System the central task of Idealist philosophy. “In German
Idealism ‘system’ was explicitly understood as the requirement of absolute
knowledge. In addition, system itself became the absolute requirement and
thus the key term for philosophy as such. This change in the idea of system
from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to that of German Idealism
at the beginning of the nineteenth century accordingly presupposes that
philosophy understood itself as absolute, infinite cognition” (Heidegger
1985: 35). The subject of philosophy is its own history. This also changes
the meaning of reason, turning it into contemplation: it is no longer the
order of things but the system of understanding that dictates the rules.
“Reason is the faculty of looking out into a view, the faculty of forming a
horizon. Thus, reason itself is nothing other than the faculty of system”
(37), the imperial exercise of theoria: it rules the views it commands. “Rea-
son is the presupposing faculty, what truly reaches out and encompasses.
The presupposition which it posits is that unity on the basis of which
knowledge of a realm of objects and a world is at all possible. . . . Reason is
in itself systematic, at once the faculty and demand of system” (37).
At the same time, however, the will to system, at the very moment it
claims to replace religion with its Program, at the moment it promises to
redeem history in the aesthetic myth, is forced to repeat the history of this
redemption as the truth of history. “Only since the philosophy of German
Idealism is there a history of philosophy in such a way that history itself is
a path of absolute knowing on the way to itself. History is now no longer
what is past, what one is finished with and has discarded, but it is the
constant form of becoming of Spirit itself. In German Idealism, history is
understood metaphysically for the first time. . . . For the thinkers of Ger-
man Idealism . . . system is the totality of Being in the totality of its truth
and the history of the truth” (48). Thought is trapped in a vicious circle
because the moment history achieves the status of truth, as it does in this
philosophy, is also the moment when truth is burdened with (its) history.
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Theoria can only survey the ruins of civilization. In this polarity of myth
and history, the ugly Greek again raises her two heads and with her gaze
turns the aesthetic body into stone.
The movement from the program to the System, from the mythological
to the speculative, from contemplation to identity, is characterized by a
contradictory logic. Winckelmann wrote in 1755: “The only way for us to
become great, and indeed—if this is possible—inimitable, is by imitating
the ancients” (Winckelmann 1985: 33). This attitude, this logic of the imi-
tation of the Greeks,89 is the double bind of the Hellenic. “Why a logic of
the double bind? Because the appropriation of the means of identification
must both take place, and not take place, through the imitation of the
ancients, essentially the Greeks. It must because there is no other model
but that of the Greeks (following the collapse of religious transcendence
and its corresponding social and political structures: one will recall that it
is German thought that proclaimed the death of God and that popular
romanticism founded itself on a nostalgia for medieval Christianity). It
must not because the Greek model has already served the needs of others”
(Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1990: 300). The contradiction of the injunc-
tion is quite apparent in another expression of the mandate for a new myth,
written a few years after the “System-Program” by Friedrich Schlegel in the
“Talk on Mythology” part of his Dialogue on Poetry (1799–1800): “The
modern poet must create all these things from within himself, and many
have done it splendidly; up to now, however, each poet separately and each
work from its very beginning, like a new creation out of nothing. I will go
right to the point. Our poetry, I maintain, lacks a focal point, such as my-
thology was for the ancients; and one could summarize all the essentials in
which modern poetry is inferior to the ancient in these words: We have no
mythology. But, I add, we are close to obtaining one or, rather, it is time
that we earnestly work together to create one. For it will come to us by an
entirely opposite way from that of previous ages, which was everywhere the
first flower of youthful imagination, directly joining and imitating what was
most immediate and vital in the sensuous world. The new mythology, in
contrast, must be forged from the deepest depths of the spirit; it must be
the most artful of all works of art, for it must encompass all the others; a
new bed and vessel for the ancient, eternal fountainhead of poetry, and
even the infinite poem concealing the seeds of all poems” (Schlegel 1968:
81–82). The poetic ideal can be understood only with reference to the
Greeks and yet can be realized only by means that are antagonistic to
theirs: there is need for a Greek myth that is completely non-Greek. The
treatment proposed for the disease of history (namely, the epigonality of
modernity) is allopathy. Because of the way the Hellenic has been articu-
lated, because of the double bind of an autonomy aesthetically defined, “in
the modern epoch—even though that epoch reverses, in principle, the
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Greek relationship between art and nature—one must indeed repeat that
which is most Greek among the Greeks. Begin the Greeks again. —That is
to say, no longer be Greek at all” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1978: 71).90
If there is no longer anything immediate to imitate or any tradition to
continue, if the modern poet is the one who has been creating out of noth-
ing, the promise of mythology is a spiritual one: the totality of the aesthetic
praxis. The Moderns, who believe in it, are those who are against the An-
cients because they themselves want to be the true Greeks and therefore
need the Greeks dead. Indeed, the extinction of Greece is the inadmissible
desire at the heart of the post-Reformation world, a desire for which there
is no common term (like anti-Hellenism, for example) or tradition of
study—no regret or research. If there is a common thread connecting all
trends within the project of modernity; if there is a common denominator
in all its forms of racism and discrimination; if there is a common element
in all fears and persecutions (of otherness, difference, heterology, and skep-
ticism), it is the philosophical colonization of Greece by the Hellenic ideal
and her death sentence pronounced by universal proclamations of phil-
hellenism. From the viewpoint of the Hellenic ideal, the Greeks are dead—
that is why, unlike other Moderns, no Greek alive, no modern Greek has
been compared to Socrates or Pericles, or to any Hebraic figures for that
matter. The Hellenic extermination (executed over and over again by mas-
ters like Horkheimer and Adorno) is the unspeakable (because originary)
violence of all interpretation and emancipation.91
As exemplified by a work like the Dialectic, Mythology as the (exclusively
Christian, regardless of the author’s ethnicity) study of myth has not been
just another area of specialty but an assemblage of disciplines which to-
gether constitute a particular domain of knowledge—the (guilty) moral
conscience of epigonal modernity. “To many Christian scholars it was in-
admissible that a pagan people ignorant of Revelation could be thought of
as living a serenely contented life. The Greeks had not escaped the Fall.
The beautiful surface of Greek life and art, the harmonious forms admired
by Winckelmann, could only be a covering drawn over intense and unre-
solved primitive terrors and confusions. It was these scholars who first
sought—and found—what has been called the Nachtseite, the dark under-
side of ancient civilization, which they claimed was closely related to the
oriental cultures classicism had tried to reject and disavow as barbarian.
And it was they who issued the only significant challenge to the neohu-
manist version of classical antiquity that had established itself as an ortho-
doxy in the German universities” (Gossman 1986: 46). The disciplines of
Mythology have included areas of fields as diverse as philology, compara-
tive mythology, anthropology, folklore, history of religion, psychology, psy-
choanalysis, literary theory, examinations of ideology, and media studies
(Barthes 1972). Any critique of modernity in the nineteenth and twentieth
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centuries has been based on these disciplines which have constituted the
scholarship of cultural criticism, especially after (what the intelligentsia
saw as) the failure of the proletariat to rise and demonstrate in, or even take
over, the Parisian arcades. These disciplines were also the methodologies of
high culture and codifications of discrimination which affirmed the superi-
ority of elite taste. They offered the professional training promised by
Bildung after it shed its democratic aspirations. They started expressing
their abhorrence of popular taste some time before the mid–nineteenth
century, when myth was first connected with popular ideology, man’s prim-
itive instincts, woman’s treacherous sensuality (Kestner 1989), the false
consciousness of the masses, and the disruptive power of politics. From the
early nineteenth century until the end of World War I, Europe became
obsessed with degeneration, individual or collective (Pick 1990). Disci-
plines and arts from medicine to statistics and social sciences to literature
voiced an obsessive fear of the masses (as crowds), the city, criminals, and
atheism, while recording and categorizing psychological, sexual, and na-
tional pathologies. Malady, perversion, contamination, and decay seemed
to threaten order and health. From France to Russia and from Italy to
Sweden, intellectuals and administrators, artists and scientists saw the bar-
barians at the gates. Visions and projects of regeneration developed along
with a morbid fascination with the vulgar, the banal, and the transgressive.
The alarm was less over revolution than pollution, less over political anar-
chy than social decline. Above all, it appears that in this “age of declining
culture or without culture” (Wittgenstein), civilization has come under
attack. A host of philosophers, psychologists, historians, and biologists
warned that barbarism could unleash its demonic potential any time. Poli-
ticians and educators discerned its Dionysian fury (McGrath 1974) lurking
in public squares and state institutions, salons and bedrooms.
Greece provided the central stage and characters for reenactments of
this panic. The fear spread that the Grecian urn might turn into a Pan-
dora’s box (Frank Wedekind). It was already well-known that the stories of
the Greeks were not all harmony and serenity. With the help of Burnouf,
Frazer, Harrison, and Dodds, modernism used these narratives to depict
disorder, disequilibrium, dissolution. To artists like Léger, Stravinsky, de
Chirico, or Richard Strauss, they signified primeval passion; to authors like
Hofmannsthal, Joyce, Svevo, Pound, Yeats, D’Annunzio, and Giraudoux,
they denoted instability, disorientation, and uncertainty. Similar feelings
were shared even by those who found the “mythical method” employed in
Joyce’s Ulysses “a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a
significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is con-
temporary history” (Eliot 1923: 483).
This development of modern art “makes the problem of neo-classicism
a touchstone for every interpretation of artistic modernity” (Bürger 1984–
85: 118). George, Jung, H. D., Mauss, Kraus, and Gide probed the dark
172 CHAPTER TWO
secrets of mythic memory. For Freud, Sartre, Milhaud, or Dali, mythology
mediated the problematic relation between philosophy and history. Am-
biguous figures like Narcissus (Valéry) or Tiresias (Eliot) emerged as arche-
types. From Mallarmé’s Les dieux antiques (1880) to Wilhelm Wundt’s
Mythus und Religion (1905–9, 3 vols.), Ernst Cassirer’s Language and Myth
(1924), Lévy-Bruhl’s La mythologie primitive (1935), Georges Dumézil’s
Mythes et dieux des Germains (1939), and Lévi-Strauss’s tetralogy Mytholo-
giques (1964–71), the exploration of mythic thought became a major sci-
entific, philosophical, and artistic concern for people of all political persua-
sions. For Modernism, which has been called “myth turned against itself”
(Adorno 1984: 34), mythology provided the grand narrative of tempta-
tion—one of defiance or seduction, revolt or fall (all represented in the
films of Pier-Paolo Pasolini).
Another notable example, this time from theology, is the “demytholo-
gizing” of the kerygma (Bartsch 1953) proposed by Rudolf Bultmann
(1884–1976). “The ‘demythologizing’ movement in twentieth-century
Protestant theology and exegesis stems precisely from an awareness that
the category of myth had subverted that of revealed historicity” (Steiner
1984: 110). For Bultmann, mythology is the use of worldly, human terms to
express the other-worldly, the divine. Under the influence of Heidegger,
“demythologization cuts to the letter itself. It consists in a new use of
hermeneutics, which is no longer edification . . . but a boring under the
literal meaning, a de-struction, that is to say, a de-construction, of the letter
itself” (Ricoeur 1974: 389). Demythologization is the first stage of keryg-
matic interpretation—not a demystification but an interpretation of myth
which follows the intention of the myth (which is to be demythologized).
“Demythologization then is only the inverse side of the grasp of the
kerygma” (389). It is the proper beginning of the understanding of kerygma
as dictated by itself. “Thus, Bultmann’s entire undertaking is pursued on
the assumption that the kerygma itself wants to be demythologized. . . . It
is the kerygmatic core of the original preaching which not only requires but
initiates and sets in motion the process of demythologization” (392). The
similarities of this principle with the deconstructionist idea that texts set in
motion their own deconstruction which the reader only applies—or that
the sacred text “assigns the task to the translator, and it is sacred inasmuch
as it announces itself as . . . to-be-translated” (Derrida 1985: 203)—are
obvious.
The disciplines of Mythology studied myth and its Hellenic origins, try-
ing to cleanse modernity ethically, to purify it from an irrationalism that
was first perceived as psychological, later intellectual, and finally political.
During the period 1880–1920, almost everywhere in the Protestant West
there is an endless scholarly fascination with the dark power of irrational
forces, from the magical to the physiological. “Scholarship of this type re-
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discovered the importance of myth as determining the actions of men and
society. The study of myths was transferred from anthropology, where it
had played a leading role for some time, to the social sciences and the
humanities. Myth was no longer confined to the thought of primitive man
but was treated as a present concern, an enemy to be defeated and exor-
cised” (Mosse 1985: 47). By the time it was identified with the political and
appeared to threaten the religion of art and cultivation, myth, and with it
the Hellenic in general, became the subject of exorcism. If Thomas Mann
(1875–1955) was the last representative of self-cultivation, The Magic
Mountain (1924) is the encyclopedic compendium of these disciplines,
and Doktor Faustus (1947) the monument of exorcism.92 Not only did My-
thology contribute to the ethnographic construction of the exotic but,
from Durkheim to René Girard and from Karl Kerényi to Mircea Eliade, it
also responded to the fear that politics “appears to have largely replaced
[myth] in modern societies” (Lévi-Strauss 1963: 209). There have been a
few valuable reminders of the ideological constitution of ethnography: “To
cite, today or tomorrow, that which everyone agrees to call myth is to en-
dorse an out-of-date faithful acceptance of a cultural model that appeared
in the eighteenth century when the sum total of accepted ideas concerning
pagan divinities between Ovid and Apollodorus are in the realm of fable
which scholarly erudition then called mythology. . . . It thus seems risky to
have wished to take it as the subject for a rigidly applied method of schol-
arly research and to have laid down its rules since the discovery of the West
Indies” (Detienne 1986: 131–32). This view, however, cannot be accepted
as long as Mythology identifies its subject with the irrational, and proceeds
to discover its operations in socio-political turmoil and conflict.93
The cathartic and therapeutic treatment of the pathological and the irra-
tional by the disciplines of Mythology is best observed in their maenadic
pursuit of Dionysus, the god of mysteries and orgies. “No other Greek god
has created more confusion in the modern mind, nor produced a wider
spectrum of different and often contradictory interpretations. By the same
token, Dionysus has also stimulated more interest than any pagan deity”
(Henrichs 1984: 240). In addition to the writings of Rilke, Gide, and Mann,
suffice to acknowledge here his presence in the operas Ariadne auf Naxos
(1916) by Richard Strauss, Revelation in the Courthouse Park (1961) by
Harry Partch, The Bassarids (1966) by Hans Werner Henze, and Death in
Venice (1973) by Benjamin Britten. Previously the god had appeared in the
arts as the exuberant Bacchus. “From the Renaissance until about 1800,
the life aspect of Dionysus was the dominant feature. The Romantic reac-
tion rediscovered the death aspect, through direct recourse to Greek litera-
ture rather than Latin” (Henrichs 1984: 212).
While Winckelmann was probably the first to contrast the masculine
ideal of Apollo with the homoerotic beauty of Dionysus, the dual nature of
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the latter (which internalized the Apollo-Dionysus opposition) was discov-
ered by the generation of Lessing and Herder. The invention of the Greek
with two heads, the split personality, the schizophrenic disposition, the
dual nature, may be dated to this internalization of the conflict, this aes-
theticization of difference, this dialectization of inconsistency. “Eigh-
teenth-century Hellenism was still an Apollo-governed Hellenism; but the
Romanticists had dethroned Apollo and set the tragic Dionysos in his
place” (Robertson 1924: 22).94 It was the discipline of dialectics—the self-
reflexive exercise of contemplation, the introspective application of aes-
thetics to the self—that, before the end of the century, constructed, out of
the presumably irreconcilable contradictions in tragedy, the model of an
inherently torn and divided Greece. “It is known that the Germans discov-
ered, at the dawn of speculative idealism and of romantic philology (in the
last decade of the eighteenth century, at Jena, among Schlegel, Hölderlin,
Hegel, and Schelling), that Greece, in reality, had been double: there had
been a Greece of measure and of clarity, of theory and of art (in the proper
sense of these terms), of ‘beautiful form,’ of virile, heroic rigor, of law, of
the City, of the light of day; and a buried Greece, nocturnal, somber (or too
blindly bright), the archaic, savage Greece of group rituals, of bloody sacri-
fices and collective intoxications, of the cult of the dead and of the Earth
Mother—in short, a mystical Greece, on which the other, not without diffi-
culty, was raised (through the ‘repression’ of the mystical one), but which
always remained silently present right up to the final collapse, particularly
in tragedy and in the mystery religions. One can follow the traces of this
doubling of Greece in all of German thought from, for example, Hölderlin’s
analysis of Sophocles or Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind to Heidegger, pass-
ing through Johann Bachofen’s Mutterrecht [1861], Rhode’s Psyche [1925]
and the Apollinian and Dionysian opposition structuring Nietzsche’s Birth
of Tragedy [1872]” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1990: 300–301).95
The doubling of Greece attributes to the ancient culture the modern
syndrome of the double bind—the contradictory injunction of imitation,96
the Hellenic search for an utterly non-Greek Greek myth and the ensuing
anti-Hellenic resentment. The double bind of the relation of the Moderns
to the Greeks mandates that “art, so far as it imitates nature, is specifi-
cally—and following Winckelmann—Greek art: mimesis is Greek. On the
other hand, it is up to the Moderns to accomplish—to see through or bring
to term, to complete—what nature cannot carry out. Consequently, it is up
to the Moderns to go a step beyond the Greeks—to ‘accomplish’ them.
That is to say, to surpass or surmount them” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1989: 238).
That is why modernity, driven by its Hellenic ideal (which overdetermines
the project), needs the Greeks tragic (that is, contradictory and self-cancel-
ing, and therefore incapable of transcendence) in antiquity and dead in the
present. On a more fundamental level, the doubling of Greece reproduces
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within the Hellenic the constitutive double bind of modernity, the Jerusa-
lem-Athens opposition, with the result that, beginning with Romanticism,
Greece acquires two natures, one Hebraic and the other Hellenic.97
Starting with Hölderlin, the development of the dark side of Greece al-
lowed Romanticism to express less favor for the gods than Weimar clas-
sicism. “The old passionate self-abnegation of German mysticism and
pietism returned, and with it the revival of an intensely personal Christian-
ity, a repudiation of the cold deism of the eighteenth century. Indeed, this
religious revival led not a few of the gentler souls of the epoch back into the
fold of the mother Church. . . . The classic age had not felt the need of
tempering its optimistic Christianity with a renunciatory Nazarenism;
deism cherished no antagonism to the joyous serenity of Hellenism. . . .
Something of the hostility of earlier centuries to the Greek ideals returned;
. . . the gods of Greece became once more the gods of heathendom” (Rob-
ertson 1924: 20–21). During the first decade of the nineteenth century,
philosophers and scholars like Friedrich Schlegel and Georg Friedrich
Creuzer, the author of The Symbolism and Mythology of the Ancient Peoples
(1810–12),98 traced Dionysus to Indian cults, Asia Minor mysteries, Egyp-
tian mythology, thus orientalizing Greek religion. The Symbolists attacked
the Romantic Hellenism of the classicists and prevailed. Their position was
revised to exclude any Oriental influence, starting with the work that made
the scientific study of myth a key to the Greek mind, Karl Otfried Müller’s
Prolegomena to a Scientific Study of Myth (1825); nevertheless the Roman-
tics remained convinced about the need to take a stand in the hostility
between the gods and Christianity. The disciples of Dionysus addressed in
Hegel’s poem “Eleusis” (1796) later denounced the mysteries of Ceres and
moved closer to the ideals of Novalis’s essay “Europe, or Christendom”
(1800). Where Dionysus used to signify ecstatic inspiration and artistic
creativity, by the time of Heinrich Heine he was associated with sensuality,
intoxication, primal instinct, and darkness (as opposed to the Apollonian
reason, spirit, and light). What Herder saw as “animal-like sensuality”
seemed later more a source of threat than a promise of pagan spontaneity.
After the Symbolists cultivated the fear of the festival and the orgy, mys-
tery was decisively left out of poetry. It is therefore no exaggeration to
claim that “the terrible spiritual conflict in Heine’s soul between Nazaren-
ism and Hellenism is . . . the most significant spiritual happening in the
period of declining Romanticism” (Robertson 1924: 24).99 It was he who
gave to the distinction between Hebraism and Hellenism its modern cur-
rency, which he found in the work of Ludwig Börne. In one stroke, Heine
turned against Dionysus, Hellenism, Christianity, and political radicalism.
In his writings, for the first time, the god became the carrier of destruc-
tion—a threat to morality, tradition, and balance. The revolution had
turned out to be an orgy. “The case of Heine is particularly interesting with
176 CHAPTER TWO
regard to the past for which he is nostalgic. In his ‘aveux de l’auteur’ (au-
thor’s confessions) which conclude De l’Allemagne, he reveals that al-
though once a philhellene (like most Jacobin-democrats), he has recently
turned back to his Judaic antecedents; and he affirms that the true prefigu-
ration of the French Revolution is neither ancient Greece with its slavery,
nor Rome with its legalistic chicanery, but rather Mosaic law and the cus-
toms of ancient Judaism” (Sayre and Löwy 1984: 78).100 In this public
atonement, the revolutionary fervor of Jacobinism, with its radical critique
of both monarchy and bourgeois oppression, comes to an end—succeeded
already by the utopian socialism of Moses Hess and the yearning of Rome
and Jerusalem (1862).
The pantheistic celebration of mythology was replaced by the dread of
barbarism. “In the later nineteenth century the gods of Greece were dead,
vanished from the world, without seeming hope of ever coming back” (Ro-
bertson 1924: 28). Until Wagner’s rereading of tragedy, no creative syn-
thesis of the opposing powers seemed possible. The opposition of Robert
Browning (1812–89) to uses of Greek mythology was typical. It was with
Nietzsche (and to a lesser degree Walter Pater) in the 1870s that myth was
fully upgraded again, becoming the essence of active life, of existence as
creative act: “Myth is thus basically the same in both its primitive and its
revealed forms; it is the measure of our aesthetic relation to reality, of our
ability to take the world as an ‘aesthetic phenomenon,’ and its develop-
ment might be called the aesthetic education of man. . . . The state of
belonging to a mythical culture and understanding existence in terms of
one’s myths is thus not really a state at all but, rather, a constantly renewed
act of artistic creation” (Bennett 1979: 423). Thus myth was saved appro-
priately by Schillerian aesthetics, by the principle of freedom as an aes-
thetic attitude, becoming the activity of that attitude and the conscious-
ness of that freedom—the narrative (of the legitimacy) of full-fledged
human autonomy.
Before long, however, the ritual origins of drama attracted attention
when British and German classicists, especially under the spell of Sir James
Frazer’s The Golden Bough (1890, 2 vols.; 1915, 12 vols.) during the first
decade of the twentieth century, turned to evolutionary anthropological
theories which originated in the 1870s and 1880s (Kluckhohn 1961). The
Cambridge School,101 in particular, studied the way religious ritual influ-
enced the development of ancient drama. For this school of classics, ritual
practices predated the formulation of myths. “By using the tools of com-
parative religion, the theorists were in fact able to construct accounts of the
worship of Dionysus and the rites traditionally associated with the origins
of drama. . . . High art was shown to evolve out of high ritual” (Payne 1978:
185). The philosophy of religion of the Biblical critic William Robertson
Smith (1846–94), author of the Lectures on the Religion of the Semites
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(1894), which considered myth secondary to ritual, was a major source of
inspiration for the Ritualists (as it was for Freud). “What had been true of
ancient Hebraism became true for ancient Hellenism” (Turner 1981: 122).
Although the impact of the Ritualists was felt mostly in modernist theories
of myth, drama, and literature, Dionysiology did not lose its exorcistic
character: from books like W. F. Otto’s Dionysos (1933) and H. Jeanmaire’s
Dionysos (1951) to more recent works by René Girard, Walter Burkert,
Marcel Detienne, and Michel Maffesoli (works which often extend the
ritualist approach to thought and society in general), Dionysus remains a
major figure of ritual, deviation, aggression, sacrifice, and violence.
The position taken by the Dialectic against mythical barbarism is heavily
indebted to the comprehensive iconomachic campaign at the turn of the
century to destroy the idols of profane culture. “Typically, political forces
seemed to play no role in checking myth. Instead, culture provided the
antidote” (Mosse 1985: 54), together with a massive cross-disciplinary
enterprise to comprehend and control the perceived return of an antiq-
uity that had been considered extinct for more than fifty years. “Bloch’s
warning not to leave irrationalism to right-wingers” (Bürger 1984–85: 125)
fell on deaf ears. Creating institutes for its study seemed a better
(counter)political strategy. An eminent representative of this strategy of
cultural diagnosis was Aby Warburg (1866–1929), who sided with the mor-
alists, trying to exorcise evil with a history of reason. The subject of his
scholarship was another return of Greece, the impact of antiquity on fif-
teenth-century Florence. “Though he saw the Renaissance as an era of con-
flict between reason and unreason he was entirely on the side of reason. For
him the library he collected and wanted to hand on to his successors was to
be an instrument of enlightenment, a weapon in the struggle against the
powers of darkness which could so easily overwhelm the precarious achieve-
ment of rationality” (Gombrich 1986: 13). The edificatory task of the
scholar was to help preserve the laws of rationality by dispelling pagan su-
perstition. Within the “Science of Culture” he envisioned, “his principal
concern was that of ‘das Nachleben der Antike,’ literally ‘the after-life of
classical antiquity.’ . . . [H]e was more concerned with what would now be
described as ‘revivals,’ the reappearance in the Italian Renaissance of artis-
tic forms and psychological states derived from the ancient world. He
wanted to know what significance should be attached to these impulses
from a pagan past, which he traced in astrological superstitions no less than
in the imagery of court pageants” (16). Puzzled by the “continued vitality
of the classical heritage” (16), he attempted, as he wrote in 1926, “to un-
derstand the meaning of the survival of paganism for the whole of Euro-
pean civilization” (quoted in Gombrich 1986: 307). By looking microscopi-
cally at “The Significance of Antiquity for the Stylistic Change in Italian
Art in the Early Renaissance” (to use the title of a seminar he gave in the
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winter of 1925–26 for Hamburg University), he explored how antiquity is
imagined.
Warburg’s position was clear: “Every age has the renaissance of antiquity
it deserves” (238). Accordingly, he intended to contribute to the renais-
sance he considered appropriate for his time. As part of his defense of the
“spirit of Europe,” he concentrated on the pathology of collective psychol-
ogy. “By ‘paganism,’ as we know, Warburg means a psychological state, the
state of the surrender to impulses of frenzy and fear” (308). In studies of
representation and social memory, he recognized “in symbolism an aspect
of human culture in which the irrational was still very close to the surface.
It was the task of a scientific ‘psychology of culture’ to analyse and explain
this form of irrationalism which pervades both religion and art” (75). From
his humanistic viewpoint, “the surviving elements of antiquity were always
seen as a potential threat to human values, but also as a potential guide
towards their expression. Later in his life Warburg was to fall back on the
Romantic concept of ‘polarity’ to formulate the ambivalent role which the
classical heritage plays in Western civilization” (87). The notion of polar-
ity, based on Nietzsche’s Apollonian-Dionysian dimensions of Greek
thought,102 enabled him to ask how science emerged out of magic, reason
out of fear, and to look for the creative potential of dark forces—a positive
attitude rejected, together with its faith in enlightenment, by the Frankfurt
School. By that time, however, Warburg had no patience for questions of
tradition. (For example, he showed no interest in Medieval art—moving in
his comparisons directly from the Hellenistic period to the Renaissance.)
“While his early research on the Florentine fifteenth century had been
based on the concept of development by which one state of mind is re-
placed by another, he preferred during the last decade of his life to see
the rhythm of civilisation represented by the model of polarity and oscilla-
tion. . . . [T]his attempt by a scholar completely devoted to historical re-
search to eliminate the time factor as a creative force recalls Franz Ro-
senzweig’s analysis of the Jewish mind which is outside the world and
therefore essentially beyond its historical periods” (Liebeschütz 1971:
232). Analyzing history in order to transcend it (for example, studying an-
tiquity in order to undemonize it), examining time in order to redeem it,
was a major goal of cultural studies at that time.103
Warburg’s pursuit of enlightenment may be described with his term
“undemonizing.” He studied survivals of antiquity in an era he considered
similar to his own, the Renaissance, trying to account for their demonic
power and thus warn indirectly against their pernicious influence. “It was
the move from magic practice and blood-stained sacrifice to the purely
spiritual attitude of inward devotion to which he responded with profound
enthusiasm” (Gombrich 1986: 278). But unlike Horkheimer and Adorno,
who also emphasized the departure from sacrifice, he did not reject ancient
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thought completely. Subscribing to the standard conception of a double
Greece, he saw two opposite forces, one good and one evil, competing for
its soul. When he wrote in 1920 that Athens had to be recovered from
Alexandria, it was clear which side he chose. “The mind of Aby Warburg,
German patriot and German scholar, is evidence that cultivated German
Jews saw themselves as part of the Athenian forces—the forces of reason,
of enlightenment, of Bildung” (Gay 1975: 40). The Athenian forces of the
twentieth century, however, fought with the Hebraic means of high cul-
ture. There are few achievements of this struggle comparable to the collec-
tion of books that Warburg, the consummate autonomous scholar, built as
his own university, exclusively devoted to the study of myth: “If it makes
any sense to call Jews the people of the book, the Warburg Library is, al-
most by definition, the most Jewish of creations” (40), and the grandest
physical monument to both the disciplines of Mythology and the conquest
of culture by Jewish Bildung.
Among the numerous branches of Mythology, such as the history of art
promoted by Warburg and his Institute, one area of study whose contribu-
tion to the analysis of myth has not been sufficiently recognized is the
“Science of Judaism.” Its creation is dated in the early scholarly activities of
its founder, Leopold Zunz (1794–1886): the publication of his Notes on
Rabbinic Literature (1818), the establishment of the “Society for the Cul-
ture and Science of the Jews” in Berlin (1819), and the publication (for one
volume only), under his editorship, of the Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft
des Judentums (1822). From the beginning, the practitioners of the Science
accepted the current standards of scholarship and promoted the principle
of free and objective interpretation. “When it came into being, the Science
of Judaism was a powerful and very active force in Berlin, Galicia, Prague,
and other centers open to the influence of early nineteenth-century Ger-
man culture. . . . It arose and took effect under the influence of antiquar-
ian, ideal, and romantic conceptions” (Scholem 1971a: 305). Given the
prevailing religious sensitivities, issues of faith were carefully avoided, and
consequently Biblical studies systematically neglected.
Two major goals emerged. The first was an internal one: to support the
Reform movement with the scientific study of religion. The religious moti-
vation of the Science was strong: it is worth noting that “nearly all the
creators and co-workers in the domains of Jewish historiography and Sci-
ence of Judaism were theologians. The rabbinic share in both the positive
and the problematic is enormous; it cannot be overestimated” (305). After
the Enlightenment, religiosity had to be based on evidence, not religious
laws and communal customs. According to the recommendation of Rabbi
Abraham Geiger (1810–74), one of the leaders of the Reform movement as
well as a pioneer of the field, a scientific (for example, philological and
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archaeological) investigation of the sources was needed in order to revital-
ize the practices of piety. “The Science of Judaism was regarded by Geiger
as the only way that led to true Jewish religiosity. . . . Geiger saw in the
Science of Judaism the principal tool of renewing Jewish religion” (Wiener
1952: 46). Reform Judaism undertook the task of preserving tradition in
an era of rapid modernization through a mediation between faith and
Bildung.104 “The integration of Judaism into the frame of modern culture
was the absorbing concern of liberal theology in nineteenth-century Ger-
man Jewry. ‘Wissenschaft des Judentums’ as a historical science was con-
ceived as the tool for the accomplishment of this end. It was hoped that
once one had grasped the development of the Jewish ‘idea’ as a historical
process, its essence would emerge in its unadulterated purity, freed from
the encumbrances of tradition, and one had no doubt that the ‘refined’
(geläutert) type of Judaism thus arrived at would splendidly fit into the
world of modern Europe” (Altmann 1956: 193). Hence the urgency of
works like the History of the Israelites (1820–28, 9 vols.) by Isaac Marcus
Jost, the “first Jewish scholar since Josephus to undertake a comprehensive
history of the Jews” (Meyer 1975: 330).
The second, external goal was to wrest the analysis of Judaism from the-
ologians and historians of religion, and protect it from Higher Criticism,
which was already demolishing the New Testament, by making the histori-
cal development of Israel the proper object of study. In the second half of
the eighteenth century, certain Talmudists had started calling for a textual
criticism based on the authority of reason, rather than tradition. At issue
also was the status of the Torah and the relationship between faith and
conduct. Similarly, for the first Scientists, freedom of interpretation meant
freedom from tradition, especially from Oral Law. They advocated the au-
tonomy of texts and interpretation, proposing the principle that the Sci-
ence “treats the object of study in and for itself, for its own sake, and not
for any special purpose or definite intention” (Wolf 1957: 201). They often
encountered resistance to the revisionary approach from more traditional
quarters. “It is important to realize, however, that the concept of modern
Jewish studies called for a transformation of Jewish learning from a litera-
ture of glosses, commentaries, bibliographical lists, and collections of chro-
nographical materials into comprehensive presentations of Judaism as
found in its literature, its philosophy, and its history—manifestations of
the new vistas of learning, marked by scholarly objectivity, broad scope,
meaningful context, proper form and style, and—respectability” (Glatzer
1978: 153).
What the young Scientists were advocating was a major shift of direction
in response to the demands of assimilation—one from tales of destiny to
histories of progress. The shock of modernity caused a rupture within the
Jewish tradition when “the ethnic narcissism of the Jew suffered all at once
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a grievous trauma by its discovery of nineteenth-century European civiliza-
tion. In the pre-Emancipation era, Jewry could maintain the illusion of its
privileged position by maintaining the plausibility of its expectation of the
long-deferred messianic reversal. A credible theodicy was always ready at
hand to explain ‘the problem of evil’—namely, the present (and hence ap-
parent) inferiority of the Jewish people vis-à-vis the present (and hence
apparent) superiority of the surrounding goyim” (Cuddihy 1974: 146). The
covenant of assimilation, with its promise of secular delivery, challenged
the credibility of the normative messianic expectation. The cohesiveness
and continuity of the ethnic culture, its particular codes of belief and com-
munication, broke down. “As long as the Jews formed their way of life in
accordance with the Jewish tradition, a tradition oriented towards religion,
their interpretation of the course of their own history—as far as Jews tried
to account for it at all—was dominated by the concept of a historical pat-
tern derived from the biblical prophets: that of a sacred people which, hav-
ing strayed from the sacred path assigned to it, must languish in exile until
it will be saved. . . . In the course of half a century, three historical devel-
opments occurred successively in almost all the Jewries of Europe, except
those living under Russian rule or influence: enlightenment, political
emancipation, and the reform of dogma and liturgy. . . . It is surely no coin-
cidence that German Jews, who had gone through enlightenment, emanci-
pation, and religious reform, who had escaped from the narrowness of a
one-sided historical vision, and had been trained during their university
studies to arrive at conclusions by scientific method and without precon-
ceived notions—that they, too, were anxious to build a groundwork of
scholarly research for a history of their own community” (Herlitz 1964: 69).
The Science was going to be the first collective cultural project of emanci-
pation—appropriately enough, a monument to the disciplines of interpre-
tation. Their strategy was to identify monotheism with rationalism. “Wis-
senschaft was to become a messianic substitute for religion in a secular
world” (Biale 1979: 16).
The Scientists encouraged the recognition that “Judaism, as a result of
its own inner characteristics, has always remained strange and isolated in
relation to the rest of the world” (Wolf 1957: 194). This recognition was a
prerequisite for the proposed exodus. The secular challenge was certainly a
recent one: “Only when modern history began were the Jews overtaken in
the life of culture” (199). The call of modernization was for an active effort
to bridge the worlds of synagogue and culture, and reconcile faith with
Bildung. Both goals, internal and external, are mentioned at the end of the
essay “On the Concept of a Science of Judaism” (1822) by Immanuel Wolf,
the manifesto of secular scholarship which opened the first issue of Leo-
pold Zunz’s short-lived journal. The internal one is dictated by the fact
that “the inner world of the Jews . . . has in many ways been disturbed and
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shaken by the unrelenting progress of the spirit and the associated changes
in the life of the peoples. It is manifest everywhere that the fundamental
principle of Judaism [earlier defined as the ‘religious idea’] is again in a
state of inner ferment, striving to assume a shape in harmony with the
spirit of the times” (Wolf 1957: 204). The external goal is related to eman-
cipation: “Scientific knowledge must decide on the merits or demerits of
the Jews, their fitness or unfitness to be given the same status and respect
as other citizens” (204). The three branches of the new science—philology,
history, and philosophy—will move away from the isolationist preoccupa-
tions of Biblical exegesis to prove that Judaism has been “for most of the
history of the world an important and influential factor in the development
of the human spirit” (200).
As the Scientists tacitly admitted with their strategic employment of
scholarship, so far as Western culture was concerned, there were no Jews
before modernity, only Hebrews. The Jew of the West is a (relatively late)
by-product (and, as history has brutally shown, an expendable one) of He-
braism. It was Hebraism, some two hundred fifty years after its emergence,
that allowed certain people to identify themselves (and/or others) as Jews
and claim Judaism as an identity (as Hellenism enabled others to embrace
a Hellenic identity). “Hebraism is the tactic of admitting one’s inferiority
in terms of power in order to claim moral superiority in terms of indigenous
spirituality and simplicity. It is a standing temptation for the modernizing
intellectual” (Cuddihy 1974: 171). Chosenness is assumed to be the ability
to choose freely. The intellectual, the prince of Bildung, denounces social
power in order to achieve the superior standing of the self-made: cultivated
interiority. The same tactic was followed by the Jew of modernity. “ ‘He-
braism’ was for the unsynagogued, secular Jewish intellectual what Reform
Judaism was for the German Jew still committed to ‘formal’ membership in
a Jewish—albeit a ‘reformed’ Jewish—community. Both these ideologies
elided the ‘shameful’ Talmudic ‘interlude’ of Yiddishkeit. Both recurred to
the Hebrew Bible, traded on its high prestige in the West, and glorified
their ancient ancestors as the ‘seedbed’ of all that was noble in the
West. . . . Using invidious comparisons, the ‘assaulted intellectuals’ of Re-
form Judaism and Hebraism thus launched their mission civilisatrice to
Gentile Europe” (171).105
The appearance of the Science marked the moment when, after its initial
gains, the Haskalah, which had emerged in central and eastern Europe in
the 1780s, focused more narrowly on theology and ritual, transforming it-
self into the Reform movement. The maskilim, the Westernizing intelli-
gentsia which sought the emancipation of understanding from the com-
munity of the Talmud, saw “the renewal of the religion as essential for the
survival of its adherents. Their understanding of assimilation was ‘narrow’:
they thought the continued existence of the Jews and Judaism was beyond
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the bounds of the emancipation contract. . . . In other words, they wanted
a Deutschtum that would get them political equality and social acceptance
alongside a Judentum that would preserve their collective identity” (Sorkin
1990: 21). As part of their conservative program to control discontent and
disobedience among the weakening ranks and centrifugal forces of the sec-
ularizing community, they started openly taking the rabbinic leadership to
task, engineering internal reforms, and at the same time creating a field
explicitly devoted to the redefinition of tradition. The stakes were high:
How much of tradition could be compromised in the name of civil emanci-
pation? How far could faith go in the direction of reason when the sirens of
mythic thought were threatening to lure enlightened minds into supersti-
tious self-confidence? To Immanuel Wolf, two forces seemed to dominate
the course of humanity: “In Judaism the divine idea is present as a given,
revealed idea. In Hellenism all knowledge has developed from the human
spirit itself. Both in their very different ways are the most momentous fac-
tors in the cultural history of the human spirit” (Wolf 1957: 196). The
Scientists hoped for a Hegelian synthesis of the two forces. In 1836 Zunz
confesses: “I cannot agree to the hostile division between revelation and
paganism; rather do I see everywhere only emanations of one and the same
world spirit [Weltgeist]; only in the phenomenal world are there antago-
nisms, even contradictions, but philosophy resolves them” (quoted in
Glatzer 1978: 155–56). Although Horkheimer and Adorno did not share
this optimism,106 approaches to the Hebraism-Hellenism opposition like
this one show that the real topic of the Dialectic (and even a potential
alternative title) is the dilemmas of assimilation.107
The initial methodology of the Science was a historicist approach, with
emphasis on cultural particularity. “The issue of doctrine, of the binding
character of tradition, of truth, could be safely excluded from the investiga-
tion. . . . Historicism as applied to the messianic idea helped Zunz to keep
the eschatological dynamite from exploding in his structure of Judaism,
which he presented as a movement toward humanism, progress, democ-
racy, and Europeanism” (155). The area of culture was naturally an espe-
cially important one, and the Protestant interpretive tradition had pre-
pared the ground for the recognition of Hebrew excellence. Jewish writing,
for example, was treated by the Science as the epitome of world literature.
Treatises like Zunz’s Zur Geschichte und Literatur (1845) defend positions
similar to Lowth’s or Auerbach’s view of the Western canon: an under-
standing of Jewish literature is necessary for the understanding of the laws
of all literature. Such aesthetic approaches endowed the Hebrew Bible with
artistic authority and protected it from Higher Criticism, thus radically
revising traditional modes of reading. “To advance this theory [of world
importance of Hebrew letters] Zunz had to break with the scale of values
of classical Judaism, to which a Biblical commentary or a halakic work was
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central and a Jew’s treatise on a medical subject peripheral. Zunz super-
imposed the concept of literature (in the sense of a multifaceted body of
writings) on Hebrew letters, just as he forced the writings of the Jewish
community out of their seclusion into the wider framework of world litera-
ture” (157). In general, scholars tried to take over possession of the com-
munal past from the Talmudists and, later, tried to show that Israel’s story
was both a true history and an important story for world history. “Thus
Judaism shows itself to be for most of the history of the world an important
and influential factor in the development of the human spirit. . . . An idea,
such as Judaism, which has developed for so many centuries, which has
been alive and productive for such a long period in the history of the world
must for this reason be founded on the essence of humanity itself and thus
be of the greatest significance and importance for the thinking spirit”
(200). As the distinct national character of Judaism was outlined, its signif-
icance for the evolution of the West was simultaneously highlighted (and
the role of Christianity underplayed). If Hegel’s idea to place Judaism on
the map of world history was to be accepted, its universal importance had
to be justified in terms of the teleological philosophy of the spirit.108 Thus,
after the Jews were welcomed into bourgeois society, they tried to make not
only Judaism but also Jewishness acceptable by spiritualizing it. Few people
(and not always from the more traditional side) discerned the serious dan-
ger of compromising its real life and present character.
Although Hegel’s presentation of Judaism as an Oriental system within
world history did not satisfy everyone, interest in the Orient was such that
in 1822 Wolf had no difficulty seeing the Science of Judaism participating
in the Oriental direction of the humanities: “But today the attention of the
scholar, in his attempt to obtain a thorough insight into the history of the
development of the human spirit from the earliest ages of man, is directed,
above all, towards the Orient, this cradle of human culture, this source of
so much that is great and sublime. As this is so, would it not be timely to
subject Judaism, this richest and most widespread fruit of the Orient, to a
thorough examination from a purely scientific point of view?” (Wolf 1957:
203). That was also the time when Greece was often orientalized (for exam-
ple, by the Symbolist study of myth): “During the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries much speculation had arisen in both Britain and Ger-
many about the possible oriental influence on Greek culture” (Turner
1981: 105). The important advance of the Science was that the Jews were
presented as the historical people par excellence, the ones who were no-
where and everywhere at home, and were therefore truly universal.109 Long
before homelessness, Heine’s predicament, became common fate, as
Adorno observed, it was the new historical identity of the Jews that associ-
ated their role with departure and difference—with an exile characterized
by purposefulness without a purpose (as opposed to Odysseus’ adventure
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of return). If the philosophy of the Enlightenment had universalized He-
brew reason, the scholarship of Idealism universalized Jewish history by
narrating it as the epic of spiritual development. Following Mendelssohn’s
idea in Jerusalem that Jewish faith was more of a moral legislation than a
religion, scholars examined Judaism as the law of the Jewish nation, con-
centrating on intellectual and cultural achievements and not on political
developments. As the definition of Judaism was broadened to cover all di-
mensions of culture, its universal qualities were exalted.110
Despite its claims to objectivity, the Science of Judaism never made any
secret of its political goals. The professionalization of disciplines had not
yet reached the stage where interpretive freedom had to be identified with
impartiality. Support for civil equality was explicitly part of its program:
“Scientific knowledge of Judaism must decide on the merits or demerits of
the Jews, their fitness or unfitness to be given the same status and respect
as other citizens. This alone will make known the inner character of Juda-
ism and separate the essential from the accidental, the original from the
later addition. Science alone is above the partisanship, passions and preju-
dices of daily life, for its aim is truth” (Wolf 1957: 204). The cultural poli-
tics of the Science also went beyond that. The effort to define Jewish par-
ticipation in the historical universal was the scholarly dimension of the
larger project to usher Jews into the scene of present history. People who
were called and/or considered themselves Jewish and had gone successfully
through the cultural training of Bildung sought to present themselves as
the real (as opposed to abstract—say, literary or philosophical) Jews of the
Enlightenment, not only claiming the legendary heritage of Mendelssohn
but ultimately seeking to identify themselves with the Hebraic. The recog-
nition for Jewish Bildung, which they started demanding, meant respect for
their superiority in the Protestant Hebraic kingdom. “Ultimately, the only
tenable posture for a minority people such as the Jews—even of the State
of Israel—to adopt in a world that sees no room for them (and often con-
vinces Jews to that effect) is to try afresh in every age to formulate in tran-
scendent terms the reason for its continuity” (G. Cohen 1975: xxix).
By appropriating the methods of Higher Criticism for the goals of Higher
Historicism, the scholars of Judaism argued that Jews were not just a histor-
ical force and model but an active presence too. Hence the urgent call to
Jewish scholarship: “But as the formation of a science of Judaism is an
essential need for the Jews themselves, it is clear that, although the field of
science is open to all men, it is primarily the Jews who are called upon to
devote themselves to it. The Jews must once again show their mettle as
doughty fellow-workers in the common task of mankind. They must raise
themselves and their principle to the level of a science, for this is the atti-
tude of the European world. This attitude must banish the relationship of
strangeness in which Jews and Judaism have hitherto stood in relation to
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the outside world. And if one day a bond is to join the whole of humanity,
then it is the bond of science, the bond of pure reason, the bond of truth”
(204). If the traditional image of Judaism was infested with pagan miscon-
ceptions, once that mythic layer was removed, its message to humanity
would become legible again. Thus the attack against myth on philosophical
and scientific grounds was from the very beginning an integral part of Ju-
daic scholarship.
Surveys of the Science of Judaism which accept the 1860s as the period
of its decline are usually influenced by Scholem’s attacks on the disci-
pline111 (following Rosenzweig’s suggestion that their generation “smuggle
in Jewish knowledge” rather than subscribe to Gentile scholarship) and the
emphasis on a new historical reality by Zionist separatism. Such surveys
therefore fail to recognize that, after that time, the field did not decline but
abandoned its narrowly defined cohesion and moved in the direction of
developing its own sub-disciplines. “In the years approaching the First
World War, the self-confidence and security of German Jewry was chal-
lenged by a new Jewish sensibility that can be described as at once radical,
secular and Messianic in both tone and content. What this new Jewish
ethos refused to accept was above all the optimism of the generation of
German Jews nurtured on the concept of Bildung as the German Jewish
mystique. . . . For German Jews of that earlier generation the ‘Bildungs-
ideal’ of Kant, Goethe and Schiller assured them of an indissoluble bond
between Enlightenment, universal ethics, autonomous art and monothe-
ism (stripped of any particularist ‘Jewish’ characteristics). The mission of
the Jews could be interpreted, as Leo Baeck did in his 1905 Essence of
Judaism, as the exemplary embodiment of the religion of morality for all
humanity” (Rabinbach 1985: 78). The radical Modernist sensibility de-
clared the contract of Bildung void, divested from Hellenocentric human-
ism, and concentrated its capital in elite culture. Under the urgency of
debates on decline and decadence, which included “the many analyses of
the ‘sickness of Judaism’ written by Jews at the turn of the century” (Mosse
1970: 81),112 the generation of Rosenzweig responded by transforming the
Science into a set of loosely connected sub-disciplines devoted to the He-
braic rejuvenation of civilization. To these belong, among others, the mes-
sianic mysticism of Buber (who wrote in 1901 his dissertation on Jacob
Böhme), Bloch (who published in 1921 his dissertation Thomas Münzer als
Theologe der Revolution), Rosenzweig, Shestov, and Scholem; psychoanaly-
sis (which Freud saw becoming “a Jewish national affair”); the school of the
Warburg Institute (Aby Warburg, Erwin Panofsky, Ernst Cassirer, Ernst H.
Gombrich), which studied the history of classical tradition after Christian-
ity; deconstruction; academic enterprises in “Judaic” or “Jewish Studies”
(together with their programs, journals, book series, and conferences); and
of course the Frankfurt School (which Gershom Scholem called in 1977 a
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“Jewish sect”).113 The effort to establish the autonomy-as-difference of Ju-
daism as a cognitive subject succeeded so much in acquiring scholarly inde-
pendence and intellectual legitimacy that it was able to produce its own
field and epistemology. Moreover, this remains the only Science ever estab-
lished for the study of a particular ethnic group, for the obvious reason that
no other group has required and merited this kind of study.
Even the Jewish intellectual (presumably such as Warburg, Adorno, or
Auerbach) is presented by the Science as a “unique entity” (Mendes-Flohr
1982: 143) which demands a special method of analysis. For although edu-
cated Jews were not the only members of the Geistesaristokratie who
found their faith in the egalitarian promise of Bildung betrayed by the hier-
archy of the Prussian administration (158–61), they were the ones for
whom professional failure worked as a sign of distinction. In 1822, a year
after the Prussian law concerning Jewish emancipation was introduced, a
Royal Order disqualified Jews from academic positions, giving rise to their
peculiar occupational patterns. This strengthened their sense of otherness
because “in pursuing social integration the German Jew became a cogni-
tive insider—i.e., he obtained an academic education and high German
culture—but, nonetheless, he remained a social outsider” (162). Especially
since that time, the Jews of Hebraism represent the others of society—not
only the historical Jews of modernity but also artists, leftists, perverts, mar-
gins, people of color, and the like (but never the non-Western and exotic).
At the same time, when culture started losing its national character and
acquiring a cosmopolitan one in the second half of the nineteenth century,
the Jews of the Science had already assumed a comparable universalist po-
sition. The essence and feats of the Jewish intellectual—or “the genius of
the Jew” (Roback 1929: 40)—have been an area of special (self-reflexive)
interest for the Science of Judaism, which applied itself with great zeal to
“the documenting of Jewish accomplishments in science and culture”
(Deak 1968: 27). This effort was also a response to a common perception:
“[M]any Jews . . . accepted the general proposition that there was some
‘racial’ quality in the Jewish character that emerged most distinctively in
the products of high culture: in the exercise of cleverness, of restless intelli-
gence, of a certain unmistakable inwardness. . . . Such self-appraisals are as
frequent in the literature of the Wilhelminian as in that of the Weimar
epoch” (Gay 1975: 25). This kind of study, which (like the examination of
Jewish racial characteristics by Horkheimer and Adorno) searches for “eth-
nic constants” (George Steiner), is inspired by “the fact, at once flattering
and problematic, that the Jewish element has been largely dominant in the
revolutions of thought and of sensibility experienced by Western man over
these last one hundred and twenty-five years” (Steiner 1976: 64).
The search often uses triumphalist language: “Can it be denied that the
leaders of present-day thought and even art are Jews?” (Roback 1929: 43).
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In its more populist manifestations, it takes the form of a gallery of Great
People (a list of geniuses that would be quite unthinkable for, say, Swedish,
Indian, Arab, Zulu, or Mexican cultures). Another standard argument is
that the Jew, with his traditional aptitude for study, excels as interpreter,
has a “mastery in the field of philology” (62) and is “the critic par excel-
lence” (440).114 Finally, these explorations often rely on the Hebraism-
Hellenism contrast for a fuller elucidation of Jewish qualities, noting, for
example that “the Greeks were always interested in the logical, matter-of-
fact view of things. They were keen on definitions, laid the foundation of
modern science and evolved a theory of knowledge. The Jews, on the other
hand, were racially inclined to trace the origin of their experience, to ana-
lyze, introspect and discover the manner in which they were affected by
them. . . . If there is any concept which characterizes the Jewish bent of
mind, it is that of Purpose. The Jew, from biblical times on, always asked
himself, ‘Why?’ ‘Whither?’ This was the purport of the whole prophetic
movement. The Greeks asked ‘What?’ ‘How?’ In this difference we have the
kernel of the two great world conceptions” (184–85).115 Such generalizations
sometimes reach a mis-Hellenic pitch.116 It has been prudently pointed out
that, “like notions of Jewish rootlessness and cleverness, the charge—or
boast—of presumed Jewish hunger for experiment in the arts and thirst for
innovation in literature is largely myth, fostered in part by Jews them-
selves” (Gay 1975: 26). With the Hebraization of culture, however, it has
become difficult to argue that an idea so ardently embraced by so many
sides is still a “myth.”
The Science of Judaism, like the other disciplines associated with My-
thology, saw the pollution of reason by myth as always imminent, and
fought to prevent it. The fear of the mythical—the irrational, the orgiastic,
the anarchic—haunted modern imagination in the street, the bedroom,
the classroom, and the factory. Intellectuals tried to contain and exorcise
the threat internalizing (Jung),117 etymologizing (Cassirer), poeticizing
(Yeats), or universalizing (Lévi-Strauss) myth. This narrative of the Dio-
nysian explosion regularly stood for the political claims expressed in pop-
ular culture. In works from Ernst Toller’s Masse-Mensch (1920) and
Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) to Elias Ca-
netti’s Masse und Macht (1960), it was the mass and the crowd (McClel-
land 1989) that were considered hostile to culture and prone to mythical
thinking, heedlessly open to its seductive allure.
The political element is obvious not only in Germanic ideology and Fas-
cist patriotism but also in the “Hellenic polytheism” of Louis Ménard
(1822–1901), the author of Prologue d’une révolution (1849), who found in
Greek concepts of order a more meaningful sense of law than in its biblical
enforcements; in the anarcho-syndicalist myth of the “general strike”
which Georges Sorel (1847–1922), the author of Contribution à l’étude pro-
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fane de la Bible (1889), proposed to counter traditional socialist utopia; or
in the political myth of cultural criticism of the Right which repudiated
rationalism and intellectualism in favor of instinct, “the neopagan turn
that pushed Christian themes into the background in favor of a mytholo-
gizing recourse to the archaic” (Habermas 1989: 440). Writers like Ludwig
Klages (1872–1956), Hermann Alexander Graf Keyserling (1880–1946),
and Leopold Ziegler (1881–1958) who rediscovered Johann Jakob Bacho-
fen (1815–87) and the anthropology of romantic conservatism, repudiated
reason in the name of instinct, and were absorbed by the aesthetics of
Stefan George, who extolled the holiness of the word in “The Poet in
Times of Chaos” (1921). The appeal of myth was great for new social
groups such as the ones in Austria which, unhappy with the restricted fran-
chise of parliamentary democracy, “raised claims to political participation:
the peasantry, the urban artisans, and the Slavic peoples. In the 1880’s
these groups formed mass parties to challenge the liberal hegemony”
(Schorske 1980: 5) and met with great success. The liberal establishment
came under serious attack. “The new anti-liberal mass movements—Czech
nationalism, Pan-Germanism, Christian Socialism, Social Democracy, and
Zionism—rose from below to challenge the trusteeship of the educated
middle class, to paralyze its political system, and to undermine its confi-
dence in the rational structure of history” (118).
In general, during the period of the simultaneous Hebraization of cul-
ture and demonization of the Hellenic, Greek myth represented the anar-
chy of the political—the disruption of the civic and the eruption of the
popular into the public sphere. The response of the various branches of the
Science of Judaism to the mythical impulse of industrial culture was to
dehistoricize it: Aby Warburg, who had investigated the interaction be-
tween art and patronage in the taste for the antique among fifteenth-cen-
tury bankers in Florence, looked for the universal laws of creativity
(Liebeschütz 1971); Buber related myth to religiosity, then to mysticism,
until he found in an area of Jewish Volk, the Hasidim, an alternative popu-
lar mythology;118 Freud turned public debates in the main square of Thebes
into a Viennese domestic dispute. The nineteenth-century historicism of
the discipline was systematically undone in the twentieth, when the He-
braic prevailed in the autonomous domain of culture, as a small part of “the
pervasive revolt against industrial society that unfolded among European
intellectuals and youth at the turn of the century. A central theme of this
revolt was its counterposition of Kultur and Gemeinschaft with Zivilisation
and Gesellschaft, the former concepts suggesting the sought-after natural,
face to face community that would truly meet man’s spiritual and creative
needs, the latter concepts defining the existing ‘society’—mechanized, al-
ienated and destructive of the essential vitality and fullness of human life”
(Breines 1970: 9–10).
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THE SIN OF ASSIMILATION
The Frankfurt Institut für Sozialforschung (established in 1923), more than
any other of the branches of the Science, saw myth as the primordial evil of
civilization, and made its destruction a primary task. The Dialectic of En-
lightenment, as anatomy of the mythical predicament of bourgeois society,
is an outstanding example of the Mythology research tradition and incor-
porates many of its dimensions, including the psychoanalytical, the anthro-
pological, the Marxist, and that of literary criticism. Like so many elements
of the Frankfurt program, interest in myth was indebted to Neo-Kantian-
ism. Influenced by recent Protestant analyses, Hermann Cohen in the
1880s found the messianic message emancipatory because the prophets
made the future possible by liberating history from myth. “He never made
a conscious break with his original intention to bring Judaism and Chris-
tianity as near together as possible; but with the advent of the new century
the emphasis changed. Cohen still recognised the possibility of under-
standing the doctrine of incarnation as a symbol for the power of the
human mind to legislate on good and evil; but the accent is now on a
critical discussion of its derivation from myth. The justification of Judaism
is now based on the thesis that no other creed had succeeded in liberat-
ing man radically from this primitive stage of belief. Christianity is by its
very nature based on the existence of one person; the mythological form of
thought is also characterized by personification” (Liebeschütz 1968: 24).119
In Das Wesen des Judentums Leo Baeck, Cohen’s student and friend,
adopts his teacher’s position that ethics in Judaism is not just an element,
as in every religion, but its very essence. “Myth is therefore categorically
excluded from the Jewish realm. Judaism, Baeck asserts, is the only religion
which has produced no mythology proper” (Altmann 1956: 199). Rosen-
zweig, who asserts the primacy of revelation in The Star of Redemption
(1921), also takes a similar approach when “he compares the mythical
world of paganism with the Biblical world of the Word, of dialogue, of
openness and love. Paganism presents God, world and man in their mute,
closed, unrelated and unrevealed aspects. It is the world of a mythical
Olympus, of a plastic cosmos, of the tragic hero, as Oswald Spengler had
depicted the Apollonian culture. . . . The world’s real drama unfolds only
once the isolation of God, world and man is broken and relationship en-
sues. Revelation breaks the spell, and makes the true history possible”
(206). Likewise, the Institute systematically portrayed mythology as the
opposite of history. Its members saw the temptations of archaic thought
lurking everywhere: in Nazism (Fromm), in Stravinsky (Adorno), in com-
modities (Benjamin), in identity (Horkheimer), in propaganda (Lowen-
thal).120 To them, the archaic was the static, repetitive, stifling, annihilat-
ing opponent of reason, and myth, its worldview, was barbarism.121 If Hegel
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had found a noble place for myth in his Bildung of the Spirit, they, who
belonged to the second generation that lost faith in cultivation, attacked its
heroes, Odysseus and Prometheus, for their totalitarian behavior.122 They
focused their criticism primarily on the crisis of culture123 and the decline
of taste. Their fastidious contempt for the philistinism of the middle class
and their revulsion toward popular art indicate that their understanding of
class was based on aesthetic terms: discrimination remained an acquired
distinction, and no egalitarian beliefs could do away with the privileges of
educated sensibility. The crisis of the aesthetic was nothing less than the
sickness of culture.124 “For them, the search for transcendence was essential
for an ideal social and political integration on the basis of a shared human-
ity. But for these socialists, conscious ‘alienation’ from the present was a
precondition for the ‘true consciousness’ on which a better future could be
built. Only by standing apart could men understand society in its entirety
and begin the work for change. Thus outsiderdom itself became a necessary
prerequisite for transcendence” (Mosse 1985: 60). The critique of the ple-
beian corruption, technolatry, and barbarism practiced by the Spengler-
ian125 Right was appropriated eventually for the purposes of the Western
Marxism—the “Marxism of the superstructure” (J. G. Merquior), of cul-
tural criticism—and combined with an admiration for the moral austerity
of radical Modernism.126 The result was an ethical aestheticism not very
different from that of Nietzsche and Heidegger127 (or even Ernst Jünger’s
political myth), with one significant difference: the unequivocal denuncia-
tion of the Hellenic.
The course of the School was in a way prefigured (as Auerbach would
say) in Richard Strauss’s turn to three-act bourgeois nostalgia (Der Rosen-
kavalier, 1911), which followed his two one-act “essays” on the Hebraic
(Salome, 1905) and the Hellenic (Elektra, 1909). In the wake of the appear-
ance of The Will to Power (1901) and Being and Time (1927), few feasible
tasks remained to a philosophy witnessing the “darkening of the world”:
wresting the social sciences from the Weberians, protecting Judaism from
critiques directed against Protestantism, and debunking myth were among
them. The Frankfurt thinkers also thought that the best way to refute bar-
barous reality was to dehistoricize it, to neutralize it culturally. Their
method was the textualization of philosophy and culture. “Textuality, with
Adorno as with some later theorists, thus becomes a rationale for political
inertia; praxis is a crude, blundering affair, which could never live up to the
exquisite many-sidedness of our theoretical insights. It is remarkable how
this Arnoldian doctrine is still alive and well today, occasionally in the most
‘radical’ of circles” (Eagleton 1990: 363). With the Frankfurt School, cri-
tique, having long ago abandoned its Enlightenment goal of public educa-
tion, proudly accepts its own Fall into the abyss of interpretation and the
omphaloscopic character of its historiography: “Philosophy, which once
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seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed. . . .
Having broken its pledge to be as one with reality or at the point of realiza-
tion, philosophy is obliged ruthlessly to criticize itself” (Adorno 1983: 3).
The task of modernity is defined as the exegetical rereading of the canon
after the dissolution of the religious tradition: ascetic contemplation, that
is, commentary: “Philosophy rests on the texts it criticizes. They are
brought to it by the tradition they embody, and it is in dealing with them
that the conduct of philosophy becomes commensurable with tradition.
This justifies the move from philosophy to exegesis, which exalts neither
the interpretation nor the symbol into an absolute but seeks the truth
where thinking secularizes the irretrievable archetype of sacred texts” (55).
The Frankfurt School made interpretation of tradition its only history
and negativity, the proper mode of interpretation, the impossible cleansing
of philosophy from the secular.128 “The primacy of culture entailed the
primacy of theory” (Mosse 1985: 60), and theory resigned itself to survey-
ing its predicament: sometime between the Dialectic and Minima Moralia,
it turned into melancholy science (Raulet 1979–80). “The union of free-
dom as reason and as self-realizing action was split asunder. The Frankfurt
School, following its initial instincts, could only choose reason, even in the
muted, negative form in which it might be found in the administered
nightmare of the twentieth century” (Jay 1973: 279–80). Thus critique, in
concentrating on the murmur of its canonic works in an effort to redeem
its tradition, purged itself from history and reified the locus of bourgeois
identity, the aesthetic.129
The attack on myth and the transcendence of politics is the double goal
of the textualization of history, of modernist literalism. “The sacred is at-
tainable only through the texts of history, but it is realized only when it
breaks free of the profane language in which it is rooted. It achieves a par-
tial sacredness on the renewed vision, but its authentic moment is found
only in the historically redeemed Zion that comes after the revolution,
after the Messianic mediation has made the sacred sensually real” (Fried-
man 1981: 219). Some thought that the redeeming power of art was the
path to the sacred, and proposed the aestheticization of politics;130 the ma-
jority tried to prevent history from returning to mythology and to make it
move forward toward its Messianic fulfillment (Bourgeois 1970). “Judaism,
the most extreme instance of antimodernity in the Western tradition, was
appropriated as the ground from which to resurrect the sacred in order to
undermine the profanity of bourgeois life” (Friedman 1981: 19). Looking
for an answer in a transmission of philosophy that denounces its Hellenic
identity (still accepted in the return to Greece by Lukács and Heidegger),
“the task of philosophy, of Critical Theory, in a profane age is to view the
world through the prisms of the Messianic redemption: to view the world
through the scraps of the divine that have been left in the world in the
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Text. Critical Theory, like the Midrash, becomes the profane hermeneutic
of the utterly sacred” (101). Thus the critique of myth was not only an
attack on the political but a preparation for the messianic.131 This exe-
getical approach is clear in Benjamin’s contribution to Mythology.
Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) was a theologian of civilization prophesying
the redemption of the sin of the sign. He lamented the “Fall” of the
“name” from the “name language,” the “language mind,” to the “human
mind” (Benjamin 1978a: 327) and the Fall of understanding into interpre-
tation. He bewailed the corruption of culture by the bourgeoisie. He called
his method “redemptive criticism,” as he sought, through interpretations
of messianic prefiguration, to save the work (and its Word) from wordly
consumption, and restore it to its authentic meaning (which equals its
name and being). He replaced the older notions of the man of taste and the
woman of cultivation with the role he enacted in all his writings, the per-
sona of the collector—the person who wants to possess his Bildung and,
like Warburg, searches for God in the details of the precious items he owns.
“For in one sense Benjamin’s life work can be seen as a kind of vast mu-
seum, a passionate collection, of all shapes and varieties of allegorical ob-
jects” (Jameson 1971: 68).132 In his theory, Cohen’s philosophy of universal
Judaism returns to its roots: “And thus the demand upon the philosophy of
the future can finally be put in these words: to create on the basis of the
Kantian system a concept of knowledge to which a concept of experience
corresponds, of which the knowledge is the theory. Such a philosophy in its
universal element would either itself be designated as theology or would be
subordinated to theology to the extent that it contains historically philo-
sophical elements” (Benjamin 1983–84a: 49). Here the Program-System of
philosophy-as-mythology is recuperated for theology.
Like his friends at the Institute, Benjamin studied the myth-Enlighten-
ment dialectic. He viewed Enlightenment as the liberating promise of
modernity and myth as the threat of the return of the archaic. In his early
work Benjamin “attributes a theological character to logos and truth. That
is precisely Cohen’s thinking: to liberate thought ‘from the entanglement
with myth’ from the perspective of monotheistic revelatory religion—or,
better yet, to make way for it. Above all, Benjamin’s early contraposition
of divine power and mythical violence is nourished by such a critique of
‘myth’ sub specie religion” (Menninghaus 1988: 300). His critique of
mythic consciousness, from which he sought to emancipate philosophy,
was based on an opposition between myth and truth. The seductive power
of demonic forces appeared to loom large over art and society. “In Ben-
jamin’s early writings, the concept of myth occupies the systematic posi-
tion of a radical, theological gesture of destruction. Myth comes into view
for him as a sphere of demonic ambiguity: convicted of fraud and illusion,
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myth disappears into nothingness in the presence of the authority of the
divine name. Although it is still unhistorically and abstractly worded, the
concept of myth in the early theological criticism is applied to objects of
‘bourgeois society’: as a critique of the Enlightenment and the aesthetic
autonomy of the beautiful (Goethe’s Elective Affinities); as a critique of the
modern legal state (‘Critique of Violence’); and as a critique of a com-
municative, conventional interpretation of language (‘On Language as
Such and on the Language of Man’). The characteristics of myth—ambigu-
ity, charm, compulsive repetition, nature’s power, mere life—are all mobi-
lized against a bourgeois society conscious of its secularization” (Lindner
1986: 37–38).
But as he moved from ethics to aesthetics, Benjamin substituted history
for truth: the approach became historical, its subject modern culture. Like
Auerbach, Benjamin discovered truth in the wisdom of the aggadah:
“Kafka’s work presents a sickness of tradition. Wisdom has sometimes
been defined as the epic side of truth. Such a definition stamps wisdom as
inherent in tradition; it is truth in its haggadic consistency. It is this consis-
tency of truth that has been lost” (Benjamin 1969a: 143). Once truth was
understood as the narrative of history, cultural interpretation and aesthetic
materialism served as the critique of the ideology of bourgeois culture.
In an effort to save art not from history but from its barbaric, archaic
uses by the middle class, Benjamin attacked the mythical as belief in prog-
ress, presence, and permanence. The great enemy was “the dominance of
mythical fate. Myth marks a debased human species, hopelessly deprived of
the good and just life for which it was determined—banished to a cursed
cycle of merely reproducing itself and surviving” (Habermas 1979: 39). In
his last major project, the Passagen-Werk, he described capitalism as “a
natural phenomenon with which a new dream-sleep came over Europe, and
in it, a reactivation of mythic powers” (quoted in Buck-Morss 1983: 215).
In his view, modernity is asleep under the spell of paganism. “In the Pas-
sagen-Werk, myth is the indicator for the ambiguous and contradictory
co-existence of the return of the archaic and economic technological up-
heaval, liquidation of experience (Erfahrung) and intensification of the so-
cial image-space, (anthropological) materialism and (failed) revolution”
(Lindner 1986: 39–40). Differentiating the Passagen-Werk from Louis Ara-
gon’s novel Le paysan de Paris (1926) which inspired it, Benjamin adopts
Freud’s analogy between myth and dream, and talks about the dream wait-
ing for its awakening: “Aragon persistently remains in the realm of dreams,
but we want here to find the constellation of waking. While an impression-
istic element lingers on in Aragon (‘mythology’) . . . what matters here is
the dissolution of ‘mythology’ into the space of history. Of course, that can
only happen through the awakening of a knowledge of the past that is not
yet conscious” (Benjamin 1983–84: 2–3). At the same time, he sought not
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a philosophy of history, like Adorno, but the revelation of the aesthetic as
a secular illumination—a belief related to his onomatopoetic theory of lan-
guage, which sees a necessary relationship between word and thing. Both as
archaic faith and as modern commodity, myth stands in the way of this
happening: it taints the immediacy, blurs the vision. Combining a strong
interest in the dehellenization of Christian dogma begun by the Lutheran
theologian Adolf von Harnack (1851–1930), especially in his History of
Dogma (1886-89), with a vehement opposition to the uses of myth by the
George school (Roberts 1982: 122–33), Benjamin tried to continue Nietz-
sche’s critique of modernity while rejecting the Greek model.
His understanding of myth becomes clearer when he laments its modern
political connection: the emancipation of art has not happened because of
industrial middle class politics. At this point Bildung is relinquished for
messianism, and Enlightenment for revelation: as Rosenzweig demanded,
(Benjamin’s notion of) Jewishness is smuggled in. Since the complemen-
tary projects of Bildung and Enlightenment have been hopelessly appropri-
ated by the middle class, all that can be done is to expect divine interven-
tion and compose the narrative of the Fall, the pre-history of the modern
predicament. As Benjamin wrote to Scholem in 1926, “meaningful political
goals are non-existent.” With the death of the public, he resigned himself
to the esoteric function of the intellectual: he continued the Idealist proj-
ect, practicing critique as the self-criticism of art addressed to an elite
group of intellectuals (like the one organized in the Frankfurt Institute). As
he wrote in “The Technique of the Critic in Thirteen Theses” around
1925, “the more important court of judgment” is not the public but the
colleagues of the critic. Thus the circle of hermeneutics closes with the
return of aesthetics to theology and of criticism to illumination.133 In his
late work, Benjamin seems to abandon the messianic and to adopt the
apocalyptic, a restitutive apocalyptic in history which he calls by another
Greek word, “apokatastasis.”134 The redemptive of his criticism and the
catastrophic of his theory of history are combined in a collector’s aesthetic
view of religion.135 It is “the retrieval of everything and everyone,” the abo-
lition of sin and damnation, the restoration of language and knowledge, the
belief that “all souls go to paradise.” In his last piece, the “Theses on the
Philosophy of History” (1940), we find “the impotent proclamation that
salvation is indeed at hand in spite of all the barriers presented to it by
actual conditions. . . . In the historico-philosophical theses, Benjamin is
about to leap out of historical materialism into the realm of political Mes-
sianism where nothing can be done at all. . . . The retranslation of material-
ism into theology cannot avoid the risk of losing both: the secularized con-
tent may dissolve while the theological idea evaporates” (Tiedemann
1983–84: 96). A materialist theology? a politics of salvation? an aesthetic of
redemption (Bersani 1990; Wolin 1982)? or what Brecht referred to as Ben-
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jamin’s “judaisms?” In any case, cultural criticism offers to serve God’s
plans for humanity once again.
The idea of critique as secular theology in a pagan world which has
earned the wrath of God was a constant motif in Benjamin’s writing. An
early example (which is also a precursor in many respects of the “Elements
of Anti-Semitism” in the Dialectic) is his “Critique of Violence” (1920–
21), which uses the Hebraic-Hellenic opposition (borrowed from the late
work of his teacher Cohen). This critique is based on the relation of vio-
lence to law and justice, and concerns the justification of its means. Exam-
ining current legal philosophy (positive and natural law), he discovers the
interest of law in a monopoly of violence that aims at preserving law itself:
violence that is not in the hands of the law threatens it by being outside it.
That is why modern law divests individuals of all violence. “All violence as
a means is either lawmaking or law-preserving” (Benjamin 1978: 287). In
any exercise of violence, the law protects and reaffirms itself. From this
follows that “all violence as a means, even in the most favorable case, is
implicated in the problematic nature of law itself” (287). Violence is “the
origin of law” (286). Conversely, law is inextricably implicated in violence.
“Among all the forms of violence permitted by both natural law and posi-
tive law there is not one that is free of the gravely problematic nature,
already indicated, of all legal violence” (293). Violence in lawmaking func-
tions as a means for establishing both law and power as law. “Lawmaking
is power making, and, to that extent, an immediate manifestation of vio-
lence.” It follows that power is “what is guaranteed by all lawmaking
violence” (295).
These are strong positions with an anarchist bent and a heavy debt to
Sorel’s Réflexions sur la violence (1907), itself a response to the work on
crime by Max Stirner (1806–56). Benjamin, however, reacts against this
syndicalist who took a positive attitude to the social function of myth as an
expression of mass will and contrasted it with utopia, the daydream of
intellectuals. After the critique, Benjamin asks whether there are any
“other kinds of violence than those envisaged by legal theory” (293) that
could contribute to the solution of human problems. Before proposing his
alternative, he collapses both kinds of violence into a new one: mythical
violence. This is identical to lawmaking violence and illuminates “fate,
which in all cases underlies legal violence” (295). He then proceeds, in
response to his question, to propose “divine end making” (295) and oppose
it to mythical lawmaking through a comparison of the concept and effects
of justice in the Niobe myth and in the Biblical story of Korah (294, 297).
What the modern world needs is the pure, immediate violence that would
halt the mythical rule—divine violence. “Mythical violence is bloody power
over mere life for its own sake, divine violence pure power over all life for
the sake of the living. The first demands sacrifice, the second accepts it”
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(297). He calls the former “executive” and the latter “sovereign” (300); one
is pernicious, the other benevolent. When he asks for the destruction of
legal violence, he seeks therefore the abolition not of the state but of myth-
ical forms of law. For Benjamin, the law of the modern state is by nature
violent and exercises mythical violence that looks like fate. Contrary to
God’s will, myth has bastardized pure divine violence with law. “Just as in
all spheres God opposes myth, mythical violence is confronted by the di-
vine. And the latter constitutes its antithesis in all respects” (297). There
should be no other law but the law of God. Only its violence is justified.
The law of the state speaks the language of myth. Only God’s violence is
totally justified. The violence of Greek thought, legal and mythical, violates
God’s will with its idolatry.136
From this perspective “Benjamin forms the concept of revolutionary vio-
lence according to this configuration: It is as if the act of interpretation,
which extracts the selective breach in the natural-historical continuum
from the past art work and makes this relevant for the present, is invested
with the insignia of praxis. This, then, is the ‘pure’ violence or ‘divine’ force
which strives toward ‘the breaking of the cycle maintained by mythical
forms of law’ [Benjamin 1978: 300]. Benjamin conceptualizes ‘pure’ vio-
lence within the framework of his theory of experience and therefore he
must divest it of the attributes of goal-oriented (purposive-rational, zweck-
rational ) action; revolutionary violence, like mythical violence, mani-
fests itself—it is ‘the highest manifestation of unalloyed violence by the
human being’ [300]. It follows logically that Benjamin should refer to
Sorel’s myth of a general strike and to an anarchistic praxis which is distin-
guished by its banning of the instrumental character of action from the
realm of political praxis and its negation of purposive rationality in favor of
a ‘politics of pure means’: ‘the violence (of such praxis) may be assessed no
more from its effects than from its goals, but only from the law of its
means’ [292]” (Habermas 1979: 55). Thus praxis becomes autonomous,
namely, aesthetic. The violence of aesthetic interpretation is the proper
revolutionary praxis. “As teachers in the humane studies, our sacred world
must remain the book. . . . An interminable making of interpretations is
the duty of the teacher; in this duty he is freer than most other citizens”
(Rieff 1972: 6). The connection between emancipation and interpretation
is preserved indissoluble.
Like so many of his contemporaries, Benjamin was fascinated by the
figure of Odysseus, which represented, always ambiguously, the pagan
power of myth over both magic and reason, namely, defiant cunning.
Speaking about the group of assistants/messengers who populate Kafka’s
stories, he observed: “Even the world of myth of which we think in this
context is incomparably younger than Kafka’s world, which has been prom-
ised redemption by the myth. But if we can be sure of one thing, it is this:
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Kafka did not succumb to its temptation. A latter-day Ulysses, he let the
Sirens go by ‘his gaze which was fixed on the distance, the Sirens disap-
peared as it were before his determination, and at the very moment when
he was closest to them he was no longer aware of them.’ Among Kafka’s
ancestors in the ancient world, the Jews and the Chinese, whom we shall
encounter later, this Greek one should not be forgotten. Ulysses, after all,
stands at the dividing line between myth and fairy tale. Reason and cun-
ning have inserted tricks into myths; their forces cease to be invincible”
(Benjamin 1969a: 117). Thus Kafka is portrayed as the true Ulysses, the one
who resists temptation. The Odysseus of the Dialectic, however, who is
depicted as “the first man of the modern State” (Deleuze and Guattari
1987: 355), is the hero who did not resist. Benjamin’s comment “becomes
fundamental to Adorno’s argument in the chapter on Odysseus in Dialectic
of Enlightenment” (Buck-Morss 1983: 225).137
Benjamin also pointed out the importance of cunning for reason. “In his
1935 exposé [on the Passagen-Werk], Benjamin wrote: ‘Every epoch . . .
carries its ending within it, which it unfolds—as Hegel already recog-
nized—with cunning.’ For Hegel, through cunning, Reason (conscious-
ness) works its way into history by means of the passions and ambitions of
unwitting historical subjects” (224). It is this cunning that Benjamin
hoped to enlist against reason itself in order to free it from the grip of
myth:138 “Told with ‘cunning,’ the Passagen-Werk would accomplish a dou-
ble task: it would dispel the mythic power of present being (Wesen) by
showing it to be composed of decaying objects with a history (Gewesen).
And it would dispel the myth of history as progress (or the modern as new)
by showing history and modernity in the child’s light as the archaic. Told
properly, this fairy tale would use enchantment to disenchant the world”
(225–26). The course of rationalization, as described by Weber, would be
reversed, criticism would redeem modernity and seek the apokatastasis of
divine law. “His pedagogy was a double gesture, both the demythification
of history and the re-enchantment of the world” (224). “Cunning intelli-
gence” (Vernant and Detienne 1978), the sin of deception and the vice of
manipulation, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, is employed in order
to reverse the Fall and re-enchant knowledge into Edenic identity. To this
end, Benjamin, like a rhapsode, spins “the Passagen myth,” a modern jour-
ney to Hades, with additional similarities to another Aragon epic, The Ad-
ventures of Telemachus (1922), which in turn rewrote Fénelon’s Les Aven-
tures de Télémaque (1699): “In ancient Greece one could show places where
one descended into the nether world. Our waking existence is likewise a
terrain in which places are concealed leading to the underworld, incon-
spicuous places where dreams flow to the surface. During the day we pass
them by, unsuspectingly, losing our way in their dark passages” (quoted in
Menninghaus 1988: 309). These places, these thresholds, are the arcades,
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the Passages. The “Grand Tour” (Burke 1966) of sacred places of antiquity
has been reduced to the Parisian prowler’s peregrinations in the burial
places of bourgeois memory (Macdonald 1988) in search of “fascination”
(Baudelaire).
There is another narrative that is being reoccupied here, though, the
journey to the epic underworld in the eleventh book of the Odyssey. Moder-
nity is drunk asleep like Elpenor, Odysseus’ companion who was killed at
the palace of the polypharmakos goddess Circe. Elpenor was the first soul
the king of Ithaca encountered when he went to Hades seeking advice
about his future from Tiresias—the seer who, according to the etymology
of his name, “interprets terata/signs,” and also appears as the theoros in
Apollinaire’s play (1918), The Waste Land (1922) and Pound’s Cantos, an-
other “modern Odyssey” (Forrest Read), which begins with Odysseus’
search for the underworld. From the character E. P. in Hugh Selwyn Mau-
berley (1920) to the speaker of the Cantos (Witemeyer 1969: 161–76), the
poet in Pound is Odysseus. Benjamin’s work too is a Passage. Like Pound
in Canto I (1917), which translates Andreas Divus’s Latin version of the
Nekuia, Benjamin uses the method of “cultural overlaying.” Like Odysseus,
he seeks the future, in his case not a nostos, a homecoming, but, as he says
at the end of the “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” “the strait gate
through which the Messiah might enter.” “This formulation, of the step
through a narrow gate, unequivocally satisfies the Passagen-Werk’s para-
digm of the transfiguring crossing of a threshold, the mythical rite of pas-
sage” (Menninghaus 1988: 309). Thus Benjamin plays both Odysseus and
Tiresias, hero and prophet.
For the Modernist writer, this rite is itself an ambivalent passage through
myth which seeks its destruction but is unwilling to forgo its power: “Ben-
jamin’s theory of myth seeks a blasting apart of myth but at the same time
does not want to relinquish the whole potential of its forms of experience”
(314). In his late work, which develops a counter-mythology of modernity,
“the motif of blasting apart myth becomes transfigured into the dialectic of
breaking apart and rescuing myth” (323). This is a characteristic example
of how myth, from the early Benjamin to the late Adorno, was used to make
Hellenism represent bourgeois society (in reversion of Marx’s critique) and
Hebraism stand for either purity (transcendence of the dialectic) or total
otherness (negative dialectic). Here is an equivocal attempt to purge cul-
ture of paganism which cannot help but both renounce and embrace the
cunning to which it owed its potency.
The entire problematic of culture—shared by the Frankfurt group and
their contemporaries—which was haunted by mythical echoes of violence
and seduction, was first articulated in the sociology of Georg Simmel
(1858–1918). In his progress from Kulturphilosophie to Lebensphilosophie,
Simmel saw life as creative becoming, as production of culture, and placed
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great emphasis on the cultivation of individuality. In his formulation, “cul-
ture is the road from a closed unity through an unfolded multiplicity to an
unfolded unity” (quoted in Weingartner 1960: 76). Cultivation was ex-
pected to heal the distinctions of experience and the divisions of the world.
This was the autonomous and pure world of feelings and verses created by
George which so fascinated Simmel. For Weber, who was the first to ob-
serve that ethical questions were reduced to matters of taste, the lesson
derived from George’s spirituality of form was that “in the modern era,
while having credentials as a form of aesthetic redemptory values, [culture]
never really delivers” (Whimster 1987: 277). Hence he opposed artistic
(and in general cultural) values. “Weber closes down one avenue, culture,
but opens up another, the public realm, however unpromising and unfor-
giving this realm is” (277). Simmel, however, using Modernism as his
model for understanding modernity, hoped that a spiritual aristocracy of
creators would help transcend the alienation and objectification studied in
the essay “The Tragedy of Culture” (1911). Over the years, as Simmel grew
pessimistic about the abilities of personality to develop, and admitted an
irreconcilable struggle between experience and process, life and form, it
was the generation of people like Bloch (who attended Simmel’s seminar)
that inherited his stark vision. “For the great question of whether culture
is ‘possible’ . . . turns primarily on whether it is possible to shape life itself,
if only in ways that, from a historical perspective, may be no more than
transitory” (Márkus 1983: 13).
Gyuri von Lukács, the student of Simmel and Weber who made this his
central concern, always asked: “[W]hat is the social possibility of culture?”
(Lukács 1970: 21) “Culture was the ‘single’ thought of Lukács’ life”
(Márkus 1983: 3). This thought stood for the unity and harmony of life that
would prevail in a post-capitalist world.139 From the time of On Spiritual
Poverty (1912), and Aesthetic Culture (1913) to Die Eigenart des Ästheti-
schen (1964, 2 vols.), the possibility of culture meant “the question of
whether it is possible to live a life free from alienation. But behind this ques-
tion lay his passionate diagnosis of the hostility to culture, the ‘crisis of
culture,’ that characterized modern bourgeois existence, and his own de-
termined rejection of it” (4). The product of culture “possesses real cul-
tural value only when it is valuable for itself. The moment cultural produc-
tions become commodities, when they are placed in relationships which
transform them into commodities, their autonomy—the possibility of cul-
ture—ceases” (Lukács 1970: 22).
From his observation that culture in the bourgeois world is impossible,
Lukács draws a Schillerian conclusion: authentic culture transcends aliena-
tion and makes life authentic. “For authenticity is nothing other than ac-
tively using one’s abilities to the full, shaping everything that happens to
one into a personal destiny that expresses one’s innermost nature” (Márkus
1983: 9). It is the aesthetic ideal of Bildung that affirms the dignity of life
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and explains what makes it “more-than-life” (Simmel). “[A]rt is, therefore,
the process of investing life with meaning and raising it into consciousness,
of transcending the chaos of life. It is a ‘judgment on life’ and gives ‘mas-
tery over things.’ The existence of art is proof that the alienation of ‘ordi-
nary’ life can be overcome” (11). The Theory of the Novel discovered the
historical possibility of authentic, integrated culture in the Greek polis. “As
nearly always in his work, the essential bias is one of subversive, radical
conservatism. He solicits the revolutionary future in the name of classic
humanistic ideals many of which belong to the leisured civilization and
generosities of the bourgeois past” (Steiner 1967: 345). According to his
aesthetic view of autonomy, “the question of whether culture is possible, of
whether it is possible to shape life, appears . . . to be an ethical problem, a
question of moral conduct—either active or passive behaviour, but in ei-
ther case behaviour based on free, individual self-determination or, more
generally, a question of the way in which the individual leads his life”
(Márkus 1983: 20–21).140 The generation of Lukács (Gluck 1986) and Hei-
degger inherited from Cohen’s Judaic “turn” the dilemma: ethics or reli-
gion? In the 1920s the program of Neo-Kantian philosophy was abandoned
and the Marburg School dissolved. At that time Heidegger “said it is the
true task of theology, which must be discovered once again, to seek the
word that is able to call one to faith and preserve one in faith” (Gadamer
1976: 198). Lukács had already written “Tactic and Ethic” (1919) and Ben-
jamin the essay on violence, both dealing with the nature of ethical norms.
Since they felt abandoned by God, they opted for an ethics which they
transformed into cultural suprapolitics. Having identified politics with cap-
italism and barbarism with the taste of the masses, they rejected modernity
altogether, save for the program of aesthetic autonomy, which became
their ethics. “These young philosophers were moved by eschatological
hopes of a new emissary of the transcendent God, and they saw the basis of
salvation in a socialist social order created by a brotherhood. For Lukács
the splendor of inner-worldly culture, particularly its esthetic side, meant
the Anti-Christ, the ‘Luciferian’ competition with God’s effectiveness. But
there was to be a full development of this realm, for the individual’s choice
between it and the transcendent must not be facilitated. The final struggle
between God and Lucifer is still to come and depends on the decision of
mankind. The ultimate goal is salvation from the world, not, as for George
and his circle, fulfillment in it” (Marianna Weber, quoted in Holzman
1985: 91).141 For Lukács, the total revolution would be a cultural one.
Hence the importance of artistic form142 for the formation of his social
theory.
By the end of the Weimar period the ideal of Bildung had lost all its peda-
gogical credibility and philosophical urgency—its market value as cultural
capital. The Dialectic of Enlightenment accounts for the failure of that in-
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vestment by blaming it on the capitalist system. “During the 1930s the
critical theorists had retained some trust in bourgeois culture’s potential
for reason which would be released by the pressure of the developing forces
of production. . . . [T]he stock of trust was depleted to such an extent at
the beginning of the 1940s that Horkheimer and Adorno felt that the
Marxist critique of ideology had definitely exhausted itself; they no longer
believed that they could fulfill the promises of a critical social theory with
the methods of the social sciences. Instead they attempted a radicalization
and totalization of their critique of ideology in order to enlighten the En-
lightenment about itself. . . . Horkheimer and Adorno therefore consider
the basis of the critique of ideology destroyed; and yet they want to hold on
to the basic premise of Enlightenment. So they take that which Enlighten-
ment did to myth and turn it back onto the process of Enlightenment
itself. Critique becomes total: it turns against reason as the foundation of
its own analysis” (Habermas 1982: 21–22). They also counter-propose the
negative dialectic of (guilt-ridden) autonomous art as the self-immolation
of the aesthetic tradition—the Hebraic atonement for the sin of Enlighten-
ment, the Fall into Hellenic knowledge. Emancipation is conceptualized as
expiation. “A valid theory could only be one which thinks against itself,
undoes its every act, achieves a frail evocation of that which its own discur-
sivity denies. Emancipatory thought is an enormous irony, an indispensa-
ble absurdity in which the concept is at once deployed and disowned, no
sooner posited than surmounted, illuminating truth only in the dim glare
of light by which it self-destructs” (Eagleton 1990: 347).
Nowhere can this theological project of aesthetic atonement be compre-
hended more clearly than in the vindictive theory of contemporary culture
outlined in the chapter of the Dialectic entitled “The Culture Industry:
Enlightenment as Mass Deception.” What is offered here as a critique of
global culture under capitalism is not only an outline of negative aesthetics
but also a theology of Art elaborated on the basis of the binary opposition
fall-redemption. According to their contemptuous description, the distin-
guishing features of contemporary culture are uniformity, standardization,
repetition, conformity, banality, and exhaustion: “the bread which the cul-
ture industry offers man is the stone of the stereotype” (Horkheimer and
Adorno 1972: 148). An anonymous, omnipresent market produces formu-
laic, generic art for the faceless masses, geared toward the sensational ef-
fect. All it amounts to is big business: entertainment agencies, company
directors, studio hierarchies, and panels of experts calculate and package
everything, trying to sell their products and outsell each other. The single
purpose is to make people buy and consume, to make a profit. The message
of the industry is a very alluring one in its egalitarian promiscuity: there is
nothing out of reach. “Everything can be obtained” (161). This is the age
of the mechanical mass reproduction of beauty: “only the copy appears”
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(143). People are treated like (and finally trapped in a manipulative cham-
ber of mirrors as) potential customers. The culture industry is an unscru-
pulous business which depends on “classifying, organizing, and labeling
consumers” (123), like any other enterprise of that kind and scale. It manu-
factures their needs and promises amusement goods but never really deliv-
ers because it “perpetually cheats its consumers of what it perpetually
promises” (139). It promises pleasure and fulfillment, gaining the trust and
consent of the aroused audience, without ever supplying full satisfaction.
There is one thing people do not realize: “Under monopoly all mass culture
is identical” (121). Instead, they duly submit their desires for the custom-
ary treatment, each time vainly anticipating better results.
In this era of universal publicity, art, entertainment, and advertising are
literally fused, contributing to a “depravation of culture” (143), a hierarchi-
cal society, and a justification of domination based on “the false identity of
the general and the particular” (121). Hence the pervasive feeling of help-
lessness and defenselessness of “a culture in the process of self-liquidation”
(142). In addition, the “myth of success” (134) has been cultivated through
the “idealization of individuality” (140), the praise for subjective indepen-
dence. By analogy to this society-individual dichotomy, culture has been
schizophrenically polarized between the entertainment industry and “its
counterpart, avant-garde art” (128), between bourgeois/autonomous/seri-
ous Art and its “shadow,” its “social bad conscience” (135), light art. Thus
division, separation, opposition, and mediocrity prevail.
Horkheimer and Adorno find every single manifestation of modern cul-
ture repulsive: radio, television, films, commercials, advertisements, jazz,
records, concert relays, reproductions, soap operas, producers, executives,
stars—all aspects and members of the realm they call the “pleasure indus-
try.” “Finally, in their analysis of mass culture, Horkheimer and Adorno
want to demonstrate that art, when fused with entertainment, is drained of
its innovative power and emptied of all its critical and utopian content.
The earlier critique had concentrated on the affirmative aspects of bour-
geois culture; it now turns into an impotent rage over the ironic justice of
an irreversible judgment which mass culture executes on art which itself
had always already been ideological” (Habermas 1982: 17). Pleasure, espe-
cially when expressed as sheer enjoyment, they disdain. The most disgrace-
ful and degrading feature of modern art, the authors argue—as others later
do about postmodernism (Baudrillard 1981, 1988)—is its exclusive ex-
change value: it is worth only what it can be exchanged for. Nothing is
recognized for its own value, no longer does any artwork seem to possess
any inherent merit. Art is not appreciated but exchanged; it has only a
social rating and a market price, like any other commodity, but no aesthetic
qualities. Like any other industrial product, it is simply marketable, ex-
changeable, dispensable, replaceable, and therefore utterly debased. “The
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work of art, by completely assimilating itself to need, deceitfully deprives
men of precisely that liberation from the principle of utility which it should
inaugurate” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972: 158). The authors acknowl-
edge that this development was unavoidable under the particular historical
circumstances: “Art as a separate sphere was always possible only in a bour-
geois society” (157). It won its independence at the cost of being seg-
mented and isolated from the rest of society and culture. Its contemporary
status is still determined by capitalist economy, and the complacency (if
not complicity) of even the greatest artworks with the exchange system of
commodities can hardly be disputed. “It is to its commodity character that
art owes its liberation in the first place; it was a liberation for the private
enjoyment of the bourgeois reading and theater, exhibition and concert
public that came into being in the 17th and 18th centuries. The continua-
tion of this same process, to which art owes its autonomy, also leads to the
liquidation of art” (Habermas 1979: 41). With its ability to resist appropri-
ation dramatically diminished, art today is almost happily participating in
the fetishization of itself.
This diagnosis is parallel to the authors’ critique of contemporary lan-
guage abuse. Their starting point is the same: “public opinion has reached
a state in which thought inevitably becomes a commodity, and language
the means of promoting that commodity” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972:
xi–xii). Publicity manipulates language to such a degree that it becomes
meaningless, and, in the wheels of propaganda machines like those of fas-
cist regimes, just empty. The reason for this dissolution of signification is
that the word has become a sign (164, 165) and, once separated from its
vital content, is perceived as conventional. “The absolute separation, which
makes the moving accidental and its relation to the object arbitrary, puts
an end to the superstitious fusion of word and thing” (164). Whereas be-
fore there was unity (even though only superstitious) between language
and the world which it was entrusted to represent and preserve, now this
unity has been questioned, and language is rationalized, while the world is
reduced to information. The name is detached from magic; it becomes a
means of manipulation and spreads ideology, that is, new myths. “The de-
mythologization of language, taken as an element of the whole process of
enlightenment, is a relapse into magic” (164). Thus the discovery of arbi-
trariness has led to more arbitrary domination.
It is especially interesting that this critique of modernity shares with the
Reformation the same fear and loathing for nominalism, which the authors
call “the prototype of bourgeois thinking” (60). Horkheimer and Adorno
are, like Benjamin, indebted to the refutation of the arbitrariness of the
sign in the essay “The Importance of Names” by Origen (185–254). They
find Enlightenment “a nominalist movement” (23) and in the Dialectic,
their protesting program of a negative interpretive emancipation (and
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therefore the first outline of Adorno’s literalist Aesthetic Theory), they
chronicle the abuse of signification by the Enlightenment. They show that
the original division in language and the dispersion of meaning took place
in Greek religion. In the superstitious world of mythology, the sign and the
thing, language and the world, were indissoluble, and the “permanence of
the signified” (17) was felt everywhere in magical rites and daily life. “In
Jewish religion, in which the idea of the patriarchate culminates in the
destruction of myth, the bond between name and being is still recognized
in the ban on pronouncing the name of God” (23). But with the “Olympian
chronique scandaleuse” (17), the elements started acquiring some indepen-
dence and the mythical, under the onslaught of doubt, paled into the fan-
tastic. With the manipulation of the sign by Odysseus, who names absence
(Udeis) and so pronounced himself god, the bond of identity dissolves.
“Because both the hero and Nobody are possible connotations of the name
Udeis, the former is able to break the anathema of the name” (60). What
followed was the “clean separation of science and poetry” (17). Science
turns the world into a sign which it tries to decipher. “As a system of signs,
language is required to resign itself to calculation in order to know nature,
and must discard the claim to be like her” (18). Greek Enlightenment ef-
fected this change and caused the break: the internal division between sig-
nifier and signified culminated in the friction between sign and thing, and
led to the estrangement between art and science. The original innocence
was lost and now there is no way of return. “The separation of sign and
image is irremediable” (18). Dissipation of sense, feeling, and experience is
the modern predicament, together with “a utopian yearning for identity
which must deny itself under pain of fetishism and idolatry” (Eagleton
1990: 347).
Adorno was later to declare: “All post-Auschwitz culture, including its
urgent critique, is garbage” (Adorno 1973b: 367). And yet, this garbage is
still indispensable to him because it may prevent another Auschwitz: “Cul-
ture keeps barbarism in check; it is the lesser of two evils” (Adorno 1984:
357). This lesser evil is all that is left to defend the integrity of thought. As
a result of the negative diagnosis Horkheimer and Adorno offer on moder-
nity, “emancipatory prognoses of necessity took on an unrealistic, utopian
hue. Unable to locate progressive emancipatory tendencies in the concrete
historical present, the Critical Theorists were constrained to identify ersatz
repositories of negation—above all, the aesthetic sphere” (Wolin 1990:
35). The dream of emancipation shrinks to this limited territory. For
Adorno, “art represents a form of ‘salvation’ vis-à-vis the ‘pressures of theo-
retical and practical rationalism’ that predominate in daily life. Moreover,
in Adorno’s aesthetics art becomes a vehicle of salvation in an even stronger
sense. It takes on a compelling utopian function as a prefiguration of recon-
ciled life” (37). This is the theological use of Auerbach’s recuperation of
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typology. “What recommends itself, then, is the idea that art may be the
only remaining medium of truth in an age of incomprehensible terror and
suffering” (Adorno 1984: 27).
The truth of this art, however, is necessarily a negative one: the expres-
sion of suffering under barbarism, combined with messianic anticipation.
“Almost always the theodicy of suffering has originated in the hope of sal-
vation” (Weber 1958: 273). In Critical Theory, the salvation promised by
art demands the pain of discipline—of the self-discipline of atoning theory:
“Suffering, not positivity, is the humane content of art” (Adorno 1984:
369). The Dialectic argues that this suffering may only be articulated dia-
lectically by going against norms, rules, and the dictates of tradition
through the askesis of style: “Style represents a promise in every work of art.
That which is expressed is subsumed through style into the dominant
forms of generality, into the language of music, painting, or words, in the
hope that it will be reconciled thus with the side of true generality”
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1972: 130). Therefore style, like Lukács’ culture,
is a promise of reconciliation and fulfillment: it confronts and challenges
tradition and orthodoxy, promising to create truth by revising the estab-
lished norms and to fulfill aesthetic needs with genuine artistic satisfac-
tion. It further promises the “reconciliation of the general and particular,
of the rule and the specific demands of the subject matter, the achieve-
ment of which alone gives essential, meaningful content to style” (130) and
its functions. It is an impossible promise but “only in this confrontation
with tradition of which style is the record can art express suffering” (130–
31)—only in what they call “the necessary failure of the passionate striving
for identity” (131). This moralistic view glorifies failure as true success,
reification as emancipation, neutralization as critique—in other words, the
rule of aesthetic autonomy as the supreme religion of modernity.143 “There
is something perversely self-defeating about this aesthetic, which takes its
cue from a notable contradiction of ‘autonomous’ culture—the fact that
art’s independence of social life permits it a critical force which that same
autonomy tends to cancel out. ‘Neutralisation,’ as Adorno comments, ‘is
the social price art pays for its autonomy’ [1984: 325]” (Eagleton 1990:
349). Authentic art negates itself because it is aware of its pending failure
and yet attempts the impossible: “the style of the great work of art has
always achieved self-negation” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972: 131).
Adorno found that this (high modernist) asceticism “has today become the
sign of advanced art” (Adorno 1978: 274). Thus style becomes the ethics of
autonomous art, confining suffering to the realm of self-righteous contem-
plation: “Terribilita should remain an aesthetic, not a political, capacity; it
rightly belonged to Beethoven and Michelangelo, in their work, not to the
condottieri, or Hitler, in theirs” (Bloom 1984: 23). The postmodern style of
contemplation is finally reduced to the morality of minimalist commonal-
ity, the ethics of lifestyle (Swenson 1990).
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The poetic vocabulary employed by Horkheimer and Adorno in these
pages is revealing: words like longing, suffering, promise, expectation, rec-
onciliation, fulfillment, and failure are derived from their commentary on
Judaism and invoke its theodicy. Their theory of art is modeled on this
depiction of the Jewish spirit, their aesthetics patterned on their funda-
mentals of Biblical monotheism. In both their artistic and philosophical
theories the muted referent is the unnamable God. His religion should be
understood as the only viable alternative to the false, pernicious project
of (Greek) Enlightenment. Not that Adorno was advocating a religious art
of “beauty and holiness” (Martin 1990; Brown 1990): “The exalted unity of
art and religion is, and always was, highly problematic in itself. Actually it
is largely a romantic projection into the past of the desire for organic, non-
alienated relations between men, for doing away with the universal division
of labor. Probably no such unity ever existed in periods where we might
speak of art in the proper sense of freedom of human expression as distinct
from the symbols of ritual which are works of art only accidentally”
(Adorno 1945: 677). In a differentiated, fragmented world, art and religion
have a responsibility to each other to remain separate: art is not the faith
but the promise of the faith—not the face but the prefiguration of its
apokalypsis. “The theological legacy of art consists in the kind of secular-
ized revelation which is the ideal and the limit of every work. To equate art
entirely with revelation would amount to an unreflective projection of art’s
inevitable fetish character on to the theory of art. On the other hand, to
eradicate all traces of revelation in art would be to reduce art to a copying
machine” (Adorno 1984: 155). The true alternative to the Greek “mono-
ethic” (Lukács) art is a monotheistic art of self-negation which “can keep
faith to its true affinity with religion, the relationship with truth, only by an
almost ascetic abstinence from any religious claim or any touching upon
religious subject matter. Religious art today is nothing but blasphemy”
(Adorno 1945: 679).
Despite the Hebraic triumph of the aesthetic, the political, which the
Frankfurt School identified with barbarism (specifically, the return of the
archaic), did not disappear. Furthermore, because the political, like myth,
was often left in the hands of conservatives and reactionaries, it made its
presence felt in catastrophic ways. As a consequence, there are those who,
in the course of postmodern reconsiderations of the Enlightenment in the
West, have denounced assimilation, the whole problematic of the “Jewish
question,” because they have felt that Hellenic investments in it did not
pay off. A separatist kind of criticism, for example, attacks the New Left,
“sometimes taken as a ‘Jewish’ movement” (Ozick 1970: 269) and called
“The New Joodeyism” (Rieff 1972: 38), for its emphasis on manners and
lifestyle. Instead it proposes “covenant and conduct” (Ozick 1970: 272) as
the proper rules for life. The universalist choice of Enlightenment, “to be
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Mankind rather than Jewish” (282), was wrong, and its secularization false.
“The secular Jew is a figment; when a Jew becomes a secular person he is
no longer a Jew. This is especially true for makers of literature” (276). Au-
thors recognized this when they discovered that there are “no Jewish liter-
ary giants in the Diaspora” (274). It was the promise of a secular religion,
art, that lured people to choose humanity and its disciplines over their own
tradition. The novel is a case in point. “The novel at its nineteenth-century
pinnacle was a Judaized novel” (272). Things have changed in a secular
direction: “Now it is the novel that has been aestheticized, poeticized, and
thereby paganized” (271). Its true character has been lost. “At bottom it is
not the old novel as ‘form’ that is being rejected, but the novel as a Jewish
force” (272). This attitude, like Mimesis, sees the fate of the novel as a
Hebraic-Hellenic struggle between faith and idolatry. The choice is be-
tween “God or Apollo, Judaism or Art” (Gitenstein 1983: 200). The bitter
realization that “the Jewish fiction writer who covets Apollo as god denies
Yahweh and His law” (199) dictates a change toward a religious under-
standing of literature. As Auerbach suggested, the good author is an agga-
dist (Ozick 1970: 279, 280).
There is, however, a great difference between the modernist and the
postmodernist position: the contemporary author resents the canon Auer-
bach admired because she feels she cannot ever enter its pantheon. The
postmodern artist who distrusts art, “though tantalized by the excitement
and vitality of secular creativity, recognizes its danger, and fears (even as
she lusts after) its magic” (Gitenstein 1983: 199). She earnestly tries to
become famous but remains minor. Now she feels betrayed by the eman-
cipatory covenant of culture: “Though I had yearned to be famous in the
religion of Art, to become so to speak a saint of Art, I remained obscure”
(Ozick 1970: 267) and did not enter the Christian heaven (of universally
canonic scriptures). Now she finds that “the religion of Art . . . is the reli-
gion of the Gentile nations” (266), a beguiling mythology. In a dramatic
change of mind, she rejects the “portrait of the Jew as Luftmensch, en-
nobled by otherness, universalized through wandering, gifted in his home-
lessness by exceptional sight and judgment, made free by unbelonging”
(265). The covenant is denounced, assimilation ridiculed. “Diaspora-flat-
tery is our pustule, culture-envy our infection. Not only do we flatter Gen-
tiles, we crave the flattery of Gentiles” (277). She associates Modernism
with sacraments, and in its place advocates a “liturgical” Jewish writing,
different from that of “aesthetic paganism.” “It was not only an injunction
that Moses uttered when he said we would be a people attentive to holi-
ness, it was a description and a destiny” (276). Liturgical writing, described
here in ways reminiscent of Mimesis, will first appear in fiction. “[T]he
liturgical novel will not be didactic or prescriptive; on the contrary, it will
be Aggadic, utterly freed to invention, discourse, parable, experiment, en-
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lightenment, profundity, humanity” (280). In a return to the dilemmas of
Moses Mendelssohn and his generation, it is suggested that, if “we define
ourselves as a religious community” (278), Jews should appropriate, rather
than assimilate, and return to their lost, authentic heritage, Yiddish, by
treating English the way they treated German. Jews are asked to repent for
the sin of emancipation and restore to their art its moral character.
The issue of assimilation was by definition (like all questions of emanci-
pation in modernity after the Battle of the Books) one of Hellenization.
Those who were challenged to integrate through modernization were faced
with the dilemma of aesthetic paganism: “We can do what the German
Jews did, and what Isaac D’Israeli did—we can give ourselves over alto-
gether to Gentile culture and be lost to history, becoming a vestige-nation
without a literature; or we can do what we have never before dared to do in
a Diaspora language: make it our own, our own necessary instrument, un-
derstanding ourselves in it while being understood by everyone who cares
to listen or read. If we make out of English a New Yiddish, then we can
fashion a Yavneh” (282), a Jerusalem Displaced.144 Although the aesthetic
has been Hebraicized, it seems that it still is what it always has been—
inalienably Western.145 According to the tribalist view, the only place of
true consolation and integration remains the traditional community.
“[L]ike the Buber-Rosenzweig group in Germany, the alienated American
Jewish intellectuals will, I imagine, return to the integrally alienated, the
highly individual Judaism of our literature, and of the remaining Jewish
communities which have retained their wholeness” (Halpern 1946: 17).
The larger problem is as old as the social disenfranchisement of the early
German Romantics: “How to find the community: that, you recognize, is
the dilemma of the Jewish intellectual of our day—but not only of the
Jewish intellectual! And in this fact that you think you may have discovered
a way out. That way is through the community of all the disinherited—the
‘alienated,’ those who see the world ‘as disenchanted’” (15).146 This time,
though, the advice is very different from Schiller’s and the proposed solu-
tion opposite to Heine’s, warning that “you are letting yourself be beguiled
by a theory which would endow the condition of ‘alienation’ with signifi-
cant psychological compensations exclusively available to you, as a Jew, but
denied to him as a Gentile” (15). The answer to the dilemmas of emancipa-
tion is a typically postmodern separatism that defiantly goes the way of its
difference, pride, and communal tradition.147
This decision, inspired by the perceived failure of Enlightenment and
assimilation, is accompanied by a deep feeling of disgust and rage of mis-
Hellenism. It confesses “a revulsion against the values—very plainly I mean
the beliefs—of the surrounding culture itself: a revulsion against Greek and
pagan modes, whether in their Christian or post-Christian vessels, whether
in their purely literary vessels, or whether in their vessels of Kulturge-
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schichte. It is a revulsion—I want to state it even more plainly—against
what is called, strangely, Western Civilization” (Ozick 1970: 265–66).
Christianity, too, becomes a target of contempt: “I am no advocate of some
earlier credal organization. In particular, I have not the slightest affection
for the dead church civilization of the West. I am a Jew. No Jew in his right
mind can long for some variant of that civilization. Its one enduring quality
is its transgressive energy against the Jew of culture” (Rieff 1972: 27). There
are declarations of religious war that go beyond “the aesthetic warfare be-
tween the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament” (Bloom 1984: 13), a
perennial problem for Protestant criticism, and that also express hatred: “I
am an enemy of the New Testament. My enmity is lifelong and intensifies
as I study its text more closely” (4). Beyond the revulsion, the contempt,
and the hatred, the open war against Christianity (which has not been met
with any protests) is the final assault against the source of all evil, including
the gospel of love—pagan orgy and intelligence.148
Such attacks on the Hellenic ideal are part of the intellectual-function
that has been aptly called the “Jew of culture,” and express its constant
cultural defensive struggle with and for modernity: “For the sake of law and
order, justice and reverence inseparable from their god-terms, we mere
teachers, Jews of culture, influential and eternally powerless, have no
choice except to think defensively: how to keep ourselves from being over-
whelmed by that complex of orgy and routine which constitutes modern-
ization and its totalitarian character type using the language of trust
against authority—without which trust cannot exist” (Rieff 1972: 50). For
the “Jew of culture,” modernity is (under) a constant threat: “The possibil-
ity of a permanent barbarism lies before us” (65), he warns again and again.
Such apprehension and despair sometimes lead to demands for strict mea-
sures that limit civil rights: “In the absence of a supreme interdictory
figure, another Moses, a defense by Jews of culture against our democratic
orgiasts may be reordered, their preposterous position-taking constrained,
from the outside in—by a revival of severe codes of law” (70). There is need
for a new order. For example, “consider eliminating the prison system en-
tirely; instead, substitute an order of physical punishment. . . . The supervi-
sion of such punishments would again become the right and duty of a
would-be ruling class” (72). The task of the intellectual, who today is a “Jew
of culture,” is to prepare such a class, the interpretive despotism: “You and
I, fellow teachers, are the real police, whether we like it or not. No culture
can survive without police of our sort—priests, teachers, whoever acts as a
responsible draftsman of the ceaselessly redrawn hermeneutic circle,
within which is the essential safety, from the danger of living outside it”
(43). This exclusive circle cannot be allowed to operate democratically.
The advice is simple and direct: “Rehabilitate authority” (72) or “revive the
constitution of authority” (73). It is time for culture to rule with all the
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brute force which has been denied to it (or until now hypocritically de-
nounced by it). Its real enemy is the Dionysian orgiast, the Greek “satyr,
who opposes the Jew of culture” (81) and represents contemporary anar-
chy. Under the rule of culture, he must be disciplined. The democratiza-
tion of Bildung in the industrial era has produced the disruptive politics of
mass protest. To save law and virtue, the whole egalitarian project of En-
lightenment must be denounced.
The primary target of social criticism and political radicalism, which are
presented here as barbarism, is the current intellectual hegemony: “Make
no mistake: the figure under siege in our culture is not Johnny Carson, but
Lionel Trilling, superior teacher and leading American Jew of culture” (80).
Trilling (1905–75) was among the few Modernists interested in Bildung,
essentially arguing that “literature is concerned with the self.” Placing great
emphasis on personal style and manners, the disciplines of civility, he made
selfhood the highest aesthetic preference. This choice must be seen in the
context of his decision to explore how the modern Jew might define him-
self.149 For intellectuals of the 1940s, from Adorno to Daniel Bell, from
Horkheimer to Mann, and from Auerbach to Sartre that question was one
of paramount importance, often taking the form of comparisons between
the “estranged Gentile” and the “alienated Jew.” The assumption common
to most discussions was the familiar plight of the culture and intelligence
elite suffering the privilege and purposelessness of autonomy: “The young
Jew is left helpless, and aware. He is aware of a distance both from the
Jewish culture from which he came and the Gentile culture into which he
cannot or will not enter. He is helpless because he cannot find his roots in
either. Yet out of this tension of understanding and inhibition has been
bred a new kind of Jew, the Jew of alienation, a Jew who consciously accepts
this situation and utilizes his alienation to see, as if with a double set of
glasses, each blending their perspective into one, the nature of the tragedy
of our time” (Bell 1946: 15). Thus for some resistance to assimilation was
the ethic of emancipation. They turned the theoros’s distant view from
above into the prophet’s higher moral ground: “The assumption of aliena-
tion is a positive value, fostering a critical sense out of a role of detachment;
it is, if you will, the assumption of the role of prophet, the one who through
an ethical conscience indicts the baseness of the world. . . . Alienation does
not mean deracination. It means the acceptance of the Jewish tradition—
its compulsion to community—and the use of its ethical precepts as a
prism to refract the codes and conduct of the world. As long as moral cor-
ruption exists, alienation is the only possible response” (19). Following the
precepts of the aesthetic morality and politics first outlined by Schiller and
the Tübingen seminary circle, the status of “otherhood” (Benjamin Nel-
son) is no longer a social predicament but valuable cultural capital accumu-
lated by the true Jews of modernity, the (Protestant) priests of culture. Like
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any other member of the cultural hegemony, the alienated Jewish intellec-
tual “can live only in permanent tension and as a permanent critic” (19).
Jewishness and critique, both aesthetic absolutizations of the Reformation
exercise of interpretation, continue to function as the conscience of the
Fall of emancipation into idolatry.
Trilling combined the two notions with a nostalgic return not to the
German ideal of Bildung but to its British equivalent from the age of Em-
pire. “ ‘Culture’ early became associated in Trilling’s thinking with the so-
cial ideal of the gentleman. He took over his conception of the gentleman
mainly from nineteenth-century English literature, which became his pro-
fessional specialty. That ideal of the self is illuminated by Maurice
Samuel’s polemical book The Gentleman and the Jew (1950), which tries to
demonstrate the incompatibility of the social types named in its title.
Samuel sets up a schema in which the gentleman, actually the English
gentleman, is moved by a passion for battle and personal honor. He is
pagan, competitive, egotistic. The Jew, on the other hand, is presented by
Samuel as peaceable, cooperative, and loving” (Krupnick 1986: 27). Unable
to trust the heritage and the support of the Jewish community for its intel-
lectual, Trilling wanted the prestige of the gentleman’s image for the Jew.
It was in the early 1950s that “he first sharply withdrew from politics. In
those years he evolved the conception of an ‘opposing self’ that existed not
so much to oppose specific social arrangements as to oppose ‘the culture’
in some general sense and to oppose death and lesser evils of the human
condition” (167). After The Liberal Imagination (1950), which grew out of
his notion of the “literary imagination” in the 1940s, he saw the self and
culture in conflict, and believed that only art had the power to “liberate the
individual from the tyranny of his culture” and allow him to achieve a
conscious, distinct, independent identity.150 Thus the intellectual self be-
came the basis of an “adversary culture,” of the aesthetic suprapolitics
advocated by Hölderlin, Lukács, and Adorno.
Trilling’s faith in art, however, was only the swan song of the assimila-
tionist ideal, which was soon succeeded by separatist calls for ethnic auton-
omy. During the 1970s, when these calls were systematized into a coherent
position, conservative intellectuals like Norman Podhoretz, Jerry Falwell,
Irving Kristol, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Alan Bloom, William Bennett, John Sil-
ber, Roland Posner, William F. Buckley (to limit ourselves to the United
States), and other “Jews of culture” reclaimed public culture for a funda-
mentalist version of the Hebraic ideology. During the same period, notions
and principles of the sacred made a comeback in the humanities, staging
the return of scriptural concerns and methods. Both sides, traditional hu-
manism and the professed anti-humanism of scholarship, shared the same
faith in higher education: “Because the university must be the temple of
the intellect, uniquely unchangeable in that respect, it is a sacred institu-
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tion, the last in our culture” (Rieff 1972: 7). Conservatives and decon-
structionists, moralists and formalists, all reached a remarkable consensus
on the place and mission of the education elite: “For us, in our priestly
roles, everything there is is there to be interpreted; outside the temple, we
are not priests” (13). In this convergence of opinion, the Hebraization of
culture finally prevails in higher education and research. “Folding back
upon itself, criticism has therefore refused to see its affiliations with the
political world it serves, perhaps unwittingly, perhaps not. Once an intel-
lectual, the modern critic has become a cleric in the worst sense of the
word” (Said 1983: 292).151 With the explicit return of the sacred in the
disciplines of interpretation, the reoccupation of critique by theology
launched in the Dialectic appears to have succeeded. “What one discerns
today is religion as the result of exhaustion, consolation, disappointment:
its forms in both the theory and practice of criticism are varieties of un-
thinkability, undecidability, and paradox together with a remarkable con-
sistency of appeals to magic, divine ordinance, or sacred texts” (291). This
exhaustion and resignation marks the end of the interpretive religious wars.
Both the separatist and the assimilationist positions, both the humanist
and the anti-humanist attitudes find in Hebraism the postmodern univer-
sal that asserts the moral superiority of contemplation, the cultural ethics
of atonement. To the extent that they believe this, they are happy to accept
for themselves, figurae of the Jew, the situation described by Arnold Zweig
in 1933: “The Jews are proletarians. They are proletarians, despite their
luxury, their ten-room apartments, their university education, and their
intellectual professions” (quoted in Deak 1968: 26). Proletarians of the
public sphere and the political arena, intellectuals are content with their
priestly function in a society that has benevolently agreed to respect their
lack of purpose in exchange for their renunciation of interest.152 As Paul de
Man, a typical Hebraic thinker, had ample opportunity to find out, the
situation was one of perfect accommodation: so far as the military, politi-
cal, economic, and bureaucratic establishment was concerned, theorists
were welcome to atone for their autonomy with their opposition so far as
this remained a cultural and interpretive one, namely, an aesthetic posi-
tion. But the proud isolation of autonomy seemed to make them uncom-
fortable. They worried that they had not managed to formulate in Western
language the message of their own singularity. “Until now all we have at-
tempted is an apologetics limited, without great difficulty, to bringing the
truths of the Torah into line with the West’s noble models. The Torah
demands something more” (Levinas 1989b: 286). What a modern Torah
like Mimesis and the Dialectic demand, according to their literalist, and
therefore fundamentalist readers, is more than just emancipation or appro-
priation. “In the singularity of Israel a peak is attained that justifies the very
perenniality of Judaism. . . . But this is a singularity that the long history
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from which we are emerging has left at the level of sentiment or faith. It
needs to be made explicit to thought. It cannot here and now furnish rules
for education. It still needs to be translated into that Greek language
which, thanks to assimilation, we have learnt in the West. We are faced
with the great task of articulating in Greek those principles of which
Greece had no knowledge. The singularity of the Jews awaits its philoso-
phy” (287).
This dictates the need for the ultimate project of Mythology, which has
been called “de-Hellenization”: the total elimination of the Greek element
from Western thought, an effort pioneered by Adorno and Horkheimer.
This is the message of the aphorism: “It is time not for first philosophy but
last philosophy” (Adorno 1983: 40). When they proposed Judaism as the
project of atonement and return to the kingdom of God, their message to
their sinful age was simple: repeat, repent, return. But it might have no
urgency or potency without a terrifying enemy, a satanic ghost conjured up
as the incarnation of evil. Accordingly, a sinister, frightful model of Greek
thought was constructed to play this role and represent thirty wretched
centuries of Western civilization, from Odysseus to Hitler.
It is frightfully alarming, however, to realize that, had Horkheimer and
Adorno not built this monstrous Hellenic idol and sacrificed contemporary
culture to it, had they not invented a mythology of their own, their invoca-
tion of the Hebraic God might simply not have been possible at all. It is
equally alarming to notice that, in their iconomachic virulence, postmod-
ern plans for de-Hellenization also construct Greek idols on which the ab-
sence of justice and freedom are blamed in order to preserve the legitimacy
and status of contemplative ethics. In sharp contrast, the socio-political
realities in Bucharest, Bombay, Beirut, Buenos Aires, or Birmingham, Ala-
bama, remind us that demonology cannot restore the validity of aesthetic
faith. “Theory cannot prolong the moment its critique depended on. A
practice indefinitely delayed is no longer the forum for appeals against self-
satisfied speculation; it is mostly the pretext used by executive authorities
to choke, as vain, whatever critical thoughts the practical change would
require” (Adorno 1973b: 3). When the moment of self-referential culture,
the rule of autonomy, passes, critique languishes in the mirrors of logology,
theory fades into ersatz sacrament: “What is the city over the mountains
/Cracks and reforms and bursts in the violet air / Falling towers / Jerusalem
Athens . . . / Unreal” (Eliot). Beyond just the privileges of interpretation,
the very promise of emancipation is questioned and the quest for indepen-
dent governance begins again: What can be the auto- of autonomy if not
the demos of democracy? The regime in Ithaca, rather than the nostos of
Odysseus, is at issue here.
Chapter Three
WRITING THE LAW
Indeed the Holy Scripture is the lock on the portals
of salvation,
But paganism is, sadly, the only key that fits it.
—Ludwig Feuerbach
THE SPIRIT AND THE LETTER
The figures of Abraham and Odysseus as symbols of modernity’s supreme
right (interpretation) and responsibility (transcendence) became quite
common in nineteenth-century discussions of the critical task. They repre-
sented two contrasting views of critique (of adventure and trial), one cen-
trifugal and the other centripetal. Thus when Emmanuel Levinas (b.
1905), at the beginning of the period of his Talmudic writings,1 proposed
the Patriarch and the King as alternative models of thought,2 he was se-
curely relying on their elaborate portraits devised by Kierkegaard and by
Horkheimer and Adorno, respectively. Fear and Trembling defined the pure
interiority of understanding achieved by the transcendence of the social
moment, while the Dialectic of Enlightenment inspected the ferociously
and ruthlessly independent bourgeois consciousness. Levinas combined
the two models in an opposition that represented the dilemma of reflec-
tion—return or separation: “To the myth of Ulysses returning to Ithaca we
can oppose the story of Abraham leaving his fatherland forever for an un-
known land and forbidding his servant to lead even his son to the point of
departure” (Levinas 1968: 37).
Levinas believes that Odysseus’ adventure is circular; his career, which is
but a return home, represents the central concern of Greek and most west-
ern thought, from Parmenides to Heidegger: the search for self, truth, and
Being as the algos of nostos. Philosophy has long aspired to the totality of
homeliness, the ideal of at-homeness (Heimatlichkeit) in one’s entire exis-
tence, and has found its model in the Greek objective (self)representation.
“Philosophy is being at home with self, just like the homeliness of the
Greek; it is man’s being at home in his mind, at home with himself” (Hegel
1955: 152). Being-at-home-with-oneself means to be the ground and origin
of oneself, to arise from out of oneself and be in possession of one’s life.
Independent existence has its own self-justifying value: this is the lesson
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modern man should learn from antiquity. “When man began to be at home
with himself, he turned to the Greeks to find enjoyment in it. Let us leave
the Latin and the Roman to the church and to jurisprudence. Higher, freer
philosophical science, as also the beauty of our untrammelled art, the taste
for, and love of the same, we know to have taken their root in Greek life and
to have created therefrom their spirit. If we were to have an aspiration, it
would be for such a land and such conditions” (150). Home is where dwell-
ing takes place. According to Heidegger, dwelling is “the basic character of
Being in keeping with which mortals exist” (Heidegger 1971c: 160). His
Introduction to Metaphysics (1953) suggests, in talking about the Pre-
Socratics, that Logos held man rooted and at home when einai and noein
(Parmenides) were still one. Now, however, man finds himself in a “not-at-
home” situation, “unhomely” in the world, a stranger (Kristeva 1990). In
this search for dwelling, symbolized by the travel back to Ithaca, Levinas
detects the incurable nostalgia for the same. “Philosophy’s itinerary re-
mains that of Ulysses, whose adventure in the world was only a return to his
native island—a complacency in the Same, an unrecognition of the other”
(Levinas 1987a: 91).
Abraham, on the other hand, responding to God’s command, does not
return but leaves his homeland behind for an unknown place. His destina-
tion is not self-realization and self-knowledge but separation from one’s
own, following a command that comes from an “Other.” Thought is based
on separation, not on Heidegger’s “calling into nearness”3 or on identity.
“Separation opens up between terms that are absolute and yet in relation,
that absolve themselves from the relation they maintain, that do not abdi-
cate in it in favor of a totality this relation would sketch out” (Levinas 1969:
220). Relation presupposes separation. “Relation is possible only as a func-
tion of a separation proceeding from the impossibility of totalization” (Lib-
ertson 1982: 311). Hegel, who yearned for autochthonous dwelling, saw
Abraham as the personification of the unhappy consciousness: by leaving
home and abandoning his culture, he chooses foreignness and becomes a
wanderer. In the Phenomenology of the Spirit (1807), this move is presented
as severance and homelessness. Levinas changes this perspective by making
separation, now an ethical category, primary: “Subjective existence derives
its features from separation. . . . Separation is the very act of individuation”
(Levinas 1969: 299) because it tears existence apart from the personal. “In-
dividuation is an uprooting rather than a rooting within being or within
manifestation. But this uprooting is no more an entry into communion
than an entry into dispersion” (Libertson 1982: 316). Separation as discon-
tinuity is anterior to subjectivity, and therefore to relation too: it is thought
as well as (its) communication. “Every basic term which describes a rapport
or relation, in Levinas’ philosophy, describes the production of separation
by the alteration of being” (317). Alteration, the arrival of alterity, sepa-
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rates and individuates. Ultimately, as the example of Abraham shows, sepa-
ration is the distance from Deus absconditus, the experience of that “mo-
ment when God withdraws from the world and veils His face” (Levinas
1979: 218). It is that “distant,” “absent,” “hidden God” to whom Levinas
always refers.4
In his examination of the Akedah, Levinas foregrounds God’s interven-
tion in Abraham’s affairs and the demand for obedience. The source of
ultimate meaning is the eruption of the “Other” into one’s life. The Other
opposes the self by the infinity of his transcendence; he commands respect
and demands justice (Mouw 1990). The Other is God who commands
Abraham out of his being-at-home. Adopting Kierkegaard’s ethical impera-
tive from the discussion of Isaac’s sacrifice, Levinas argues that serving the
Other is more important because it means obeying a command—being
called to task, to one’s responsibility (which is different from Heidegger’s
“historical calling,” the “call to care”). What is important for the unmedi-
ated encounter with the divine is not the leap of faith but the uncondi-
tional surrender to the call.
Starting with Time and the Other (1947)—if not with his very first book,
the dissertation The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology (1930),
as Derrida (1978: 84) has suggested—Levinas tried to break with what he
called the Parmenidean philosophy of Being, “the exercise of the same”
which culminated in Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927), by exploring al-
terity. Thought which seeks to ground itself in its own dwelling has lost
contact with the divine: “Philosophy is atheism, or rather unreligion, nega-
tion of a God that reveals himself and puts truths into us. This is the lesson
of Socrates’s teaching” (Levinas 1987: 49), he suggests, and elsewhere he
calls philosophy the “temptation of temptations.” Presenting ontology—a
term explicitly denounced by Heidegger after 1935—as “a philosophy of
immanence and of autonomy, or atheism” (Levinas 1968: 35), he turns his
attention to the centrality and irreducibility of the Other. Being is alterity.
Against “ontological imperialism,” which reduces ethics to knowledge, he
“affirms the metaphysical priority of ethics over ontology” (McCollester
1970: 345). Levinas finds the revolt of Kierkegaard against the metaphysics
of the Hegelian system valid but not well founded: the real resistance to the
totalitarianism of philosophy does not lie in the self but in the face of the
Other—in “the epiphany of the absolutely other” (Levinas 1968: 41) and
the “absolute of the presence of the Other” (46). Being is sought in the
infinity of alterity rather than the totality of identity.
Following Rosenzweig’s belief that the reign of “anthropos theoretikos”
is over, Levinas concludes: “Already of itself ethics is an ‘optics’” (Levinas
1969: 29). This position, which is contrasted to “panoramic existence”
(Wyschogrod 1974: 294) from Plato to Heidegger, not only revises Sartre’s
notion of the “look” but offers an alternative to Hellenic theoria. According
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to Derrida’s expansive reading, Levinas’s work is a critique of the “imperial-
ism of theoria” (Derrida 1978a: 84–85) and the “Greco-Platonic tradition”
(91) of light, glance, and presence. Levinas takes as a model for his “meta-
physics of the face” (92) Moses’ encounter at Sinai. “The face of God
which commands while hiding itself is at once more and less a face than all
faces” (108). Moving in such a direction, “Levinas already aims for the
face-to-face, the encounter with the face. ‘Face to face without intermedi-
ary’ and without ‘communion’” (90).5 It is the face that calls and com-
mands. “The face ‘signifies’ beyond, neither as an index nor as a symbol,
but precisely and irreducibly as a face that summons me. It signifies to-God
(à-Dieu), not as a sign, but as the questioning of myself, as if I were being
summoned or called, that is to say, awakened or cited as myself. In this
summons, the question harkens back to its primordial, underived meaning”
(Levinas 1983: 112). The alterity of the face is semeion, arche, and ousia—
condition and possibility and fulfillment of subjectivity. This type of en-
counter seeks to restore and respect the original difference of separation.
Levinas prepares for a meeting with the “unforeseeably-other,” the “infi-
nitely-other” (91), that dispenses with Christian proximity—with Jesus as
intermediary and the rite of communion as mediation. “Face to face with
the other within a glance and a speech which both maintain distance and
interrupt all totalities, this being-together as separation precedes or ex-
ceeds society, collectivity, community. Levinas calls it religion” (Derrida
1978a: 95).6 The new foundation of ethics (Gerber 1967: 185) is the Si-
naitic “re-ligio” of the private encounter with divine infinity. Levinas seeks
in alterity total appearance, full apparition. “The other is not signaled by
his face, he is this face” (100). He also seeks “the original unity of glance
and speech, eyes and mouth, that speaks” and “precedes, in its significa-
tion, the dispersion of senses and organs of sensibility” (100). Thinking of
the encounter as an epiphany, he “conceives the face in terms of the ‘re-
semblance’ of man and God” (102). The “epiphany of visage,” of the other,
opens the self to the domain of the divine. The face is the moment of faith.
As Levinas concedes: “The Other resembles God.” And elsewhere: “Dis-
course is discourse with God. . . . Metaphysics is the essence of this lan-
guage with God” (quoted in Derrida 1978a: 108). In Levinas’s religion,
“God is the other par excellence” (Wyschogrod 1974: 171)—the supreme
source of meaning and strength. “Always behind its signs and its works,
always within its secret interior, and forever discreet, interrupting all histor-
ical totalities through its freedom of speech, the face is not ‘of this world.’
It is the origin of the world” (Derrida 1978a: 103).
For Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), the most receptive response to the
command is listening. “Mortals speak insofar as they listen. They heed the
bidding call of the stillness of the dif-ference even when they do not know
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that call. Their listening draws from the command of the dif-ference what
it brings out as sounding word. This speaking that listens and accepts is
responding. Nevertheless by receiving what it says from the command of
the dif-ference, mortal speech has already, in its own way, followed the call”
(1971d: 209).7 The command of the call is to accept. As exemplified in the
commentary on Hölderlin, Heidegger’s method involves attentive and re-
spectful listening, and the passive preservation of Being: “To preserve the
work is simply to listen to it, in all passivity, knowing that it is uniquely and
absolutely true. . . . It is not a case of a freedom grasping another freedom
that, like it, attempts to clear a way to the truth: that would be interpreting
and critiquing, and there simply can be no question of interpreting Being;
all that can be done is to receive it and preserve it” (de Man 1983a: 253).
Listen, receive, accept, preserve: these are the commandments of the work
(which is by definition the work of art), and they dictate the disciplinary
practice of reading.
Reacting to Heidegger’s quietist hermeneutics, Levinas proclaims that
western philosophy is a philosophy of the response, of the answer, while in
Biblical thought what matters is the question and the search of the ques-
tion.8 “There is a question and yet no doubt; there is a question, but no
desire for an answer; there is a question, and nothing can be said, but just
this nothing, to say. This is a query, a probe that surpasses the very possibil-
ity of questions” (Blanchot 1986: 9). Abraham does not respond as much as
he is overtaken by the command: he dutifully receives the Other. “It is not
at all a situation where one poses the question; it is the question that seizes
you: what occurs is, you are put into question. All these situations probably
appear differently in the Greek style and in the style which is inscribed very
profoundly in the Biblical tradition. My concern throughout is precisely to
translate this non-Hellenism of the Bible into Hellenic terms and not to
repeat the Biblical formulae in their obvious meaning, isolated from con-
text, which context, at the level of such a text, is the entire Bible. Nothing
can be done: philosophy speaks Greek” (Levinas 1982: 137). Suddenly, the
situation of the question changes into the question of translation from one
style to another—translation from the Biblical tradition of question and
separation to the Greek philosophy of response and return, or from alterity
to identity. There is a question and yet it has to be translated. What neces-
sitates this move, Levinas argues, is that philosophy, “the science of the
Greeks” (Husserl), has always spoken Greek. He does not explain why one
should speak philosophy: its priority for (not only western) thought is never
justified, just accepted (like a call) a priori. The possibility of a reverse
translation, from the Greek to the Biblical, is not entertained either. It is as
if, to use Levinas’s terms, Biblical tradition, the very thought of the ques-
tion, had been seized, put into question, by the eruption of the “other,”
220 CHAPTER THREE
Greek philosophy, and had to obey its command. It appears that the ques-
tion of the question is the Greek character of thought, or at least of the
language of existence.
Trying to listen receptively to the same command, Heidegger argued
that to ask the question (which, for him, was the question of Being) is not
to step outside the limits of philosophy but rather to repeat its originary
Greek move. Seeking to restore the question of Being to its inaugural Greek
authenticity, he insisted that the very question “what is x?” is the Greek
mode of thought—that Greek is the condition and horizon of philosophi-
cal inquiry. “If we so stubbornly insist on thinking Greek thought in Greek
fashion it is by no means because we intend to sketch a historical portrait
of Greek antiquity, as one of the past great ages of man, which would be in
many respects more accurate. . . . Rather, our sole aim is to reach what
wants to come to language in such a conversation, provided it come of its
own accord. And this is that Same which fatefully concerns the Greeks and
ourselves, albeit in different ways. It is that which brings the dawn of think-
ing into the fate of things Western, into the land of evening. Only as a
result of this fatefulness [Geschick] do the Greeks become Greeks in the
historic [geschichtlich] sense” (Heidegger 1984: 25). It is this reexamina-
tion of the Greek dawn of philosophy that Levinas criticizes as return (to
philosophy’s homeland). Equally concerned about the destiny of western
thought, he opposes to its “land of evening” the land that Abraham sought.
Still, to the extent that he has to translate the experience of separation into
the language of identity, he is condemned to repeat its illusionary return.
This is the crucial objection raised by Derrida, who finds that “Levinas’s
metaphysics presupposes what it seeks to put in question in such a way that
it remains haunted by it” (Bernasconi 1987: 127). Like Adorno, who had to
diet on the garbage of post-Auschwitz culture, Levinas can address God
only in the atheistic language of philosophy. Faith may have been emanci-
pated from the church but not from the spell of Greek idols.
The first philosopher to take an uncompromisingly and unreservedly hos-
tile position against Hellenism from a Hebraic viewpoint was Lev Shestov
(1866–1938) in Athens and Jerusalem (completed in 1937), where he ar-
gued that between the two, no reconciliation or peaceful coexistence is
possible. The failures of “the greatest representatives of the human spirit
. . . for almost two thousand years” (Shestov 1966: 47) have shown that
Jerusalem and Athens, “religion and natural philosophy” (48), are incom-
patible. At the beginning of his “Foreword,” Shestov challenges the tradi-
tional conjunctive assumption: “ ‘Athens and Jerusalem,’ ‘religious philos-
ophy’—these expressions are practically identical; they have almost the
same meaning. One is as mysterious as the other, and they irritate modern
thought to the same degree by the inner contradiction they contain.
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Would it not be more proper to pose the dilemma as: Athens or Jerusa-
lem, religion or philosophy?” (47) In his earlier work (e.g., 1932: 234–35),
Shestov had accepted that the ancient philosophers are eternal and indis-
pensable. Here he insists that an absolute choice must be made between
faith and reason, revelation and rationalism, Biblical and speculative
thought, religious and secular philosophy.
Shestov’s critique is directed against western metaphysics—what he
called, before Levinas, Derrida, and Lyotard9 the “Parmenidean tradition.”
He criticizes collectively, and most of the time synchronically, all philoso-
phy, and finds it corrupt and seductive from its very (Hellenic) beginning:
“Plato and Aristotle, bewitched by Socrates, and, after them, modern phi-
losophy—Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, as well as Kant—seek, with all the
passion of which men are capable, universal and necessary truths—the only
thing, according to them, which is worthy of being called ‘knowledge’”
(Shestov 1966: 51). Thought since Parmenides remains in the chains of
Necessity—of reality, fact, reason, science, truth: “Just as in Hegel, philoso-
phy, in the course of its millennial history, remains one” (271). Christianity
is not excluded from this rule of incessant repetition: “Now it appears that
the Christian also cannot do without Socrates” (246), which is understand-
able since “Christian thought in its beginning already admitted two ‘Old
Testaments’—the Bible and Greek philosophy” (271)—a trend that con-
tinued with scholastic thought and modern philosophy.
From Parmenides’ revolutionary claim that being is the same as thought,
two parallel projects began. The first was metaphysics as a science search-
ing for ultimate truth, which encouraged blind trust on the constraining
truths of knowledge. “Metaphysics must be a parere (obedience), just like
the positive sciences. Parmenides, Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, ‘con-
strained by the truth itself,’ do not choose and do not decide. Someone has
chosen, someone has decided, someone has commanded, without them.
And this is what is called the truth. . . . All the ‘reasons’—theoretical and
practical, human and superhuman—have always told us, each in particular
and all in general, the same thing throughout the millennial development
of philosophical thought: one must obey, one must submit” (151–52).
Knowledge has only encouraged submission. “The Greeks, indeed, placed
obedience above everything else” (285). The second project was that of an
independent discipline of ethics. “In the world ruled by ‘Necessity’ the fate
of man and the only goal of every reasonable being consist in the perfor-
mance of duty: autonomous ethics crowns the autonomous laws of being”
(59). Since the time of the Greeks, Necessity remains sovereign and hu-
mankind has made no progress toward true liberation.
If in Shestov’s story Parmenides is the first man, Socrates (as in Nietz-
sche’s story) is the great villain.10 He was the one to formulate the two
self-defeating plans of philosophy. “To Socrates belongs the merit of hav-
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ing created what was later called ‘autonomous ethics.’ But it was also
Socrates who laid the foundations of scientific knowledge” (158). He was
the first real sinner, responsible for the fall of thought into knowledge. “In
the eyes of all, publicly, Socrates had to repeat the act which, according to
the ancient myth that no one can attest, Adam had committed” (171).
From Aristotle to Hegel, philosophers have followed his path. “All this con-
stitutes the heritage of Socrates. Since Socrates the truth, for men, has
been confounded with universal and necessary judgements” (167).
In contrast, Shestov is attracted to the figure of the first Patriarch: “Abra-
ham does not ask reason, he refuses to admit the legitimacy of the preten-
sions of knowledge” (319). For Shestov too, the “knight of faith” (Kier-
kegaard) was the model of the thinker. In two long sections on Fear and
Trembling, Repetition, and The Concept of Dread, Shestov examines Kier-
kegaard’s view. “Kierkegaard felt Socrates’ problem, which is the basic
problem not only of ethics but of all philosophy, no less deeply than Nietz-
sche. And, like Nietzsche, he strained all his powers to overcome Socrates’
enchantment. It was for this reason alone that he turned to the Bible”
(239). In Abraham he found an imposing alternative and realized that a
choice had to be made. His special problem, however, was that, despite his
preference for the Patriarch, he retained a certain admiration for the phi-
losopher. Kierkegaard could not see Socrates as a fallen man but only as
“man as he was before tasting the fruit of the tree of knowledge” (240).
Despite his severe criticism of Hegel, he could not free himself from the
requirements of the dialectic. He proposed a major reorientation by return-
ing “to faith the position that the Bible had conferred upon it” (332). He
never made the “leap of faith” himself, however, because “he ‘understood’
in Abraham only what recalled to him Socrates” (242) and his ethics. He
pointed a way but was unable to follow it; the spell of antiquity and its
knowledge were too strong. “Kierkegaard could never overcome the anxiety
that he felt before Greek wisdom” (248). Shestov offers his own position in
one of the many short sections comprising the last chapter (XIX) of his
book, entitled “Abraham and Socrates.” For him, the two men represent
the basic types of thinker, the believer and the scientist, respectively. Their
views and attitudes are opposite and incompatible. “And if philosophy
wishes to attain the promised land . . . , it must adopt the method of Abra-
ham and not that of Socrates and teach men at all events to go forward
without calculating, without seeing anything beforehand, without ever
knowing where they are going” (397). Shestov is unwilling to allow for con-
cessions like those made by Kierkegaard. Mankind, he insists, must accept
“the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob, and not the God
of the philosophers” (67). There can be no middle ground.
Shestov’s book is a frontal polemic against Greek philosophy: “The
Greeks await salvation from their wisdom founded on knowledge, but they
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are going to their ruin, for salvation comes from faith, from nothing but
faith” (320–21). His goal is to expose “the indestructible bond between
knowledge, as philosophy understands it, and the horrors of human exis-
tence” (66). This is a cardinal idea later described by Levinas as the totali-
tarianism unleashed by Greek thought against what is noblest and purest in
man. The hope of transcendence, however, is not lost for Shestov, who sees
dialectics only as the latest manifestation of the time-old Greek terror.11
“We must, before everything else, reject the basic categories of Greek
thought, tear out from our being all the postulates of our ‘natural knowl-
edge’ and our ‘natural morality’” (288). He goes back to Tertullian, who is
commonly considered the first to articulate this dilemma, and reiterates
the question: “quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis?” (286) An intermediary
position is not feasible, he presses, “for what is foolishness for Athens is
wisdom for Jerusalem and what is truth for Jerusalem is for Athens a lie”
(287). One must select, dedicate himself to, and live with, one or the other.
Shestov, like Kierkegaard, contrasts knowledge, the original sin and lie of
speculative philosophy, with faith. “What is important for us is that the
faith of Scripture has absolutely nothing in common with faith as the
Greeks understood it and as we now understand it” (323). Far from being
another feeling of belief, “the faith of the Bible determines and forms being
and thus abolishes knowledge with its ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ ” (323).
His critique is not directed against philosophy but only its Greek ancestry:
the opposition he establishes is not between philosophy and faith but
rather Greek and Judeo-Christian philosophy. Shestov does not want phi-
losophy abolished or overcome (as did Kierkegaard) but re-directed, re-
oriented toward God because what it really aspires to overcome is rational-
ism, not its own self. Tertullian, Peter Damian, Luther, and Pascal have
already shown this path.
As the only alternative to the practices of rationalism, Biblical revela-
tion12 “is founded on nothing, and is never justified” (274).13 It is supported
only by faith. “Reason wishes to understand” (318). This is the search for
the single principle, the ultimate cause. “But ‘faith’—again, naturally, the
faith of the Bible—concerns itself neither with understanding nor with
proofs” (318). With their enslavement to evidence, “the ‘first principles’ of
the Greeks choked the essential truth of the biblical ‘revelation.’ Not only
is not faith a lower form of knowledge, but faith abrogates knowledge”
(321). There is a great difference between the eternal truths of reason and
the created truth of the Bible (370): “It is in this that the essential opposi-
tion between the ‘truth’ of the Greeks and the ‘revelation’ of the Bible
consists. For the Greeks the fruits of the tree of knowledge were the source
of philosophy for all time, and by this very fact they brought men freedom.
For the Bible, on the contrary, they were the beginning of enslavement and
signified the fall of man” (325). This difference raises inevitably the ques-
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tion of Biblical understanding: Is there a language available for the appro-
priate approach to God’s message? “Is a man educated by the Greeks capa-
ble of preserving that freedom which is the condition of the right under-
standing of what the Bible says?” (278) Obviously not, answers Shestov,
since the two categories correspond to totally different modes of compre-
hension. But if there is an absolute choice between the “metaphysics of
knowledge” and “biblical epistemology” (277), then the hermeneutic apo-
ria arises: “How shall we succeed in reading and understanding Scripture
not according to the teaching of the great Greek masters but as they who
have transmitted to us, by means of the Book of Books, that which they
called the word of God wished and demanded of their readers?” (278) The
answer has already been given: by absolute faith that does not inquire and
does not question. Belief in God is by nature unconditional: “Faith does
not examine, it does not look around” (332). Shestov warns: “Human wis-
dom is foolishness before God, and the wisest of men . . . is the greatest of
sinners. Whatsoever is not of faith is sin” (70). Sin is the Hellenic view—
rationalism, knowledge, science, culture. The contradiction (with which
Auerbach’s approach to the Bible is also fraught) is that even the uncondi-
tional trust in the word of God, even Abraham’s unexamined faith, need to
be discussed in terms of (Hellenic) understanding.
The important lesson which Derrida derived from the failures of Shestov
and Levinas is this: if the language of response is inescapable even for the
thought of the question, then the only viable (non)alternative to the phi-
losophy of return is the rhetoric (and celebration) of repetition—an intrin-
sic critique of the search for identity exposing its inability to recover the
same (origin). In other words, the repetition of the Greeks demanded by
modernity should be done in a way that shows the impossibility of a return
to Greece. The problem with this practice of endless repetition, this delib-
erate confusion of the search (and its tongues) is that it can quickly become
even more predictable than the destination of the return. The spectacular
success of “derrida” (as sign and signature) testifies to that: by the early
1980s it was almost impossible to say anything about “derrida” (at least in
English) that was not predictable and banal.14 At the same time, it became
equally inevitable, at least in discussions of art and literature, that some-
thing would be said about Jacques Derrida.15 Banality and predictability
were the hallmarks of the reception of his work by everyone (including
himself). The wishful impotence of the practice, however, should not en-
tirely subsume the larger project of recasting the Other in the infinity of an
immanent otherness.
Jacques Derrida (b. 1930), like Heidegger and Levinas, is interested in the
“Greek limits of philosophy” (Clark 1987). In “Violence and Metaphysics:
An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas” (1964), written on the
occasion of Levinas’s latest book, Difficile liberté: Essais sur le Judaïsme
WRI TING THE LAW 225
(1963), Derrida addresses himself to the Greekness of philosophy, the dis-
tinctly and exclusively Greek character of (western) thought. “The entirety
of philosophy is conceived on the basis of its Greek source. As is well
known, this amounts neither to an occidentalism, nor to a historicism. It is
simply that the founding concepts of philosophy are primarily Greek, and
it would not be possible to philosophize, or to speak philosophically, out-
side this medium” (Derrida 1978: 81). We still think within the security of
Greek knowledge because our very language is Greek. “The knowledge and
security of which we are speaking are therefore not in the world: rather,
they are the possibility of our language and the nexus of our world” (82).
We are all Greeks, Derrida argues, to the extent that we think (and we
cannot help thinking) Being and identity, totality and metaphysics.16
Derrida views all Western tradition in unperturbed synchronicity as the
monstrous trajectory of Greek thought. From Parmenides to Heidegger,
almost at a moment of total presence and direct continuity, the whole
enterprise appears to him, as it does to Shestov and Levinas, one and the
same—that of speaking (in) Greek. The theorist of the different perceives
no difference and admits no differentiation among periods, cultures, socie-
ties, or languages: in his eyes, all spaces belong to one and the same site, the
Site of the Same. They map the era of metaphysics, which imposes notions
such as the self, transcendence, presence, plenitude, speech, light, identity,
and Being. According to this spectacular tautology, the era of “the Greek
domination of the Same and the One” (83) is one and the same. From the
ancient to the modern “Greeks named Husserl and Heidegger” (83), the
Same has been happening and the One has been occurring again and again.
Derrida’s favorite symbol of this oneness—borrowed from the Aryan
solar myth of Nazi ideology (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1990: 309), and
therefore, like the Dialectic of Enlightenment, associating Greece with that
ideology—is the Sun, rising and reigning above the Site of the Same (which
is of course the same site, a commonplace). He calls its discourse “photol-
ogy,” its social actuality “heliopolitics,” and its thought “heliocentric meta-
physics.” With Heidegger’s “bringing to light” (or even Rosenzweig’s
“opening up to the light”) apparently in mind, he claims that “the entire
history of our philosophy is a photology, the name given to a history of, or
treatise on, light” (Derrida 1978c: 27)—the light of Being. The Sun is the
source of “the light that comes to us from Greece” (Levinas) which makes
seeing, presence, clarity and identity possible. The light of the Sun gives us
the presence of Being, which Greek reason promises to define and serve; at
the same time, it provides for the power of identity, for the sameness of the
site. With respect to this tradition, the modern philosophies of phenome-
nology and ontology are no exception. “Through them, the entire philo-
sophical tradition, in its meaning and at bottom, would make common
cause with oppression and the totalitarianism of the same. The ancient
clandestine friendship between light and power, the ancient complicity be-
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tween theoretical objectivity and technico-political possession” (Derrida
1978: 91). Derrida totalizes the history of thought and reduces it to one
and the same movement—what Benjamin called immergleich (the ever-
the-same)—only to warn against totality and identity. What difference
does it make, then, if the Sun will again shine on the site of Being? Or is
there an alternative in sight for those who have already seen the light?
Derrida supports Levinas’s critique of the Greek tradition of philosophy.
He praises his questioning of “Western philosophy’s very decision, since
Plato, to consider itself as a science, as theory” (118) and his “attempt to
free the other from the light of Being” (96). He proceeds, however, to de-
construct Levinas’s “natural atheism” (103) and show that, to the extent
that it privileges speech, the living voice, it has not liberated itself from
metaphysics. For although Levinas “places sound above light” (99) and
effects “the transcendence of hearing in relation to seeing” (100), he be-
lieves that “only living speech is expression” (101). For Levinas, language
is preeminently speech. Derrida shows that this assumption keeps him cap-
tive to Platonic ideas about writing, and is therefore inconsistent with an
effort to define the difference of Judaism. “Moreover,” he asks, “how could
Hebraism belittle the letter, in praise of which Levinas writes so well?”
(102). Derrida perceives in the work of Levinas an “anxious movement
within the difference between the Socratic and the Hebraic, the poverty
and the wealth of the letter, the pneumatic and the grammatical” (73). He
applauds the anxiety but criticizes the hesitation and the final preference
for speech, arguing that the anxiety should instead be celebrated and the
tension kept alive. “The difference between Derrida and Levinas is the
breach between speech and writing, a writing which is itself fissured by
spatial and temporal difference” (Wyschogrod 1989: 191). Although they
both denounce logocentrism, they disagree over the character of Judaism.
For both, that character has to be established with reference to the Greek-
ness of philosophy. They are aware of this inherent limit: “How can the Jew
be true to his Jewishness? But what is the essence of Jewishness to which
the Jew is to be true? The very question is Greek” (Llewelyn 1988: 282).
Levinas feels that only Biblical infinity can transcend the limits of Greek
language. For Derrida, on the other hand, (Hebraic) alterity is an intrinsic
condition and differential quality of (Greek) identity. He does not believe
in the possibility of a prophetic speech: “In effect, such a language would
be purified of all rhetoric, which is what Levinas explicitly desires” (Derrida
1978a: 147). Instead he shows that rhetoric is the violence within the met-
aphysics of language.
Despite appearances of resolution, Derrida suggests, everything is not at
peace with itself because, far from being just the foundation of metaphys-
ics, “light is the element of violence” (117). There is a war going on in light
between violence and metaphysics, a “war within discourse” (117).17 “The
limit between violence and nonviolence is perhaps not between speech and
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writing but within each of them” (102). Levinas fails to notice this limit
and recognize the struggle within metaphysics. “The philosopher (man)
must speak and write within this war of light, a war in which he always
already knows himself to be engaged; a war which is inescapable, except by
denying discourse, that is, by risking the worst violence” (117). Where
there is light, there is discourse, and where there is discourse, there is vio-
lence. “The distinction between discourse and violence always will be an
inaccessible horizon. Nonviolence would be the telos, and not the es-
sence of discourse” (116). The logic of philosophy leads from light to dis-
course to metaphysics to violence. Philosophy is thus trapped between the
“inescapable” and the “inaccessible,” within the prison-house of its Greek
language.
Derrida defines violence in terms that he also attributes to metaphysics—
seeing, light, sameness, totality, discourse, time, history. Violence is all we
know, or rather all that we do not know about (do not recognize in) meta-
physics: it is philosophy’s claim to truth and identity, to oneness and same-
ness. The language and the light are Greek (philosophy); with them comes
metaphysics and the violence of its discourse, and the site turns into a
battleground, since war “is the very emergence of speech and of appearing”
(129)—of speaking a language and of appearing on a site, of a voice and a
presence.18 “One never escapes the economy of war” (148). We are thus
condemned to the violent economy of language and light, which is the
economy of the fall into the site of the same and into the contradictory
tautology of identity. But if we accept the Greek premise, the premise of
Greek as knowledge or the curse of knowledge, we have to oppose some-
thing else to it and oppose it: the Greek is always posited in opposition.
Derrida chooses to contrast metaphysics not with something different, as
other thinkers of modernity before him did, but with difference itself.
The title of the third and last part of the essay on Levinas, “Difference
and Eschatology,” enunciates the non-polar dichotomy of Derrida’s theory.
Levinas opposed eschatology, which “institutes a relation with being be-
yond the totality or beyond history” (Levinas 1969: 22), to philosophy. In
turn, Derrida opposes the radical difference19 of the undefinable different,
of the elusive other, of the ineffable strange, to the eschatology of meta-
physics. He is careful to refuse any ontological anchoring to the “infinity of
the other” (Derrida 1978b: 114). Although opposed, difference is not the
opposite but the negative;20 it is not the other (as positive) but otherness
itself (as not-the-same), the very “alterity of the Other” (123). “Différance
marks the separation and the relation to the entirely other” (Derrida
1988b: 85), thus superseding Levinas’s ethics of alterity. Derrida avoids
drawing a line between same and other, demarcating autonomous identi-
ties, or affirming qualities of existence; instead, he wishes to respect this
reciprocal tension, the alterity of otherness—a letter (letter a, as in
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différance or altarity; or letter h, as in Hamann’s “New Apology of the Let-
ter H, by Itself”) without voice, a dialectic without synthesis, a conflict
without resolution, a difference without eschatology, a faith without salva-
tion. Since “the other cannot be absolutely exterior to the same without
ceasing to be other” (126), the tension, the differential character of differ-
ence, must be preserved. Same and other are necessarily and mutually im-
plicated: they define each other.21 Difference is about the otherness of the
same, the heteronomy of identity, the multiplicity of the monad, the dark
side of light, the extraterritoriality of the site, the war within discourse.
Difference is another name for the dilemmas of assimilation.
Derrida’s emphasis on difference over identity, distinction over similar-
ity, differentiation over comparison, is far from new: long before his work,
philosophy realized that any discourse on identity requires demarcation of
differences.22 In addition, the de-Hellenization of western thought, the
project he rightly feels he has inherited from Levinas, remains the same.
For this “anti-Hellenic world” (Atkins 1980: 773), the pressing question of
a counter-course is still there. What distinguishes his approach from the
tradition of the question is that the war of de-Hellenization is conducted
not through attack (as was the case with Shestov) or opposition (Levinas)
but through contamination and disablement. If a different thought must
still speak Greek, it should not denounce but parody it, disassemble it, and
eventually appropriate it. If the Greek will, sooner or later, call, question,
and seize its different, then a truly anti-Hellenic non-alternative thought
ought to try and irrupt it from within (repeating what Heidegger called
“irruption of Greek philosophy” in thought), reversing the roles and play-
ing the Greek’s infinite (because presumably intrinsic) other. A differential
thought is both non-Greek and made possible by the non-Greek. Thus to
“the Greek element, the Greek thought of Being, the thought of Being
whose irruption or call produced Greece” (82), Derrida opposes the “irrup-
tion of the totally-other” and calls “this experience of the infinitely other
Judaism” (152). “Hebraism, in its difference from onto-theology, provides
a stance for a radical re-vision of Hellenic assumptions” (Wolosky 1982:
290). His strategy is to un-Greek philosophy by exposing it to the Judaic
difference.23 “Thus it is not enough to say that Deriddean theory dehellen-
izes literary criticism, smashing the idols of New Critical scrutiny. In a
profound sense, Derrida Judaizes that criticism, recalling the birth of his
own proliferative theory in the desert generation of witnesses born to He-
brew women straining over birthstools” (New 1988: 34). Judaization
emerges as the properly critical method of de-Hellenization.
What has made the banality of Derridean theory attractive is its playful
reliance on the Hebraic-Hellenic dichotomy. Given the philosophical tradi-
tion to which the author subscribes, the belief in a vicious Hellenic24 dom-
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inance and a benevolent Hebraic otherness becomes inevitable. He has
turned the standard distinction, however, into a dogma, making it the cen-
tral topic of his investigations, the pivotal concept of his views, the funda-
mental issue of his writings. Over and over again, he resorts to it, reducing
any distinction to a difference and every difference to the infinite and yet
imperceptible distance between the two terms, which are confronted and
contrasted in an endlessly absorbing array of variations: presence-absence,
seeing-hearing, speech-writing, plenitude-lack, voice-silence, and here es-
chatology-difference. They are all perfect and contagious, appealing to
both traditional structuralist dispositions and radical poststructuralist
aspirations. But Derrida insists that they are incestuous as well: what we
see, understand, and know may be Greek; but the condition for its appear-
ance, its vital supplement, is the elusive Hebraic trace. Hebraism is the
experience (in fear and trembling) of the infinitely other, the absolute dif-
ference within the heart of philosophical identity. In this regard, the essay
on Levinas is exceptionally interesting because here the author, just a few
years before introducing the allegorical emblem of différance, does not
defer (to higher, philosophical or artistic, authorities) but defines the dif-
ference as the Hebraic-Hellenic dichotomy, and proclaims that it entails
(and can only exist as) war. The essay quotes Matthew Arnold in its motto:
“Hebraism and Hellenism—between these two points of influence moves
our world” (Derrida 1978a: 79). The title of the essay imitates and reverses
that of Arnold’s book: Arnold’s Hellenic can be either anarchy or culture;
Derrida’s Hellenic has the potential of both violence and metaphysics.
There is an obvious correspondence between anarchy and violence, and
culture and metaphysics. The two authors differ in their understanding of
the dialectic: while Arnold believed that, since the two ideas are incompat-
ible, people should opt for culture, Derrida criticizes the disjunction and
shows that we cannot help living with both, that culture implies anarchy
and metaphysics—that there is an anarchy of culture and a violence of
metaphysics. The play of his title with Arnold’s polarity, however, indicates
that he is equally interested in contesting the cultural sphere.
Derrida’s sense of mission is openly apostolic. He addresses the nations:
“Are we Jews? Are we Greeks? We live in the difference between the Jew
and the Greek, which is perhaps the unity of what is called history” (153).
This is the war within discourse. “The history of philosophy is ultimately an
argument between Jews and Greeks” (Handelman 1983: 114). The agon is
hermeneutic and its battleground textual. “ ‘The original opening of inter-
pretation essentially signifies that there will always be rabbis and poets.
And two interpretations of interpretation,’ writes Derrida. There will al-
ways perhaps be war between Jews and Greeks, war over Scripture” (177).
He envisions a heroic thought which “seeks to liberate itself from the Greek
domination of the Same and the One (other names for the light of Being
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and of the phenomenon) as if from oppression itself—an oppression cer-
tainly comparable to none other in the world, an ontological or transcen-
dental oppression, but also the origin or alibi of all oppression in the world”
(Derrida 1978b: 83). Like Horkheimer and Adorno, Derrida demonizes the
Greeks by blaming all oppression on them. We live under this overwhelm-
ing oppression, the tyranny of the light, but at the same time we experience
its fundamental tension, the war which is the possibility of discourse. “Be-
tween original tragedy and messianic triumph there is philosophy, in which
violence is returned against violence within knowledge, in which original
finitude appears, and in which the other is respected within, and by the
same” (131). The tragic and the messianic, the Hellenic and the Hebraic,
may determine (and contest for) our world, but within the Hellenic domi-
nation Derrida detects the hope for a Hebraic liberation. This hope is not
that of freedom, salvation, or even God, at least not in any sense of ontic
determination: “But what does this exclusion mean if not the exclusion of
every particular determination? And that God is nothing (determined), is
not life, because he is everything? and therefore is at once All and Nothing,
Life and Death. Which means that God is or appears, is named, within the
difference between All and Nothing, Life and Death. Within difference,
and at bottom as Difference itself” (115–16). God is bracketed in/by/as
Difference, His coming deferred in all that He differs. “Since Being is noth-
ing (determined), it is necessarily produced in difference (as difference)”
(150). This is the messianic hope offered by Derrida: he calls on us to
depart from the pagan space of the polis, the Greek site, and move, like
Abraham, toward the Promised Land of interminable difference, or rather
toward what he calls “the Hebraic nostalgia for the Land” (145)—the dif-
ferent and deferred Land which is only known by God’s choice and prom-
ise: the House of Israel. To the eschatology of presence he opposes the
messianism of that promise. If the “speculative dialectic is an eschatology
of the identical” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1990: 81), deconstruction is a Messian-
ism of the different. The question of emancipation (this time, from the
Greek oppression) comes under a new light.
Thus différance is only a figure for the Hebraic-Hellenic opposition, a fig-
ure that revises the opposition from a competitive antagonism to an an-
tagonistic interdependence, which is the ground of history. The interde-
pendence is that between the same and its other, the one and the many,
language and the unsayable, meaning and its supplement, eschatology and
war, metaphysics and violence, or philosophy and its rhetoric. The tension
resulting from the indissoluble interdependence is thought. The difference
ensues from the relationship of the positive to its internal constitutive
other, and this radical difference of the (immanently negative) different
Derrida defines as the Hebraic. Levinas identified Hellenism with self, rea-
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son, and atheism, while Hebraism with other, experience, and theism (Ger-
ber 1967: 177–78). For Derrida, if the Hellenic is light, speech, and history,
the Hebraic is then simply the non-Hellenic—all that makes the Greek
possible without allowing for the possibility of itself being posited.
The romantic dimension of Derrida’s position raises the old question of
originality, of aristocratic (namely, aesthetic) survival in a democratic (that
is, bourgeois) tradition: what is left when the imitation of the Greek
(namely, the play of high culture) is exhausted? The infinite pursuit of
difference, he responds, endless differentiation—play as askesis: “It will not
do, however, simply to say that from now on we’ll be Hebrews instead of
Greeks. We cannot, on religious or any other grounds, airily reject meta-
physics: it is sedimented into our language. . . . All we can do is deconstruct
instead of destroy, de-constitute or de-sediment the ‘metaphysico-theolog-
ical’ concepts and show the roots of their complicities” (Schneidau 1982:
15). But how do we know difference if we cannot posit it? Derrida aptly
summarizes the agony when he asks: “will the other of the Greek be the
non-Greek? Above all, can it be named the non-Greek?” (Derrida 1978b:
82). This question perturbed philosophy and art since their achieved au-
tonomy in modern time—the question about the possibility of the other of
the Greek that makes the Greek the founding otherness of western culture.
Seeking the non-Greek, yearning for it, has not exorcised the Greek spectre
haunting this civilization. “The Greek father who still holds us under his
sway must be killed; and this is what a Greek—Plato—could never resolve
to do, deferring the act into a hallucinatory murder. A hallucination within
a hallucination that is already speech. But will a non-Greek ever succeed in
doing what a Greek in this case could not do, except by disguising himself
as a Greek, by speaking Greek, by feigning to speak Greek in order to get
near the king?” (89) The question of philosophy turns into the ultimate
bourgeois quest, the quest of (Abraham as) Poet and Jew—the (Jewish)
question of freedom and culture in a world ruled by the regime of interpre-
tive rights. But this phrasing also reveals and explains Derrida’s strategy, his
own compulsive “feigning to speak Greek.” He was the first to argue that
the Hebraic is not Judaism (the positive different) but its war with the
Hellenic (difference itself). The Hebraic can kill the Greek father only by
speaking Greek, the language of “alien wisdom,”25 the language of the
Alien. Indeed, the Hebraic is the killing of the Hellenic, the un-Greeking of
thought. In the aesthetically emancipated postmodern West, the last inter-
pretive project that can protect cultural capital and keep political demands
in check is the announcement of a messianic (and therefore already in
process) liberation from Hellenism.
Shestov (1932: 158–59) suggested that the fall of philosophy coincides
with its beginning, since already its Greek founders pursued unity and to-
tality. Similarly, in Derridean theologesis, the Hebraic stands for Edenic
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language and the Hellenic for knowledge after the fall. If Hegel wrote his
history of philosophy as a Bildungsroman, Derrida writes his own as a para-
ble about the fall of man into knowledge (and into the search for answers),
where God is the Different—the negative, unreachable otherness—and
Greek the Serpent. We are condemned, he suggests, to be blinded by the
light of philosophy, deafened by the discourse of return. Since the loss of
Paradise (the only true dwelling), since time became history, we can know
God only as Difference, and every site as exile. Here an important distinc-
tion is made implicitly. In the discourse of the response, God, who is the
Different, cannot be known, cannot be spoken about: the Greek language
of presence, which guarantees His absence, does not allow for that. What
can be dimly perceived, within the violated limits of metaphysics, is our
impossible and yet necessary relation with Him, which is one of abysmal
difference. The Hebraic (does not simply signify but) is and makes that
Difference.
War began with secular language. “Violence appears with articulation”
(Derrida 1978a: 147–48). As Benjamin taught, arbitrariness disrupted the
primordial identity and peace as soon as language lost its Adamic inno-
cence and, instead of calling things, started naming them.26 Predication,
the Greek mode of speech, “is the first violence” (147). The natural imme-
diacy disappeared behind the screen of clarity, of seeing and perceiving a
separate world of objects. “Every determination, in effect, presupposes the
thought of Being” (140). To speak (Greek) is to articulate, to define, to
predicate existence. “There is no speech without the thought and state-
ment of Being. But as Being is nothing outside the determined existent, it
would not appear as such without the possibility of speech. Being itself can
only be thought and stated. It is the contemporary of the Logos, which
itself can only be as the Logos of Being, saying Being” (143). The unavoid-
able thought of Being (like the use of God’s name) is the mortal sin ever
since the fall into language. Logos, predication, Being, metaphysics, are the
human lot in a site of glaring light and blaring voices: Derrida’s history of
philosophy amounts to this sweeping generalization. “What is most strik-
ing about Derrida’s presentation of the history of writing is that in it he
subscribes to something suspiciously like a myth of lost linguistic pleni-
tude, displayed in a binary opposition that takes the form of pluri-dimen-
sionality/linearity” (Scholes 1988: 291). His consolation for the human pre-
dicament is equally predictable: the Hebraic nostalgia (as opposed to the
Odyssean nostos) for the Promised Land.
Derrida’s Edenic view of language and poetry is not very different from
Heidegger’s. In either case, the political lesson of quietism is resignation:
“A regard for metaphysics still prevails even in the intention to overcome
metaphysics. Therefore, our task is to cease all overcoming, and leave met-
aphysics to itself” (Heidegger 1972: 24). For Heidegger, thought is actively
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letting what encounters us (Being) be (in its own way). “Like Wittgenstein
with whom he has often been compared, Heidegger returns us exactly to
where we are, leaving the whole structure of everydayness comfortingly in
place, but allows us to do so in the flattering knowledge that we are conse-
quently in on the deepest conceivable mystery” (Eagleton 1990: 312). Fol-
lowing the quietist admonition, Derrida advises those worried by irrecon-
cilable differences that change is impossible; there is no point in it: just let
it/them be. Heidegger’s advice on art is adopted as a principle of life: “This
letting the work be a work we call the preserving of the work” (Heidegger
1971a: 66). We preserve the work by attending to its separation: “A work
conceived radically is a movement of the Same towards the Other which never
returns to the Same” (Levinas: 1987a: 91). Like the promise which it pre-
serves, the work needs to be let be in its distance (that is, to be aestheti-
cally). “As an orientation toward the other, as sense, a work is possible only
in patience, which, pushed to the limit, means for the agent to renounce
being the contemporary of its outcome, to act without entering into the
Promised Land” (92). The aesthetic disposition acquires the force of an
ethical imperative: the askesis of atonement is the letting-be of Being, the
thinking of thought, the speculative respect for alterity, and the pious at-
tention to difference. “If to understand Being is to be able to let be (that
is, to respect Being in essence and existence, and to be responsible for one’s
respect), then the understanding of Being always concerns alterity, and par
excellence the alterity of the Other in all its originality: one can have to let
be only that which is not. If Being is always to be let be, and if to think is
to let Being be, then Being is indeed the other of thought. And since it is
what it is only by the letting-be of thought, and since the latter is thought
only by virtue of the presence of the Being which it lets be, then thought
and Being, thought and the other, are the same; which, let us recall, does
not mean identical, or one, or equal” (Derrida 1978a: 141). If (Hebraic)
Being is the Other of (Hellenic) thought, then the thought of Being is
nostalgia for its essence and atonement as letting be. Thus contemplation
returns to its theological roots—human interest in God.
When Derrida proposed this askesis as a discipline, he called it “gram-
matology.” It is the science of the uneasy acquiescence, protesting com-
plicity, dissenting acceptance. Grammatology is also the science of the
open Book, a new discipline of reading: atheological interpretation. “Gram-
matology is the world of the text which stands by itself because the portals
of the infinite have all been closed up” (Raschke 1988: 136). The hidden-
ness of God from secular reading determines the conditions of disinter-
ested contemplation. “This lost certainty, this absence of divine writing,
that is to say, first of all, the absence of the Jewish God (who himself writes,
when necessary), does not solely and vaguely define something like ‘moder-
nity.’ As the absence and haunting of the divine sign, it regulates all mod-
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ern criticism and aesthetics” (Derrida 1978c: 10). For writers from Men-
delssohn to Horkheimer, interpretation in the absence of God was better
known as the Hebraic problem of modernity, the project of assimilation: to
them, difference was the abyss opened by the decline of the sacred in a
world of autonomous readings—the experience of the Jew (or the intellec-
tual) as the Other bourgeois. For Derrida, however, différance is a name
(and parable) not only for the Hebraic-Hellenic difference but, in addition,
for its textual identity. The debt to Hegel is obvious: “Dialectic . . . inter-
prets every image as writing” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972: 24). Interpre-
tation deciphers the writing of a hand long gone, the trace of an image long
banned. “Recent discussions, notably in the visual arts, have witnessed the
ascendancy of the concept of écriture, inspired perhaps by certain drawings
by Klee that seem to shade over into a human scrawl. This is another in-
stance where a notion of modern art throws light on the past: art in general
is like a handwriting. Its works are hieroglyphs for which the code has been
lost, and this loss is not accidental but constitutive of their essence as art
works. Only qua handwriting do they have a language, do they speak”
(Adorno 1984: 182).
But the attachment to the text acquires systematic importance: “The
way of deconstruction is always opened through reading” (Critchley 1989:
93). The Hebraic is now defined in terms of an ineluctable textual indeter-
minacy. Grammatology pays differential attention to a text: it treats it first
as a New Testament, and asks: What differentiates it from its predecessor?
How does it authorize the oldness of the Old one? Above all, what is the
violence of its Greek language and the dissemination of its enabling trace?
And what is the rhetorical supplement that enables it to claim to supple-
ment? Thus grammatology—the post-Biblical study of Écriture/Scripture,
rather than an intrinsic pharmakon in western ontology—is the decon-
struction of the Logos of the Gospel (compare section 6 of Being and Time,
“The Task of a Destruction of the History of Ontology”): in claiming its
gramma (letter) and diminishing its pneuma (spirit), it constitutes the
most important attack on Christology from the left-Kantian direction.27
Turning against “pneumatology, the science of pneuma, spiritus, or logos”
(Derrida 1978c: 9), it deconstructs the incarnation of spirit—Christ as the
logos of faith.28 “The Father as presence and as being becomes manifested
to man in Christ. And Christ, as logos, allows man access to the ‘spoken/
thought sense’ of a ‘creator God.’ This is, as Derrida demonstrates, the very
structure of sign-theory” (Wolosky 1982: 286).
If Derrida approaches the Greeks with deconstructive care and contami-
nates their language with dissimulated tautologies, his attitude to Chris-
tianity is one of destructive onslaught against its sacred signs, especially
Christ as the figura of incarnation: for the deconstructionists, (Biblical)
reading must be purged of the spirit. “Almost every tradition influenced by
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Christianity has aspired to a spiritualization of the word, its transformation
and even disappearance as it passes from ‘word as pointer to word as thing
itself.’ A logocentric or incarnationist thesis of this kind haunts the fringes
of most studies of literature, and explains the welcome accorded at present
to semiotic counterperspectives” (Hartman 1981a: 35). The central ques-
tion is whether ousia should be defined in terms of identity/filiation or
difference/separation. What is at stake is nothing less than the decision of
the Council of Nicaea (325) regarding the homöousion (Bloch 1972: 181–
83): “First, and above all, stand those great moral doctrines of the Gospel
to which the highest place has been assigned beyond dispute in the Gospel
itself. But, next after these, ecclesiastical history teaches us that the most
vital, the most comprehensive, the most fruitful, has been, and is still,—
not the supremacy of the Bible or the authority of its several books, not the
power of the Pope or of the Church, not the Sacraments, not Original Sin,
not Predestination, not Justification, but the doctrine of the Incarnation”
(Stanley 1907: 196). Hebraic thought claims that reading has been enslaved
by theories of the logos as incarnated spirit and has forgotten the insistence
of the letter in the text. “American criticism, on the whole is ‘incarnation-
ist’ . . . and it often associates this bias with Christian doctrine. Similarly,
then, contemporary anti- or nonincarnationist views would move toward
the pole of Hebraism, whether or not influenced by canonical texts from
that sphere” (Hartman 1985: 174–75). If the covenant of interpretation has
been compromised by demands for presence, fullness, and completeness, a
need is felt to renew it by emphasizing not the text but writing itself. The
result ought to be a renegotiation of the (Hellenic) aesthetic character of
the (Hebraic) social contract.
Consideration of Paul’s “new covenant” is indispensable for an under-
standing of deconstruction as a fundamentally theologico-political project
(like Spinoza’s). This covenant was given “not in a written code but in the
Spirit; for the written code kills, but the Spirit gives life” (2 Corinthians
3.6). If, as Paul states, “the Lord is the Spirit” (3.17), then the Spirit is the
highest source of authority. “For Paul, the giving of the Spirit is the estab-
lishment of the law” (Cranfield 1964: 65). But who is addressed, called by
the Spirit? Who is commanded, seized by it—only Jews, or Gentiles as
well? The Epistle to the Galatians deals with the identity of Christianity
regarding its Jewish roots: Are Christians obliged to observe the Mosaic
law? Should a Gentile become a Jew before becoming a Christian? In his
discussion of God’s promise to Abraham and its relation to the law, Paul
proclaims: “Now before faith came, we were confined under the law, kept
under restraint until faith should be revealed. So that the law was our cus-
todian until Christ came, that we might be justified by faith. But now that
faith has come, we are no longer under a custodian; for in Christ Jesus you
are all sons of God, through faith. For as many of you as were baptized into
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Christ have put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither
slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ
Jesus. And if you are Christ’s, then you are Abraham’s offspring, heirs ac-
cording to promise” (Galatians 3.23–29). There are those who see the early
church as an enemy of tradition: “One of Christianity’s central interpretive
axioms was the distinction between ‘spirit’ and ‘letter.’ The severity of this
differentiation justified the Church’s overthrow of the authority of Rab-
binic law, the divine text of the Jews, as mere ‘letter.’ For the Church, the
true ‘spirit’ was the New Testament through Jesus” (Handelman 1982: 15).
In general, during most of the twentieth century, to raise the question of
the Spirit is to ask again who is the true heir to Abraham, Christianity or
Judaism. Rosenzweig thought this was a racial issue when he talked about
the Jews as an eternal “community of blood” whose eternity is (already)
present.29 Adorno and Levinas argued that the West is heir to Odysseus,
not to Abraham. The whole question, however, is a rather recent one. Al-
though writers as early as Samuel Hirsch (1815–89) argued that, after Paul,
Christianity broke with Judaism, it was only after Paul and his Interpreters
(1911) by Albert Schweitzer that a distinction between two Judaisms (a
Semitic or Palestinian and a Hellenistic or Diaspora) became popular and,
in turn, produced two Pauls (the Jewish and the Hellenistic). Since then
the relation of Paulinism to Judaism has been a major topic in Protestant
theology. “It is quite significant that all these fresh attempts in the inter-
pretation of Paul’s theology try to expel his doctrine of justification by faith
from its commanding position” (Koester 1965: 192). A de-Hellenized and
apocalyptic Paul has emerged as his debt to philosophy and rhetoric dimin-
ished in importance.
In order to answer who is commanded by the Spirit, and therefore who
becomes party to the new covenant, Paul must define the relation between
law and faith. Before the advent of Jesus, the apostle proclaims, people
were like children, and therefore confined under the law which was their
custodian. “But when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son,
born of woman, born under the law, to redeem those who were under the
law, so that we might receive adoption as sons. And because you are sons,
God sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying ‘Abba! Father!’”
(Galatians 4.4–6). The Spirit of the Son of God redeems from the law,
liberating the faithful from an exclusive set of rules and obligations. What
is important is not circumcision or uncircumcision, but living and walking
by the spirit, because “if you are led by the Spirit you are not under the law”
(Galatians 5.18). Paul does not think about the shortcomings of one’s obe-
dience to the Law. Although it was the introspective conscience of the
West that attributed to him the question about the Law in general, salva-
tion, and a struggle with one’s conscience, “it appears that Paul’s references
to the impossibility of fulfilling the Law is part of a theological and theoret-
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ical scriptural argument about the relation between Jews and Gentiles”
(Stendahl 1983: 81). The teaching of Paul the Pharisee (Segal 1990), of
Saul from Tarsus, was very different from Luther’s “Pauline Christianity.”
The issues for Paul were: “(1) What happens to the Law (the Torah, the
actual Law of Moses, not the principle of legalism) when the Messiah has
come? (2) What are the ramifications of the Messiah’s arrival for the rela-
tion between Jews and Gentiles?” (Stendahl 1983: 84) The major problem
facing the new religion was the place of the Gentiles in the church and in
the messianic community according to the plan of God. “Yet it was not
until Augustine that the Pauline thought about the Law and Justification
was applied in a consistent and grand style to a more general and timeless
human problem” (85).30 After this Reformist revision, the “letter” came to
signify scholastic exegesis, while the “spirit” the interpretive ideal of pri-
vate (non-dogmatic) reading (outside the Catholic church).
Given its interpretive understanding of the “letter,” Protestant thought
still sees Christianity as a textual event.31 According to a typical view, “to
prove its own legitimacy, the Church had at once to undermine the author-
ity of the Jewish people while maintaining (in fact, appropriating) the au-
thority of Jewish texts. For this reason the battle for authority between the
Church and Judaism took place within the arena of textual politics” (Ra-
gussis 1989: 137). Although this view creates the impression that the
church acted more like a contemporary critical movement, it is far from
unique. Along the same lines, it has been also suggested that “the theme of
the purloined letter can characterize our entire problem of Rabbinic versus
Patristic hermeneutics. For as we have stressed, it was above all the ques-
tion of the nature of the letter, the integrity of the text which was at stake.
Stealing the ‘letter’ is stealing the text, stealing Scripture, and transferring
meaning elsewhere. It might be said that Paul stole the letter from the Jews
and tried to abolish it by transcending it through the spirit” (Handelman
1982: 163). Furthermore, since this viewpoint accepts the Protestant reifi-
cation of the text as the only explanatory approach possible, it also evalu-
ates interpretations on the basis of organic integration. Some critics find it
in the original Book: “Though Christianity attempted to set the ‘spirit’
against the ‘letter’ by treating the Bible as a transcended Book of Laws, or
stories blind to what they prophesied, for Jews this split between letter and
spirit did not occur, or else was repaired by inventive exegetical methods
which kept the law-portion and the story-portion as a single, inalienable
donation. Here was God’s plenty indeed” (Hartman 1985b: 211). Others
find organic integration in the tradition which claims to have inherited that
origin: “Christianity is a criticism of the Hebrew Scriptures—not only an
interpretation, but an evaluation. . . . For nearly two milennia, Christianity
has been little other than a critical enterprise. . . . Indeed, it has become
commonplace to say that Christian criticism is the only kind we know”
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(Marshall 1989: 4). Such views attest, however, to “the inseparable rela-
tionship between criticism and theology” (Atkins 1983: 8), and agree in
seeing Christianity as a hermeneutic occurrence and believing that “Jews
were ‘converted’ textually, authorially, by the early Church fathers” (Ra-
gussis 1989: 139). Thus the doctrine of incarnation appears to drive Paul’s
critique of the law and to produce the new canon: “The Rabbinic word
became substantialized into flesh. . . . While claiming to spiritualize Juda-
ism, Christianity in effect literalized it with a vengeance” (Handelman
1982: 17). At the same time, in order to strengthen the interpretive resolve
of close reading, alternative examples of ascetic resistance have been of-
fered, such as Levinas’s adherence to “the Talmud’s steadfast refusal to
‘spiritualize’ since spiritualization can become a stratagem for evading re-
sponsibility” (Wyschogrod 1974: 174). This and any other (Modernist or
Postmodernist) example of interpretive resistance accepts an aesthetic as-
sumption about the gentility and supremacy of the text. “If we lose our
identity it will be because, as I have warned elsewhere, there is no longer a
textual difference between ourselves and the gentiles. To ask what a textual
difference can be is to confront the truest question of Jewish cultural iden-
tity” (Bloom 1985: 116). Hebraic cultural oligopoly is based on the owner-
ship of the means of textual consumption, of the complete textualization
of the social. In other words, interpretive capitalism rests on Protestant
rules of reading which define the stock as Hellenic and the market as He-
braic. Hence freedom has been traded for rights.
Derrida’s enterprise is quite different. His attack on Christology does not
present Hebraism naively as the perfect alternative. Offering a better faith
would be inconsistent with his anti-dialectical understanding. His own
method is Judaization: Derrida is converting Christians into Jews by lead-
ing them through the familiar desert of bourgeois promise, culture. This
time, though, culture does not signify liberation—a commodity no longer
in high demand among the quite secure intelligentsia—but the renewed
moral authority of artistic resistance: “All those who deal or inhabit lan-
guage as poets are Jews—but in a tropic sense. What the trope comes to is
locating the Jew not only as a poet but also in every man circumcised by
language or led to circumcise a language” (Derrida 1986a: 340). If Paul said
that “there is neither Jew nor Greek,” Derrida argues that (to the privileged
extent that we are poets, of course) we are all Jews: “Anyone or no one may
be Jewish. No one is (not) circumcised; it is no one’s circumcision. If all the
poets are Jews, they are all circumcised or circumcisers” (341). If Paul said
that circumcision is not very important,32 Derrida argues that, on the con-
trary, it is our “date” with history: “There must be circumcision, circumci-
sion of the word, and it must take place once, each time one time, the one
time only. This time awaits its coming, it awaits a date, and this date can
only be poetic, an inscription in the body of language. How are we to tran-
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scribe ourselves into a date? Celan asked. When we speak here of a date of
circumcision, we are no longer speaking of history. . . . No, the circumci-
sion of the word is not dated in history. In this sense, it has no age, but gives
rise to, is the occasion of, the Date. It opens the word to the other, it opens
history and the poem and philosophy and hermeneutics and religion”
(346). Where Paul saw the Spirit as the Redeemer of humanity from the
law, Derrida, in his treatise on the occasion of the date (which recalls
Rainer Maria Rilke’s celebration of Once in the 9th Duino Elegy), presents
circumcision as the affirmation of the law, the inscription of the law on the
body. This inscription is a textual event too: the poetic date of the body of
language with the call, the command of circumcision, which makes every-
one who obeys it a Jew. The result of these re-readings is that “Derrida, in
moving beyond a dialectics of consciousness (Sartre), beyond a dualistic
problematic of ‘castration’ (Freud), has turned his work into a protracted
meditation on the institution of circumcision” (Mehlman 1983: 82). If the
Rabbinic word became Christian flesh, the incarnated spirit still cannot
escape the Mosaic law, as Derrida has shown by his circumcision of the
word “difference.” Where Augustin de Narbonne, in his Jésus circoncis
(1694), suggested that Jesus had to undergo circumcision to prove he was
a true Jew, the philosopher argues that people need to be circumcised to
achieve the poetic status of Jewishness. Thus to the irruption of the Hel-
lenic dawn, he is opposing the occasion of the Hebraic date. In all these
disputations, Derrida is obviously engaged in an unremitting settling of
accounts with the most important Hebraic thinker of the twentieth cen-
tury, Heidegger (Zarader 1990).
HISTORY AND EXILE
The theological foundations of Heideggerian theory have long been no-
ticed: “His teaching constitutes a sort of meta-theology, whose language is
immersed, inescapably, in that of Pietism, scholasticism and Lutheran dox-
ology” (Steiner 1978: 63). The basic concepts in Being and Time preserve
their religious character: “All of them originated in the Christian tradition,
however much death, conscience, guilt, care, anxiety, and corruption are
formalized ontologically and neutralized as concepts of the Dasein”
(Löwith 1966: 68). Early on Heidegger felt that the Christian tradition was
at great risk. “If we ask ourselves what Heidegger’s real intention was, what
led him away from Husserl toward the problem of historicality, it is obvious
today that it was not so much the contemporary problematic of historical
relativism that preoccupied him as his own Christian heritage. . . . His
question became: how can one successfully resist the alien influence of
Greek philosophy upon the Christian message?” (Gadamer 1981: 435).
What can be done when, as Nietzsche declared, “God is Dead”—when, as
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Heidegger rephrased it in 1945, “the world of the Christian God has lost its
effective force in history” (quoted in Lacoue-Labarthe 1990: 39)? Some
kind of return seems necessary. In this respect, Heidegger (like Benjamin)
contributes to the de-Hellenization of Christian dogma launched by Har-
nack in the 1880s—a systematic and multifaceted effort of Protestant the-
ology that is still under way.33 “Hegel attempted to syncretize the Hebraic
and the Hellenic; in the course of doing so, he hellenized Christianity.
Heidegger’s Christianity, on the other hand, is heavily dependent on a the-
ological tradition that sought to bring it back to its primitive, that is, He-
braic roots” (Megill 1985: 314). His critique of forgetfulness as fall and his
own change of orientation toward Protestantism intensified the Hebraic
character of his thought. “Given Heidegger’s enduring interest in religion,
it is not surprising to learn that his account of the fall of Western man into
the role of the self-deifying subject resembles the Old Testament account
of the fall of the ancient Israelites into greed and idolatry” (Zimmerman
1981: 227). Heidegger offers a narrative of sin and redemption (though a
different one from Rosenzweig’s).
From the beginning of his career and well into the early 1920s, Heidegger
presented himself as a Christian theologian. For example, the former Jesuit
seminarian was considered in 1916 for the chair of Catholic philosophy in
the philosophy department of Freiburg University. At that same Univer-
sity, he taught a lecture course in the winter semester of 1920–21, “Intro-
duction to the Phenomenology of Religion,” concentrating on Paul and
early Christianity. “Part One of the course introduces a phenomenology
dedicated to recovering what was forgotten by the entire Western tradition
(including Husserl), but which, even if unthematically, was understood by
early Christianity: life in its here-and-now facticity, factical life-experi-
ence” (Sheehan 1979: 315). Here the memory of the West is directed not
to its Greek roots but to the beginning of its church. “Notice the parallels
between Heidegger’s approach to early Christianity and his approach to the
Greeks. In both cases he sees a lived but unthematized level of experience
which was covered over by subsequent ages and which must be recovered
by a ‘violent’ de-construction of the tradition. Note as well the parallels in
the content of these two experiences. In both cases the experience is a
pre-theoretical, pre-rational lived experience of ‘self-exceeding,’ of being
drawn out beyond one’s ordinary self-understanding” (315). While the
Greek model had not emerged in his thought yet, the idea of a lost dwelling
and a homeless wandering betrays another debt: “In claiming that Western
humanity had forgotten the originating event and thus ended in technolog-
ical nihilism, Heidegger was paradoxically closer to the Jews than to the
Greeks. For Heidegger, of course, the originating event was not the Divine
Law revealed to the Jews, but instead the event of ‘being’ revealed to the
Greeks. Like the Old Testament prophet, Heidegger reminded his people
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that they wandered in the technological desert because being had con-
cealed itself from them” (Zimmerman 1988: 1117).
In the years 1916–19, Heidegger’s religious conviction underwent a shift
from Catholicism to Protestantism, and at the same time his disciplinary
alliance changed from theology to philosophy.34 This break with the past
marks the turn to the “historical”; and it is the “historical” as the Protes-
tant bourgeois understanding of tradition that enables him, like the other
writers of modernity, to invent the Hellenic by discovering the Greeks.
Thus Heidegger’s doctrine of temporality is derived from an interpretive
approach to early Christianity. “It seems that, perhaps unknown to himself,
Heidegger has brought us into the orbit of Biblical Hebrew: . . . a language
of the kind into which Heidegger attempts to transcribe German” (Rose
1984: 78). The thought which claims, which needs to claim, that it is speak-
ing (“feigning”) Greek is Hebraic. “When Heidegger, then, thinks he is
thinking Greek (ur-Greek), he is thinking Hebrew” (Hartman 1981: xix).
This apparent contradiction is resolved when placed in the general picture:
According to interpretation theory, while Hebraism is the discipline of cri-
tique, and the Jew is the model critic, the Greeks are always unreflective—
always at home, inhabiting (as Heidegger would say) the essence (of lan-
guage, world, art) but never thinking it; that is why philosophy in moder-
nity is still a Greek language but is never a Greek activity (for example, one
associated with contemporary Greeks). The experience of that language
may be Greek, but its truth is proudly presented as a modern discovery as
well as the preordained future of Greek. That is why Heidegger was able to
assume that German harvests and shelters logos: “In this relation a Greek
word applies to a German word for safekeeping, and the German word
offers its services as bestower” (Rand 1990: 443). Thus the modern invaria-
bly emerges as more Greek than the Greek itself, since it becomes the
measure as well as the destination of its authenticity.
In Part Two of the 1920–21 course, “A Phenomenological Interpretation of
Original Christianity in St. Paul’s Epistles to the Galatians and Thessaloni-
ans,” Heidegger begins the practice of his hermeneutics (which is better
known from its later applications to poetry). In his reading of I Thessaloni-
ans, he concentrates on Pauline eschatology and discovers in the Christian
“awaiting” for the Parousia a meaning very different from that of Jewish
awaiting: “The authentic Christian relation to the Parousia is fundamen-
tally not the awaiting of a future event” (Sheehan 1979: 321).35 The rela-
tion to the Parousia (of the Logos) is a matter of temporal experience: “The
question of temporality in Christian religious experience becomes a matter
of how one lives one’s facticity” (322). The Parousia requires authentic
presence in the present: “The Christian—or Pauline—meaning of escha-
tology has shifted from the expectation of a future event to a presence
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before God, . . . a context of enacting one’s life in uncertainty before the
unseen God. The weight has shifted to the ‘how’ of existence” (322). The
Logos is para/ousia—not ousia but the Spirit of ousia. What is important,
and what Heidegger seeks to encounter, is that Spirit in its full presence,
without the mediation of the Law. “Heidegger seems to give us Yahweh
without Torah: the event seems to include advent and redemption, pres-
ence and owning, but not the giving of the law on Mount Sinai, and its
repeated disowning” (Rose 1984: 80). As an apocalyptic thinker, he is inter-
ested in the call as epiphany, in the encounter as private date: after all,
Saul’s conversion did not involve any documentation. The Hellenic model
would eventually allow Heidegger to bring back from Sinai his own tab-
lets—the Presocratic fragments. “Thus Heidegger displays a monumental,
though deeply hidden tension between the Hellenic and the Hebraic”
(Megill 1985: 315). While the poet, traveling on “the track of the holy”
(Heidegger 1971: 97),36 brings a trace of the vanished gods into the cosmic
night, the responsibility of the philosopher is to discover and preserve it,
listening for the absent call. This is the piety of thought.
Levinas adopted the exegetical notion of the trace, a translation of the
ikhnos of Plotinus (Enneads 5), in “The Trace of the Other” (1963) and
developed it out of the chapter on “The Dwelling” (1969: 152–74) in Total-
ity and Infinity (1960), a book which is “a phenomenological defense of
subjectivity taken as neither a personalism nor as an egoism but as the
blueprint for the affirmation of the divine” (Gerber 1967: 177). Levinas
explains: “The beyond from which a face comes signifies as a trace. A face
is in the trace of the utterly bygone, utterly past absent” (Levinas 1969:
103), who does not appear. Paul announced the possibility of full knowl-
edge: “For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know
in part; then I shall understand fully, even as I have been fully understood”
(1 Corinthians 13.12). Levinas rejects this promise. The epiphany of the
face does not involve any phainesthai, and therefore “the signifyingness of
a trace consists in signifying without making appear” (Levinas 1969: 104),
without a promise of incarnation. Thus “a trace signifies beyond being”
(103), epekeina tes ousias. In the trace (the letter from beyond), the law of
the gender, the law of separation, and the law of the Lord come together.
“Through a trace the irreversible past takes on the profile of a ‘He.’ The
beyond from which a face comes is in the third person. . . . The supreme
presence of a face is inseparable from this supreme and irreversible absence
which founds the eminence of visitation. . . . He who left traces in wiping
out his traces did not mean to say or do anything by the traces he left. He
disturbed the order in an irreparable way. He has passed absolutely. To be
qua leaving a trace is to pass, to depart, to absolve oneself” (104–5). Der-
rida, building on this view,37 uses the trace of the vanished gods to destroy
incarnation, the omöousion of the Parousia. If Heidegger deduced thinking
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from thanking (Eucharist), he consumes like a parasite every host (hostia).
The deconstruction of logo-/phono-centrism serves only as a foil for a feast
of cannibalism on the body of Jesus—its Dionysian textualization. “As
against conventional sign-theory, Derrida proposes a theory of the trace. In
this theory, not speech, but writing, becomes the preeminent linguistic
sign” (Wolosky 1982: 288). Christ is not a sign, as Kierkegaard thought, but
a signified—neither spirit nor ousia but the false idol of a trace. “The the-
matics of the trace . . . abolishes the Pauline distinction between spirit and
letter” (298). There is only writing—the letter of the law and the law of
gender: the circumcised body. The trace is Derrida’s postcard with Socrates
writing, the letter that Paul “stole from the Jews,” the circumcised tablets
that poets recover from the desert.
The question of ousia came into theological prominence early in the
thirteenth century. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215), in its effort to
define a unified Christian faith, drew on Aristotle’s distinction between
“substance” and “accident” and “came up with the doctrine of transub-
stantiation. This stated that while the substances of bread and wine be-
came the substance of Christ, the accidents remained unchanged. . . . In
fact, this apparent solution, which seemed to establish the temperate bal-
ance between opposites, heralded the beginning of further conflict. The
relation between accidents and substances became increasingly a point of
controversy, which coincided with a growing split between a focus on pub-
lic ritual and ceremony and one on private internalized worship. Long be-
fore the Reformation, the doctrine of the ‘real presence’ of Christ in the
Eucharist had been attacked by heretical outsiders reacting against the
general materialism of the medieval Church in favor of a more spiritually
oriented religion” (Kilgour 1990: 81). The Reformation saw Christianity as
a religion of history, of the history of God’s revelation to humankind in
events taking place in time. Among such events, the incarnation was the
most important one.38 During his explorations of the real presence of
Christ, “when Luther . . . came to his fulfilled doctrine of justification by
faith he associated it most closely with his doctrine of the sacraments. He
shows the eucharist to be the objective declaration and assurance of for-
giveness of sins and the place where the incarnate Christ is known and
received uniquely in his very flesh and blood for our salvation and eternal
life” (Hall 1985: 115). As a consequence, the eucharist was disassociated
from the church: “For Luther sacramentum speaks directly of Christ and
not of the mass” (118), and this position allowed for the great debate of the
1520s about the meaning of “real presence,” which centered on the verse
“this is my body” (Matthew 26.26). “It seemed to Luther that the whole
principle of the clarity of scripture (which he regarded as fundamental to
his reforming programme at this point) was at stake over the interpretation
of this verse” (McGrath 1988: 121). The specific question was whether the
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esti should be taken literally or figuratively. Luther stressed the verba and
took it literally, hence his “insistence that the body and blood of Christ are
in with and under the elements of bread and wine” (Hall 1985: 127). He
wrote various treatises on the subject, like That these Words of Christ ‘This
is my Body’ still Stand Firm against the Fanatics (1527). “For Luther the
exposition of scripture is always more important than theological system-
making and he did not deduce the real presence from speculative theory or
philosophical definitions but from the words of scripture itself” (132). Dur-
ing the same decade “Zwingli and others had ceased to regard the sacra-
ment as a means of grace, and reduced it to a sign of divine grace” (130),
following a figurative understanding of the sacrament and rejecting the real
presence of Christ. Since that time, the debate between the literalist and
the figurative or symbolist positions has traversed many areas and stages:
from the view of the Port-Royal Jansenist grammarians that the sacramen-
tal eating of Christ’s body is performed through the grammar of the sen-
tence “this is my body” (Marin 1989, originally called La Parole mangée) to
the Romantic doctrine of the symbol where “the Eucharist is revised into
an ideal of aesthetic communion” (Kilgour 1990: 146); and from the con-
clusion of Act I of Parsifal (1882) to the “accident” of the destruction of
the sacramental symbols in Leonard Bernstein’s Mass (1971). Derrida’s
thematics of the trace, which ranges from a study of esti (Derrida 1982b)39
to discussions of absence, contributes precisely to this Protestant debate,
while attacking its debt to Pauline Christology.
Derrida radicalized the trace,40 especially in the lecture “La différance”
(1968)—a deconstruction of the trace in Heidegger’s Anaximander essay
(Heidegger 1984)—by making it the mark of the (always already) inter-
preted text, and the sign of the absent original (Tablets). “For Derrida the
trace is of a text and not of the Other” (Bernasconi 1988: 24). Heidegger’s
facticity (I am always already in a world) becomes Derrida’s textuality (a
book is always already interpreted). “The question of the text repeats, in at
least a formal manner, all the movements that characterize Heidegger’s
elaborations on Being” (Gasché 1983: 170). Since the Parousia is now re-
placed with the trace of interpretation, “Heidegger’s notion of Being and
Derrida’s notion of text are akin” (160). But it is the letter of the law, rather
than the spirit of communion, that becomes primary.41 “Reading in the
classical context is akin to the celebration of the ‘mass,’ the assimilation of
meanings, the consumption of the god, the transfer of presence. It is clear
that ‘deconstruction,’ which prophesies ‘the end of the book,’ is founded
upon the Hebraic passion for iconoclasm, for de-situating holiness and
making it a temporal disclosure” (Raschke 1988: 134). The mass of con-
sumption is disrupted and its book desecrated by the meaning of lan-
guage:42 “There is only letter, and it is the truth of pure language, the truth
as pure language”43 (Derrida 1985: 204). The letter is the truth and the law
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of the text. “Derrida has made it clear that the word text can be substituted
for the word Being. Text is a translation for Being” (Gasché 1983: 172). At
the same time, text is also the diaspora (dissemination) of Being.
The only problem is that in this textualist ontology there-is-no-outside-
reading: the interpretive activity, although expanded beyond the bound-
aries of the autonomous text, remains an autonomous discipline of the
response (Derrida’s piety of reading), and dissemination is only a festive
form of preservation. “Geoffrey H. Hartman has called attention to the
absence of any account in Derrida of the passage from the (orally
grounded) world of ‘imitation’ to the later (print grounded) world of ‘dis-
semination.’ In the absence of such an account, it would appear that the
textualist critique of textuality, brilliant and to a degree serviceable as it is,
is still itself curiously text-bound. In fact, it is the most text-bound of all
ideologies, because it plays with the paradoxes of textuality alone and in
historical isolation, as though the text were a closed system” (Ong 1982:
168–69). Derrida is willing to denounce the Book, any and all books, in
order to save reading as a spiritual exercise. When all outside justifications
for the disciplined attention to the independent text have been discred-
ited, when the institutional authority protecting depth, quality, and beauty
has weakened, the last resort for a last-minute defense of interpretation
must pose its validation as a self-sufficient praxis. “The problem of the text
is both a logical concomitant and an evolutionary sequel to the loss of the
significance of scripture. . . . The problem of the text, as Gadamer has indi-
cated, actually comes from the Romantic preoccupation with historical
contingency as well as the early nineteenth century endeavor to find a met-
aphysical standpoint for the investigation of culture. . . . The text shows
itself as text once historical self-reflection has permeated the adventure of
inscription and interpretation. Derrida’s program of deconstruction be-
tokens the final moment in the progressive self-portrayal of the text. It is
hermeneutics that has lost its enthrallment with history, which is exactly
what happened during the French structuralist interlude, and must fall
back upon the solipsism of reading and writing” (Raschke 1988: 129).
Through the notion of writing, autonomy is transferred to reading, which
becomes closed rather than simply “close”: there is no emancipation other
than interpretation.
The text as writing is no longer the letter that kills but the law that gives
life. The sanctity of the commentary tradition returns to the scene of in-
struction while interpretation is elevated to the status of faith. “Giving
writing a primal status seems to be a way of retranslating, in transcendental
terms, both the theological affirmation of its sacred character and the crit-
ical affirmation of its creative character. To admit that writing is, because
of the very history that it made possible, subject to the test of oblivion and
repression, seems to represent, in transcendental terms, the religious prin-
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ciple of the hidden meaning (which requires interpretation) and the criti-
cal principle of implicit significations, silent determinations, and obscured
contents (which gives rise to commentary). To imagine writing as absence
seems to be a simple repetition, in transcendental terms, of both the reli-
gious principle of inalterable and yet never fulfilled tradition, and the aes-
thetic principle of the work’s survival, its perpetuation beyond the author’s
death, and its enigmatic excess in relation to him” (Foucault 1979a: 144).
With this position, a long course of inquiry has been completed: revising
Kierkegaard’s model of the reader as Abraham, Levinas portrayed the theo-
phanic experience of Moses as the possibility of an encounter with the
author, which Derrida challenged by showing the inaccessibility of the orig-
inal. We are now left with the Book alone and the trace of its past interpre-
tations. The promised return to the land of the endlessly repeatable (and
always already interpreted, and hence canonical) Text is possible only as a
post-Biblical, and therefore aesthetic, exercise. In the course of this search
for ultimate meaning, one parameter has remained constant: the indispen-
sable assumption that the aesthetic attitude (contemplation), Heidegger’s
passive preservation, is the prerequisite for any ethical relation.
The relation between ethics and aesthetics also preoccupied another
prophet of Judaization, Hermann Cohen (1842–1918). In “The Style of the
Prophets” (1901), where Greek and Hebrew moral views are compared, he
argued that Plato creates an autonomous science of morality, ethics, and
expresses disdain for poetry and myth. “The prophets, on the other hand,
consider themselves to be above the web of myths their people had
spun. . . . But though they may neglect the past, they use their rich poetic
endowment to depict the future and thus, in their rhetoric, prove to be
genuine and great poets. . . . They are artists, not philosophers” (Cohen
1971: 106).44 Elsewhere Cohen differentiated between myth and religion
with regard to guilt, arguing that, while the former is concerned with fate
and suggests that “man is not an individual, but rather the offspring of his
ancestors” (Cohen 1972: 169), the latter “is concerned with man’s guilt”
and must be considered as “the origin of the I as individual” (168). Here
the distinction between myth and religion was made not on grounds of
ethics but of aesthetics.
At the same time, although Cohen elevated art to the level of the highest
knowledge, he realized that, if philosophy could no longer support religion,
the risk was great: “The fate of religion hinges on this question. Religion is
not science; subsequently, it can also not be ethics. But does this make its
morality a mere artifact? Are the prophets nothing but artists, and is their
style merely an exercise in aesthetics?” (Cohen 1971: 107). If not on an
epistemological basis, how is the superiority of religion going to be de-
fended? Prophetic religion needs to be seen as both art and more-than-art.
Cohen argued that “by their very opposition to mythology the prophets
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create a new kind of religion. The new religion of the One God is the work
of art created by and expressive of their particular style” (107). Some two
centuries earlier, art had to compare itself to religion to gain respectability.
When Cohen presented the prophetic expression as artwork, he was ap-
pealing to aesthetics in order to save the credibility of religion. He was also
appropriating, in a rare move, the aesthetic from mythology and religion.
“As it is, the style of the prophets—who, though neither philosophers nor
merely artists, are most creative teachers—expresses the special character
of religion in contradistinction to mythology, art, or science” (107). The
last three areas are the familiar and glorified expression of the Greek spirit.
Prophetic art, on the other hand, is not a secular but a religious expression:
the prophets are the best artists in that they created religion-as-art. Cohen
justified their prophetic work exclusively on aesthetic grounds. If originally
religion (through its Protestant interpretive methods) produced art, now
the quality of art is called upon to salvage religion.
Cohen’s view of art reached its concise formulation in “On the Aesthetic
Value of Our Religious Education” (c. 1914), where quite appropriately he
called “the Messianic concept of man the basis of modern aesthetics”
(155). This position is explained by “Judaism’s notion of individual man;
for when we speak of the aesthetic value of the Jewish concept of man, we
think primarily of the individual, that is, of his nature and the unity of his
body and soul” (158). If the religious concept of guilt is the origin of the
individual, the autonomous I, then the individual’s aesthetic value inheres
in guilt and Messianic hope. Art is the supreme expression of the Messianic
hope of the subject, who is always the guilty individual. As Cohen sees it,
art is the religion of the individual. “Aesthetic and religious values then are
correlated. For the aesthetic value of our ancient texts is due to their basic
religious significance which, in turn, so affects man’s emotions that he feels
continually driven to express his own religious feelings in new aesthetic
forms” (158). Religion and art reinforce each other, and the proper attitude
to art is the religious one (a position rejected later by Adorno). “We cannot
truly appreciate the aesthetic value of any work of art without experiencing
a sense of reverence for the eternal genius inherent in all creations of abid-
ing aesthetic value. This holds true especially with regard to the Bible,
which awakens in us a feeling of reverence for its religious genius and ap-
preciation for its aesthetic sense” (159). Morality and art are closely related
and should progress together. “The relationship of aesthetics and ethics is
of crucial importance for the aesthetic value of our religious education”
(156). One could go further and envision not just correlation and coopera-
tion of the two but even total identification. Cohen quotes from the Bible
and concludes: “Such sayings of our Messianism, reflecting an unmistak-
able and ingrained sense of aesthetics, tend to eliminate the distinction any
systematic philosophy must make between ethics and aesthetics” (156).
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Although the distinction had been already questioned by French and En-
glish Aestheticism, it is rather interesting to see a Neo-Kantian agreeing in
principle with, say, Oscar Wilde that aesthetics is the modern ethics, and
that the morality of the subject is that of the artist.
The Hebraization of culture in the twentieth century promised the resolu-
tion of antinomies plaguing the relation between ethical tasks and aes-
thetic exercises in the superior synthesis of the praxis of contemplation.
Still, a major issue remained unresolved: Can there be a Hebraic culture at
all? This question has beset modernity repeatedly. For if bourgeois culture
cannot prove its tolerance by hosting an(y) other tradition and establishing
a society of equality based on shared sentiments and practices, it has no
universality, and therefore no validity. This challenge creates the anxiety of
assimilation. Those who have not been entirely convinced that such a soci-
ety can be created fear that “American Jewish culture is at best as much an
oxymoronic phrase as German Jewish culture was” (Bloom 1985: 111) un-
less some qualification is introduced: “[Jewish] Culture in our context
broadly must mean literary culture, if by ‘literary’ one means biblical and
post-biblical written tradition” (109). There seem to be some inhibiting
limitations within Hebrew religion: “The prohibition against images
obliged a channeling into the written word of imaginal energies. Derrida in
this is Hebrew rather than Hellene: aniconic yet intensely graphic” (Hart-
man 1981: 17). This may mean that, in order to establish the Hebraic iden-
tity of culture, Jews have to fight the Greeks not just over texts but over the
very meaning of culture. “The work of reading is a sullen art reacting
against modern iconomania. It may be too panicky a view that there is a
contest between word and image which is being won by the latter” (Hart-
man 1980: 187), since the graphic letter can play an intensely iconoclastic
role. For students of the Hebraic, though, Simmel’s dilemma persists: is
culture a possibility of the tradition or a condition of modernity?
On the subject of aesthetics in Jewish religious thought, “it has been
noted that, however creative Jews have been in such fields as religion, law,
literature, science, and economics, until recent times—that is, until large
numbers of Jews, and with them their artistic traditions, were assimilated
into non-Jewish cultures—no Jewish art was produced, nor were there Jew-
ish artists of any great significance. There can thus be no surprise that there
has never been any body of Jewish literature on art or aesthetics. How then
Jewish aesthetics—that is, a Jewish theory of art?” (Cohen and Mendes-
Flohr 1987: 1). The interdiction of the Second Commandment banished
the world of images and idols, condemning it as pagan mimesis.45 It was
only after questions of representation overcame realist demands that “in
the twentieth century art has finally begun, by divorcing itself from the
pagan aesthetic of nature and from the Christian aesthetic of incarnation,
WRI TING THE LAW 249
to catch up with the aboriginal Jewish aesthetic (for Jews and Gentiles
alike) of a phenomenal world in eternal pursuit of the ideal, divine, or at
least messianic world. . . . In modernism, art is assimilating Judaism” (5–6).
This narrative discovers a disturbing continuity between mimesis and in-
carnation, and finds in the Jewish aesthetics of modernist art another revolt
against idolatry. Its central document is Arnold Schönberg’s opera Moses
und Aron (1930–32), a “sacred fragment” (Adorno) or counter-Parsifal,
which cancels itself into a theological inquiry (Altizer 1982: 149–50). As
“an extended dramatization of Jewish iconoclasm” (Cohen and Mendes-
Flohr 1987: 4),46 it deals with the incommensurability between image
(Bild) and idea (Gedanke)—the inability of representation to present the
“divine idea,” the “idea of One Timeless,” the “Everlasting One.” Schön-
berg shares the conclusion of Karl Kraus in his last poem (1933): “No word
redeems.” Still, as his prophet stutters his way through the desert of pagan-
ism, he never loses his faith in the promised land of the word (Blanchot)—
the transcendence of translation.
Derrida has elaborated an anti-incarnationist theory of Hebraic culture,
beginning with the assertion that “for the Jew and the Poet” space and
language are not defined by the Greek polis. The Biblical “kingdom of
priests” is replaced by culture as the kingdom of Jews. “The thinking of
Being thus is not a pagan cult of the Site, because the Site is never a given
proximity but a promised one. And then also because it is not a pagan cult”
(Derrida 1978a: 145). Both Jew and Poet are destined for the promised land
of language. The same point is amplified in another article of the same
year, “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book” (1964). This is proba-
bly Derrida’s only paper that is not an exercise in critique (deconstruction
or otherwise) but a straightforward aesthetic appreciation—a book review,
in fact, where a literary work recently published is interpreted and evalu-
ated. The article has been rightly placed before “Violence and Metaphys-
ics” in Writing and Difference because the two introduce and complement
each other. Also in this paper, the by-now-familiar literary incarnations of
difference—letter, writing, book, Scripture, Jew—make their first appear-
ance. The traditional romantic culture-nature opposition is here translated
into Scripture-Nature (Derrida 1978: 71), and a new equivalence emerges
which stands Arnold on his head: Culture is Scripture.
The article is characterized by a strong, occasionally strident tone of
French Modernism. Derrida reiterates the Mallarméan “unpenetrated cer-
tainty that Being is a Grammar; and that the world is in all its parts a
cryptogram to be constituted through poetic inscription or deciphering;
that the book is original, that everything belongs to the book before being
and in order to come into the world” (76–77).47 He also affirms the Flauber-
tian textual faith:48 “everything that is exterior in relation to the book,
everything that is negative as concerns the book, is produced within the
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book. The exit from the book, the other and the threshold, are all articu-
lated within the book” (76). Jabès (1912–90) himself has expressed the same
faith in even more extreme terms: “If God is, it is because He is in the
book. . . . The world exists because the book does” (quoted in Handelman
1985: 57).49 Thus Derrida draws freely from the modernist dogma, accept-
ing such principles as the autonomy of the work, the omnipotence of the
author-God (Derrida 1978: 70), and the self-reflexivity of literature.50 In
true formalist fashion he discusses the ways in which “the book becomes a
subject in itself and for itself” and “infinitely reflects itself” (65), while
acknowledging the impossibility of closure (in works like Moses und Aron)
and honoring the suffering of form: “The fragment is neither a determined
style nor a failure, but the form of that which is written” (71). He glorifies
its inconclusiveness and its pain: “Everything enters into, transpires in the
book. This is why the book is never finite. It always remains suffering and
vigilant” (75). Thus the counter-theory of grammatology, which Derrida
developed into a science of gay dialectic, is inspired by modernist writing
and the aesthetic ideal of the Book (of books). In a world infected by sur-
plus (of meaning, value, and production), the pharmakon of the infinite
totality and reflectivity of the autonomous book, autonomous even from
its readings, becomes the model of a general economy: the economy of the
pure aesthetic.
If Levinas reconstructs the encounter at Sinai, Derrida is more inter-
ested in its interpretive aftermath, the fate of the Law in an aesthetic cul-
ture: “The inspired interpreter stands on a mountain apart (like Moses
receiving the tablets) in profound communication with the poet” (Fisch
1977: 64). He shares with every vatic critic “a concern with ‘tablets,’ with
text-centeredness and text-obsessiveness” (Bloom 1982: 329). The Hebra-
ism of the Book is the blissful suffering of the text—a pathology of reading
already captured in Schiller’s notion of the sentimental. The sentimental
reader suffers the pure autonomy of writing which, in its absolute sacred-
ness, has already dispensed with its readers. When the aesthetic approach
prevails, “in the passional regime the book seems to be internalized, and to
internalize everything: it becomes the sacred written Book. It takes the
place of the face and God, who hides his face and gives Moses the inscribed
stone tablets. God manifests himself through trumpets and the Voice, but
what is heard in sound is the nonface, just as what is seen in the book are
words. The book has become the body of passion, just as the face was the
body of the signifier. It is now the book, the most deterritorialized of
things, that fixes territories and genealogies. The latter are what the book
says, and the former the place at which the book is said. . . . In any case, this
is the point of departure for the delusional passion of the book as origin and
finality of the world. The unique book, the total work, all possible com-
binations inside the book, the tree-book, the cosmos-book: . . . Wagner,
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Mallarmé, Joyce, Marx and Freud: still Bibles. If passional delusion is
profoundly monomaniacal, monomania for its part found a fundamental
element of its assemblage in monotheism and the Book. The strangest
cult” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 127). The cult of reading, of total textu-
alization, consumes the body of its passion in rituals of inscription, of cir-
cumcision, and speaks in tongues of commentary and territory.
Derrida’s attention remains fixed on the Palestine of the literary text:
“When a Jew or a poet proclaims the Site, he is not declaring war. For this
site is not the empirical and national Here of a territory. It is immemorial,
and thus also a future. Better: it is tradition as adventure” (Derrida 1978:
66). The real adventure is not Odysseus’ return but the departure into the
immemorial land of interpretive tradition. The poet is a Jew, and Judaism
is writing.51 “The Jew who elects writing which elects the Jew” (65) is des-
tined for the land of the total text, the absolute work. Because he aspires to
survive outside history, “the situation of the Jew becomes exemplary of the
situation of the poet, the man of speech and of writing” (65). They both
live in the “Desert of the Promise” (66), the text: “Autochthons of the
Book. Autonomous too” (67), like the text they read.52 The basis of auton-
omy is no longer contemplation but its object. If, according to the Hebraic
model, the Book made the Jew, then the text makes (its) readers. This is
the Law of Derrida.
Heine’s idea about the Jews as “People of the Book”53 is here elevated
from an ethno-cultural to an aesthetic principle (Eisen 1986).54 The idea
has been basically a narrative of national continuity, like the following one:
“That is to say, it was an obsession with study, a condition of text-centered-
ness, that held the great Diaspora Jewries together. This is the common
element in Babylon-Persia, Alexandria, Arabia-Spain, Provence, Renais-
sance Italy, East Europe and Germany-Austria” (Bloom 1982: 321). Now
this idea becomes the sign of Bildung as election and destiny: “The dwell-
ing assigned, ascribed to Israel is the House of the Book” (Steiner 1985: 5).
Thus the People of the Book are not homeless, because the Book is their
dwelling. After Heidegger, in his essay on Georg Trakl, “Language in the
Poem” (1959), had talked about the “apartness” of the wandering stranger,
Levinas pointed out that the true place of gathering (Greek synagoge, syna-
gogue) was indicated in “the Bible’s permanent saying: the condition (or
the uncondition) of being strangers and slaves in the land of Egypt brings
man close to his neighbor. In their uncondition of being strangers men seek
one another. No one is at home. The memory of this servitude assembles
humanity” (Levinas 1987b: 149). Heidegger, however, had given an aes-
thetic definition of home, arguing, in his commentary on Hölderlin, that
“poetry first causes dwelling to be dwelling. Poetry is what really lets us
dwell” (Heidegger 1971b: 215). Home is where poetry is read and pre-
served. “The poetic is the basic capacity for human dwelling” (228). When
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he talked about the sacred as a dimension of coming to be at home, via
building and dwelling, though, Heidegger meant Heimat, homeland as the
natural home rooted in a rural locality (Applegate 1990). Jabès, whose col-
lected edition of early writings is entitled I Built my Dwelling (1959), re-
versed the order and talked about poetry and departing,55 calling the text
“the fatherland of the Jews” (67). If poetry causes dwelling, then writing is
where one dwells—through exodus rather than return (Gurr 1981). Writ-
ing is the call to dwelling, the election to reading.
Together homelessness and exile constitute a major motif of any theory
of modernity because they reflect the distance of history from Greece, the
only home culture seems to have known. “German philosophy as a whole—
Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, to name the greatest—is the most
fundamental form of romanticism and homesickness there has ever been:
the longing for the best that ever existed. One is no longer at home any-
where; at last one longs back for that place in which alone one can be at
home, because it is the only place in which one would want to be at home:
the Greek world!” (Nietzsche 1967: 225). From Novalis to Lukács, the
agony of displacement cries for return and restitution. This is an expression
of alienation not only from the (Greek) Alien but primarily from a public
that seeks knowledge and gratification elsewhere. The typical aesthetic ges-
ture is to turn this alienation to the moral advantage of the intelligentsia:
“ ‘It is even part of my good fortune not to be a house-owner,’ Nietzsche
already wrote in the Gay Science. Today we should have to add: it is part of
morality not to be at home in one’s home” (Adorno 1974: 39). It is espe-
cially in the bourgeois home, the home one owns, that aesthetic guilt
dictates that one not feel at home. More recently, as the Hebraization of
culture indulges itself in tautology, it has turned its gaze from the home
lost to homelessness to the land promised to exile—from heathenism to
Judaism.
Buber repeated a common formula of the Science of Judaism when he
said that “the most deep-seated humanity of our soul and its most deep-
seated Judaism mean and desire the same thing” (Buber 1967: 55). Derrida,
with his references to “exile as writing” (Derrida 1978: 74), takes this into
the heart of aesthetics: the modern artist, literature and culture, he pro-
claims, are Jewish. In views like this Hebraism has been transformed from
the avant-garde of humanistic acculturation to the avant-garde of aesthetic
culture. The artist emerges as a figura for the Jew.56 This is a pervasive,
although usually veiled, concern: “The ‘thematics of the Jew’ most often
appears in Derrida in sublimated or disguised form. Judaism is a hidden
center and motivation for other issues that might at first glance seem to be
entirely unrelated to it” (Megill 1985: 304).
At the same time, this sublimated thematics remains an integral and
recognizable part of modern identity. We are all going “the way through
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the Desert. Writing is the moment of the desert as the moment of Separa-
tion. . . . God no longer speaks to us; he has interrupted himself: we must
take words upon ourselves” (68). Our plight is quintessentially Jewish: it is
not that the gods have departed, as Hölderlin thought, but that God will
not address us any longer. Thus reading (his Word) and writing (about that
reading) become our tasks. “The Jewish consciousness is indeed the
unhappy consciousness” (68) or the “hypertrophied” one, according to
Levinas; however, it is not only Abraham’s, as Hegel believed, but our own
too. Jabès has already hurled at his readers: “You are all Jews, even the
antisemites, for you have all been designated for martyrdom” (quoted in
Derrida 1978: 75). Other intellectuals (from the Nobel Prize winner Elie
Wiesel to the commix artist Art Spiegelman) have declared that the world
“has become the Diaspora Jew.” This applies to everybody: “After the Holo-
caust, we are all Jews . . . all of us . . . including George Bush, J. Danforth
Quayle, Yassir Arafat, and even Yitzhak Shamir. Now our job is to convince
them of that” (Spiegelman 1989: 22). Where Horkheimer and Adorno
feared that the entire world, including the Jews, had turned anti-Semitic,
Judaism has become (or is on its way to becoming) a universal condition:
all of us, poets and rabbis, are Jews.57 Derrida bestows upon this proclama-
tion its proper aesthetico-theological tone, calling the agent of designation
writing, every interpreter a rabbi, the poet a Jew—and finally (like Adorno
and Horkheimer) anything Greek “anti-Scriptural” (Handelman 1982: 10)
and anti-Semitic.58 The Jew is the poet, the Scripture is the book, exile is
writing, the desert is the Library, the Fall is language, reading is commen-
tary, and all philosophy is interpretation: this is his basic (poetic) narrative
of the human condition—an aestheticist, decadent existentialism, to be
sure, but endowed with the charm of a seductive irreverence toward the
decorum of the profession (whatever Derrida may choose that to be, de-
pending on the occasion) and above all a seemingly irresistible declaration
of aesthetic anti-nomy.
Derrida’s Judaization of textual exegesis sets out and departs from Jabès’
modernist aesthetics. Reading Jabès also serves as an interesting mediation
between Levinas’s phenomenology of faith and his own negative herme-
neutics: it helps ground interpretation in the heteroglossia and repeatabil-
ity of the text itself. Levinas belongs to the phenomenological tradition of
Modernism. His face-to-face encounter is a model of reading derived from
the principles of the modernist artwork—an isolated, direct, supra-histori-
cal communication with the total, overwhelming presence of a perfect, in-
dependent, incarnated voice. “Thus his Talmudic interpretations bear wit-
ness not only to a deep indebtedness to Husserlian principles but also to
Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology” (Wyschogrod 1974: 171). Le-
vinas declares unequivocally the theological identity of his poetics of alter-
ity: “The comprehension of the Other is thus a hermeneutics and an exege-
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sis” (Levinas 1968: 39). At the same time, he has to resort to the discourse
of philosophy to validate his Talmudic science. “It is fundamental to Levi-
nas’ characterization of himself as thinker to disclaim the role of theolo-
gian” (Wyschogrod 1974: 159). Hence the use of the Bible to mediate be-
tween philosophy and religion. Jabès transposes Levinas’s face-to-face to an
encounter with the supreme text but keeps the text’s experience private:
“The Jew remains alone with the divine text. He always faces this text”
(Jabès 1987: 10). The true object of devotion is the Torah: “Facing the text
has replaced facing God” (Jabès 1986: 354). The proper response to the
question is obeying the command of reading: “Whether it is the Bible or
secular texts, man is alone with the text. We have no other reality beside
that which the books give us. This also is one of the ways of Judaism” (Jabès
1987: 11).
Derrida, rejecting the appearance of the face altogether, concentrates on
its two major designations: otherness and writing. He suggests that writing
is not presence and fullness but difference—not peaceful form and repose
but formation through violence, because the work is produced by and situ-
ated within a tradition which it recalls and reactivates and reenacts, and it
acquires meaning only from/as its difference from it. Thus contemplation
as the locus of the aesthetic is replaced not by its object but by the condi-
tion of the object, which is the contemplation of the theoros by it, “the
action of literature on men” (Levinas).
Furthermore, otherness as separation and strangeness is crucial for the
understanding of both Jew and Poet. Derrida considers the conditions that
“made the Jew into the archetypal stranger—on the same grounds as the
writer and any other creator” (Jabès 1987: 8) and the reason why the “his-
tory of the writer and that of the Jew are both but the history of the book
they lay claim to” (Jabès 1985: 27). Thus writing turns gradually from the
homelessness of wandering to the endless deferral of the land and into a
nomadic site (a contradiction in terms): the dwelling of the reader/poet in
the house of the Book.59 The promise which has been kept is not the Logos
of the Gospel but the nomadic (Attali 1990) meaning of the Bible—the
disseminated presence of the supplement of all interpretation. Even here,
though, in the middle of the desert, the shadow of Heidegger, who was
aware of the difference between the Hebraic destination and the Hellenic
destiny, falls heavy on the open pages: “As it reveals itself in beings, Being
withdraws. In this way, by illuminating them, Being sets beings adrift in
errancy. . . . Without errancy there would be no connection from destiny to
destiny: there would be no history. . . . When we are historical we are
neither a great nor a small distance from what is Greek. Rather, we are
in errancy toward it” (Heidegger 1984: 26). The Hebraic separation is
measured by the Hellenic distance, the distance from Greece. That is the
meaning of the trip (Wanderung) to Italy, and especially Freud’s hesitation
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before crossing the Adriatic: for Winckelmann, Goethe, Herder, Shelley,
but also Graves and Henze, it is the errancy toward the Greek (the error of
interpretation). Joyce knew that, if the nomadism of errancy is Hebraic, its
nostalgia is Greek. That is why he, before Levinas, found the idea of a
wandering Greek (in Dublin) implausible.60
Derrida completes the grandiose modernist project of claiming the prac-
tices of literature for the people of the Book. He, like Blanchot (1986: 141)
later, quotes Levinas approvingly: “To admit the action of literature on
men—this is perhaps the ultimate wisdom of the West, in which the peo-
ple of the Bible will be recognized” (Derrida 1978a: 102). Derrida’s ap-
proach to the project is different, though: against Levinas’s Spinozist “nat-
ural atheism” he counterproposes a “negative atheology” (Derrida 1978c:
297)61—a theology without affirmation, apocalypse, or redemption. It is
the theology of the Pharisees, of the interpreters of the letter (whose rise
has been explained by some as a reaction to the Hellenistic culture sup-
ported by the Sadducees). “Jewish praxis, both ritual and ethical, is prior to
understanding. The exemplar of this life is the Pharisee” (Wyschogrod
1974: 167), the custodian of the book—Saul rather than Paul. Derrida con-
tinues Heidegger’s project of the 1930s, “overcoming aesthetics,” but
avoids its pitfall—to use the expression of the other major thinker of the
time involved in the same project, “the aestheticization of politics” (Ben-
jamin). Playing Benjamin against Heidegger, he pursues an aesthetic way of
overcoming aesthetics: “A new transcendental aesthetic must let itself be
guided not only by mathematical idealities but by the possibility of inscrip-
tions in general, not befalling an already constituted space as a contingent
accident but producing the spatiality of space” (Derrida 1976: 290). This is
the postmodernist aesthetic of difference, of the total synchronic availabil-
ity and play of tradition—autonomy as autology. “Deconstruction is essen-
tially a kind of formalism because it interprets as symptoms of a metaphys-
ical syndrome (fissures in a text, structures of supplementarity, positing of
a transcendental signified) what are actually the internal reflections of the
other historical conditions of a text’s production” (Wood 1988: 63). There
is a broad debate regarding the epistemological, artistic, and political direc-
tion of this formalism.
Certain critics (Ulmer 1984) have portrayed Derrida as a postmodern
thinker: “What we seem to find in Derrida is a postmodernist polemic
against modernism in art and criticism” (Megill 1985: 300). To them, he is
the preeminent aesthetician of the postmodern (and one of its illustrious
practitioners), since his concerns focus on the Book as a repeatable origin.
Modernism was ahistorical, formalist, epiphanic: it believed in the eternal,
fulfilled presence of the pure work. Postmodernism, on the other hand,
is not ignorant or innocent of history but rather sees it as the total,
synchronic, undifferentiated presence and availability of tradition. While
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the modernist artwork is about itself and seeks redemption from history
through form, the postmodernist is about tradition and surrounds it-
self happily with history; the former strives to establish its own code, the
latter thrives on borrowed codes (and time).62 The postmodernist work
reflects the experience of the library, where everything is available and
within reach but placed in an order that eliminates any sense of hierarchical
history.63
Other critics, however, have argued that certain radical aspects of con-
temporary art “do not undercut deconstruction so much as they make it,
from their vantage points, wholly irrelevant. In this respect Derrida stands
to postmodern art much as Schoenberg stands to the new consonance: as
an example of a certain intellectualism which is no longer the vogue” (Ra-
paport 1986: 141). His critique of phenomenology has been turned against
his own bracketing of the world within quotation marks: “It is difficult to
see, on this point, why Derrida’s and others’ attacks on structuralism for its
courting of formalism and historical aridity do not apply to Derrida as well.
Derrida’s deconstructive project is formalist through and through. Its syn-
chronic desire for ‘the greatest totality,’ for dialogue with a unified tradition
(logocentrism), defeats its would-be historicist disposition” (Lentricchia
1980: 177). To the extent that he works simultaneously within and against
tradition (Melville 1986), practicing and discrediting critique, Derrida re-
mains strategically ambivalent about the adventures of Enlightenment and
the pleasures of culture. “Technically, then, deconstruction would be bet-
ter described as neo-structuralism rather than post-structuralism” (Boly
1988–89: 180). Whether he is erotically teasing his readers or playing Judas
to the Logos (Derrida 1986b: 33a), his is the ethic of tempting the tempta-
tion which, as Levinas taught, is philosophy. In his discussions of authors,
“Derrida constitutes himself . . . as the other’s temptation” (Harpham
1987: 266). To the extent that he remains faithful to the possibility of
culture, he sides with the unfinished agenda of modernity; but to the ex-
tent that he confounds this by questioning the possibility of assimilation,
he works within the framework of a skepticist Modernism. “Derrida be-
longs squarely within the tradition of modernism, where modernism is
taken as a movement from presence to self-presence. So modernism in
painting is the movement whereby painting comes to have painting, repre-
senting and seeing, as its object; literary modernism is the literary question-
ing of the practice of writing literature. Derrida is a philosophical modern-
ist with a difference; he does not ask the question ‘What is thinking?’ but
rather the literary question ‘What is writing?’ in philosophy” (Bernstein
1987: 104). In general, “Derrida’s programmatic hesitation toward his his-
torical situation” (Said 1978: 700) expresses his ambivalence about Hellas,
the Protestant allonym for civil emancipation: if Greek is the language of
philosophy, then it must be spoken at the House of the Book; and yet the
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Book cannot be assimilated into the allochthonous (Hellenic) culture but
has to be preserved in difference to it. In Protestantism, where understand-
ing is the result of a happy fall, the theory of interpretation becomes a
sermon, a sermon on error, because interpretation is by definition in error,
an errancy from the text to which it claims to come so close, an errancy in
the sea (Odysseus) or the desert (exile). Errancy is true homeliness.
If Heidegger thought that the time of poetry does not have a history, Der-
rida knows only the time of the library and interpretation:64 this, he argues,
is the eternal time of Jewish history. Beyond the disciplines of reading he
has no interest in cultural or social practices: his consideration of institu-
tionality stops where the yearning for the innocence of (and the pain of
separation from) the Other (language) begins.65 “[W]hatever his more re-
cent pronouncements, Derrida himself has hardly been remarkable for his
‘institutional’ as opposed to discursive analyses, and is thus performatively
askew to what he claims in ways of interest to deconstructive criticism”
(Eagleton 1986: 79). His position is again programmatically ambivalent
and strategically ambiguous: “On the one hand, Derrida has repeatedly
insisted on the political character of deconstructionist practice: ‘it is not
neutral,’ he assures us, ‘it intervenes.’ On the other hand, he has been
rather evasive about just which politics, or approach to politics, it in-
volves. . . . Thus, the debate concerning deconstructionist politics stems in
no small measure from Derrida’s unwillingness or inability to ‘decide’ it by
word or example” (McCarthy 1989–90: 146). Despite the flaunted unde-
cidability of meaning, margin, and measure, “the ‘radicality’ of deconstruc-
tion,’ as Derrida conceives it, inexorably carries it in the direction of the
ineffable, and that, while this may be harmless enough when dealing with
metaphysics, it is seriously disabling where morals and politics are con-
cerned” (147).66 After all, the mythic figure of the vatic critic who struggles
heroically and in vain to overcome uncertainty and doubt (Mileur 1990)
and the complementary one of the “antinomian” (Oscar Wilde) artistic
critic who sees style as incarnation are too familiar since the reactions of
Herder or Wordsworth to the French Revolution. As a contemporary form
of professionalized “cultural prophecy” (Bloom 1982: 318)—namely, au-
toscopic critique—“it seems that deconstruction is, despite its ‘radical’ im-
pulses and procedures, truly conservative. . . . It is the quintessence of de-
construction that it responds to the decline of academic literary criticism
by inscribing within the academy a project of preservation” (Bové 1983:
17). Before a broader assessment of this project can be made, a study is
needed relating deconstruction to the Reconstructionism of Mordechai
Menahem Kaplan (1881–1983), which considers Judaism as a cultural so-
cial totality. What is already clear is that the iconolatric promise of emanci-
pation has been replaced by the iconomachic ideal of resistance. “In this
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respect, dissidence is less a set of social and political values than a cultural
ethics” (Marx-Scouras 1987: 107).
Derrida moves from the synchrony of the structure, which fascinated the
structuralist grammarians, to the structure of synchrony, which gives free
entry to any library or museum in the world (as always, to those who have
the leisure to seek it). And since Postmodernism is fundamentally about
playing (games, roles, works, fashions, codes, genders, arms, etc.), he
chooses to perform the part of the Pharisee (Saul) , one of “those misun-
derstood men of literality” (Derrida 1978a: 68), aspiring to become a (per-
formance) artist of tradition67 (playing, for example, Plato to Nietzsche’s
Socrates, or Moses to Levinas’s Abraham), not a philosopher of history
(like all his predecessors in modernity). “To be a Jew is to believe in the
intelligence of the Pharisees and their masters. It is through the Talmud’s
intelligence that we accede to the Bible’s faith” (Levinas 1990: 136). Since
Derrida, like the Jew and the Poet, is elected by writing, he chooses to live
not in history but in (its) tension, the tension of emancipated tradition:
between literality and allegory, nominalism and literalism, philosophy and
messianism, the polis and the Land, Hellenism and Hebraism. It is what he
calls the violence within metaphysics, the war within discourse, but should
rather be seen as the postmodernist aesthetic exercise: interpretation cruis-
ing cable TV channels, touring the shopping mall, pillaging the tradition,
plundering the canon. “In this regard, the fetishizing of multiplicity, differ-
ence, aporia, undecidability merely masks behind another image or myth
the secret deployment of the ruling culture’s real power: that power gener-
ated by its own production of surpluses. . . . Play, laughter, and carnival
merely parody the freedom, the luxury, of the ruling class. . . . The surplus
of the ruling class, however, is the origin and end of production, the perpet-
ual ‘holiday’ that structures internally the means of labor” (Rowe 1985–86:
49–50). The aesthetic education of man, which used to involve the Grand
Tour or attentive museum pilgrimages, now takes the form of learning to
bid at auctions. But then autonomy has always invested in art.
The interplay of Hebraism and Hellenism as conceived by Derrida should
be examined within this broad post-industrial, consumerist context, in-
fused with the rampant hedonism of figures (as opposed to the modernist
asceticism of forms). Significantly, the violence and the antagonism be-
tween the two appear rather one-sided: although the tension is assumed to
develop between the Greek and the Jewish, only the latter seems to experi-
ence it: the Jewish is difference, but the experience of difference is exclu-
sively Jewish too.68 “There are the Jews and there is something else. But
what complicates things is that the ‘something else’ is also Jewish” (Vidal-
Naquet 1980: 97). Above the supremacy of the Hebraic perspective, the Jew
is endowed with divine qualities. “Whether he is Being or the master of
beings, God himself is, and appears as what he is, within difference, that is
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to say, as difference and within dissimulation” (Derrida 1978: 74). The
same can be said about the Jew who is, “to purloin Heidegger’s image, ‘the
shepherd of being’” (Steiner 1985: 7)—both trace and difference, absence
and supplement, the writing of the Scripture and the letter of metaphysics.
“The Jew is responsible for all creation” (Wyschogrod 1974: 166). This is
his command and task. “God, after all, like [Joyce’s] Poldy, is Jewish”
(Bloom 1986: 4). The Jew lives in exile and separation, difference and nega-
tivity. “This difference, this negativity in God is our freedom” (Derrida
1978: 67), as well as the very possibility of literature. Thus liberation is
understood aesthetically: its Romantic means have become its postmodern
ends. If “God separated himself from himself in order to let us speak” (67),
so does man separate himself from himself at his most Jewish and divine
moment, that of creating literature: “Life negates itself in literature only so
that it may survive better. So that it may be better. It does not negate itself
any more than it affirms itself: it differs from itself, defers itself, and writes
itself as différance” (78). Like Abraham, who deferred his homeland, and
like the Jew, who is split between the two dimensions of the letter, literary
writing separates itself from itself in order to give God back His words. “I
assert that writing is a revolutionary act, a scrupulously Jewish act, for it
consists in taking up the pen in that place where God withdrew Himself
from His words, it consists indefinitely in pursuing a utopian work in the
manner of God who was the Totality of the Text of which nothing subsists”
(Jabès, quoted in Handelman 1985: 65). Here Derrida’s romantic equiva-
lence connecting God, Judaism, and literature is repeated with a postmod-
ernist vengeance: Scripture, having long ago claimed (bourgeois) morality,
now claims culture. If Hebraism was allegorized by Romanticism and subli-
mated by Modernism, with Postmodernism it has been wholly identified
with the aesthetic attitude.
This development, inaugurated by the rehabilitation of figura in Mime-
sis, marks the return of the sacred back to reading after it was expelled by
Higher Criticism two centuries ago. For the first time since early Romanti-
cism, the subject is raised explicitly: “Our relation to literature is a sacred,
sacralizing moment, at least by virtue of the fact that a literary text is a text
in which the distinction between the signifier and the signified, let’s say to
be brief, or between form and content, is impossible” (Derrida 1985a: 24).69
Since the “transvaluation of sacred symbols into secular norms” (Fisch
1977: 68) and during the long era of aesthetic education, literature, as the
secular scripture, has been the beneficiary of textual faith. Its appreciation
provided a new dispensation—the satisfaction of individual independence
and the promise of personal salvation. “The aesthetic is thus the wan hope,
in an increasingly rationalized, secularized, demythologized environment,
that ultimate purpose and meaning may not be entirely lost. It is the mode
of religious transcendence of a rationalistic age” (Eagleton 1990: 88). The
“sanctification of literature” (Fisch) legitimized interpretation as a secular,
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self-governing practice. With the Hebraization of culture, sacrality gradu-
ally returns to interpretation, this time as the already-interpreted: “What
comes to pass in a sacred text is the occurrence of a pas de sens. And this
event is also the one starting from which it is possible to think of the poetic
or literary text which tries to redeem the lost sacred and there translates
itself as in its model” (Derrida 1985: 204). Literature and Scripture to-
gether find their common origin in writing: “And that, which holds for the
literary text or the sacred text, perhaps defines the very essence of the liter-
ary and the sacred, at their common root” (186). This return of the sacred
has been made possible, to a large extent, by a particular kind of anti-
Hellenism, the attack on myth.70 When Walter Benjamin (1969) criticizes
the “aestheticization of politics” or Lacoue-Labarthe (1990) proposes that
National Socialism can be seen as a “national aestheticism” in so far as it
“fictionalized” politics by conceiving the nation-state as a self-organizing,
self-producing work of art, what these writers really object to (and resent)
is mythification, the fact that politics appropriated myth. For them, the
supreme form, indeed conduct, of politics is culture: politics should not be
aestheticized because it taints aesthetics—the supreme politics. That is
why Lyotard (1988) finds Auschwitz a horrible artwork; that is also why
Hartman is haunted by “an ever-present suspicion of political solutions to
aesthetic problems. Hartman is troubled by the politics of art, though more
because he fears the degradation of art by politics than the aestheticizing
of politics in works of art” (Sprinker 1983: 59). The return of the sacred to
the Scripture is intended to make the Biblical connection of literature visi-
ble again. As Derrida’s narrativization of philosophy shows, literature is
more than holy writing: it is sacred history.
Consequently, the discipline of Grammatology, one of the postmodern
branches of the Science of Judaism, prescribes that the task of reading in a
scriptural culture is an a-theistic commentary: the aesthetic repetition of
the Bible. To borrow the conclusion of Hölderlin’s hymn to impossible
nearness, “Patmos”:
what the Father
Who reigns over all loves most
Is that the solid letter
Be given scrupulous care, and the existing
Be well interpreted
(Hölderlin 1980: 477)
Commentary is the spirit of the law in the House of the Book, as Scholem
taught. “Against both the Jewish existentialists and their rationalist pre-
decessors, Scholem asserts that commentary and not theology is the
correct discipline for understanding Jewish tradition” (Biale 1979: 98).
Like Judaism, theology cannot be assimilated. Commentary, however, the
Hebraic discipline of contemplation qua praxis, may reoccupy the answer
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position left vacant by the defunct askeses of Bildung. “The necessity of
commentary, like poetic necessity, is the very form of exiled speech. In the
beginning is hermeneutics” (Derrida 1978: 67). The interminable, subser-
vient, belated task of commentary, “the interpretive imperative” (67), fol-
lows from Derrida’s conflation of theology and aesthetics, and articulates
the new nomos, an interdiction against freedom. “In this activity known as
commentary which tries to transmit an old, unyielding discourse seemingly
silent to itself, into another, more prolix discourse that is both more ar-
chaic and more contemporary—is concealed a strange attitude towards lan-
guage: to comment is to admit by definition an excess of the signified over
the signifier; . . . but to comment also presupposes that . . . by a superabun-
dance proper to the signifier, one may . . . give voice to a content that was
not explicitly signified. By opening up the possibility of commentary, this
double plethora dooms us to an endless task that nothing can limit. . . .
Commentary rests on the postulate that speech (parole) is an act of ‘trans-
lation,’ that it has the dangerous privilege images have of showing while
concealing, and that it can be substituted for itself indefinitely in the open
series of discursive repetitions. . . . This is an exegesis, which listens,
through the prohibitions, the symbols, the concrete images, through the
whole apparatus of Revelation, to the Word of God, ever secret, ever be-
yond itself. For years we have been commenting on the language of our
culture from the very point where for centuries we had awaited in vain for
the decision of the Word” (Foucault 1975: xvi–xvii). In an era when all the
world is a library, interpretation is the play of prayer, prayer as play and
ploy: “The original opening of interpretation essentially signifies that there
will always be rabbis and poets” (Derrida 1978: 67). Derrida’s agenda for
postmodernist criticism is simple: interpret—pray, play, and plunder. His
(narrativization of) philosophy amounts to a virtuoso affirmative critique
of modernist/formalist/structuralist aesthetics and a defense of the favorite
postmodernist pastime, turning the hierarchy into a junkyard. Others be-
fore him (like Roland Barthes) did it with pleasure, but Derrida was the
first to do it with faith, proposing that form should be discarded because it
is Greek. Answering the life-long concerns of Lukács and Croce, he declares
that difference is the “formation of form” (Derrida 1976: 63), the possi-
bility of philosophy, the Hebraic otherness of culture. His invocation of a
synchronic, scriptural, tautological, undifferentiated tradition effectively
promised the ultimate liberation—delivery (without transcendence) from
history. But the unanswered question remains: why history and whose
history?
Part of the Levinas-Derrida dialogue about the meaning and mission of
Judaism involves a disagreement over history. For Levinas, history is a
nightmare of violence. War, the purest experience of pure Being, consti-
tutes the experience of the movement of history. “We do not need obscure
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fragments of Heraclitus to prove that being reveals itself as war to philo-
sophical thought, that war does not only affect it as the most potent fact,
but as the very patency, or the truth, of the real” (Levinas 1969: 21). The
conduct of war and the affairs of the polis are closely connected. For Le-
vinas, as for Buber and Benjamin—and more recently in books expressing
fear of Greek politics and thought, like I. F. Stone’s The Trial of Socrates
(1988) or Joseph Heller’s Picture This (1988)—the Hellenic, after its ostra-
cism from the realm of culture, is identified with the mask of paganism and
barbarism, the political. “The art of foreseeing war and of winning it by
every means [is] politics” (21). War and politics are denounced as lan-
guages of ontology and games of power. Levinas repeats a claim already
made by Adorno: “Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power”
(46). The social moment, which Kierkegaard represented with Agamem-
non’s public space of decision regarding (the Trojan) war, politics, and
power, is here rejected as the tyranny of history. Levinas, too, seeks an
alternative in the privacy of the encounter, in the ethical responsibility of
the subject toward the personal call. “In political life, taken unrebuked,
humanity is understood from its works—a humanity of interchangeable
men, of reciprocal relations” (298). But justice is not based on reciprocity.
Politics and ethics are contradictory. “Politics must always be criticized
starting from the ethical” (Levinas 1985: 80). Levinas reverses Heidegger’s
reduction of ethics to ontology, making the ethical prior to all judgment:
“Morality is not a branch of philosophy, but first philosophy” (Levinas
1969: 304). Its function is annunciatory: “Morality will oppose politics in
history and will have gone beyond the functions of prudence or the canons
of the beautiful to proclaim itself unconditional and universal when the
eschatology of messianic peace will have come to superpose itself upon the
ontology of war” (22). The goal is one of “liberating truth of its cultural
presuppositions” (Levinas 1987a: 101), from its social construction which
threatens to render it local and relative.71 The threat of a new nominalism
appears imminent: “The saraband of innumerable and equivalent cultures,
each justifying itself in its own context, creates a world which is, to be sure,
de-occidentalized, but also disoriented” (101). For the philosopher, only
the centrality of western thought functions as a firm reference point in
today’s confused world. “I think that Europe is the Bible and Greece. This
is not colonialism—the rest can be translated” (Levinas 1988: 174).72 Be-
yond colonialism and Eurocentrism, above society and history, “before cul-
ture and aesthetics, meaning is situated in the ethical, presupposed by all
culture and all meaning. Morality does not belong to culture: it enables one
to judge it” (Levinas 1987a: 100). Politics, however, is far from eliminated:
as an ethical system, it becomes state politics, the politics of divine law: “In
the measure that the face of the Other relates us with the third party, the
metaphysical relation of the I with the Other moves into the form of the
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We, aspires to a State, institutions, laws, which are the source of universal-
ity. . . . Metaphysics therefore leads us to the accomplishment of the I as
unicity by relation to which the work of the State must be situated, and
which it must take as a model” (Levinas 1969: 300). Thus ontology (as well
as cultural nominalism) are transcended through an eschatology, the ethics
of the supreme commandment—what Levinas has called “monotheistic
politics.”73
There is a judgment, however, outside the teleology of history, that of
the prophet, which lifts individuals outside secular jurisdiction. The
prophet of Israel is the voice of justice. “The prophetic word says both the
ethical language of the face and the language of justice which belongs to
society. It therefore says more than philosophy can say, for the saying with-
out the said of the ethical call would seem always to be beyond it” (Bernas-
coni 1988b: 257). The eruption of the ethical dimension into social life
removes the subject from the realm of culture and politics: “The idea of
infinity delivers the subjectivity from the judgment of history to declare it
ready for judgment at every moment” (Levinas 1969: 25) the command
calls. Subjectivity is that invisible side of human action ignored by history.
Prior to the Logos which regulates the cosmos is the prophetic word which
establishes the possibility of language and law. This is the prophetic exteri-
ority. The prophetic is the non-contextual word which judges history from
without. “It is not the last judgment that is decisive” (23), as Christianity
taught; eschatology should be “distinguished from the revealed opinions of
positive religions” (23) which work with a logic of apocalypse and salvation.
“The eschatological, as the ‘beyond’ of history, draws beings out of the
jurisdiction of history and the future” (23).
For Hermann Cohen, the prophetic tone had not become an exteriority
yet. In “The Social Ideal as Seen by Plato and by the Prophets” (1916), the
comparison of the two “spiritual guides of mankind” (Cohen 1971: 77) is
made within the secular realm. “Plato and the prophets constitute the two
most important wellsprings of modern culture” (66). The modes of cogni-
tion they express correspond to the two elements fundamental for every
harmonious society. “A social ideal represents a fusion of two basic compo-
nents: a scientific mode of cognition and an ethics formalized as religion.
Plato is and remains a symbol of the former, and the prophets are and
remain that of the latter” (66). Plato developed a philosophy of knowledge
based on his theory of ideas, while the prophets concentrated on man and
sought the development of his social conscience: he dealt with science,
they cultivated morality.
Cohen expands on this basic opposition through three major distinc-
tions concerning history, society, and suffering. “History is in the Greek
consciousness identical with knowledge simply. Thus, history for the Greek
is and remains directed only toward the past. In opposition, the prophet is
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the seer, not the scholar. . . . The prophets are the idealists of history. Their
vision begot the concept of history, as the being of the future” (Cohen
1972: 261–62). This is the first, theoretical advantage of prophetism: its
orientation toward the future. The second advantage is practical. “For
prophetism tolerates no discrimination against men, and no differentiation
among them” (Cohen 1971: 75). On the contrary, Plato, with his system
“which regards intellect and reason as the sole principles of cognition” (74),
differentiates among men according to their capacity to philosophize, and
has to appeal to the supreme authority of one ruler, his philosopher-king.
The third advantage of the prophets is ethical and is exemplified in their
understanding of suffering. In tragedy, as Kierkegaard observed in his dis-
cussion of Antigone, suffering is punishment for primordial guilt, and
therefore results from fate. The prophets, however, introduced the pres-
ence of the benevolent God who cares about the human weakness of the
sinner. “The God of the prophets is the God of justice” (73) and not of
blind tragic fate. “He is the God of world history, and therefore, will at
some time make amends to mankind for the suffering of the individual”
(73). Thus suffering is justified, and recognized for its value.
Cohen’s dedication to the Platonic ideal remains strong and thorough:
“Human compassion is no substitute for knowledge. Without philosophy,
mankind’s suffering cannot be ended; knowledge must become the corner-
stone of the world’s social structure. Without it, the cause of man’s misery
will never be found, let alone eliminated; nor will man be redeemed from
its suffering” (74). For the elimination of suffering, both science and mo-
rality, “philosophy” and “religion” (Cohen 1972: 9), are necessary, and man
must learn and live with both. “Broadly speaking, we might say that world
history fluctuates between these two basic orientations, the Platonic and
the prophetic, with their conflicts as well as their interactions. In our time,
we must gain a twofold insight” (Cohen 1971: 76). “Cohen’s goal was the
same as that of the other Western spokesmen for Judaism who came after
Mendelssohn: to establish a harmony between Judaism and culture, be-
tween Torah and derekh eretz” (Strauss 1983a: 235). At the same time,
regarding the world that must be prepared, the future that must be built,
Cohen’s position is unambiguous: “ ‘All the people a nation of priests’—
this fundamental prophetic principle must become the motto of the new
world” (76). The moral society of the prophets is the world science/philoso-
phy must help create. From the first three chapters of Spinoza’s Tractatus
to Cohen, and from Bloch to Cornel West (1953), theologians of moder-
nity have found in prophetism a most inspiring emancipatory model.
In Levinas’s eschatological view, the People of the Book do not expect—
they anticipate. Rosenzweig’s “eternal people” possess not a land but the
longing for a land, and therefore the future. That is why they are eternally
unhistorical. “To be a Jew, for Levinas, is to exist ‘outside of history,’ in the
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sense of retaining the ability to judge” (McCollester 1970: 351). The Jew,
the shepherd of Being who is responsible for the entire creation, judges
history instead of being judged by it.74 For this reason, he has not been
tainted by Hellenic politics. “As the Church entered politics she was often
conquered by the very paganism she was trying to convert. Judaism, the
victim of power, remained undefiled by the paganism of power” (351). Ex-
amining contemporary thought, Levinas concludes that his epoch marks
the triumph of paganism, of the attachment to the homeland. “In Hei-
degger atheism is a paganism, the presocratic texts anti-Scriptures” (Le-
vinas 1987: 53). This raises once again the question of western superiority
and the importance of the Scripture for it: “Are not we Westerners, from
California to the Urals, nourished by the Bible as much as by the Pre-
socratics” (Levinas 1987b: 148), he asks, wondering about the Greek limits
of philosophy and the fate of Biblical translations. “The verses of the Bible
do not here have as their function to serve as proofs; but they do bear
witness to a tradition and an experience. Do they not have a right to be
cited at least equal to that of Hölderlin and Trakl? The question has a more
general significance: have the Sacred Scriptures read and commented on in
the West influenced the Greek scripture of the philosophers, or have they
been united to them only teratologically?” (148). At this juncture, Levinas
makes a major decision: faced with the threat of innumerable and equiva-
lent cultures, he denounces “the artist’s world, the pagan world” (Levinas).
Judaism, maintaining itself on the margins of history, refuses to be seduced
by art and has no need for aesthetics. “We alone in the world desire a
religion without culture” (Levinas). The true monotheist breaks radically
with the idolatry of civilization. Not for him the luxury of ambiguity, the
ambivalence of assimilation: “There is no Jewish aesthetic, and cannot be,
because of the deep and permanent warfare between Yahweh and all idola-
try whatsoever, and yet we cannot deny the aesthetic strength of the He-
brew Bible, since its spiritual authority is inseparable from its rhetorical
power” (Bloom 1985: 118). Levinas turns decisively against art, culture,
history, politics, and global equality, siding with an ethnic identity which
for him is ontologically primary because fundamentally ethical.
This is the decisive move against alien wisdom that makes Derrida disso-
ciate himself from eschatology. He charges that Levinas’s system amounts
to a new religion, requiring man’s unqualified submission to the divine will.
His face-to-face, as a model of human encounter, “supposes the face-to-
face of the man with bent neck and eyes raised toward the God on high”
(Derrida 1978a: 107). Levinas needs God as a positive Other to guard
against disorder. “This is why God alone keeps Levinas’ world from being
a world of the pure and worst violence, a world of immorality itself” (107).
Because he sees anarchy as a threat, he posits God as an outsider to guaran-
tee and protect the finite totality and order of human experience. Derrida
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interprets Levinas as an apocalyptic thinker, whose eschatology envisions a
triumph against the powers of evil. He finds that Levinas’s understanding
of Sinai as face-to-face has overly strong Christian overtones. The failure of
Levinas’s virulent attack on Christianity proves that rejections of the Prot-
estant Logos as the sin of Greek language are always already expressed in
Hellenic terms.75 Derrida criticizes the acceptance of revelation (apokalyp-
sis) as unveiling of truth by Heidegger and Levinas. True Jewish faith, he
counters, is messianic (that is, grounded in deferral), not apocalyptic
(based on epiphany).76 “Man, one might say, is a God arrived too early, that
is, a God who knows himself forever late in relation to the already-there of
Being” (107). Between the too-early and the too-late, between the messi-
anic and the always already, develops this tension which Derrida allegorizes
as the Hebraic-Hellenic antagonistic interdependence, and calls human
history. Its discipline ought to be Grammatology, and its method decon-
struction, namely, the un-Greeking of philosophy and the Judaizing of the
aesthetic: disassembling the Hellenic and appropriating it (making it
speak) for the Hebraic. Derrida realizes that Levinas’s wholesale con-
demnation of history runs the danger of denouncing the major contempo-
rary Hebraic victory, the conquest of culture in the twentieth century. For
the Hebraic to be saved from the judgment of history and the equality of
cultures, it should not be exempted from comparisons and made the su-
preme arbiter of ethics; on the contrary, Derrida’s strategy is to promote it
to an aesthetic model by showing how it can incorporate Greek art—
indeed, how it incarnates Hellenic Bildung. The familiar rhetorical tactic
insists that the “letter” is the authentic “spirit” and that the “law” is the
true “faith.”
Derrida’s disagreement with Levinas over the character of Judaism77
(which has to be established with reference to the Greekness of philoso-
phy) is only a recent chapter in a long story that can be traced at least as far
back as J. G. Hamann’s critique of Mendelssohn—the story of the self-
definition of modernity with reference to its intrinsic other, the Hebraic.
“The question must be asked: is contemporary life the adversary or the
double of Jewish consciousness?” (Wyschogrod 1974: 161). Ever since the
Moderns defeated the Ancients, this has been the “Jewish question,” that
of universal successful assimilation into the bourgeois rule of self-govern-
ment through rigorous contemplation. Levinas’s effort to liberate Judaism
from the ontic determinations of being and time (i.e., culture and history)
has largely relied on a particular exploration of the question—the dialogue
between Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber. During the 1940s and early
1950s, when Levinas’s work consisted primarily in a polemic against Hei-
degger which turned destruktion against Dasein, the (usually unack-
nowledged) presence of Rosenzweig’s existential religion in his system was
indispensable.78 “For Levinas and the group of French Jewish thinkers
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grouped under the name of the ‘Paris school,’ Rosenzweig is the chief influ-
ence and inspiration. For Levinas, Buber represents a different tendency in
Jewish thought and spiritually is often more an antagonist than a master”
(McCollester 1970: 344). This is true so far as certain issues are concerned,
especially the Law. “Levinas was initially preoccupied with differentiating
or separating his own position from that of Buber” (Bernasconi 1988b:
100). Starting with the dominance of the éthique in his work in the late
1950s in reaction to the influence of Simone Weil, however, the former
antagonist becomes more of a master. With Totality and Infinity (1961),
Levinas feels that, by returning to Kierkegaard’s ethics of subjectivity, he
has adequately responded to Heidegger’s historicization of Parmenides,
and begins directly addressing the religious inspiration of his writings.
Thus he “consciously declares himself a participant in twentieth century
Jewish philosophical tradition” (McCollester 1970: 344). Levinas now seeks
to go beyond Rosenzweig’s concept of redemption, which he finds depend-
ent on salvation, rather than justice. He also seems more determined to
resist Christian temptation, and makes no attempt to reconcile it with Ju-
daism. To that effect, Buber’s adamant refusal to negotiate provides a
model of consistency: there can be no dialogue with Christianity—the face
of the Other is only that of God. Levinas’s theology of the encounter recu-
perates the theology of I and Thou (1922) by Martin Buber (Levinas 1967
and 1984). Both are efforts to substitute for the public light of the social
life the private response to the revealed, yet hidden, face of divinity—the
God of the Protestant (immanent) reading. For both, the real apocalypse
is interpretive rather than divine—the revelation of the concealed accord-
ing to the principle of secrecy: “The sources, the roots, of being lie, in fact,
in that which is hidden and not in that which is revealed: Deus est Deus
absconditus (God is a hidden God)” (Shestov 1966: 434).
Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929), who studied in Berlin under Hermann
Cohen and wrote the preface to his posthumous three-volume Jewish Writ-
ings (1924), felt that his teacher’s Judaization (Cohen and Mendes-Flohr
1987: 5) of Kantianism at the turn of the century represented the most
important breakthrough in the Science of Judaism since its establish-
ment—the end of its first, historicist phase. Thus, when he attended in
1929 the university conference on Kant in Davos, which culminated in the
famous debate between Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer, he rightly saw Cas-
sirer, Cohen’s legitimate inheritor, as the representative of the ossified
Marburg tradition, and Heidegger as the true heir to Cohen’s later break
with idealism. Following his teacher’s lead, Rosenzweig worked on a “hy-
giene of return” to Judaism for the alienated Jew of advanced modernity,
seeking to contribute to her spiritual health (in ways not entirely different
from Freud’s). In his view, Odysseus has made it to Ithaca but is dissatis-
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fied with his success. The remedy he proposes for the ills of successful
assimilation is a “new thinking”: the philosophy of dialogue where another
type of discourse, Sprechdenken (speech-thought, thinking from language),
replaces the monologic method of old thinking. Rosenzweig acknowledges
that, although Hegel completed the (ancient) project of idealism “from
Ionia to Jena,” the “new thought” cannot transcend the project since it
remains its counter-project: philosophy still speaks Greek (idealism). For
this reason, instead of inventing a new language, he proposes an alternative
way of speaking. “Thus, dialogue with the other person becomes a model
for the relationship between man and God” (Kaufman 1976: 40). Like his
other alienated contemporaries (Wittgenstein, Russell, Freud, Saussure,
Heidegger, Schönberg), he is offering a verbal treatment, an entirely new
grammar, as an alternative to the Greek language of thought. Emphasizing
the temporality of discourse, he finds that thinking properly guided by lan-
guage becomes “grammatical.” Long before Derrida’s Grammatology, he
argues that interpretation, too, must become “grammatical” through a
commentary (in The Star of Redemption) on the story of Creation devel-
oped in opposition to pagan cosmology.
Following the example of the late Cohen, Rosenzweig writes as a philos-
opher-become-theologian (in contrast to Heidegger’s move from Catholic
theology to Protestant philosophy). “Philosophy and theology depend on
each other and together produce a new type of theological philosopher”
(Löwith 1966: 55). The impasse of idealism produces a type of thinker
strongly reminiscent of Hamann (to whose philosophy of language Rosen-
zweig was so indebted): “The philosopher must at the same time be a the-
ologian in order to be capable of understanding eternal truth, both as it is
in itself and as truth for us” (59). Trying to smuggle in Judaism, Rosen-
zweig “takes up theological concepts and reintroduces them into philoso-
phy as ontological categories” (Levinas 1990: 190). Rosenzweig concen-
trates on revelation, his most important theological concept, as the vehicle
of transcendence. Eternity is the present reality for the Jew: Judaism lies
outside history and represents its eschatological goal. “He was deeply
troubled by the fact that Christianity played a more significant role in his-
tory than Judaism. Therefore, he aimed to clearly differentiate Judaism
from Christianity. Yet, at the same time, he wished to maintain that both
Judaism and Christianity are facets of the truth, that both Judaism and
Christianity have a significant role to play in Heilsgeschichte, in sacred his-
tory. And he felt that he could achieve this aim by maintaining that Chris-
tianity is the eternal way whereas Judaism represents eternal life. In other
words, whereas the Jew has his being outside of history anticipating re-
demption, the Christian is forever on the way” (Kaufman 1976: 46). Like
Cohen, Rosenzweig returns to Jerusalem, rather than the Second Critique,
for moral guidance; like Cohen too, he seeks a compromise between the
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two religions. Their meeting ground is the encounter, which is a mutual
responsibility: the I-Thou relationship is reciprocal. Here Rosenzweig ap-
propriates Feuerbach’s critique of Christianity in the name of human un-
derstanding in real life. Feuerbach located the essence of community in the
I-Thou relation. According to Rosenzweig, a person becomes an individual
when he receives a call from the other which has to be answered. The
encounter is historical since Sprachphilosophie means lived speech, that is,
time- and situation-specific. Its character, though, is eschatological: the
dialogical present happens between an “already” and a “not yet.” The for-
mer refers to the “already-being-always-in-existence” of the world; it also
includes a “not yet.” Because communication presupposes trust, the future
is already present in it: “ ‘Thou’ is future” (313). For a consummated en-
counter, anticipation, readiness, and openness to the surprising character
of the future are required by this religious existentialism. This is Rosen-
zweig’s central topic of faith as experience which became Buber’s concept
of meeting. “The dialogical Thou is futural, a future that really approaches
me” (315). One has to make oneself available to this call. Rosenzweig called
his theory of truth the “theory of messianic knowledge.”
During the second decade of the twentieth century, a loose alliance of
thinkers who opposed transcendental philosophy emerged under the name
of “dialogicalism.” “Independent of each other, and of the other docu-
ments from the early period of dialogicalism, are Cohen’s later work com-
posed in the winter of 1917–18, Ebner’s “pneumatological fragments,”
written in the winter of 1918–19, [Gabriel] Marcel’s indications in Journal
métaphysique, which, more or less, from July 1918 on turn on the dialogical
principle, and finally, in essence, also I and Thou itself” (Theunissen 1984:
266). The structure of the movement itself was dialogical: “No less charac-
teristic than the absence of any connection, however, is on the other side,
the close alliance that, especially in the circle around Rosenzweig, made
possible a sumfilosofen, the like of which has rarely occurred in the
history of philosophy” (267). Describing their approach as “new thought,”
the philosophers of dialogue inherit Kierkegaard’s critique of idealism and
call their philosophy a linguistic or grammatical one. Thinking of language
as conversation, however, they emphasize speech, since they see the meet-
ing as a linguistic reality. Thus, when Derrida mentions the pneumatic-
grammatical opposition, he is alluding to Ferdinand Ebner’s Das Wort und
die geistigen Realitäten: Pneumatologische Fragmente (1921) and Schriften
I. Fragmente, Aufsätze, Aphorismen: Zu einer Pneumatologie des Wortes
(1963) or Rosenzweig’s “grammatical” exegesis as much as he is debating
Paul’s distinction between Spirit and Law. Those discussions sought a way
out of Kantian ethics, with its emphasis on individual reason and con-
sciousness, by socializing the subject—by positing conversation as primary
and constitutive of the subject’s identity: “I take the individual to be nei-
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ther the starting point nor even the end point of the human world. But I
take the human person to be the irremovable central location of the battle
between the movement of the world away from God and its movement
toward God” (Buber, quoted in Theunissen 1984: 285). Already in their
work conversation acquires the character of conversion (Buber 1965: 13–
14): both because the meeting, as a happening of the spirit, is usually
epiphanic,79 and especially because the individual experiences this meeting
as a call. That is why the dialogists stress the command, the order: their
Thou is rooted in the imperative; one has no choice but to respond. By
attributing to contemplation the intensity of conversion and a categorical
character, these theories prepare the conditions for the postmodern denun-
ciation of emancipation. Contemplation, defined in terms of an epiphanic
meeting, is already understood as the purest praxis.
Although Buber’s earliest thoughts on the encounter probably go back to
his Hasidic studies around 1905, he was first faced with the challenge of the
Greek limits when he realized that “the thought about the ‘dialogical prin-
ciple’ springs not from a metaphysical experience but from an ‘experience
of faith’ and must, for this reason, first be translated into philosophical
concepts” (269). The origins of the subject are found in the Scripture:
“The biblical leaders are the foreshadowings of the dialogical man, of the
man who commits his whole being to God’s dialogue with the world, and
who stands firm throughout this dialogue” (Buber 1948a: 131–32). Yet
Greek translation requires a philosophical presentation of faith. Thus in-
stead of using Abraham’s trial as a model, Buber (who completed the first
draft of I and Thou in 1919 under the title “Religion as Presence”) aban-
dons his early ecstatic mysticism and follows Ludwig Feuerbach’s anthro-
pology outlined in the Principles of the Philosophy of the Future (reedited in
1922), especially his emphasis on human community and the I-Thou inter-
relationship.80 Buber accepts that the modern Jew is split between the secu-
lar world and his own tradition. As a hygiene of reconciliation, he offers the
encounter with the Other and the overcoming of mediatedness—the meet-
ing character of the between. The relation with man is a simile of the rela-
tion with God. “The Jewish myth is the I-Thou relationship in which the
I is either God or ‘a kingdom of priests and an holy nation’ and the Thou,
conversely, either this chosen people or God” (Bloom 1959: 4). Thus the
goal of Buber’s dialogicalism is a theology of the between. “As ‘theology,’
the philosophy of dialogue, like all great philosophy of religion since Kant,
can only be the philosophy of the kingdom of God” (Theunissen 1984:
384). God is “the existent reality of the between” (383), its ground, possi-
bility, and destination. Man does not possess God: in the encounter, man
is addressed by God (who can only be encountered—neither inferred nor
met). In I and Thou the action of the Other is experienced as “coming to me
and not as going to me” (279). If God is (the) between, the Other is (the)
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coming to the meeting. “Here the Other is precisely the one who comes to
me with his claim, while I have to correspond” (339). This is the Messi-
asproblem (F. von Hammerstein) in Buber’s thought. “Consequently, the
originality of the between in the concrete experience of meeting manifests
itself as the precedence of being spoken to over speaking to” (339). In the
meeting, where man encounters God, he is addressed and seized by the
Messiah’s coming. Dialogue for Buber is not Rosenzweig’s “new thought”
but new history—“the final, messianic overcoming of history” (Buber
1948a: 133) which rejects historical time.
Among the messianic thinkers, only Ernst Bloch (1885–1977) makes a con-
sistent effort to connect the political with the Bible. In the three-volume
Hope the Principle (1954–59)—“the odyssey of a mind from the spirit of
exodus” (Habermas 1983a: 63)—he compares two attitudes to history: “It
is surprising for how long a time the ultimate fear was neither thought nor
dreamed about on the Jewish side. The Jews were as immanently oriented
a people as the Greeks, but one whose life had an incomparably more vigor-
ous direction toward the future, toward goals” (Bloch 1970: 93). What ac-
counts for this difference is the Greek sense of politics as a practice in this
world, history, and society. “The Greek dreams of things to come were
almost always rooted firmly in this world. Life itself was to be improved in
them, without any alien increment, in rational, albeit motley, fashion. The
most remote islands of Greek wish-fulfillment were still located in a contig-
uous world, and so was their happiness. Happiness, along with its institu-
tions, was immanently inserted into existing life and held up to that life
as an example” (125). This holistic description may not be that original
but, as it is meant to elucidate Messianism, it acquires special significance,
since the political dimension of the ancient totality is not forgotten. “No
social utopia was worked out in the Bible” (125), argues Bloch, because
an exodus and a kingdom of a transcendental, transhistorical order was
promised there. In the polis, the future is a matter of uncertain, unpredict-
able negotiation, while in the Bible it is the secured outcome of a trusted
promise.
Bloch looks at Messianism from a different angle and compares the He-
braic and Hellenic attitudes toward the future in a short section called
“Unavoidable and Avoidable Fate; or Cassandra and Isaiah.” Here he finds
that the Greek fate, moira, is inevitable: “doom rolls on even without guilt.
It rolls mechanically, not caused but simply occasioned, and hence inexora-
ble” (205). It is usually experienced as an overwhelming end. “Moira is the
flat, disparate inevitability that brings not only the mind to a standstill but
makes the blood freeze” (205). It constitutes the supreme order in the
universe and nobody is exempt from its workings, not even the gods. “The
very irony of the Greek fate shows how little depends here on the manner
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or direction of human acts” (206). The blind belief and attitude of helpless
mortals is personified in Cassandra. Things are different in the Bible.
Cohen already praised monotheism for severing the link between (collec-
tive) guilt and suffering by making people, as individuals, responsible for
their acts. This possibility is attributed by Bloch (who wrote his doctoral
thesis under Cohen) to the “open space of messianism” (206) and its eth-
ics. Not only is moira not ruling the world: “Fate is completely capable of
being changed, rather; Isaiah, above all, teaches that it depends on the
morality of men and on their decisions. This is the active antithesis to the
Greek seer, especially to the mere passive despair of Cassandra’s vision: in
the Bible fate hangs in the balance, and the weight that finally decides is
man himself” (206). Biblical fate is not static or finite, it never decides in
the absence of man. “It is not categorical but hypothetical” (207), and its
potential actualization depends on human freedom and faith—the “belief
in a God of time” (207) and the space of independence and free will it
produces. The fate of the believer flows from his faith. There is a divine
commandment inserted there. “And yet this moral insert in the mode of
fate opened a countermove of freedom noticeably different from Cassandra,
from mere impotent foreknowledge, from what is called prophecy outside
the Bible” (207). Bloch is talking about the moral freedom blessed by faith
for which Shestov yearned. His Messianism, however, has a different aim in
that it seeks to justify the absence of a social utopia from a future-oriented
book like the Bible. According to Bloch, the reason that Biblical religion,
despite its message of individual freedom and responsibility, was never
concerned with a better world—while Greek thought, despite its pervasive
fatalism, explored (and experimented with) the idea—is that the messi-
anic vision saw a God in time who redeems man from history. In Bloch’s
picture, it is not so much the question of fate that matters as the differ-
ence between hope and utopia, Messianism and politics, transcendence
and contingency.
Bloch calls Marxism “the leap from the Kingdom of Necessity to that of
Freedom” (Bloch 1972: 69). With this religious conception, he returns the
sacrality of the secular scripture to its source: “So far as it is, in the end,
possible to read the Bible with the eyes of the Communist Manifesto” (69).
He takes this interpretive path resolutely by trying to go behind corrup-
tions in the transmission of the original text which distorted, trimmed,
compromised its subversive potential. “Which means finally, that biblical
criticism needs the broadening that will come from continually tracking
down the interestingly different, rebelliously different readings in the avail-
able text. For nothing could completely efface or conceal the way things
stood before the great redactions” (71). In order to discover the other,
suppressed text, he proposes a hermeneutics called “detective Bible criti-
cism” (73). The task of this criticism will be “to identify and save the
Bible’s choked and buried ‘plebeian’ element” (75). To achieve that, what
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needs to be rejected is a Zeus- or Cronos-like deity, the “doctor of Israel”;
and what needs to be saved is religion as a human utopia. “So the banner
should cry not ‘Demythologize!’—without distinguishing Prometheus or
Baal from the ‘Kerygma’—but ‘De-theocratize!’ Only that can do justice to
the Bible’s still saveable text” (82). The text will be saved through a close,
intrinsic, deconstructive reading of margins and tensions, silences and dif-
ferences, and not the demythologizing attacks of historicism. “With this
vision as sign-post, and therefore with a quite different sort of criticism—
criticism through the Bible—it is possible to see more acutely than ever
that there are in fact two Scriptures: a Scripture for the people and a Scrip-
ture against the people” (83). After the bankruptcy of the historicist ap-
proach, only a Biblical reading can save the Bible. The alternative under-
standing is a literalist one, which marks the textualization of resistance.
The question of translation again inhibits most theologians from doing
justice to eschatology: “It is simply that their systems are bound together
with Greek thought, which is being-oriented and anti-historical, instead of
with the historical thought of the Bible, with its Promise and its Novum—
with the Futurum as an open possibility for the definition of being, right up
to the point of Yahweh himself” (56). Still, even Bloch cannot purify his
own thought when he compares, for example, the idea of god in Aeschylus
and Isaiah (94), or non-conformists in the Bible with Prometheus (36). In
a section entitled “Patient Sufferer or Hebrew Prometheus?” Bloch por-
trays Job, the true rebel who turns against the status quo and invests hope
only in Exodus, as follows: “That is the Titan who challenges God, and who
needs no demi-god to be his champion (after the model of the Greek trag-
edy against Zeus), but who places himself fair and square in the fight and
takes his stand as a man against an enemy he believes to be almighty”
(117). Despite the drive toward an inherently Hebrew understanding, the
problem with Bloch’s messianic politics is that its political, like the lan-
guage of philosophy, remains stubbornly Hellenic.
Levinas’s effort to combine Rosenzweig’s philosophical criticism of on-
tology with Buber’s theology of faith is in reality a compromising mediation
between the two. On the one hand, “Levinas can be interpreted as a de-
scendant of post-Kantian German idealism. For thinkers of this tradition
religion becomes the arena for ethical activity and the proper field for its
expression” (Wyschogrod 1974: 160). On the other hand, he is writing after
Heidegger’s declared hostility to neo-Kantianism which appropriated
dialogicalism for historical thinking. While thinkers like Moritz Lazarus
and Hermann Cohen “give expression to liberal and progressive tenden-
cies, Levinas rejects an interpretation of prophetic futurism which makes
the political arena the sphere of its operation” (160). For him, it is not
enough to Hebraicize the Hellenic—Heidegger’s major contribution to
philosophy—since even that cannot stop barbarism. This is because west-
ern civilization must be purged completely of the Hellenic (in this case, the
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political), and if need be, even the cultural, so that its authentic Hebraic
character can prevail. Derrida, who is more aware of the relation of the
face-to-face with confession, breaks with this existentialist tradition, ex-
posing the structures of personal faith as religious norms, and proposing
the aesthetic disposition as the ethical response proper. Neither redemp-
tive nor apocalyptic, the Hebraic finds in his work a new site, writing. And
yet, through his predecessors’ discussions and disagreements, through so
many returns and revisions, from Bloch and Lukács to Gadamer and
Lyotard, the issues debated by Rosenzweig and Buber regarding the visita-
tions of divine justice have remained alive. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration
to see their dialogue as setting the agenda (and the commensurate anti-
Hellenic tone) for much of twentieth-century interpretive thought. “Ever
since Martin Buber split off Kierkegaard’s view of the existential from Kier-
kegaard’s Christology, and dressed it up as a universal posture, there has
been a dominant inclination to conceive of metaphysical content as bound
to the so-called relation of I and Thou” (Adorno 1973a: 16). Whether it
seeks an “ideal speech situation” (Habermas)81 in a rational society or
Celan’s “Conversation in the Mountains” (to use the title of his 1959
essay); whether it examines humankind’s “dialogical situation” (Niebuhr
1989) or, as in Gadamer’s early writings, proposes a consensus based on
conversation (Sullivan 1990);82 whether it advocates a “dialogical plural-
ism” (Robert Wood) or “dialogism” (Handler 1990) as a model for social
services in the welfare system; whether it relies on Peirce or on Augustine’s
notion of complete knowledge as a “face-to-face” encounter in Book 12 of
the Confessions (400); whether it promotes a “conversation of mankind”
(Michael Oakeshott) or a “cultural conversation” (Richard Rorty), dialogi-
calism has produced a strong research tradition in many disciplines and
major antidotes to political theories of organization and change.
Still, the real history of the Buber-Rosenzweig dialogue and the ensuing
debate is not its evolution over time but the political history that it has
made possible: the historical possibility of Israel, the “date” of Israel with
history, the reality of an Israeli state. Buber’s Zionism, based on “Hebrew
Humanism,”83 envisioned the creation in Palestine of a dialogical state (“an
event in mutuality”)—a state of Gemeinschaften, of communities of dia-
logue. This spiritual understanding of Jewish nationhood has been ex-
panded further: “The suffering of the just for a justice without triumph is
lived as Judaism. Israel, historical and physical, becomes again the religious
category” (Levinas 1979: 218). Justice is a shibboleth.84 “(And I will add as
well, in parentheses, that in its terrifying political ambiguity, Shibboleth
could today name the State of Israel, the state of the State of Israel)” (Der-
rida 1986a: 338). The Zionist controversy informs all Hebraic discussions,
even when their immediate subject happens to be translation, atonement,
or Maurice Blanchot. The “question” for post-Kantians from Cohen to
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Lyotard is the code of justice that would make Israel accountable only to
ethics and not to history.85 The Israeli state as the Other of the nations, the
nation with a right to exist, represents “Israel’s universal vocation which
the state of Zion ought to serve only, to make possible a discourse ad-
dressed to all men in their human dignity, so as then to be able to answer
for all men, our neighbors” (Levinas 1987c: 153). But what happens when
the Book is circumcised by the Land? Can there be an encounter between
law and politics? “The meaning of Israel has lost its unique quality and has
been integrated into the historical process itself. Thus, for Levinas, the
Hegelian view of cultures is the most formidable threat to the absolute
values presented by the Jewish ethic” (Wyschogrod 1974: 161–62). The
comparative discussion of cultures goes back to the time of Herder, when
the autonomous (aesthetic) idea of the nation first emerged. Israel as
“counterlife” (Philip Roth), however, as it was already clear to Herder or to
English Israelites, is the figura of the nations,86 the nation which did not go
through a revolution—a normative model announcing collective identity
as the basis for the universal.
Some critics (like Gershom Scholem) who still remembered the discur-
sive invention of Hebraism, rejected the theory of mission: “It has been
said that the very success of Zionism—meaning the dialectical success it
manifests in its historical founding of a state—constitutes a betrayal of the
mission of Judaism. But this theory of mission, ‘to be a light unto the
nations,’ which over the last hundred and fifty years was accepted by a large
part of Jewry, was invented ad hoc by a people who were aware of their
historical impotence, that is, their lack of vital resolve to live as a people. It
was invented as a kind of spiritual recompense, a lame justification for the
existence of Judaism in the Diaspora. The mission theory is one of the most
dialectical (in some ways praiseworthy, in some ways shameful) aspects of
Jewish experience since the emancipation. Thus, Zionism may indeed be a
betrayal of the mission of the Jews invented by German, French, and Ital-
ian Jewry a hundred and fifty years ago” (Cohen and Mendes-Flohr 1987:
507). Levinas, on the other hand, believes that in the contemporary world,
Israel “is and must remain anachronistic in the sense that it represents a
non-coincidence with its time. Judaism maintains the temporality of in-
teriority against the time of history” (Wyschogrod 1974: 162). His escha-
tology draws directly from the terms of the covenant: “He presupposes the
transhistorical unity of Jewish consciousness and the permanence and con-
tinuity of Israel” (171). There can be no concessions to historical or cul-
tural exigencies. “This is Israel’s apolitical vision of itself. A people whose
history has until extremely recent times been lived in diaspora cannot ac-
commodate its morality to politics” (189). The Law of the Land ought to
be one, that this is the Land of the Law.
Thus when Levinas talks about return or separation, or Derrida about
nostalgia for the land or deferral, they take positions reminiscent of the
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efforts of the Haskalah philosopher Nachman Krochmal (1785–1840) to
elevate Israel above the contingencies of history, and they reenact the op-
tion of Palestine haunting the correspondence between Walter Benjamin
and Gershom Scholem.87 For high and late modernity, the call to task is
issued from two supreme texts—the Book and (its) Israel. It can even be
argued that they are two columns of the same text, and therefore Israel
itself is treated like scripture—that, for the interpretive conscience which
appropriated Arnold’s culture for Hebraism, the state of Israel is the exem-
plary modernist work: independent, self-sustained, self-regulated, autono-
mous, exclusive. The homeland of the late twentieth century is the textual
desert: “We are capable of living in a state in which certain things that have
happened have not. At the same time that they have. This is The State of
Israel” (Ronald Sukenick, quoted in McHale 1987: 99). From Buber to
Blanchot and from Shestov to Deleuze, the nature of the aesthetic disposi-
tion (by definition alienated by the Hellenic Alien), exilic or nomadic
(Petrosino and Rolland 1984), is negotiated in terms directly related to the
identity of Israel.
The question of its (historical) constitution, however, has not been set-
tled. Some, like Hannah Arendt, looked in vain for inspiration in Hei-
degger’s notion of dwelling. Others have chosen to limit the problem to the
ethnic group most directly affected: “Whether or not Jewish history will be
able to endure this entry into the concrete realm without perishing in the
crisis of the Messianic claim which has virtually been conjured up—that is
the question which out of this great and dangerous past the Jew of this age
poses to his present and to his future” (Scholem 1971b: 35–36). Derrida’s
response has been an invitation to preserve the relevance of the question:
that constitution cannot be written because the question itself is already a
text, if not the Book that has always been interpreted. “The Jew is split, and
split first of all between the two dimensions of the letter: allegory and liter-
ality. His history would be but an empirical history among others if he
established or nationalized himself within difference and literality” (Der-
rida 1978a: 75). By transforming the aesthetic into a messianism, Derrida
has achieved what Nietzsche suggested: he has transformed history, “the
antithesis of art” (Nietzsche 1983: 95), into a work of art. And yet the
discursive and political genealogy of the issue is such that it never avoids
the language it has tried to silence: when the question is raised whether
Israel is a site or a land, and whether it would “like to be an Athens, and not
a Sparta” (Avineri 1989: 114), not only does the Greek polis reappear but
it also dates the date with the exacting urgency of its own ethics: (Hellenic)
politics.
Like Freud or Adorno, Levinas, in his search for the authentic in the non-
identical, is exploring the possibility of a “Jewish science” (Levinas 1979:
217). Whatever the rigor of his anti-Parmenideanism, however, his effort
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fails because of its trenchant moralism: he is too preoccupied with playing
Saul against his contemporary Paul, Simone Weil (1909–43), whose writ-
ings started appearing in the late 1940s.88 The lesson of Hermann Cohen
has been that, after historicism, a science of Judaism can only exist as a
philosophical critique of the Hellenic, that is, as a Hebraicized culture.
Since the polarity cannot be transcended, it must be appropriated. In this
light, two anti-mythological traditions stand out. “Nietzsche recalls the
Greeks. Left-wing Hegelianism (though it is rarely aware of this fact) recalls
the Jews, and for this reason it challenges Jews far more intimately and
radically” (Fackenheim 1970: 52). This lineage extends roughly from
Feuerbach to Habermas. Its dialectical countercurrent, right-wing Kant-
ianism from Kierkegaard to Levinas, has not been less influential. Decon-
struction has sprung out of their cross-breeding, a combination of Kantian
ethics with leftist politics, with Derrida portraying and playing Nietzsche as
a left-wing Kantian. To the extent that he constantly interrogates dialecti-
cal tradition, Derrida may be seen as a non-Kantian (Rorty 1982: 93), his
“textualism as the contemporary counterpart of idealism” (Rorty 1982a:
140), and deconstruction as “post-philosophical romanticism” (143). Nev-
ertheless, his dominant ideological ancestry is that of philosophical Mes-
sianism: Cohen, Buber, Shestov, Bloch, Benjamin, Levinas, Fackenheim—
the European idealists whose work concentrated on the moral viability of
the Hebraic-Hellenic opposition. All these thinkers reacted to the critique
of morality through the invocation of the Greeks by Nietzsche, who wrote
in 1885: “Today we are again getting close to all those fundamental forms
of world interpretation devised by the Greek spirit through Anaximander,
Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Democritus, and Anaxagoras—we
are growing more Greek by the day; at first, as is only fair, in concepts and
evaluations, as Hellenizing ghosts, as it were; but one day, let us hope, also
in our bodies! Herein lies (and has always lain) my hope for the German
character!” (Nietzsche 1967: 225–26). Some philosophers, like Rosenzweig,
Bloch, and Heidegger, attempted a return to Schelling. Derrida’s way of
thwarting the threat of politics is to promote the aesthetic attitude as ethi-
cal condition, and interpretation as iconomachic resistance. Consequently,
in his work the question turns into the messianic calling of contemplation.
THE FUTURE OF TRADITION
Derrida opens his essay “Violence and Metaphysics” by proposing a com-
munity of philosophers who ask endlessly the unavoidable and unanswer-
able question of the death of philosophy in remembrance of its own possi-
bility and despite the diaspora of its people: “A community of the question
about the possibility of the question” (Derrida 1978a: 80). He defends the
idea of a “discipline of the question” (80)—a discipline which he later calls
Grammatology—because the question has already begun, has a history,
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and must be maintained. “A founded dwelling, a realized tradition of the
question remaining a question” (80). Maintaining the question means
interrogating the discipline of the question (a practice which has been
called deconstruction). Heidegger defined a comparable responsibility in
the first sentence of his essay “The End of Philosophy and the Task of
Thinking”: “The title names the attempt at a reflection that persists in
questioning” (Heidegger 1977: 373). He also complained that the herme-
neutical process of questioning had lost its centrality: “The paralysis of all
passion for questioning has long been with us. . . . Questioning as a funda-
mental element of historical being has receded from us” (Heidegger 1959:
143). “The question is privileged everywhere by Heidegger as the mode of
thinking” (Derrida 1987b: 171). The problem is that Heidegger saw the
question as one of forgetfulness and recovery—as an errant and repentant
return to the ontological foundation: “This question of beings as a whole,
the theological question, cannot be asked without the question about be-
ings as such, about the essence of Being in general. That is the question
about the on he on, ‘ontology.’ Philosophy’s questioning is always and in
itself both onto-logical and theo-logical in the very broad sense. Philosophy
is Ontotheology. The more originally it is both in one, the more truly it is
philosophy” (Heidegger 1985: 51). Derrida knows that Heidegger’s “philos-
ophy of heteronomy” leads to sites where the Other may be the Volk, the
Führer, or Being itself (Wolin 1990a). For Derrida, there is no question of
return, revelation, or rediscovery because we are always part of thought’s
internal audit. “Thus, those who look into the possibility of philosophy,
philosophy’s life and death, are already engaged in, already overtaken by
the dialogue of the question about itself and with itself; they always act in
remembrance of philosophy” (Derrida 1978a: 80), committing themselves
to “this total repetition” (81): “To a considerable degree, we have already
said all we meant to say” (Derrida 1981: 65). This autistic entanglement is
not the result of an approach to, but the very nature of the enterprise,
which is tauto-logical. “Philosophy (in general) can only open itself to the
question, within it and by it. It can only let itself be questioned” (131).
Derrida would never name, let alone answer (as Heidegger did), the al-
mighty question: his strategy is to invite readers to ask (the question)
rather than question (the established, the already in place, practices of
asking). There is no intent to write a history of that asking, of the discourse
of the question, of its institutional askability. On the contrary, the goal is
to safeguard the authority of that discourse by legitimizing the auto- of
autonomy.
Like Heidegger, Derrida seems to accept “the possibility of what we
might call an ‘internal’ audit of the history of philosophy, an assessment
which confines itself to the field of its texts. Derrida, like Heidegger, will
tell us about the relationship between Marx and Democritus before he will
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mention capitalism” (Wood 1985: 38). There is no outside-the-philosoph-
ical-text, no outside-the-interpretive-tradition-of-philosophy, no-outside-
nomos; all activity takes place in the Library and the University, the tem-
ples of emancipation. “For both Derrida and Heidegger, the metaphysical
tradition is a massive, inescapable fact; but their responses to this shared
perception are revealingly different. Heidegger believes it both possible and
desirable to go behind this tradition by commemorating its withdrawn ori-
gins in traces left in ‘early words concerning Being.’ Derrida holds out no
such hope for circumvention and return; . . . One cannot get around a text
so as to locate its extratextual origin because in the very effort to do so one
meets yet another text; any soi-disant ‘origin’ is always already pre-
inscribed in a text. In short, there is only the re-inscription of one text in
another, the re-marking of one by the other—the tracery of intertextuality”
(Casey 1984: 608). Epistemologically speaking, the interpretive question of
Modernity was first (Spinoza) the question of Philosophy, then (Hegel)
Philosophy as the death of philosophy, later (Heidegger) the Fall of philos-
ophy into metaphysics, and finally the sin (and task) of reading (dead Phi-
losophy). These are the stages of the crisis of tradition and assimilation—of
History as the end of history (and its prophetic judgment), of the self-
governed and self-reflective individual. The question of Modernity has
been reduced to the aesthetic question: Athens + Jerusalem. Romanticism
connected the two words with an “is,” Modernism with an “or”; Derrida
has suggested the ambiguous silence of a slash “/.” The terms themselves,
however, remain unquestioned. Derrida conducts simultaneously a post-
modernist critique of absolutist (or pagan) Modernism and of utopian
(Christian) eschatology which may be defined as messianic aesthetics. The
choice (or rather, invention) of an effective genre for this enterprise was
particularly difficult: philosophy, theology, or literature were clearly inap-
propriate for a para-Hellenic, deliriously parasitical Hebraism that was
going to declare the entire library a playground for rabbis. As in the case of
the ambiguous, ambivalent, ambidextrous slash (dis)connecting Athens
and Jerusalem, Derrida opted for a contradictory combination: interpreta-
tion as ersatz exegesis—contemplation of the ridiculous/sublime.
Nowhere else is this choice better exhibited than in his essay “Of an
Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy” (1982), aptly pub-
lished in both the English poststructuralist literary journal Oxford Literary
Review and the American theological journal Semeia. The essay is a cri-
tique, parody, and reaffirmation of the messianic aesthetic. Its immediate
target is Kant’s Von einem neuerdings erhobenen Vornehmen Ton in der
Philosophie (1796), where “he attacks a tone that announces something
like the death of philosophy” (Derrida 1982: 66). In his piece, Kant, always
concerned about the prestige of his discipline, has a specific group of
professionals in mind: “He brings to judgment those who, by the tone they
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take and the air they give themselves when saying certain things, place
philosophy in danger of death and tell philosophy or philosophers the
imminence of their end” (67). He attacks the “mystagogues,” those who
indulge in “philosophic mystification” (68) and “never fail to take them-
selves for lords, . . . elite beings, distinguished subjects, superior and apart
in society” (69). Derrida takes Kant to task for distinguishing between “the
voice of reason and the voice of the oracle” (70): the former speaks une-
quivocally and prescribes the rules of cognition while the other is visionary,
instinctive, seeking the transcendental. Kant opposes the “false mystery
of the mystagogues” (73) to the “true mystery” of practical reason. He
complains: “The overlordly tone dominates and is dominated by the oracu-
lar voice that covers over the voice of reason, rather parasitizes it, causes
it to derail or become delirious” (71). But the weakness of this distinc-
tion is revealed when he divides Plato in two, a good and a bad one, in order
to account for the course philosophy has followed. “Kant wants at once
to accuse and excuse Plato for/of this continuous catastrophe that has
corrupted philosophy, the strict relation between the name and the thing
‘philosophy’. . . . He wants to accuse and excuse him for/of the delirium
in philosophy, one would say, in the same movement of a double pos-
tulation. The double bind against filiation: Plato is the father of the delir-
ium, of all exaltation in philosophy . . . , but without it having been his
fault. . . . So we must divide Plato; we must distinguish between the Acade-
mician and the presumed author of the Letters, the teacher and the
sender” (73–74).
It is true that there is “a constant motif in the German tradition from
Hölderlin—or even indeed from Schiller—through to Heidegger, the
theme of the two Greeces” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1990: 67). The motif of the
“two-headed Greek,” which has become equally popular in other traditions
and disciplines as well, is but a version of the common theme of Greece and
its other (Greece), Israel. If the anxious relation with the Ancient is “one
of the general foundations of the modern political sphere, being quite sim-
ply the invention of the Modern itself, i.e., of what appears in the era of the
delegitimation of Christian theocracies” (78), it is also true that the Mod-
ern, the new legitimate theocracy of immanence and depth, is always con-
ceived as Hebraic. Thus whenever twentieth-century culture has failed (its
Hebraic identity), it is the Hellenic model that is demonized. It therefore
comes as no surprise when a discussion of the fate of the Jews in modernity,
for example, resorts to standard comparisons, tracing the history of “Exter-
mination” to the Athenian massacre of Melos (35) and the program of the
Holocaust to the Funeral Oration of Pericles (97–98), or uses Hölderlin’s
poetics of Sophoclean drama to approach Auschwitz in terms of tragedy
(41–46). Nevertheless, in the Western vocabulary, Philhellenism has no
WRI TING THE LAW 281
opposite: by repressing the term, modernity will never admit its constitu-
tive anti-Hellenism.
Thus one can easily guess the rest of Derrida’s argument against Kant’s
two Platos. Having exposed the inherent contradiction and mutuality in
Kant’s opposition, he deconstructs his plan, taking apart its foundation:
“This cryptopolitics is also a cryptopoetics, a poetic perversion of philoso-
phy” (Derrida 1982: 74). As a post-Nietzschean left-Kantian, Derrida will
pursue the same inverted plan: the poetic perversion of philosophy. He will
be both teacher and sender, he will practice both science and delirium, he
will defend both reason and the oracle. When the history of philosophy is
examined in terms of an (impotent) bind against filiation, “the practice of
double reading that Heidegger produces as the way of overcoming meta-
physics and aesthetics (aesthetics being the metaphysics of presence in art)
is precisely deconstruction as practiced by Derrida. Deconstructive read-
ings are double readings that record a text’s compliance with the metaphys-
ics of presence and its exceeding that metaphysics” (Bernstein 1987a: 95–
96). Critique absolves itself of complicity.
Kant’s complaint against the mystagogues of modernity is that they are
not true philosophers but rather use poetic language and apocalyptic pre-
diction to obscure their anti-philosophical tendencies. Derrida finds that
this is “a fight around poetics (between poetry and philosophy), around the
death or the future of philosophy” (Derrida 1982: 77). Kant offers to his
opponents as a pact for peace the requirement for a basic distinction be-
tween the philosophical and the aesthetic manner of representing, which
should not be confused. Still, this contract is one between discourses of the
end which share one major element: eschatological predication. Derrida
points out that “the West has been dominated by a powerful program that
was also an untransgressible contract among discourses of the end. The
themes of history’s end and of philosophy’s death represent only the most
comprehensive, massive, and assembled forms of this” (80). Beyond all dis-
agreements, there is one particular point of common reference: “Haven’t
all the differences taken the form of a going-one-better in eschatological
eloquence, each newcomer, more lucid than the other, more vigilant and
more prodigal too than the other, coming to add more to it?” (80). Der-
rida’s complaint against trendy languages of apocalypse has been voiced
before: “The end of humanism, of metaphysics, the death of man, the
death of God (or death to God!)—these are apocalyptic ideas or slogans of
intellectual high society. Like all the manifestations of Parisian taste (or
Parisian disgusts), these topics impose themselves with the tyranny of the
last word, but become available to anyone and cheapened” (Levinas 1987:
141).89 After such expressions of intellectual indignation, the impression is
given that readers may be encouraged to ask about the interests served by
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the aesthetic and the apocalyptic, both feared and criticized by Kant; that
they may be instructed to look into the ideology supporting their alliance;
that they may be guided to think in terms of authority, institutionality,
knowledge, and historicity.
Derrida offers a list of basic questions for those who wish “to demystify,
or if you prefer, to deconstruct the apocalyptic discourse itself and with it
everything that speculates on vision, the imminence of the end, theophany,
the parousia, the Last Judgment, and so on. Then each time we intractably
ask ourselves: where do they want to come to, and to what ends, those who
declare the end of this or that, of man or the subject, of consciousness, of
history, of the West or of literature, and according to the latent news of
progress itself, the idea of which never went so badly one way or the other,
to the right or to the left? What effect do these noble, gentile prophets or
eloquent visionaries want to produce? With a view to what immediate or
postponed benefit? What do they do, what do we do in saying this? For
whom do we seduce or subjugate, intimidate or cause to enjoy, to come?”
(Derrida 1982: 82–83). Derrida seems willing to pose many similar ques-
tions throughout his paper about “all the interests of the apocalyptic tone
today” (87) “or the ends to which the apocalyptic seduces” (90). But his
response to these questions forgoes addressing the discursive and the insti-
tutional, and instead reaffirms the tautological and repetitious structure of
thinking by asserting that “every language on the apocalypse is also apoca-
lyptic and cannot be excluded from its object” (91). He presents the apoca-
lyptic as “the structure of every scene of writing in general” and as “a tran-
scendental condition of all discourse, of all experience itself, of every mark
or every trace” (87). It seems that we have never left the site of the same.
His conclusion shows that “deconstruction suffers not from a relativistic
generosity but from an authoritarian exclusion of discursive possibilities.
The charge of relativism misses the point. The problem is not that dif-
férance treats all discourses as if they were equal but that it treats them as
if they were the same” (Boly 1988–89: 181–82). Inescapable and unavoid-
able, the apocalyptic joins the supplement, the trace, the pharmakon, the
letter, the hymen, and so many other terms in Derrida’s repertory of sub-
lime/ridiculous violence. Not that it makes any difference: “In the final
analysis, the dehellenizing of literary criticism is as futile as it is inevitable”
(Atkins 1980: 779). The practice is inherently (and gleefully) impotent:
“Deconstruction cannot, on its own terms, recognize historical differences
between texts. Différance faithfully records the same violence within any
work. . . . As a result, to the eyes of différance all texts begin to assume a
tropic sameness” (Boly 1988–89: 198). If anything can be anything else, it
might as well be apocalyptic too. But how about the demystification read-
ers were promised earlier? “It is interminable, because no one can exhaust
the overdeterminations of the apocalyptic stratagems” (Derrida 1982: 89).
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After all, apocalyptic writing can be both very conservative and very useful
in misleading censorship and dismantling the established order. Thus Der-
rida’s conclusion is conveniently ambiguous: anything is potentially apoca-
lyptic, and the apocalyptic is potentially good or bad.90
Deconstruction can put the question to philosophy but cannot, and
never intended to, pose the question of philosophy, of its legitimacy. No
form of contemplation can contemplate its own conditions, precisely be-
cause contemplation understands itself as the perfect condition. “If there
is a question that philosophy, itself so questioning, manages to exclude,
this is the question of its own socially necessary conditions. Resembling the
artist in this respect, the philosopher sets himself up as an uncreated crea-
tor, a creator whom there is no getting around and who owes nothing to the
institution. The distance from the institution (and, more precisely, from
the socially instituted post) which the institution itself allows him, is one
of the reasons why he finds it difficult to think of himself in the framework
of an institution; and difficult to cease to be its instrument and its play-
thing, even in his institutionally directed games with the institution”
(Bourdieu 1983: 4). With Derrida, philosophy exchanges its (lost) gravity
with a dazzling display of style, ultimately protecting its (reputation for)
agility at a time it can no longer defend its relevance. In a social system
where the University is no longer actively political, deconstruction is “the
purest manifestation, so far, of a postmodernist academy’s desire to vindi-
cate itself as radical and liberationist, yet also shield itself from the pros-
pect of having any real cultural effect” (Boly 1988–89: 197). A case in point
is Geoffrey Hartman, who enlists Derrida “in an essentially academic enter-
prise. Deconstruction, or at least that version of it practiced in a text like
Glas, will breathe new life into a discipline whose ultimate social purpose
is to ensure that books continue to be read and taught in institutions like
Yale and by professors like Hartman” (Argyros and Flieger 1987: 68).
In order to shield itself from politics, culture denounced it as idolatry
and claimed that its own critical function was superior. Postmodern for-
malism follows the same tactic: “A ‘deconstructionist politics’ which re-
mains true to both deconstruction and to politics has to make a virtue of
necessity—or, in philosophical jargon, to ontologise its own embarrass-
ment. Deconstruction becomes itself a politics” (Howard 1989: 172). Ac-
cording to this position, contemplation is the highest form of emancipa-
tion. This is the reason why (as proved in all debates in which Derrida has
been involved but did not initiate) “there is one sort of difference which
deconstruction cannot tolerate: namely, difference as dispute, as good, old-
fashioned, political fight” (Fraser 1984: 142). The very mode of the argu-
ment tends to forbid disagreement: “Derrida will always choose to differ,
but he leaves no empty spaces for any others who would differ with him”
(Handelman 1983: 125). Heidegger, in his Rectoral Address (1933), was
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probably the first to argue that “the philosophical is the rationale or the
foundation of the political” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1982: 426). According to
this idea, every political foundation is a priori philosophical: philosophy,
the aesthetic recovery of Being in history, is the ground of politics. The
message is not that, before we do philosophy we should do politics; it is
rather that by doing philosophy we are already doing (a more fundamental
form of) politics. Critique is in itself praxis. “The Heideggerian determina-
tion of philosophy or the philosophical means first of all (and these are
terms I use only for convenience): the unconditional valorization or, if you
will, overvalorization of the philosophical. . . . For that is undoubtedly, but
I admit that the word must be put between quotes, Heidegger’s most radi-
cal ‘political’ gesture” (429). It is this gesture that Derrida repeats with an
even greater authority: to counter the totalitarian “aestheticization of poli-
tics,” instead of politicizing art, as Benjamin proposed, he politicizes aes-
thetics, endorsing while parodying the project of the Enlightenment: as-
similation (taking in one’s hands the ends of consumption), rather than
revolution (taking in one’s hands the means of production), is the only
liberation.
Banal and predictable as it may be, this conclusion serves the debunking
of Christology well: it rejects apocalypse while respecting the apocalyptic
(speaking its language). Since Derrida finds that the Apocalypse signifies
“the end, theophany, the parousia, the Last Judgment” (Derrida 1982: 82),
he attacks “these noble, gentile prophets or eloquent visionaries” (82), like
John the Evangelist, who appropriated Judaism and reduced it to the
theme of salvation, of the Christian end. His target in this case is the false
prophets, the philosophers, who have thematized the apocalyptic, who
announce an end and a judgment, ignoring God’s original covenant. “It
is possible to see deconstruction as being produced in a space where the
prophets are not far away” (Derrida 1984: 119). More precisely, “de-
construction opens the space—the difference between signifier and sig-
nified—in which faith is possible” (Mackey 1983: 270). He claims that the
tone signifies: “We are going to die, you and I, the others too, the goyim,
the gentiles, and all the others, all those who do not share this secret with
us, but they do not know it” (Derrida 1982: 84). But who are those others,
besides the goyim and the gentile prophets, who are not named? And what
is the apocalyptic that Derrida tries to salvage from apocalypse, from
having its end being talked about? The fiercely anti-Christian tone of the
paper suggests the “secret” is Messianism. Derrida questions Christianity’s
right to adopt it and transform its promise into one of ending, closure,
and punishment. This may apply to the goyim prophets but not to the
others. Like earlier post-Kantians, he compares prophetism and philosophy
to reveal the superiority of the former’s vision of the future, of the prom-
ise of the question, while repressing the politics of faith: “The proper bear-
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ing of thinking is not questioning but rather listening to the promise
[das Hören der Zusage] of that which is to come into question” (Derrida
1987b: 175).
For the postmodernist Derrida, the apocalyptic tone is neither about end-
ing (as in Christianity) nor about fulfilling (as in Hebraic Modernism): it is
about coming. “ ‘Come’ is apocalyptic” (94). In Totality and Infinity, Le-
vinas had already transformed Ernst Bloch’s utopian Marxist “not yet” into
“to-come” (à venir). “In Levinas as in Blanchot, the indefinite futurity of
the à venir or ‘yet to come’ is correlative of the anteriority or ‘always al-
ready’ which haunts punctuality in repetition” (Libertson 1982: 37). Time
is not history because history cannot happen while Being is coming:
“Through time, in fact, being is not yet; which does not confuse it with
nothingness [néant], but maintains it at a distance from itself. It is not in
a single moment [d’un seul coup, all at once]. Even its cause, anterior to it,
is yet to come” (Levinas, quoted in Libertson 1982: 37). Others can be even
more direct and talk about the (male) Messiah, the overlord who com-
mands: “His being there is, then, not the coming. With the Messiah, who
is there, the call must always resound: ‘Come, Come.’ . . . Both future and
past (it is said at least once that the Messiah has already come), his coming
does not correspond to any presence at all” (Blanchot 1986: 142). In Der-
rida, Messianism is not about fulfillment (as the ideal of the perfect and
autonomous artwork suggests) but its own process. “I shall come: the com-
ing is always to come. . . . I come means: I am going to come, I am to-come
in the imminence of an ‘I am going to come,’ ‘I am in the process of com-
ing,’ ‘I am on the point of going to come’” (Derrida 1982: 85). This com-
ing, which represents and reenacts the originary version of the apocalyptic,
is pure affirmation, beyond the grasp of cognition or the expectation of
sense; it comes from the other and invites us beyond being; it is not sup-
ported by language or identity, a voice or a sight; it is not a present
or a future but the promise-as-process of (and invitation to) a future.91
“This Viens [come] is a call prior to all other discourse and to all events, to
every order and to all desire, an apocalypse which brings nothing to an end,
which reveals nothing” (Derrida 1988b: 81). This is the order that ad-
dressed Abraham.
“Come,” in a constant state of being/coming, stands above history, lan-
guage and society: Messianism is not an advent. “ ‘Come’ no more lets itself
be stopped and examined by an onto-theo-eschatology than by a logic of
the event, however new they may be and whatever politics they announce”
(Derrida 1982: 93). It is the (be)coming of art, art beyond the canon, cul-
ture without politics—the pure aesthetic and not the artwork as an entity,
a structure, a monad. “Come” is the postmodernist aesthetic of openness,
open-endedness, undecidability—the messianic promise of a transcenden-
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tal beauty that is about itself without ever being, stopping, descending,
appearing; the promise and condition of artisticality, which is different
(from Greek art), which differs politics and defers history. “Come” an-
nounces an announcing and sends, dispatches for Abraham: “Now here,
precisely, is announced—as promise or threat—an apocalypse without
apocalypse, an apocalypse without vision, without truth, without revela-
tion, of dispatches (for the ‘come’ is plural in itself, in oneself), of addresses
without message and without destination, without sender or decidable ad-
dressee, without last judgment, without any other eschatology than the
tone of the ‘Come’ itself, its very difference, an apocalypse beyond good
and evil” (94). “Come” announces the triumph of Hebraic Messianism
against everything that Christianity read into it—apocalypse, vision, truth,
revelation, parousia, destination, last judgment, eschatology, good and evil.
While Zionism, as a modernist movement, proposed the State of Israel as
the absolute artwork,92 Derrida defends Messianism as the purest expres-
sion of art itself: Israel as a state of coming.93
Derrida may also play the Messiah on occasion, on a date, defiantly and
unapologetically: “Several times I have been asked . . . why (with a view to
what, to what ends, and so on) I have or have taken on an apocalyptic tone
and proposed apocalyptic themes. Thus have they often been qualified,
sometimes with suspicion, and above all, I have noticed, in the United
States where one is always more sensitive to phenomena of prophetism,
messianism, eschatology, and of the apocalypse-here-now” (90). He is espe-
cially addressing America, the promised land of Protestant dissent which,
as Arnold noted, tends so much to Hebraicize.94 “We can’t understand the
reception that deconstruction has had in the United States without back-
ground—historical, political, religious, and so forth. I would say religious
above all” (Derrida 1985: 2). Amplifying his emphasis on religion, he notes
that “the protestant, theological ethic which marks the American academic
world acted all the more ‘responsibly,’ basically taking deconstruction more
seriously than was possible in Europe. Or rather in Europe, paradoxically,
the dismantling of the religious element was already further along” (12). In
a distinct sense, Higher Criticism has yet to happen in America, since for
a long time criticism has operated here as higher faith.
Despite Heidegger’s horror of its culture of technology, the American
response to the call has always been more intense, more attuned to passive
listening, more prone to commentary: “From Emerson and Thoreau to
Mencken and Brooks, criticism had been the great American lay philoso-
phy, the intellectual conscience and intellectual carryall. . . . Never more
than incidentally concerned, save for men like Poe and James, with prob-
lems of craftsmanship and style, it had always been more a form of moral
propaganda than a study of esthetic problems” (Kazin 1965: 400–401).
This religious culture was secularized drastically after 1930, however, when
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criticism “became a search for fulfillment by the word, a messianic drive
toward social action” (401) and a search for cultural solutions to political
problems. “Where the first ‘modern’ critics in America had been crusaders
against Puritanism and materialism, latter-day Victorians, as it were, seek-
ing to find a place for literature in America, the more aggressive critical
minds in America now became religious crusaders, as of a world to be saved
or lost” (401–402). For those who did not join Marxism, religious practice
became exclusively a matter of interpretive activity.
The case of the American formalists is particularly pertinent: “To them
literature became not merely a great moral and intellectual activity; it be-
came the only activity. They reduced all human discourse to literature, all
literature to poetry, all poetry to the kind of poetry they cared to write and
study, and like Talmudists reduced all critical discourse to the brilliant
technical exegesis of a particular text” (402). New Critics were fully aware
of the ancestry of literary scholarship in scriptural exegesis. They remem-
bered that in the nineteenth century, poetry “was rediscovered as a cultural
force and was recruited in the cause of religion. In the now well-known
formula, poetry was more and more to take the place of both religion and
philosophy” (Wimsatt 1954: 275). New Critics felt that, following in the
footsteps of the same interpretive tradition, the quasi-religious mode of
justification in literary criticism “has in recent years, with the aid of psy-
chological, anthropological, mythological, and ritual idioms, made consid-
erable advances. The defense of religion is nowadays frequently couched in
terms which appeal to the power of poetry, and the defense of poetic imag-
ination, in terms which implicate a defense of religion. Despite the dis-
criminatory efforts of some writers . . . the vocabulary and main assump-
tions of recent criticism have been developing in a way that makes it now
difficult to speak well of poetry without participating in a joint defense of
poetry and religion, or at least without a considerable involvement in theol-
ogy” (276–77). Thus they initiated, and remained open to, a dialogue be-
tween the complementary disciplines of reading and faith with the aim of
strengthening both their common heritage and their shared values: “There
is a broad sense in which Christian thinking ought to be sympathetic to
recent literary criticism—a sense arising simply from the fact that recent
criticism is criticism; that is, an activity aimed at understanding a kind of
value, and a kind which, if not identical with moral and religious values, is
very close to these and may even be thought of as a likely ally” (267).
This “new ‘seriousness’ in criticism” (Kazin 1965: 403) was expressed in
institutional terms in the professionalization of literary studies and its
identification with humanistic instruction: “Defending itself against those
who challenged its validity as a form of knowledge, criticism now signifi-
cantly proclaimed itself a central moral activity, a beacon in an age of con-
fusions” (405). It was in the academic department, the journal, and the
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conference that the administration of the technologies of interpretation
were transferred. “And it was in criticism . . . that the radicalization of the
intellectual middle class made itself most deeply felt” (407). That radical-
ization was the gradual identification (glorified by masters of Hebraic
thinking like Susan Sontag, Philippe Sollers, Robert Wilson, and Leonard
Bernstein) of the aesthetic attitude with political activism.
If we see the formalist critic, with his exclusive devotion to the text, as
“a kind of Sadducee” and his emphasis on the autonomy of the poem as
“an example of the Written Law superseding and displacing the Oral Law”
(Fisch 1977: 66), then we can understand why Derrida plays the part of the
Pharisee. Some people have been surprised by the success of his perfor-
mance in the United States. “But America is a theological and philosophi-
cal conception of itself, a concept with much Puritanism but little ethnic
mythology at the root, which is to say, oddly, with less politics at the root.
For a long time, Jewish assimilation in America was frequently a process of
somehow becoming more Jewish by assimilating to Puritan Hebraism and
its Election theology” (Bloom 1982: 325). It is the importance of assimila-
tion for his entire work that enables him, the self-conscious outsider, to
address himself, to announce himself to his audience with the keyword of
the paper on the apocalypse: Come, he tells them, and by announcing it, by
inviting you, I am increasing my seductive power (94); come to me, the end
is near, I am your future; come to me because I am the one who is coming,
I am coming in you, I am your text—meet me, read me, give me a hand,
help me come. This may be seen as an act of “aestho-autogamy” (Flann
O’Brien), of “auto-hetero-affection” (John Llewelyn) reminiscent of outra-
geous heavy metal gigs meant to whip to frenzy their adolescent audience;
or as a performance of typical “Derri-Dadaism,” which has been compared
to safe sex (Lawrence Kritzman). The pleasures involved in either are, of
course, only promised and endlessly deferred. “In its final phase as met-
anoia, différance sticks it in the ear, but in such a way that the signifier ‘it,’
innocent depersonalization of all writing, mystically yet recuperatively dis-
solves. The final distribution is nonmembranous and itself impenetrable,
anti-hymeneal, in that it dismisses the intricate anatomies that register
vibration as noise and, potentially, as language” (Boly 1988–89: 190–91).95
Still, with these few orgasmic sentences, Derrida, the gay rabbi (as opposed
to the High Priest) of culture, performs the greatest role of his career: he
plays Messiah, the “Other,” on Levinas’s stage of the Sinai, and issues the
command, trying to seize his audience.96 “If the irony of revisionism can be
compared (as Harold Bloom has compared it) to Milton’s Satan copulating
with his own offspring, Sin, to produce the horrible giant, Death, then
Derrida’s Nietzschean or Joycean deconstructive project—the irony of
irony as it were—can be likened to a simulated coitus interruptus, after
repeated artificial stimulation of an eccentric kind” (O’Hara 1983: 119).
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Simulated, theoretical sex (pace critiques of voyeurism) is clearly the safest
of its kind.
One plays Messiah when most positions of mastery have been discred-
ited. Together with Jakobson, Russell, and Sartre, Adorno (who was pub-
licly embarrassed when protesting female students bared their breasts in
front of him) was probably the last teacher who, by virtue of the glorious
canon he owned and offered, could afford to play convincingly the Master
in academic (and intellectual in general) initiation sites. The collapse of
the western canon has rendered this mastery impossible. “The ideology of
the Western world, whether sounded forth within or beyond the universi-
ties, depends upon a literary culture, which explains why teachers of litera-
ture, more than those of history or philosophy or politics, have become the
secular clergy or clerisy of the West” (Bloom 1985: 111). Auerbach and
Curtius had every reason to worry about the declining moral authority and
social status of that canon, and made a final, grandiose effort to redefine
and defend it. In postmodern consumer culture, with no respect for the
exercises of Bildung, the Great Books have no eminent value. “There is a
profound falling-away from what I would call ‘text-centeredness’ or even
‘text-obsessiveness’ among the current generation of American undergrad-
uates, Gentile and Jewish alike” (Bloom 1982: 319). The autonomy of the
scriptural text is void. This situation has the formalist critics, the virtuosi
of interpretation, worried: “In the posthistoricist market of genial produc-
tions, moreover, pedagogy itself becomes a topic of advanced study. How
do we develop and defend reading, which used to be linked to a select,
canonical body of works? Now reading must begin in a relative vacuum,
with very few shared texts, or in a plenum, where no book can act for long
as the intellectual’s bible, as a classic with the freshness of a reborn ancient
tongue” (Hartman 1985a: 12). Among the specialists of discrimination
there has been justifiable cause for alarm: “It sometimes appears as if we
have become a remnant” (12). Some have proposed the creation of elite
schools of higher education whose sole purpose would be to prepare expert
readers as guardians of western civilization and its endangered aesthetic
principles (Steiner, Rieff). Avoiding such an aristocratic option, Derrida
chooses to begin in a plenum. His philosophy, like Auerbach’s view of the
western tradition, insists that there are no other books, no other worlds, no
other gods: it is destined for autocracy. However, even though his choices
are consistently (if not increasingly) canonical, he canonizes not a set of
books (like Auerbach) but a particular act of reading: “I will not say it is a
metaphysics, metaphysics itself or its closure which is hiding in this ‘textu-
alisation’ of discursive practices. I’ll go much further than that: I shall say
that what can be seen here so visibly is a historically well-determined little
pedagogy. A pedagogy which teaches the pupil that there is nothing out-
side the text, but that in it, in its gaps, its blanks and its silences, there
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reigns the reserve of the origin; that it is therefore unnecessary to search
elsewhere, but that here, not in the words, certainly, but in the words under
erasure, in their grid, the ‘sense of being’ is said. A pedagogy which gives
conversely to the master’s voice the limitless sovereignty which allows it to
restate the text indefinitely” (Foucault 1979c: 27).97 Until Heidegger’s “call
to conscience” and Levinas’s “command,” philosophers used to invoke/
quote a supreme order coming from above—a spirit descending upon in-
terpretation. Derrida issues such an order himself.98
“Come” is an aesthetic and Messianic notion: it is about coming to inter-
pretation and the coming of the Messiah, which is for Derrida the encoun-
ter of secular exegesis with writing. The already written (that is, canonic)
text, the Scripture, is the coming of the Messiah, which has always hap-
pened. This is why interpretation is (its) repetition. “The Torah is already
present; there is no freedom anterior to its imposition” (Wyschogrod 1974:
192). Interpretation is itself emancipation; when one is able to interpret,
there is nothing (else) from which to seek emancipation. This notion en-
ables him finally to answer the question of philosophy posed at the begin-
ning of “Violence and Metaphysics,” to name the difference (between
Athens and Jerusalem): it is the “double bind of YHWH affording (with the
name of his choice, with his name, we could say, Babel) translation and no
translation” (Derrida 1982: 64), the fundamental tension making the Sep-
tuagint possible and unacceptable. “Such is the question: the alliance of
speech and Being in the unique word, in the finally proper name. And such
is the question inscribed in the simulated affirmation of différance” (Der-
rida 1982a: 27). For Derrida, Being is not a name of God: “He suggests that
God as positive infinity might be ‘the other name of Being.’ Not one word
of Being among others . . . nor one eventual determination of the simplicity
of Being. . . . But Being and God, twin non-concepts, proving to be the
same name!” (Bernasconi 1987: 131). The question of philosophy, the ulti-
mate “question [is] finally that of the proper name” (Derrida 1989a: 838),
the Divine Name of Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption—a name like
YHWH or différance that cannot be pronounced.99 “And the proper name
of God (given by God) is divided enough in the tongue, already, to signify
also, confusedly, ‘confusion.’ And the war that he declares has first raged
within his name: divided, bifid, ambivalent, polysemic: God deconstruct-
ing” (Derrida 1985: 170). This is the war within discourse which earlier was
deceptively attributed to its Greek metaphysics. “Before the deconstruc-
tion of Babel, the great Semitic family was establishing its empire, which it
wanted universal, and its tongue, which it also attempts to impose on the
universe. The moment of this project immediately precedes the decon-
struction of the tower” (167). Deconstruction reenacts God’s punishing
wrath against the arrogance of the universal (be it what Shestov calls ra-
tionality or Levinas calls ontology).
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If YHWH is the name of the difference (between the Bible and the Sep-
tuagint), then “the question of deconstruction is also through and through
the question of translation” (Derrida 1988a: 1) and of the legitimacy of the
New (Testament) versus (its) always already (Old). The difference of the
two languages was important to those who attempted to purify the Bible of
Luther’s German: “The word of Greek antiquity is detached and formally
perfected. It is removed from the block of actual spokenness, sculpted with
the artful chisel of thought, rhetoric, and poetry—removed to the realm of
form. . . . The purity of the Hebrew Bible’s word resides not in form but in
originality (Ursprünglichkeit). Whenever it was subjected to a consciously
artistic adaptation it was polluted. Its full biblical force is present in the
biblical word only when it has retained the immediacy of spokenness”
(Buber 1968a: 214). The dialogical tradition from Ebner to Levinas is inti-
mately familiar with the encounter commemorated by the Septuagint: “Be-
cause the word of Greek antiquity is worked over and hammered into
shape—because it is a product—it tends to be monological. The atmo-
sphere of the solitary, sculpting spirit still encompasses it on the plat-
form. . . . In the Bible, when an idea is expressed, the speaker regards the
listener with concern. . . . Untransfigured and unsubdued, the biblical word
preserves the dialogical character of living reality” (215). These discussions
culminate in an attack against (the parousia in) John’s Greek: “The Greek
logos is; it possesses eternal being (Heraclitus). . . . In the beginning of the
Bible’s account of creation there is no word; it comes to be, it is spoken. . . .
The Greeks teach the word, the Jews report it” (215). Derrida’s entire work
is about the unreadability of the name—a critique of any translation from
Hebrew (Torah) into Greek (nomos), which necessarily has produced phi-
losophy and metaphysics, and a simultaneous reminder that the original
(text of God’s voice/face) is irrevocable. This trait alone makes him a
(counter)Protestant thinker, one who attempts to reform the Reformation,
to restore it to its original purpose. “There is a very real sense in which
reformation can be defined as a summons to a fuller, more concrete transla-
tion of Christ’s teachings both into daily speech and daily life” (Steiner
1975: 245). If Paul stole the letter from the Jews, Derrida snatches the
vowels out of the name of the Christian God.
There is no transcendence, of course. The condition of theoria, of atoning
culture, is inaugurated by this bitter realization. The fall into language,
into names other than YHWH, is the fall into (Greek) translations (of
the same name). Nevertheless, together with the fall comes the promise:
“Translation, as holy growth of languages, announces the messianic end”
(Derrida 1985: 202) which will deliver texts into the proper name. Twenti-
eth-century philosophers concerned with various renderings of the Bible
have been driven by the same hope: “Benjamin envisions a progressive and
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redemptive communion of all languages through translation, an activity
that should help them anticipate the ultimate messianic revelation of the
lost original tongue (whose kernel remains hidden in discrete languages in
the course of human history)” (Rand 1990: 447). Derrida is no exception:
“I believe the histories or enigmas of translation I would like to speak about
are without solution or conclusion” (Derrida 1982: 63), he admits at the
beginning of the paper on the apocalypse. And yet philosophy must speak
about its limits, the limits of Greek (translation). The specific work Derrida
has in mind is André Chouraqui’s translation of the New Testament, an
attempt which consists “in reconstituting a new Hebrew original, under the
Greek text at our disposal, and in acting as if he were translating that phan-
tom original text about which he supposes, linguistically and culturally,
that it had already had to let itself be translated (if that can be said in a
largely metaphorical sense) in the so-called original Greek version” (95).
This parasitical work is about the Hebraic Ur-original and its Hellenic
translatability; here priority is reclaimed and authenticity reenacted.100 In a
major modernist precedent, when Buber and Rosenzweig re-translated the
Hebrew Bible into German (Die Schrift, 1925–61, 15 vols.), they tried to
purify their native language from Luther’s grammar of belief and make it
speak Hebrew (again). That gesture had a distinct corrective purpose which
can hardly be compared to the postmodern colonialist enterprise of deny-
ing the New Testament its own (written) language, because this denial
assumes that Greek must be superseded at any cost.
Although Buber and Rosenzweig were originally asked by the publisher
to revise Luther’s translation, they soon declared the task impossible, and
decided “to begin anew from the original Hebrew in the hope of freeing
German from its Christian overlay” (Jay 1976: 9). Their new objective was
the “Hebraization of German” (Greenstein 1983: 28), an effort to translate
Jewish faith and its idea of the voice of God. That is why they returned to
the literal mode of rendering first introduced, in his own Bible translation,
by Moses Mendelssohn, “who wanted to provide German Jews with a Bible
in fluent, idiomatic German, to launch them into the stream of secular
culture” (20). Thus, in terms of cultural identity, their project was the
reverse of his. A more fruitful comparison should be made with Hölderlin’s
Sophoclean translations. By returning to principles derived from Herder’s
philosophy of language, they also hoped to undo the Hellenization of Ger-
man allegedly achieved in the poet’s corrective approach to ancient poetry.
(Benjamin, who, according to Gershom Scholem, was not satisfied with the
Buber-Rosenzweig work, wrote his own 1923 essay on Hölderlin’s Sopho-
cles and Pindar, “The Task of the Translator.”) Like Chouraqui, and like
the translation of “The Five Scrolls” from Hebrew by Meschonnic (1970),
they sought a “language prior to language” (Rosenzweig). Their essays, col-
lected in Die Schrift und ihre Verdeutschung (1936), show that they saw
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translation as a restorative and “messianic act” (Rosenzweig). Their work
was intended for Gentiles: the strategy was to Hebraicize German by aes-
theticizing it. Thus they tried to make the text more poetic, taking the
Bible (on the basis of Rosenzweig’s Sprachdenken as well as his attack on
the translation of Greek drama by the philologist Wilamowitz) as the spo-
ken word of God, and therefore as remnant of some Ursprache. According
to this view, the Scripture is the monument of the ultimate I-Thou en-
counter. The authors were unable to accept that they were re-translating
Luther, that they were repeating the Mendelssohn-Kant encounter. When
Gershom Scholem celebrated the completion of the task, he raised again
the question of strategy: “For whom is this translation now intended and
whom will it influence?” (Scholem 1971: 318). The original endeavor of
their Kultur politics was to feign not just the culture but language itself. As
a Hebraic re-writing of the Re-formation, it would signal the triumph of
assimilation—the appropriation (rather than just imitation) of German.
To the utter desperation of those who believed in it, the result turned out
to be “the tombstone of a relationship that was extinguished in unspeak-
able horror” (318). Soon after the publication of the first volume, Das Buch
im Anfang (1925, a translation of the Pentateuch), it appeared that the only
person who could read it was Heidegger in his crusade for the Christianiza-
tion of the Greeks. The comparison with Heidegger’s Presocratics (Horwitz
1964: 402–3) is important since “what Hebrew is for Rosenzweig is more or
less what Greek is for Heidegger” (Greenstein 1983: 39). Many years later,
the poetry of Paul Celan would still try in vain to wrestle the project of
translation from the philosopher’s Pauline grip.
The plundering of tradition obviously will not stop (why should it?
which command would make it?) before the founding Christian document.
Derrida declares that “what is at stake could be named as the appropriation
of the apocalypse: that is also the theme of this exposition” (Derrida 1982:
95). He finds it a highly appropriate choice, because it is a direct response
to a “Come.” He quotes Chouraqui to the effect that his translation “has
the calling [my emphasis] to search under the Greek text for its historic
context and its Semitic substratum” (95). But that is the command of
every “Come,” a call for metanoia and conversion: renounce the Greek text
as a translation, atone for worshiping its idols,101 research the Semitic sub-
stratum,102 recover the Bible, and return to its (lost) land. “Come” is Hei-
degger calling a gathering, a synagogue (which Cohen distinguished from
the church) of readers into the House of the Book: it is always an invitation
to an aesthetic reading of the Scripture, and of anything as Scripture. It is
not Ithaca inviting Odysseus back home; it is God’s unconditional demand
for discipline and sacrifice. “Come” is the postmodern command issued by
Derrida’s ubiquitous face—the order to return to the feast of the tablets.
People can no longer be trusted with self-government. Both Bildung and
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the canon have lost their disciplinary authority. Pure autonomy does not
hold. For the first time, the faltering aesthetic sovereignty needs to be pre-
served by outside means. Hence readers are commanded to come.
Should the audience obey this order? Do they have a right, a choice not
to? Levinas would deprive them of any opportunity. As he complains: “Au-
tonomy or heteronomy? The choice of Western philosophy has most often
been on the side of freedom and the same” (Levinas 1987: 48). Therefore
the ideal of emancipation must be abandoned. His corrective decrees that
the response is already determined by the question. “Responsibility is al-
ways prior to the realm of choice which is therefore a secondary phenome-
non” (Wyschogrod 1974: 158). If for Heidegger passivity is preservation of
the work (that is, authentic reading), for Levinas it acquires the centrality
of a supreme imperative: “It marks the place where something is prescribed
to me, that is, where I am obligated before any freedom” (Lyotard and
Thébaud 1985: 37). Levinas calls freedom into question (De Boer 1985:
212), putting justice before it. Ethics requires submission: “All morality is
grounded in a heteronomous will. To know God is already obedience to
another” (Wyschogrod 1974: 165). Levinas attempts “to save human free-
dom, while maintaining that human action depends upon the recognition
of heteronomy” (165) by claiming that an involvement with alterity can be
the most independent individual decision. This claim relies on Shestov’s
celebration of blind faith as freedom from the chains of rationality.103 First
of all, subjectivity itself is made possible by the opening to heteronomy, the
dissymmetrical relation with the other. “In the differential economy,
subjectivity is produced and invested by the passivity of communication”
(Libertson 1982: 309). Above anything else, the relation with the other
communicates hierarchy. It is the passive response to the “dissymmetry” of
communication with the other that individuates into the ethics of vulner-
ability: “The passivity of the vulnerable one is the condition (or uncondi-
tion) by which a being shows itself to be a creature” (Levinas 1987b: 147).
The subject is a vulnerable, passive hostage under accusation, a hostage of
the other. As Levinas adds in a related footnote: “Subjectivity signifies by
a passivity more passive than all passivity, more passive than matter, by its
vulnerability, its sensibility, by its nudity more nude than nudity, . . . by the
accusative of the oneself without a nominative form, by exposedness to the
traumatism of gratuitous accusation, by expiation for the other” (147).
Levinas drives his vocabulary of punishment, of “being at the ques-
tion before any interrogation” (Levinas 1981: 49), into a relentless gram-
mar of torture that argues the guilt of K. From command, passivity,
exposedness, and vulnerability to denuding, accusative, submission, sub-
jection, and traumatism, the reader is threatened and victimized into
virtue with a solemnity of purpose typical of the Grand Inquisitor. The
promise is the same—servility as redemption: “Transcendence is ethics,
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and subjectivity . . . is, as a responsibility for another, a subjection to the
other. The I is a passivity more passive still than any passivity because it is
from the first in the accusative—oneself [soi]—and never was in the nomi-
native; it is under the accusation of the other, even though it be faultless.
It is a hostage for the other, obeying a command before having heard it,
faithful to a commitment that it never made, to a past that has never been
present” (Levinas 1987c: 165). If the face is “demand” and “authority,” the
relation with the other is one of rape, of “one-penetrated-by-the-other”
(Levinas 1981: 49).104 In this relation, the Other (who is always male, the
Man) becomes “the Overlord, indeed the Persecutor, he who overwhelms,
encumbers, undoes me, he who puts me in his debt no less than he attacks
me by making me answer for his crimes, by charging me with measureless
responsibility” (Blanchot 1986: 19) and eternal guilt. As Kierkegaard pro-
claimed, man exists as guilt, he only stands accused. Hegel’s Master is
transformed into divine Highness.105 “Autrui is governed by nothing.
Autrui is the Governor. He is Master and Teacher. As is Emmanuel Levinas
vis-à-vis his reader” (Llewelyn 1988: 275). According to this view, the “re-
sponsible passivity” of Kafka’s K. is indeed the model of human virtue.
Since passivity is a “task,” K. responds and never resists: he doubts, he
agonizes, he questions, but never resists; he acts with “disarmed responsi-
bility” (Lacoue-Labarthe)—he remains passive. This is the logic of submis-
sion: “The value of human life lies not in happiness but rather in suffering”
(Cohen 1972: 263). Levinas’s vulnerability and Adorno’s melancholy con-
verge in this resigned acceptance of suffering which marks one side of the
exhaustion of emancipation. Derrida has taken care of the other.
Levinas presupposes, on the one hand, the faith of Kierkegaard’s Abra-
ham for his submissive ethical conduct; and on the other, Auerbach’s read-
ing of the Bible’s tyrannical and autocratic claim to truth which seeks to
subject its audience. With Kierkegaard’s library and Auerbach’s interpreta-
tion no longer in place, Derrida has to look elsewhere for a technology of
submission and a rhetoric of command—one that dictates without de-
manding. The modernist Levinas relied on the primacy of the autonomous
text: “To receive the Torah is to carry it out even before it is freely ac-
cepted” (Wyschogrod 1974: 192). The postmodernist Derrida poses the
political supremacy of contemplation. To do that, he draws again on Levi-
nas, who had defended the importance of the Law on two counts: first, to
refute Buber’s mystical communion of Hasidism, by “asserting the integ-
rity of legal Judaism against the romantic exponents of Hasidism as the
appropriate wellspring of authentic Jewish experience” (167); and second,
to discredit Christianity as a soteriological community based on sacrament
while valorizing Judaism as an ethical community based on formal law and
ritual. “God is made real, not through incarnation, but, rather, through the
Law” (Levinas 1979: 219). Better than anything else, this maxim com-
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mands Derrida’s critical mission. With his distaste for “positive” religions,
Levinas found in the observance of ritual law a useful discipline toward
virtue, although he mainly followed Rosenzweig’s advice to give priority to
“commandments” over “law.” What Levinas borrowed from Rosenzweig
and proposed in 1959 is “the substitution of legislation for the totalizing
thought of philosophers and industrial society” (Levinas 1990: 200). The
law becomes a superior freedom. “Consequently, Judaism—in which the
Revelation is . . . inseparable from the commandment—does not in any
way signify the yoke of the Law, but signifies precisely love. . . . It therefore
transpires that the eminent role of the Mitzvah in Judaism signifies not a
moral formalism, but the living presence of divine love that is eternally
renewed. And consequently, through the commandment, it signifies the
experience of an eternal present. The whole of Jewish Law is commanded
today even though Mount Sinai belongs to the past” (191). Pursuing this
direction further in a last-minute effort to salvage the project of autonomy,
Derrida returns to major decisions taken during the Spinozist revival of the
1770s, which influenced the formation of middle-class high culture, and
revived the importance of the Law.
In all his numerous disquisitions on the suppression of writing by orality,
in all his studies of écriture from Plato to Lévi-Strauss, in all his decon-
structions of pneuma and parousia, there is one discussion that Derrida will
not analyze, will avoid, will esoterically allude to while suppressing, perhaps
because it is exactly the cardinal discussion in which his own readings truly
participate: the debates on the relation between Oral and Written Law, the
Torah (Pentateuch). This is the Enlightenment question for those Israel-
ites (Jews and others) who were challenged to become part of it by partici-
pating in the “civilizing process” (Elias 1978) and joining the bourgeois
regime of aesthetic culture—the question of interpretation and assimila-
tion. It is the Haskalah problem for Heyne, Lessing, Mendelssohn, Ha-
mann, and their generation: Is it advisable to accept the universal religion
of reason while preserving the authority of the law? Is it possible to govern
by faith alone? In a more narrow version, the question concerns the proper
place in civil society of halakhah—the system of legal (ritual and civil)
rulings in rabbinic literature which constitutes, together with aggadah, the
sacred tradition of the Oral Law. This is also known as the problem of
revelation and tradition, of the relationship between the divinely revealed
written Law and the religious tradition which has transmitted it. According
to the dialectic of the Enlightenment, Judaism is the universal model
(Cohen’s Vernunftreligion) which already exists but has not been acknowl-
edged, while Hellenism is the one that has disappeared and needs to be
recovered and superseded through imitation. Nobody in modernity
preaches the recovery of the Hebraic model: people know it is always there
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but feel it has been often neglected or misunderstood, and therefore it
needs to become reedited and reaffirmed; thus if the Hebraic is the in-
trinsic other, the Hellenic, though no longer part of this world, is the
constitutive alien of modernity, its outside point of reference and compari-
son against which the originality and achievement of that modernity are
measured.
Law was first systematically separated from faith by Mendelssohn, who
declared that, although the Law, as the determining principle of Judaism,
is revealed, the truth of faith is the same as the truth of reason, and there-
fore does not depend on revelation. Laws were revealed to Israel by God as
Jews were given divine legislation—commandments, regulations, prescrip-
tions. “Mendelssohn put to the moderns a view that Spinoza had borrowed
from Maimonides: the most ancient monotheism is not a revealed religion,
but a revealed Law. Its truth is universal like reason; its rule and moral
institutions, Judaism’s particular support, preserve this truth from corrup-
tion” (Levinas 1990: 274). Mendelssohn was not concerned with demon-
strating the superiority but the singular right of Judaism, which he ascribes
to elements specific to its tradition. He moved Judaism from the realm of
religion into that of Kultur by restricting its essence to Law. The particular
practices of Judaism should be respected, since they belong to culture—the
practical rather than the speculative sphere. Jewish faith is universal, Jewish
practice particular. “Judaism conceived as law is by definition a way of life”
(Rotenstreich 1968: 28), another culture, not philosophy. Revelation dis-
closes the Law, not the existence of God. To cultivate and perfect aware-
ness of the latter is the responsibility of Enlightenment. “It is thus evident
that Mendelssohn was influenced by the teachings of deism, the English
counterpart of the Enlightenment, in resenting the intrusion of metaphys-
ical principles into the constitutive meaning of those axioms asserted by
faith, in transferring the seat of religion to the sphere of ethics, and in
testing religion not by the truths it proclaims but by its utility and social
benefits, by its ethical consequences in the regulation of practical affairs
and in the perceptible realm of legislation” (29). Religion becomes a ques-
tion of performance of positive commandments, not of faith. Mendelssohn
favors Judaism as a system of religious obligations over Athanasian Chris-
tianity as a doctrine. The new egalitarian dogma of cultural difference,
more than anything else, made it possible for the Others of capitalism, the
people excluded from civil society, to decide to join modernity and seek
emancipation through assimilation by becoming the People of the Book.
The Book (of interpretation) emerges when the Law disappears (into cul-
ture)—when the rule of law governs reading rather than action or logic.
Moritz Lazarus (1824–1903), in his posthumous The Ethics of Judaism
(1911), socialized Kant’s categorical imperative, making it a regulation of
social life: Jewish ethics is a social ethics regulating relations among men as
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well as public affairs. At the same time, in an effort to reconcile the auton-
omous nature of objective ethics with the heteronomous structure of Jew-
ish ethics—a problem which Levinas later tried to solve with the idea of
passivity—he proposed that, for Judaism, religion and ethics are identical.
Taking the philosophy of Lazarus as his starting point, Hermann Cohen
argued that, as a commandment, the law raises man to the ethical level
because it guides him through discipline and obedience. Kant’s objective
imperative becomes a religious one but it is still ethical because it is an
imperative of pure reason addressed to the person of cultivation. The law
is both the commandment and the duty to obey it. The religious impera-
tive is a consequence of the correlation between man and God.
It is in the context of an attack on incarnation, and specifically the sacra-
ments, that Cohen turns his attention to custom and law: “The celebration
of the eucharist presupposes as a vital element an assumption about the
nature of the trinitarian Deity, while obedience to ceremonial laws never
implies anything beyond the limits of human action: God teaches moral
behaviour by symbolic reminders” (Liebeschütz 1968: 30). In considering
the institutions of Jewry, he shows more understanding for ritual, and
abandons the denunciation of law which he inherited from the Enlighten-
ment through Kant’s ethics. Furthermore, he establishes the superiority of
the Law through a comparison with the laws defied by Antigone: “The
Greeks distinguished the ‘unwritten laws’ from the written ones. . . . Even
the positive laws require for their more profound verification conformity
with the unwritten laws. . . . These unwritten laws contained the morality
of the Greek national spirit before it was formulated and motivated by the
philosophers. . . . What the Greeks called the unwritten law, the Jews
called written teaching. They wanted to disregard in it the connection with
reason, asserted elsewhere, because their vision, their interest, was pointed
to the future, which they intended to keep connected with the past. There-
fore they fix the past as written teaching, in order to strengthen oral teach-
ing as teaching. The Greek from the very outset addresses his criticism to
the present, for which he has to lay a foundation in the past. The Jew,
however, does not want to deepen the present through criticism, but rather
through establishing its connection with the eternal, with written law”
(Cohen 1972: 83). If Mendelssohn moved the law away from religion and
into culture, and Lazarus turned it into a social regulation, Cohen, revising
Hegel’s reading of Sophocles, places it at the heart of individual ethical
conduct.
As his three-volume Jewish Writings (1924) shows, the founder of the
Neo-Kantian “Marburg School” who taught “critical Idealism” at the Uni-
versity for forty years was always interested in Judaism (supporting as early
as 1867, for example, Heinrich Heine’s Jewish Pantheism against Goethe’s
Hellenic one). However, his systematic concentration on Jewish problems,
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which he branded “return”—after he had already been identified with an-
other philosophical turn, the “return to Kant”—started materializing in
the early 1880s, after he fell out of academic favor because his thought
seemed outdated. For a while he tried to negotiate with Protestant histori-
cism, to which he had always objected, and stressed the importance of
prophetic Messianism—but it was too late. Like the author who strove in
vain to be accepted as a saint of art, he felt betrayed by the Hellenic cove-
nant of the aesthetic. “Cohen had started his life’s work with the belief in
the vocation of the German people to win over the world for the realisation
of humanitarian idealism. He never abandoned this trust in a better future.
But in the practice of his working day he transferred more and more of his
hope and his belief to the messianic faith of the Jewish people. . . . It re-
mained, however, his intention to convince his German environment that
the living Jewish tradition still offered an essential contribution to the con-
tinuity and growth of civilisation” (Liebeschütz 1968: 20). Cohen’s Jewish
return came after the decline of Hegelian historicism, which had sent the
Science of Judaism into documentary research and marginality. Thus dur-
ing the 1910s, when Buber, Bloch, Benjamin, Rosenzweig, Lukács, Shestov,
and other disaffected writers emerged and many calls for a reorientation of
the Science toward theology were heard, Cohen’s ethico-theology had al-
ready paved the way for such a move.
It is ironic that he spent his last years teaching at the Berlin Academy for
the Advancement of the Science of Judaism, and that he left his strongest
mark on the reevaluation of a Science he used to ignore. Cohen was the
writer who established a close connection between religion and reason, ele-
vating the former from its lower status (subsumed under ethics) in his
earlier work. His Ethics of Pure Will (1904), for example, argued that faith
and reason are compatible and mutually enhancing because religion, al-
though a sphere separate from reason, flows from reason and takes part in
it. Among religions, Judaism, as the religion of universal ethics, occupies a
special position because it is the religion of reason par excellence. “In the
same way in which the Greeks must be considered the creators of a scien-
tific philosophy shared by all mankind, the Jewish people created the reli-
gion of reason” (Altmann 1956: 198). In Judaism, every man is Jesus, and
in general every man, through his own moral exertion, can attain the level
of Jesus. Revelation is also compatible with reason, since God’s revelation
is addressed to man’s reason and man’s reason is a creation of God’s revela-
tion. Thus the latter, as a rational relation, discloses reason. Finally, it was
during his Jewish period, too, that Cohen, influenced by dialectical theol-
ogy, introduced the concept of correlation. Defining the problem of ethics
as one of correlation (not union), of correlating the individual with society,
he discovered man as a “fellow-man.” While Christianity seeks the way to
salvation in history, Judaism is not concerned with history because it is
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already an eternal life. At the same time, the idea that the concept of Juda-
ism cannot be derived from history strengthened Cohen’s belief in Juda-
ism’s social, even socialist, mission in preparation for the messianic future.
Nietzsche’s senior by two years, Cohen was the last intellectual for whom
assimilation was possible and desirable. Driven by fervent German patrio-
tism, he was never sympathetic to Zionism or any nationalist understand-
ing of Judaism: for him, the Jew is at home wherever he has reason to feel
at home because he has successfully assimilated. He always argued the
close affinity of Jewish tradition (as a Kulturreligion) with German culture,
and of liberal Judaism with Protestantism, which he saw as a progressive
force. Cohen’s Messianism was oriented toward the higher Jewish task, the
mission for which Israel has been chosen. In his essay “Religious Postu-
lates” (1907), Cohen laments the aversion of intellectuals, and especially
philosophers, to religion. “This attitude, by now almost predominant in
our circles, also constitutes the greatest threat and danger to our existence”
(Cohen 1971: 44). In opposition to the spiritual poverty of his time, he
offers a hierarchy of three basic principles affirming traditional values: God,
state, and culture. For Cohen, both state and culture are religious duties.
“Love of our country is a necessary corollary of the idea of the Messianic
God” (49), and in their turn, as he states elsewhere, all cultural questions
are determined by the state (164). Regarding the latter, he preaches harmo-
nious co-existence. “For this reason a distinction must be made between
nation and nationality. The modern state requires a uniform nation but by
no means a uniform nationality” (48). Jews, therefore, may preserve their
national distinctiveness while belonging organically to the nation-state. “It
is the duty of any Jew to help bring about the Messianic age by involving
himself in the national life of his country” (49). This is the liberal position
on assimilation, the one that trusts the citizens’ self-governing conscious-
ness of the law to protect the system of interpretive rites.
Against increasingly attractive Zionist aspirations, the philosopher be-
lieves that the Messianic message of prophetism points the way to cos-
mopolitanism and socialism (71). For him, the preservation of religion-as-
nationality is sufficient for the protection of Jewish identity. In his reply to
Martin Buber’s open letter, “An Argument against Zionism” (1916), he
emphasizes the unique privilege and universal mission: “We are proudly
aware of the fact that we continue to live as divine dew among the nations;
we wish to remain among them and be a creative force for them.” And later:
“Messianic hope alone guarantees our ‘reality,’ our authentic existence”
(168). Not a sectarian and proudly isolated Judaism but “only a universal,
mankind-oriented Judaism can preserve the Jewish religion” (169)—a faith
he calls “religion of mankind” and “an entirely universal religion” (168).
Until the Jews reach their Messianic future, their true home (170), they
must work for both the preservation of their (religious) nationality and
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their “political integration into the modern national state” (169). Else-
where he states his belief epigrammatically: “As religion demands man’s
whole, undivided heart, so does the state” (185). In this last respect, the
intrinsic relation of Jews with Germany is especially important. Cohen re-
fers to “that innermost accord existing between the German spirit and our
Messianic religiosity. The German spirit is the spirit of classical humanism
and true universalism” (169), he explains in a clear allusion to the Hellenic-
Hebraic polarity. “Therefore it is only natural that we German Jews should
feel at one with ourselves, as Jews and as Germans” (169).
This argument is further developed, in all its messianic intensity, in his
two-part essay “The German and the Jewish Ethos” (1915, 1916). The essay
opens appropriately with another restatement of the Hebraic-Hellenic
motif: “With the advent of the Reformation, modern man began to realize
that human insights can lead to two different kinds of certitude: that of the
exact sciences and that of faith” (176). The author proceeds to review the
project of Jewish philosophy that was launched in the ninth century, ad-
vanced by Maimonides in the twelfth, and may be reaching maturity with
Idealism, especially Kantian ethics. Cohen sees a clear and promising “con-
nection between cultural idealism and the Bible or Judaism” (177). Reject-
ing the French Enlightenment, he insists on the affinity and alliance bring-
ing Germanism and Judaism together. “For the German idea of mankind
has its origin in the Messianism of Israel’s prophets, whose spirit doubt-
lessly affected German humanism profoundly” (180). Cohen proclaims in
exaltation this spiritual bond when he confesses that “we derive a sense of
the closest religious communion from the accord existing between Jewish
Messianism and German humanism. Our feeling for Germany and its peo-
ple has therefore religious overtones, so to speak, and is marked by a sense
of religious affirmation. In perfect equanimity and harmony of soul, we feel
as secure in our German patriotism as in our Jewish religion, whose root
and crown are the One God of one mankind” (187–88). In this context and
for the sake of the German state, science and faith, humanistic idealism
and Biblical religion, will merge and blend; and because of the Messianic
roots and the Protestant character of that state, they both have an equally
important role to play. “Prophetic idealism is therefore not inferior in de-
gree or extent to the idealism with which philosophy views all being” (184).
Its contribution, Cohen implies, will be to facilitate that fusion of culture
and ethics that will bring about the era of the universal monotheism. “We
know that we as German Jews share in a central cultural force destined to
unite all nations in the spirit of a Messianic mankind” (183). Jews are an
integral part of the German cultural destiny, which is preparatory of a uni-
versal monotheism—this is his vision of the future. “The kindred spirit
linking Germanism and Judaism is thus focused on the most distant point
of the world’s historical horizon” (184). Instead of turning their attention
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to the creation of their own state, Jews should “make the preservation of
our religion a religious and cultural mandate of the German state” (186).
Cohen is not advocating a national, ethnic state but a global regimen gov-
erned by the principles of Judaism. Like Arnold, he realizes that the mod-
ern world, threatened by anarchy and skepticism, can achieve this only by
culture, and consequently declares that “it is incumbent upon the cultural
forces of the world and their leading spirit, Germany, to promulgate the
idea of Israelite monotheism” (186). By mobilizing such Hellenic forces as
philosophy, Platonism, ethics, knowledge, science, and art, he hopes to
help establish the universal state of Messianic religion.
Because he still adhered to the law of the bourgeois state, the liberal law
of individual emancipation, Cohen remained a believer in universal mes-
sianism, even though around him the old order had collapsed. He trusted
the middle-class consensus and its institutions to govern the conduct of
people where the disappearance of a shared discourse of obligations and
the challenges to the distribution of rights made it increasingly difficult for
capital to defend its moral equanimity. However, the bankruptcy of En-
lightenment administration, the decline of the Bildungsideal, and the fail-
ure of the Spirit to be realized made the abandonment of universalism by
the younger generation unavoidable. The appearance of racial anti-Semi-
tism sealed the fate of assimilationist idealism. At the same time, while the
project of modernization was considered dead, the dream of modernity
lived on. In fact the Hebraic utopian vision acquired a special urgency,
learning to speak the tongues of anti-rationalism, mystical intellectualism,
and radical secular Messianism. The historicism of the Science of Judaism
was rejected as assimilationist and complacent. The great lesson that think-
ers learned from Cohen’s radicalization of the enterprise was that its princi-
ples must be presented as directly derived from within the Judaic tradition,
rather than from humanism. “The Messianic stance rejects religiosity, the
rational and secular Judaism of the middle classes, and the personal Juda-
ism of ‘renewal’ represented by Martin Buber. Messianism demands a com-
plete repudiation of the world as it is, placing its hope in a future whose
realization can only be brought about by the destruction of the older order.
Apocalyptic, catastrophic, utopian and pessimistic, Messianism captured a
generation” (Rabinbach 1985: 81) of intellectuals disaffected with ideal-
ism, historicism, cultivation, but above all, politics. It is the notion of
(high) Culture that becomes most important for the generation of “roman-
tic anti-capitalism” which reacts with revulsion against the taste of the
masses—consumer culture. Thus critique, under the influence of writers
like Simmel, evolves into cultural criticism, and politics into intellectual,
and eventually aesthetic, politics. In his esoteric function, the intellectual
pursues redemption through contemplation as she envisions a post-politi-
cal world. The more art withdraws into its exclusive laws, the more impor-
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tant its regime appears as a model of self-regulation. This is no surprise in
the context of art’s economic history. “Indeed one might risk the rather
exaggerated formulation that aesthetics is born at the moment of art’s ef-
fective demise as a political force, flourishes on the corpse of its social
relevance” (Eagleton 1990: 368). The principles of the law and the founda-
tions of government will now be sought in the distinctive features of the
artwork itself—in a professionally sanctioned canon of hermeneutically ap-
proved and sealed masterpieces.
As part of this modernist concentration on the formal structure of iden-
tity, the langue of difference, an exclusive Hebraism, “a Jewishness without
Judaism” (Rabinbach 1985: 82), makes its appearance in marked contrast
to the Enlightenment emancipation of Judaism without Jewishness. Fur-
thermore, in opposition to Hellenic myth (which is blamed for all mass
deception, from consumer culture to politics) the messianism of a purified
language, of an unmediated, Pentecostal code, promises deliverance from
history. “The interest in Judaism now shifts from the ethical to the onto-
logical; that is, it is apprehended as a reality with qualities and relations of
its own, which develop in accordance with a unifying principle. In other
words, Judaism is beginning to be looked upon as a metaphysical, and not
primarily as an ethical system” (Rotenstreich 1968: 105) at the turn of the
twentieth century. Where Mendelssohn developed claims about the valid
particularity of Judaism and Krochmal argued the special Jewish access to
universal reason, now a self-sufficient ground was sought in works like
Baeck’s The Essence of Judaism (1905). For writers from Rosenzweig to
Levinas, ethnic identity became ontologically primary: “Judaism is no
longer just a teaching whose theses can be true or false; Jewish existence
(and I write existence as one word) itself is an essential event of being;
Jewish existence is a category of being” (Levinas 1990: 183). Judaism was no
longer simply shielded from history, as was the case with Cohen’s messian-
ism: “Instead of hoping for an evolution towards full emancipation, they
wished to escape from history itself and restore the unique place of the Jews
as an eternal people in touch with higher truths” (Jay 1976: 6). The appeal
was made for return (often contrasted to the Odyssean one) to an essential
and personal Judaism, not a communal tradition of customs and rules. The
Jewish Question was now that of being truly, authentically Jewish: Jewish-
ness was elevated to a cultural idea, the ideal type of the bourgeois of cul-
ture, and Judaism became the new counter-politics, oppositional culture.
With Cohen, the grandiose project of Enlightenment came to a belated
close: assimilation through interpretation was complete and successful, but
suddenly its masters discovered that they had to fight its greatest enemy,
the dimension they thought the disciplines of paideia had transcended:
politics. At this crucial moment, assimilation was faced with three options:
nationalist (Zionism), theological (Buber/Rosenzweig), and cultural. Al-
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most all the masters of Modernism took the last one. Leon Trotsky (1879–
1940), Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) and Bertolt Brecht (1898–1956) were
among the few who could work with alternatives other than aesthetic.
For Rosenzweig, who pursued a different alternative, the encounter at
Sinai was initially a revelation—the model of dialogic speech, not the giv-
ing of law. Later, however, the student of Cohen recognized the impor-
tance of halakhah, and disagreed with Buber’s rejection of the authority of
the law. The law must be personally experienced as a commandment and
observed as practice. Where Buber understood this more in the context of
community life and ritual, Rosenzweig believed that individual Jews must
feel that they are commanded. His ethics of personal response takes care of
a major problem for the hygiene of return: the return of the other’s call.
Since the authority of self-control (as well as that of the external law, the
law of Hegel’s state) has declined, what can mandate and guarantee con-
trol? The general attitude that had pervaded a very wide spectrum of posi-
tions was that the collapse of liberal consensus, bourgeois idealism, and the
Bildung model signaled a significant weakening of aesthetic discipline. The
humanistic regime of autonomy, devised in late eighteenth-century Ger-
many, was undergoing a major crisis. The theoros, the soloist of critique,
could no longer be left alone, undisturbed, to contemplate if he did not
survey. If not managed, people ought to be supervised. Since heteronomy
could not be brought back, autonomy would have to be administered
through the invocation (though not imposition, at least not yet) of some
outside authority. A new grammar of authority, a new code of sovereignty
was necessary. Progressives sought it in radical modernism, the glorifica-
tion of the (art)work itself. Conservatives, including many Marxists, sought
it in moral injunction. Rosenzweig was among the latter. “The task of the
Jew today, Rosenzweig argued, is to transform law into commandment”
(Löwith 1966: 48). This idea was further developed by Levinas, who raised
the command to an ontological category and individuating experience in
order to secure its unconditional observance. In his thought, the categori-
cal imperative is allowing oneself to be seized by a call which one obeys
passively: law is translated into an absolute existential commandment. At
the same time, this project of Hobbesian submission owes a great debt to
Buber’s transformation of the ethical concept of “correlation” (between
man and God, and man and man), advanced in the late writings of Cohen
(1972, chapter 8), into the ontological one of “relation.” Buber’s major
concern, however, was the element of reciprocity in man’s relation to God.
Rosenzweig was philosophically (though not politically) committed to Jew-
ish law, unlike Buber, whose phenomenology of life as a meeting was part
of a larger effort to ground ethics socially.
The Zionist Buber was also the greatest opponent of Cohen’s views on
the identity and political future of Judaism. Where Cohen, in his perennial
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search for synthesis and transcendence, was always happy to devise com-
mon grounds and possibilities for unity, Buber took an uncompromisingly
Hebraic position. In discussing the courage of moral heroism, for example,
Cohen exclaims: “Here Jewish and Greek ethics touch and attest their kin-
ship, which is based on their common relation to reason. Here one can
recognize the common denominator of reason, which makes possible the
analogy between Socrates and Plato, on the one hand, and the prophets, on
the other. Here are the sources that unite Orient and Occident. . . . Upon
this original soil of reason, the differences between polytheism and mono-
theism seem to disappear, as if they were of secondary importance in the
face of the main alternative: sensuality or reason” (Cohen 1972: 437).
Around the same time, when Buber, following Hölderlin’s Orient (Greece)-
Occident distinction, conceives “The Spirit of the Orient and Judaism,” he
chooses to stress the differences separating it from the Occident. In his
conception, the Orient is (and has at last by the end of the eighteenth
century begun to be seen as) a coherent totality. “The great complex of
Oriental nations can be shown to be one entity, an organism whose mem-
bers, no matter how functionally different, have a similar structure and a
similar vitality; and, as such, the Orient holds a position in its own right
vis-à-vis the Occident” (Buber 1967: 56–57). The two must be absolutely
differentiated: “I would define the Oriental type of human being, recogniz-
able in the documents of Asia’s antiquity as well as in the Chinese or Indian
or Jew of today, as a man of pronounced motor faculties, in contrast to the
Occidental type, represented by, say, the Greek of the Periclean period, the
Italian of the Trecento, or the contemporary German, whose sensory facul-
ties are greater than his motor” (57). Buber rejects the racial distinctions
which base their explanations on the natural sciences, and instead grounds
his theory of history on psychology, or what he understands as the psychic
identity of nations: “The basic psychic act of the motor-type man is centrif-
ugal: an impulse emanates from his soul and becomes motion. The basic
psychic act of the sensory-type man is centripetal: an impression is made
on his soul and becomes an image. Both are perceiving, both acting, men;
but the one perceives in motions, the other acts in images. The first, per-
ceiving, has the experience of action; the second, acting, has the experience
of shape. Both think; but the thinking of the first means doing, the think-
ing of the other, form” (58). While objecting to the racism of the positiv-
ists, Buber’s is a liberal racism that draws more from philosophy than sci-
ence. Thus he detects similar differences between the types in the area of
comprehension. “The Occidental progresses, step by step, from the world’s
appearance to its truth . . . ; the Oriental carries this truth in the essence of
his being, finding it in the world and giving it to the world” (60). The one
proceeds by analysis, the other through identification. “To sensory man,
guided by the most objective sense, sight, the world appears objectified. . . .
To motor-type man, the world appears as limitless motion, flowing through
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him” (59). And more abstractly: “The Occidental’s comprehension of his
sensations originates in the world; the Oriental’s comprehension of the
world originates in his sensations” (59). Adorno would later elaborate on
the objectification of the world effected by the senses of the Occidental
man and on the ensuing positivism. Another line of the argument was later
developed by Levinas. Buber argues: “In the sensory-type man, the senses
are separated from each other and from the undifferentiated base of or-
ganic life; they are under the preponderant influence of the most detached,
most independent, most objective among them: the sense of light. The
triumph of the Greeks in the creative sphere of pure form and shape is the
work of his hegemony” (58). This is the power and oppression to which
Levinas refers in his critique of “Parmenidean metaphysics.” Buber alludes
to the alternative metaphysics of the hidden face through Cohen’s favorite
comparison of Plato to the prophets: “When Plato envisions something,
there is nothing but the vision; the Jewish prophet envisions God only in
order to hear His word” (59). Monotheism, having God on its side, wins.106
The last aspect from which Buber compares the two human types and
categories is conduct. The Oriental type is driven by the “pathos of com-
mand” (61), which is revealed to be the “pathos of a divine command”
(66), the desire to be commanded by a higher power. This command is
experienced as a demand for a fulfilling life of duty. Through a comparison
of Socrates to Buddha, Buber shows that the two types go their separate
ways—the former after the contemplated idea and knowledge, the latter
after the lived idea and authenticity. In reality, only the Oriental is con-
cerned about the inner substance and destiny of man, and the transcen-
dence of his fundamental conflict. “Being is in the state of duality: the
duality of yea and nay . . . of good and evil . . . and of the real and illusory
world. . . . Man is called upon to change being from duality to unity. The
world is waiting for man, to be unified by him” (62). Unity for Buber,
however, does not mean, as it did for his predecessors, some kind of recon-
ciliation or combination between yea and nay, Hebraism and Hellenism.
Even the Oriental-Occidental distinction does not hold Buber’s interest
for too long. For after outlining it in the first part of his essay, he proceeds
to narrow it down to more basic elements, arguing that the two categories
are best represented by the Jewish and the Greek nations respectively. The
broad characterizations made earlier fully apply to them. “All I have said
about the Oriental is especially true of the Jew. He represents the human
type with the most distinctly pronounced motor faculties” (64). Doing and
acting, not knowledge, is important for him. “For the Greek, the concept
is the end of a psychic process; for the Jew, it is the beginning” (64). By his
decision and deed, the Jew unifies the world and brings it to fulfillment:
his search for perfection brings him in contact with the divine. “From this
point it can be seen that of all the Orientals the Jew is the most obvious
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antithesis of the Greek. The Greek wants to master the world, the Jew, to
perfect it. For the Greek the world exists; for the Jew, it becomes. The
Greek confronts it; the Jew is involved with it. The Greek apprehends it
under the aspect of measure, the Jew as intent. For the Greek the deed is
in the world, for the Jew the world is in the deed” (66). Buber sees as the
greatest achievement of Judaism the divine command for decision and ac-
tion in its absolute value. He believes that “through its new magic, the
magic of decision, Judaism won the Occident for the teaching of the Ori-
ent. By means of this teaching Judaism became the representative of the
Orient at its best” (68). This is more appreciated in the broader context of
western spiritual poverty: “None of the great religious teachings originated
in the Occident. The Occident received and spiritually reworked what the
Orient had to offer” (68), and this pattern has lasted for centuries. What
Europe lacks “is the pristine knowledge of the meaning of authentic life”
(69) which Oriental theories cultivated. Judaism, in particular, the most
influential spiritual system of the Orient, “whose proclamation of the way
of authentic life challenged every individual directly,” was “the Jewish
teaching of decision and return” (69). Buber adopts Kierkegaard’s notion of
individuality in emphasizing that this egalitarian message turned every per-
son into a sinner, responsible for (and guilty of) his deeds. The man called
upon to decide and act is called to repent and return because he has failed
and fallen.
An experience of duality and of demand for decision emanating from the
divine command leads necessarily to conflict. “The Oriental people’s spiri-
tual life . . . tended to develop in the form of a struggle: the struggle of
creative minds, of leaders and redeemers, against the aimlessness of the
people’s drives. This struggle was especially intense and fecund in ancient
Judaism” (73). The idea of faith as struggle was later adopted by Shestov’s
existentialism, and aggressively expounded by Derrida into the cosmic con-
cept of “violence.” This idea worried Levinas, however; it also worried
Buber, who could praise its energy as “Asiatic strength and Asiatic inward-
ness” (76) but feared its destructive potential after the Jewish progress to-
ward emancipation in the nineteenth century. “We live in the uncertain
state that followed these attempts: the last old structure of the Oriental
spirit within Judaism appears to be shaken, with no foundation laid for a
new one” (75). The specter of anarchy looms large in his understanding of
the modern world; but his idea of anarchy is much more specific and has a
geographical basis: “Our age will one day be designated as the era of the
Asiatic crisis. The dominant nations of the Orient have surrendered partly
to the external power of Europe, partly to its internally-overpowering influ-
ences. They have not preserved their most sacred possessions, their great
spiritual traditions; at times they even relinquished them voluntarily. . . .
The soul of Asia is being murdered, and is itself participating in this mur-
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der” (77). Buber may be worried but has not lost his faith, especially in the
true Oriental identity of the Jew: “He has preserved within himself the
limitless motor faculties that are inherent in his nature, and their attendant
phenomena, a dominant sense of time and a capacity for quick conceptual-
ization” (76). As long as these natural qualities survive, all is not lost. He
confesses: “On this manifest or latent Orientalism, this base of the Jew’s
soul that has endured underneath all influences, I build my faith in a new
spiritual-religious creation by Judaism” (76). This creation will save hu-
manity from anarchy and dissolution. Buber outlines his project for re-
newal and reorientation as follows: “We need a searching of our souls, a
turning inward, a return. Europe must dare to promote a new era, in which
the Orient will be preserved and an understanding between East and West
established for their mutual benefit and for the humanitarian work they
must share. In this era, Asia will not be overpowered by Europe but will be
developed from within, by its own inner resources; and Europe will not be
threatened by Asia but will be led by it toward the great vital truths” (77–
78). What the world needs is an Asiatic self-examination of European con-
sciousness; a mutual reconciliation; and a new relationship in which Asia
will develop from within and will guide the path of Europe. In these three
successive stages, the Orient, the spiritual leader, will replace Europe as the
dominant power. This Asiatization of Europe is Buber’s version of the Ju-
daization of the Occident. It was Judaism that first taught “decision and
return.” Jews, with their Orientalism still intact, may help Europe in its
new role because they are a “mediating people that has acquired all the
wisdom and all the skills of the Occident without losing its original Orien-
tal character, a people called to link Orient and Occident in fruitful reci-
procity, just as it is perhaps called to fuse the spirit of the East and the
West in a new teaching” (78).107
Cohen’s advocacy of a possible fruitful combination of humanism and
Messianism in German soil that would prepare the universal state of mono-
theism was for Buber an occidental illusion that overestimated Hellenic
philosophy and culture. He accepted the conciliatory idea of reciprocity
and fusion but in his view the superiority of Judaism should not only be the
aim (as in Cohen’s earthly Kingdom of religion) but also the means toward
its accomplishment. That is why he was unwilling to make any concessions
to Europe: its Hellenic science and knowledge must be led by the new
teaching of return and redemption emanating from Jerusalem (78). The
unification of the Orient and the Occident was not a matter of kinship
between Greek and Jewish ethics, as Cohen thought, but something for the
self-reflexive spiritual inwardness of Judaism to achieve. For the Zionist
visionary, nothing European/Occidental/Hellenic—be it culture, human-
ism, philosophy, science, or sweetness and light—will effect the desirable
synthesis, but only the religiosity originating in Palestine, the land of actual
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return. According to this Biblical literalism, the divine command for action
was directing people to the site of the promise and the date of proximity.
This separatist position, with its anti-European emphasis on race and cul-
ture, made him a major prophet of the essentialist critiques of Eurocen-
trism that emerged in the end of the second millennium. With hindsight,
its crude good vs. bad polarities may sound a warning to delusions awaiting
emancipatory appropriations of the Hebraic model of otherness in so far
as the idea of the other, tribal or humanistic, can at best seek and breed
assimilation.
The messianic ideology of Modernism is best encapsulated in a compari-
son of prophetism to secular history and the promises of delivery contained
within each. The subject of Buber’s essay “Plato and Isaiah” is the encoun-
ter of the philosopher and the prophet with history. In Plato’s case, the
philosopher tried to establish his ideal Republic in Syracuse but failed:
“The spirit is in possession of truth; it offers truth to reality; truth becomes
reality through the spirit. That is the fundamental basis of Plato’s doctrine.
But this doctrine was not carried out” (107). As a typical sensory-type, he
trusted his understanding and brought its conclusions to the world. “Plato
is the most sublime instance of that spirit which proceeds in its intercourse
with reality from its own possession of truth” (106). His, however, was not
the only failure of spirit in the face of historical necessity. There is also the
case of Isaiah, who went to the people during the period of King Uzziah but
whose message was scorned and rejected. He failed too; but there is a major
difference: “He will not suffer disappointment like Plato, for in his case
failure is an integral part of the way he must take” (108). What accounts for
their attitudes is that Isaiah does not share Plato’s belief in man’s self-
sufficient spirit and power. “Isaiah does not believe that spiritual man has
the vocation to power. He knows himself to be a man of spirit and without
power” (108). The two also differ in their self-understanding: “Plato be-
lieved that his soul was perfect. Isaiah did not. Isaiah regarded and ac-
knowledged himself as unclean” (108). Plato tried to achieve his goal with
a firm grasp of, and confidence in, his mind, his theory, and his right to do
so. Isaiah’s situation was the opposite: “He had no idea; he had only a
message. He had no institution to establish; he had only to proclaim. His
proclamation was in the nature of criticism and demands” (109). Thus
differences extend beyond personal disposition to include the nature of the
mission and its purported audience. The philosopher plans to create a new
city while the prophet voices criticism and raises demands “directed toward
making the people and their prince recognize the reality of the invisible
sovereignty” (109). Isaiah’s message is direct and personal, calling everyone
and the nation as a whole to return to God. “So, the criticism and demands
are directed toward every individual on whom other individuals depend,
everyone who has a hand in shaping the destinies of others, and that means
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they are directed toward everyone of us. When Isaiah speaks of justice, he
is not thinking of institutions but of you and me, because without you and
me, the most glorious institution becomes a lie” (110). While the philoso-
pher’s project was political, the prophet’s was “metapolitical” (110). These
passages formulate a grammar of command instituting a regime of metapo-
litical (hence invisible) sovereignty.
Plato aspired to create a new Republic, and therefore thought in terms of
a polis, in political terms. When he failed to achieve that, history’s victory
over his spirit was absolute, and his disappointment justifiable. Isaiah,
however, experienced no disappointment because he had no political aspi-
rations or chances. That is why he addressed the two fundamental unities
of the state—the individual and the nation. Consequently, his failure was
of another order—and it could be called one only in strict (that is, political)
historical terms. Thus for Buber the two characters represent opposite
types of spirit: the political, the uncertain, the risky, the profane vs. the
metapolitical, the certain, the transcendental, the religious; one is ad-
dressed to the republic and its citizens, the other to the nation and its
subjects; the former risks anarchy, the latter expresses the will of God. In
this opposition, the Hellenic is not identified with culture but with politics.
What is more, the author associates with the Hebraic metapolitical the two
greatest artworks of the modern era, the individual and the nation. Heine
had already called Abraham an artist because he fashioned the nation of
Israel. Buber develops the analogy further, opposing the artistic/Hebraic to
the political/Hellenic. Now the Greek is detested not for its culture, the
idolatry of form, but for its politics, the attention to history. Buber invokes
the vision of a metapolitical and suprahistorical order of time: “We may yet
experience an era of history which refutes ‘history’” (111). His ultimate
Messianic dream is the transcendence of history through national continu-
ity. The aesthetic politics of Jena is replaced by the prophetic metapolitics
of Vienna.
As Buber closes his essay with a reaffirmation of the place, the Zionist
“topos” (111), and the “misunderstood, misinterpreted, misused” voice of
Isaiah, Messianism comes to rest at the national State proposed by Moses
Hess. Prophetism—the transcendence of history, and not the search for a
Republic—constitutes its politics, the commanded individuals its subjects,
ethnicity its identity, and history its horror. Before becoming Professor of
the Philosophy of Jewish Religion and Ethics at the University of Frankfurt
(1924–33)—the position which paralysis prevented Rosenzweig from ac-
cepting in 1922—Buber had discovered in Hasidism an alternative Juda-
ism, one where the law functions as custom and ritual, and therefore
founds an authentic mode of life which expresses the identity of a collec-
tive. Buber had no great respect for the “vexatious Talmud” (to which
Levinas later returned), considering it antithetical to life. He was interested
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in possibilities for encounter, not the rule of law, and saw the halakhah as
enemy of openness. Preferring “inwardness without the law of God,” he
severed the relation of law and revelation.108 Custom, on the other hand, is
law spiritualized: it constitutes a vital, ethnic (as opposed to national) com-
munity.109 His early discovery was later fulfilled in the prophetic politics of
his Zionist conviction: “Gemeinschaft is a messianic category, and social-
ism acts in the direction of the messianic fulfillment; it is a messianic activ-
ity to which everybody is called” (Tillich 1959: 198). If Messianism after
Cohen is the present dimension of the future, the dialogists, who sought a
non-political praxis for life, found that dimension in the time of the meet-
ing. Bloch took the same call for the messianic praxis in a different, utopian
direction. In both cases, however, the metapolitics of prophetism required
the transcendence of history and the denunciation of secular politics,
namely, the life of the polis.
THE ART OF RULING
Among the three options with which autonomy was faced after the collapse
of the Enlightenment project, the theological one—represented by Cohen,
Rosenzweig, and the early Buber—was obviously the most conservative,
the one most attached to a religion before reason (or after Kierkegaard).
The Zionist option, adopted by the later Buber and Scholem, proved far
more successful but never broke out, perhaps never tried to break out of its
proud isolationism. As far as the West is concerned, it is the third option
that has had the greatest impact on culture: the pessimism about full as-
similation led to an optimism about assimilating others into Hebraism
through interpretation whereby the promise of emancipation does not in-
clude the entire civic life but is limited to the cultural sphere. “In short the
intellectualist mission of the Jews is the western alternative to Zionism”
(Rabinbach 1985: 95). Judaism’s mission, no longer moral, becomes intel-
lectual. As Benjamin wrote to the author Ludwig Strauss in 1912: “I see
three zionist forms of Jewishness (Judentum): Palestine Zionism (a natural
necessity); German Zionism in its halfness, and cultural Zionism which
sees Jewish values everywhere and works for them” (quoted in Rabinbach
1985: 96). His choice, and that of the majority, was to concentrate on “the
creative culture-Jew” (99). Where earlier people aspired to live in a state of
Israelitism, of pure heart and reason, of equal rights and tasks, now intellec-
tuals desire the status of Jewishness (which, of course, hardly translates
into more respect or freedom for actual Jews). They turn with apocalyptic
fervor to various aesthetic pursuits, like language, art, mysticism, exoti-
cism, or biologism. They discover that Messianism is violent and destruc-
tive but also redemptive and restorative. Before the war, the emphasis was
more on the visionary and mystical. “The war gave political shape to the
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idea of redeeming European culture and to the implication of language in
its crisis. After 1914 we see in Bloch and Benjamin’s writings an attempt to
find a secular and theological philosophy which can embody the Messianic
impulse in relation to a real apocalypse, and to translate the promise of
European culture into the promise of political redemption” (104). After
the First World War, intellectuals and artists concentrated on the counter-
politics of revolution or cultural critique.
This was the time, for example, that Bloch was working on his “System
of Theoretical Messianism” which he never completed. Caught between
the assembly line and the party line, between management and bureau-
cracy, they found the only compensation for the catastrophe of history in
interpretive atonement and aesthetic redemption. History, even as apoca-
lypse, provided no fulfillment. Thus the virtuosos of vocation devised an
interpretive materialist theology of secular society which explained the
signs of culture as allegories of the promise. In the “new” of modernism
they thought they discerned an alternative covenant. “In the critical theory
of the Frankfurt School, the Jewish Messianic idea was subsumed into rad-
ical cultural criticism because implicit in both Benjamin and Bloch was the
premise that only those products of culture that were most valuable re-
tained a utopian image of the future” (123).
This theology of bourgeois culture perceived the lawlessness of con-
temporary life as a linguistic, rather than institutional, crisis. For Benja-
min, Rosenzweig, Saussure, Cantor, Wittgenstein, Shklovsky, Schönberg,
Braque, Eisenstein, Kraus, Whitehead, Freud, or Husserl, grammar did not
hold and thus needed to be changed. State laws, public codes, or moral
regulations were no longer able to heal the arbitrariness of language and
govern understanding, let alone the masses. “The esoteric language of the
intellectual Jew is directed against the language of political instrumental-
ism. The expressive quality of language carries the promise of redemption
from power and judgment, ‘the absolutely unlimited and creative infinity
of the divine word’ [Benjamin]” (107). The intelligentsia rethought its
function in terms of a new language that they invented or discovered, so
that the conditions of subjectivity and communication could be remapped.
They saw no contradiction in this legislative ambition—that is why they
could support both social democracy and “spiritual aristocracy” (as Bloch
wrote in 1918), socialism and elite culture. Buber and Rosenzweig con-
cluded: “The times are passive, the word is active” (quoted in Jay 1976: 16).
Their re-translation of Luther was just a representative example of this
faith in language. “The times proved far less passive than they thought, the
word much less active” (22). Not only did they not recover a primal code or
discover a communitarian speech, but they also lost their last battle against
the political sphere, which they never conquered. Thus while between the
two wars the culture elite saw in the messianic (as opposed to the mythical)
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the authentic political, after World War II they abandoned politics and
proclaimed the aesthetic the authentic messianic. This, in a simplified ver-
sion, is the story of the Hebraization of western culture—a story for which
the career of Paul de Man (1919–83), rather than Buber’s Judaization of
Europe, provides the typical narrative.
By the time of Modernism, Humboldt’s and Arnold’s project of an edu-
cating culture had been abandoned. Hebraism appropriated culture from
Hellenism by identifying it with the aesthetic, specifically with master-
pieces and their professional explication—a separate and autonomous
realm with its own specialties, institutions, rituals, and passages. Modern-
ism signaled the unqualified triumph of (Hebraic) High Art over (Hellenic)
culture. Since then, the threat for Hebraism has not come from the rest of
culture but from non-Art, from the outside of the institution of art, from
practices questioning its politics. This mythical threat emanating from
below, from low art or street turmoil, has been disparaged as the barbarism
of politics in consumer capitalism. From the Battle of the Books to Mod-
ernism, all defenders of culture were spokespersons for a shared morality
and taste, a public code of feelings and conduct, calling upon (Hellenic)
culture to serve and promote the cause of (Hebraic) ethics. While the aes-
thetic regime was still Hellenic, its power was ambiguous: it could develop
into either (Dionysian) anarchy or (Apollonian) art, depending on whether
contemplation would be more attracted by leisure or discipline. During the
second half of the nineteenth century, the threat of anarchy changed from
an internal one (immoral culture) to an external one (anti-aesthetic atti-
tude). After culture was split in two seemingly antagonistic parts, art and
politics, the former part grew more and more independent, and drew moral
authority from its intrinsic value. Finally, what made modernist Messian-
ism the ultimate aesthetic was, on the one hand, its promise of an ethical
autonomy, of an autonomy which is formal because it is entirely intrinsic,
and on the other hand, its exorcism and exclusion of the political as public,
institutional, agonistic, discursive, strategic, purposeful, and interested. In
more general terms, Messianism is the aesthetic ideology of the Hebra-
icized sphere of (high) culture: the law of the genre of the promise.
At the time that Derrida was starting to settle his accounts with Plato (or,
to be precise, with Heidegger’s Greeks), Leo Strauss was concluding his.
One could imagine a parallel between their relation and that of Cohen and
Benjamin: Cohen was the last to express a coherent faith in the vitality of
a civic and national culture, and Strauss was clinging to his confidence in
the benign rule of the canon, while their successors were revising the laws
of signification and education. The common element in all their efforts
that has not changed over the years (probably because it is the interpretive
limit of the question of modernity) is the hermeneutic aporia: what is the
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non-Greek, what is the other of the (western) other, of the Hellenic, if not
our own identity? The answer is also common to all: our Hebraic difference
(from antiquity as well as from all contemporary foreigners and barbari-
ans). Strauss, for example, begins his paper “Jerusalem and Athens,” first
delivered as a Frank Cohen Public Lecture in Judaic Affairs in 1967, with
a stock generalization: “All the hopes that we entertain in the midst of the
confusions and dangers of the present are founded positively or negatively,
directly or indirectly on the experiences of the past. Of these experiences
the broadest and deepest, as far as we Western men are concerned, are
indicated by the names of the two cities Jerusalem and Athens. Western
man became what he is and is what he is through the coming together of
biblical faith and Greek thought. In order to understand ourselves and to
illuminate our trackless way into the future, we must understand Jerusalem
and Athens” (Strauss 1983: 147). After this faith-reason distinction, he pro-
ceeds to consider the possibility of an approach through the “science of
culture” (149) and rejects it because he cannot trust its claims of neutrality.
Instead, he develops his opposition on the basis of wisdom, a notion he
considers higher than culture: “We must then try to understand the differ-
ence between biblical wisdom and Greek wisdom. We see at once that each
of the two claims to be the true wisdom, thus denying to the other its claim
to be wisdom in the strict and highest sense. According to the Bible, the
beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord; according to the Greek philoso-
phers, the beginning of wisdom is wonder. We are thus compelled from the
very beginning to make a choice, to take a stand. Where then do we stand?
We are confronted with the incompatible claims of Jerusalem and Athens
to our allegiance” (149). Having established a ground outside the contin-
gencies of culture which made Levinas so apprehensive, Strauss reiterates
Shestov’s absolute dilemma and need for an exclusive choice, only to face
the same epistemological impasse: “We are open to both and willing to
listen to each. We ourselves are not wise but we wish to become wise. We
are seekers for wisdom, ‘philo-sophoi.’ By saying that we wish to hear first
and then to act to decide, we have already decided in favor of Athens
against Jerusalem” (149–50). Like Derrida (and the tradition of thought
since Milton), Strauss asks: How can we not think Greek? How can we do
philosophy without choosing the Greek one?
For the believer (like Shestov), everything in the Bible has the face-value
of truth. “But from the viewpoint of the Bible the unbeliever is the fool
who has said in his heart ‘there is no God’; the Bible narrates everything as
it is credible to the wise in the biblical sense of wisdom. Let us never forget
that there is no biblical word for doubt” (150–51). Still, how can a skeptical
age that does not believe in miracles read after Biblical criticism, which
“reached its first climax in Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise?” (150).
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Which rules should govern secular reading? The available means of under-
standing are of Greek origin and taint. Strauss intends to show how it is
possible to “avoid the compulsion to make an advance decision in favor of
Athens against Jerusalem” (151). His Spinozist principle is that imma-
nence should rule: attention to the reasoning of the Bible itself can uncover
its own logic. Thus in the first part of his essay, “The Beginning of the Bible
and its Greek Counterparts,” he gives model readings of the stories about
Creation, the Fall, Cain and Abel, the Flood, and Abraham, and then
compares them to similar stories in Hesiod, Parmenides, Empedocles, and
Aristotle. From such a parallel reading of teachings of Hebraic piety and
Hellenic philosophy on the creation, he establishes “the fundamental op-
position of the God or gods of the philosophers to the God of Abraham,
Isaac and Jacob, the opposition of Reason and Revelation” (166). Like
Auerbach, he believes that he has gained access to the logic of the Bible
without the influence of Greek principles—and like him again, he has
achieved it only through a comparison with Greek examples.
If the first part of the essay deals with beginnings, the second, “On Soc-
rates and the Prophets,” discusses endings. Strauss intends to revise
Cohen’s position, which compared philosophy and prophetism, and sought
truth in “the synthesis of the teaching of Plato and that of the prophets”
(167). His predecessor discerned many of the sharp differences dividing the
two attitudes but was deceived by his idealism into accepting the possibil-
ity of a creative fusion. “Cohen has brought out very well the antagonism
between Plato and the prophets. Nevertheless we cannot leave matters at
his view of that antagonism. Cohen’s thought belongs to the world preced-
ing World War I. Accordingly he had a greater faith in the power of mod-
ern Western culture to mold the fate of mankind than seems to be war-
ranted now” (168). What separates his age from Cohen’s, however, is not
the First World War but Modernism and its aestheticization of culture. At
the time of Rousseau, Schiller, Heine, Arnold, and Cohen, culture as a
broad humanistic area of action and creativity was still considered a valid
ideal. After art was appropriated by Hebraism, cultural synthesis became
impossible, and irreconcilable antagonism between this and the other
spheres broke out. The extreme dilemma still confronts thought: “Since we
are less certain than Cohen was that the modern synthesis is superior to its
pre-modern ingredients, and since the two ingredients are in fundamental
opposition to each other, we are ultimately confronted by a problem rather
than a solution” (168). At the same time, it may be possible for the first
time to discern the beginnings of this problem in the emergence of moder-
nity. “More particularly, Cohen understood Plato in the light of the opposi-
tion between Plato-Aristotle—an opposition that he understood in the
light of the opposition between Kant and Hegel. We, however, are more
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impressed than Cohen was by the kinship between Plato and Aristotle on
the one hand and the kinship between Kant and Hegel on the other. In
other words, the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns seems to
us to be more fundamental than either the quarrel between Plato and
Aristotle or that between Kant and Hegel” (168). The argument between
Jerusalem and Athens is connected directly to the seventeenth-
century quarrel which defined history, language, and culture in the West.
Cohen’s Plato, Strauss implies, was not truly Greek but very Kantian, and
therefore Hebraic. When the Athens-Jerusalem opposition is translated
into the ancients-moderns quarrel, modernity emerges as the project of
Protestant Hebraism—of civil interpretive governance through self-rule.
It is with reference to political praxis that the two paths of wisdom have
been separated and cannot be bridged: Strauss, like Derrida, feels that phi-
losophy has to choose between culture and politics, the wisdom of the date
and the wisdom of the polis. “The fact that both Socrates and the prophets
have a divine mission means or at any rate implies that both Socrates and
the prophets are concerned with justice or righteousness, with the perfectly
just society which as such would be free from all evils. To this extent Soc-
rates’ figuring out of the best social order and the prophets’ vision of the
Messianic age are in agreement. Yet whereas the prophets predict the com-
ing of the Messianic age, Socrates merely holds that the perfect society is
possible: whether it will ever be actual, depends on an unlikely, although
not impossible, coincidence, the coincidence of philosophy and political
power” (171). Although the missions of philosophy and prophetism are
both divine and future-oriented, the former develops plans for a perfect
society while the latter promises the Messianic age; the one searches for
knowledge, the other accepts revelation; the philosopher promotes inquiry,
the prophet preaches faith. Their ideals of justice, too, are totally different.
“The perfectly just man, the man who is as just as is humanly possible, is
according to Socrates the philosopher and according to the prophets the
faithful servant of the Lord” (172). As Buber and Bloch observed earlier,
what accounts for the difference is the contingent, historical, and political
nature of the social project which pursues the possible interaction of phi-
losophy and politics, knowledge and power, and has nothing in common
with the principles of faith and obedience invested in the expectation of a
Messianic age that will redeem all time and violence.
At the end of his essay Strauss does not formulate a specific conclusion.
He finishes with two stories that he finds parallel, Nathan’s direct criticism
of King David and Socrates’ indirect criticism of the tyrant Critias. They
represent two types of discourse about the future—one messianic, based
on faith in revelation, the other political, based on reason of thought. The
two trends portrayed here may occasionally and temporarily converge, but
essentially they are incompatible and antagonistic. Strauss does not men-
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tion reconciliation at all: there can be no negotiation with the political, no
place for the rule of the citizens.
By raising the question of the Law again, Derrida turns the appropriation
of culture against its internal prohibition, Christianity, and the promise of
emancipation against its intrinsic premise, autonomy. It is his way of ad-
dressing Strauss’s fears of a skeptical age in which Auerbach’s canon cannot
guarantee the hegemony of culture, let alone the reign of an interpretive
profession. Derrida’s initiative has been supported by jeremiads lamenting
the very creation of a civic egalitarian society: “The substitution of rules for
law in modern times seems an attempt not only to demystify power’s link
to prohibition, but also to free thought from the One by proposing, to
everyday human affairs, the multiplicity of undetermined possibilities cre-
ated by technologies. But there has always been an ambiguity in what goes
by the name of law: in its sacred, sovereign guise, it claims to derive from
nature; it annexes to itself the noble prestige of the blood; it is not power
but omnipotence. There is nothing but the law: whatever it is exerted
against, is simply nothing: not humanity, but only myths, monsters, fasci-
nations. Judaic law is not sacred, but holy. In place of nature—which it
does not invest with the magic of sin—it puts relations, choices, mandates:
that is to say, a language of obligations. In place of the ethnic, it puts the
ethical. . . . There remains judgment. It is left for the highest: God alone
judges, which is again to say, the One. . . . Saint Paul wanted to emancipate
us from the Law: the Law enters into the drama of the sacred, the sacred
tragedy, life born of death and inseparable from it” (Blanchot 1986: 143–
44). By trying to secure a dominant place for the law and the judgment of
God, deconstruction reverses a tradition of two centuries and makes the
philosopher a legislator once again. In its work, Hebraic culture offers not
aesthetic education (through the canon) but aesthetic legislation (through
commentary).110 “Derrida’s move beyond good and evil ‘annuls the ethical’
in the name of a ‘transcendental aesthetic’ in a spirit contrary to Nietz-
sche’s genealogy of morals, contrary, that is, to what Nietzsche knew about
law” (Rose 1984: 149). The law must simultaneously be cultivated and ob-
scured. To this effect, the suppression of the debate on Oral and Written
Law is particularly helpful. “By using the word ‘writing’ Derrida reduces the
meaning of law to differentiation as such and makes it enigmatic” (140).
Origin (like, say, influence in Bloom) becomes a mysterious paradox and a
mystical tautology: “Is the law in the book or, rather, the book in the law?
Does every book have its own law, or every law its book? In other words,
does reading and writing mean bowing to the law of the book or, on the
contrary, forging by and by a law to submit the book to? The law is an
invention of the book, invention of a book with the authority of law” (Jabès
1986: 355).111 With Derrida’s playful tour of the library and virtuosic use of
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intertextuality, “his reference to writing does not raise the question of the
law—it buries it” (Rose 1984: 170). His performance commands and its
promise seduces: “Derrida would have us perish without knowing why, for
he leaves the law as unknowable as it was before he raised the question of
the graphein” (168). His own writing aspires to be scripture and law: this is
the ultimate method of Judaization, one that successfully returns (in a way
that Heidegger failed to achieve) to Christianity’s Sinaitic roots. Member-
ship in culture through textualization and observance of the rituals of in-
terpretation confirms the aesthetic superiority of the law and entitles ev-
eryone to Jewishness. If Paul’s freedom was freedom from the law, aesthetic
freedom is freedom from Christianity. If Christianity was originally a re-
form movement in Judaism (Segal 1990), now Judaism becomes a reform
movement in Christianity.
What Hebraism failed to do morally (with the deployment of universal
reason), it has achieved aesthetically (with the rule of the undifferentiated
aesthetic disposition). This is seen when Lyotard (1990), for example, ar-
gues that to the extent that we all have to be faithful to the Divine Law—
which first seized the Jews—so long as we remember that we depend on it,
we are all “jews.” Rosenzweig wanted to help the alienated Jew find her way
back to Judaism; when Derrida extends his “Come,” he wants to help the
deceived Christian find his way toward Judaism. Those few who manage
to reject the offer can hardly help but refrain from a Nietzschean sarcasm:
“With Heidegger, all philosophers are reduced to the same: they represent
various but, when we come to the heart of the matter, indifferent ways of
forgetting Being, of thinking Being as presence, and of mixing up presence
and that which is, in each case, present. With post-Heideggerians, this
will become the unbreakable circle of Greek-Western onto-logo-theo-
phallocentrism. But fortunately, we are not yet completely lost. With the
help of the Zeitgeist, some noises about the possibility of evading this circle
through recourse to the Old Testament (not of course the New, hopelessly
contaminated by those damned Greeks), are increasingly perceptible. After
we had been almost convinced of the nothingness of any ‘transcendental
signified,’ we are now informed that Jehovah, his laws and the ethic of the
Hebrews can and must be restored in the place of a (meta-? or post-?)
transcendental signified. Dare we hope that we only need to replace philos-
ophy by revelation in order to be saved? No wonder that, a few exceptions
apart, philosophy is practiced less and less, and that most of what bears that
name today is just commentary and interpretation, or rather, commentary
squared and interpretation squared” (Castoriadis 1989: 6–7). For techno-
crats of interpretation like Lyotard, the question of the law, of the differ-
ence between nomos and Torah, is often more a Kantian question of jus-
tice.112 “Then we are faced with one of two things: either the just comes to
us from elsewhere, which means that we are never more than the address-
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ees of prescriptions. This, by the way, is what the Jews think. . . . Or we
have our situation: for us moderns, prescriptions are not received. And I
think that this modernity, in the precise sense of a society that must decide
what is obligatory, begins, in Western thought, with some Greeks”
(Lyotard and Thébaud 1985: 17). However, in spite of his claim that “mod-
ernity is pagan” (16),113 Lyotard not only discerns “in the position of the
Sophists, or at least some of them, the same humor in relation to com-
mands as in an entire Jewish tradition” (65), but he also finds the Hasidim
the most modern example of paganism: “What Judaism, and especially the
Hasidim, and some Sophists as well, teach us, is how to be suspicious of
prescriptions” (66).114 Thus he seems to effortlessly combine the polis of
Castoriadis with Buber’s kibbutz, as organic communities.
Returning to the essential question of writing as debated by philosophers
from Mendelssohn to Buber, Derrida proposes that “revelation and tradi-
tion [are] fundamentally one category, so that the former is immutably one
and the latter immutably many and exegetically derived from it (the Phari-
saic position)” (Fishbane 1987: 355). He abolishes the distinction between
the divinely revealed written Law and the religious tradition of its transmis-
sion by seeing the Talmud as a whole—both aggadah and halakhah, both
tradition and revelation. Levinas confirmed that “Jewish thought is insep-
arable from Rabbinic sources” (Levinas 1969a: 31) by taking an integrative
approach to tradition: “The Jewish perception of the world is expressed in
the Bible—in the Bible as reflected by Rabbinic literature, of which the
Talmud and its commentators constitute the most important part” (30).
Responding to Levinas’s commandment, “To love the Torah more than
God,” which reversed the priority of YHWH in Heidegger, Derrida argues
that the Torah cannot be separated from the Talmud,115 or the canon from
its commentary, and that interpretation (as remembrance of suffering as
well as anticipation of the messianic time) is the supreme act of faith. That
is why his message does not undermine authority but gives reasons to cele-
brate it: “I would say that deconstruction is affirmation rather than ques-
tioning, in a sense which is not positive: I would distinguish between the
positive, or positions, and affirmations. I think that deconstruction is af-
firmative rather than questioning; this affirmation goes through some radi-
cal questioning, but is not questioning in the final analysis” (Derrida
1987a: 20). From Auerbach’s aggadah (tales and homilies) to Derrida’s ha-
lakhah as written Law, a similar affirmative tone prevails. Auerbach as well
as Derrida take a midrashic approach, viewing interpretation as scriptural
exegesis. They concentrate on smaller units of the text and they decode it,
while at the same time affirming the authority of the canon and its inter-
pretive tradition. Auerbach is still a contemporary of Isaak Heinemann,
who saw midrash as a type of “creative philology” and “creative historiogra-
phy” (quoted in Stern 1987: 618). Derrida writes after the hermeneutics of
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Heidegger: his plan is one not of reconstruction, restoration, or retrieval
but of restitution—of what Benjamin called apokatastasis, “the conception
of redemption in which all are saved” (Buck-Morss 1983: 233). “Restitutive
criticism” (Hartman 1989: 32)—like Bloch’s “restorative hermeneutic”
(Finkelstein 1989: 61), with its emphasis on incompleteness, undecided-
ness, illumination, and utopia—gives back to the Oral law its proper au-
thority—this time not a legal or civic (which it could never have) but a
cultural one. “The great builders of words and thought . . . are teachers and
commentators, they are masters of meaning—but outside the Law”
(Steiner 1976: 75). Derrida wants to bring them back to the fold.
Deconstruction, as a discipline of the question, may occasionally seem to
question authority, but in the end it invariably sanctions it. This is consis-
tent with the discipline, with any discipline, since it confirms the value of
control. It is hard to imagine a more potent endorsement of authority than
a questioning that leaves it untouched. This discipline of reading endorses
interpretation as control, the self-control that knows where to stop (in the
margin, the exile of commentary). The law of deconstruction is the struc-
ture of the Law. “We cannot be sure there is a way of destructuring Law.
You see, deconstruction cannot be transgression of the Law. Deconstruc-
tion is the Law. It’s an affirmation, and affirmation is on the side of the
Law. This is rather difficult. Usually we represent deconstruction as a nega-
tive or de-structuring movement, which it is not. It is an affirmative move-
ment, first; and then, as an affirmation, it is not an affirmation against the
Law or going beyond the Law. . . . That is why writing in a deconstructive
mode is another way of writing Law. . . . [Kafka’s] ‘Before the Law’ is the
Law. We are in front of it as in front of the Law. . . . So deconstruction
affirms a new mode of Law. It becomes the Law. But the Law is guaranteed
by a more powerful Law, and the process has no end. That is why decon-
struction is not a movement of transgression, of liberation; of course, it has
some effects of—in a given situation—effects of emancipation, of trans-
gression, of liberation, but, in the end, it is not” (Derrida 1987: 197). Der-
rida deconstructs emancipation from the law, showing that the structure of
emancipation was still that of the law, that the structure of autonomy is
heteronomous. Deconstruction is the awareness that interpretation and
emancipation, reading and (its) freedom, the Hellenic return (of culture)
and the Hebraic promise (of redemption), are mutually implicated and
supportive as complementary parts of the Protestant project of modernity;
it is also a celebration of the fact that, with the success of the project, its
Hebraic element has prevailed, leaving the Hellenic outside as the barbaric
threat. Levinas felt that he had to command his audience into submission,
offering passivity as a task. Some of his followers added to the picture the
trope of innocent suffering, borrowed from romantic authoriality: “Re-
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sponsibility is innocent guilt. . . . My responsibility is anterior to my birth
just as it is exterior to my consent, to my liberty” (Blanchot 1986: 22). This
brought the penitents closer to the indulgences of Artaud, Bataille,
Fassbinder, and Pasolini than to abstinence: “Suffering suffers from being
innocent: thus it seeks to become guilty in order to lessen” (41). The lesson
for Derrida has been to tolerate and contain excess by making transgression
just another rite of atonement, heresy the most radical expression of faith.
“Derrida must somehow perpetuate the Law, at least be the father of Writ-
ing lest the parricide become an inadvertent suicide” (Handelman 1983:
125). The postmodern mode of law perpetuation is the anarchy of trans-
gression. The model and code of power continues to be the law; now, how-
ever, with the privileges of sovereignty suspended, the juridical representa-
tion of power changes from a negative to a positive one (Foucault 1978:
90).
This mode has some strong modernist precedents. “The fact that
anarchical and law-giving tendencies or instincts conflicted in Schoen-
berg’s thinking” (Dalhaus 1987: 89)—as they did in that of Benjamin,
Bloch, or Joyce—indicates the interdependence of these tendencies. At the
same time, the aesthetic rehabilitation of anarchy does not mean that its
political expressions deserve equal treatment. The Hebraization of culture
produces immanent transcendence and results in complete aestheticiza-
tion. Thus, on the one hand, it makes the profane sacred again; on the
other, it can lead to pantheism: if everything is sacred, is the divine every-
where? Benjamin dealt with the question in the essay “Dialog über die Re-
ligiosität der Gegenwart” (1912), which presents a debate between a pan-
theist and “the defender of a religious-social ethic” (Rabinbach 1985: 96).
The modernist problem was the proper ethic of the aesthetic. Some writers
reiterated the Romantic doctrine that “philosophy is an art” (Shestov).
Others went further, identifying the two: “Ethics and aesthetics are one
and the same” (Wittgenstein 1963: 147). The postmodernist problem is
the aestheticization of ethics. When taste acquires moral authority, philos-
ophy claims that it is “an exercise in morality, and therefore, to the degree
that it arrives at no firm conclusions, but rather intensifies and enriches our
experience of things, complicating and loosening the referent, it is an ‘edi-
fying’ or ‘aesthetic’ discourse” (Vattimo 1988: 148). Derrida uses the law of
law transgression to control the danger of pantheism. When the ideal of
emancipation dies, interpretation becomes a matter of anarchic taste, a
celebration of desecrating consumption. With the invocation of the law, “a
nameless Law” (Lyotard 1990: 94), Derrida also attempts to preserve the
notion of destiny despite the loss of eschatology. This is what makes him a
“teleocrat” of postcapitalist society rather than a technocrat of market
economy (Martin and Szelényi 1987: 46). So far as the prophetic authority
is concerned, which he embraces in order to legitimate his law-giving plan,
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a comparable example from musical modernism shows that “the state of
emergency which Schoenberg induced with atonality, and the renewed
state of legality which he hoped to constitute by means of dodecaphony,
were similar in character, in that their substance consisted in an act of
decision and not in a systematic web of argument or historical derivation”
(Dalhaus 1987: 90). Derrida decided that there is a different state of emer-
gency, one concerning freedom itself.
As commentators (Handelman 1982: 222–23; Hartman 1980: 55) have
already noticed, deconstructive cannibalism (on the body of the voice, the
Spirit, the parousia, the Logos, the communion, the church) may be ex-
plained through a short parable by Kafka: the fact that leopards used to
break into the temple and drink from the sacrificial chalices is now an-
ticipated and integrated into the ceremony. What these commentators
did not notice (and as commentators they could not) is that the story
can be seen as a narrative of institutionalization. When the leopards can-
not be killed or chased away, then, with the passivity that Levinas recom-
mends and K. exemplifies, they are accepted as an institutionally transpar-
ent (that is, natural) part of the ceremony. Thanks to a new interpretation,
danger as well as impotence can be textualized and accommodated. People
can be even convinced that those who are consumed will be happy or saved:
there is nothing in the covenant of (interpretive) rights to prevent that.
Derrida renews that covenant, and to the extent that he can strengthen
it, he is perfectly willing to dispense with its texts (which postmoder-
nity has discredited anyway). As long as the politics of the Law (the cere-
mony, the temple, interpretation) is not questioned, as long as people are
seduced into “trying to make the facts of their historical catastrophe agree
with the exalted promises of their Sacred Book” (Handelman 1982: 223),
there will always be rituals, sacred books, readings, textual faith, and legis-
lators (like Jacques Derrida) proposing a new “political theology” (like Carl
Schmitt in 1922) after the “re-treat of the political” (Lacoue-Labarthe and
Nancy).116
Derrida is in search of “what could be a grace beyond the work” (Derrida
1982: 63) and proposes the aesthetic itself as the answer: a grace117 beyond
apocalypse, redemption and the modernist epiphany—an aesthetic Mes-
sianism of the letter. “As regards translation, grace would perhaps be when
the writing of the other absolves you, at times, from the infinite double
bind” (64) of YHWH the lawgiver, of oral and written law, of God’s turned
face and silent absence—in different terms, the double bind of Hebraism
and Hellenism. “Grace is always improbable; it can never be proved. But
must we not believe that it comes? That perhaps is belief itself” (64). Grace
is the trace that comes, and belief is the messianic (as opposed to apocalyp-
tic) faith. Conversely, messianic hope and faith is belief in a grace beyond
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the work itself, in a gift of what is not at one’s disposal, that keeps coming
and thus has arrived.
With Derrida’s anti-Christology, the Protestant attack on the sacra-
ments, the “channels of grace,” is extended to Logos itself, to the incarna-
tion of the Spirit. “In the sacraments of the New Covenant, grace is not
merely signified or prefigured, as in the ceremonies of the Old Covenant; in
the New Covenant, grace is contained and conferred: word, material sign
(e.g., bread and wine), and grace all converge in the Presence of the
Word. . . . The doctrine of the Real Presence in the Sacrament of the Altar
of the New Covenant is thus the fulfillment of the Messianic promise—the
deconstructive longing for the deferred Presence—of the Old Covenant”
(Young 1985: 116). Deconstruction attacks the parousia of Christ by ex-
posing it to Law and its prophecies. Thus it is only fair to suggest that
Derrida “might be seen as the last scion of the Protestant Reformation,
which generally displaced the sacraments with an intense emphasis on writ-
ing—sola scriptura. Derrida would seem to have taken this development as
far as it can go: he is a Moses who has broken the Tablets and will not
re-ascend the mountain, who offers only more wandering—more erring—
in the wilderness, with the Promised Land endlessly deferred” (116). Hei-
degger’s errancy from home becomes Derrida’s “ ‘destinerrance’ [a wander-
ing that is its own end]” (Derrida 1984a: 29) in the desert of the promise.118
But his Messianic dispatches are sublime/ridiculous because of their will-
ful, inexorable dependency on Deist and quietist Protestantism, the dogma
that issued the first commandment of assimilation: to accept the task of
interpretive culture and contemplative taste.119 “Criticism, the Protes-
tantism of the earth, replaces dogmatism, the Catholicism of the milieus
(code)” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 339). Theory exposes the fallacy of
“the Law of Freedom—rational and valid because it is Law, i.e., without
ulterior sanction” (Hegel 1900: 251). Its message is that philosophers have
tried for too long (and to no avail) to change the world; it is time again to
interpret—this time, not the world but its unchangeability. “In Derrida’s
work it is never a question of belief or lack thereof, but rather of faith—in
an almost ultra-protestant sense. . . . Derrida’s writing at times seems to be
less inflecting an (older) Old Testament than reforming a (newer) New
Testament—in its battle against any katholikós, in its tension between the
‘already’ and the ‘not yet,’ and in its emphasis on that writing-as-son which
has been martyred by the carnal and spiritual circumcision practiced by all
‘false doctors’ of whatever belief. Derrida doth protest—religiously—and
asks the same of his followers” (Jardine 1985: 180–81). Naturally, his fol-
lowers have included many Protestant theologians who see “Incarnation as
Inscription” (Taylor 1982: 71). Appropriating Derrida’s emphasis on “a cer-
tain Judaism as the birth and passion of writing” (Derrida 1978: 64), decon-
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structive theology has celebrated as the resurrection of the Word the death
of (a) God who is only God, and has become a “radical Christology” (Carl
Raschke), one that considers Jesus “our différance” (Atkins 1985: 97).
“Thus two very different interpretations of the theological implications of
Derrideanism, though both Christians and Jews see Derrida as ultimately
supportive of their own religion” (Atkins 1983: 15). This response to decon-
struction recalls the positive reaction to Buber of theologies from the Epis-
copalian “relational theology” to the Orthodox existentialism of Nikolai
Berdyaev. The dogma of the Derridean aesthetic does not need Kierke-
gaard’s leap of faith, only the ersatz exegesis which colonizes the humanis-
tic tradition. His is a theologesis not of fear but of festivity or, to use the
title of an early book by Shestov, an Apotheosis of Groundlessness (1905)—
a theology of play that plays with theology. To appropriate a comment
made about another contemporary theorist, Derrida is aware “that the age
of religion has passed and that for this very reason we are tempted to pro-
duce an ‘aestheticized’ religion, an imaginary or hallucinated community,
in an age that is neither religious nor social” (O’Neill 1988: 505).120 If Ben-
jamin searched for the Messianic in the corruption of the commodity, the
waste product, Derrida discovers it in the consumption of the commodity,
in the expenditures of cultural life as lifestyle. Modernist formalisms have
been succeeded by Postmodernist literalisms like the recycling of the classi-
cal tradition by the Early Music movement, which repeats the canon on
period instruments for the compact disc industry.121 In his postmodern
“theology of culture” (Paul Tillich), aesthetics, which evolved out of Bibli-
cal hermeneutics, comes full circle and succeeds theology: faith becomes
the aesthetic attitude par excellence. Criticism no longer serves a purpose
but is “a means of provisional grace” (Des Pres 1975: 278). That is
why Grammatology is a populist doctrine, and its prophet the first global
philosopher.122
Still, reading-as-faith and aesthetics-as-theology, especially a century
after the decadent charms of Aestheticism, are simply kitsch (even for the
elite of cultural capital). Like the health industry and its new abstinence,
which arose at the same time as deconstruction, they are based on penance,
self-denial, discipline, deferral, endlessly renewed promise, pharmaka, sup-
plements, joyful exercise, celebration of form, and renunciation of the so-
cial body. These disciplines are covered in the newspapers as fashionable
trends: “Non-ism is only viable as a temporary state, but more and more it
is being portrayed as a state of grace” (O’Neill 1990: 14). This grace is
induced by an aesthetic self-flagellation, an orgy of encratism: “This secret
self-ravishment, this artists’ cruelty, this delight in imposing a form upon
oneself as a hard, recalcitrant, suffering material and in burning a will, a
critique, a contradiction, a contempt, a No into it, this uncanny, dreadfully
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joyous labor of a soul voluntarily at odds with itself that makes itself suffer
out of joy in making suffer—eventually this entire active ‘bad con-
science’—you will have guessed it—as the womb of all ideal and imagina-
tive phenomena, also brought to light an abundance of strange new beauty
and affirmation, and perhaps beauty itself” (Nietzsche 1969: 87–88). The
Protestant ascetic ethic which invented the aesthetic compensation finds
here its perverse fulfillment: theology begins reoccupying the answer posi-
tions left vacant by the exhaustion of culture. After higher criticism and
high art, the last discipline to console faith is high theory, theoria of its own
height.
Recent festivities of self-denial have been accompanied from the begin-
ning by the utterly predictable (but no less enjoyable, for that reason)
sound of the disco beat, their contemporary dance (to which all exercising
takes place). The true sound of deconstruction is what the music business
calls “remixing”—playing with the original song by adding, stripping,
breaking up, stretching, reversing, quoting. The phenomenon of issuing
multiple versions of the same song, especially dance tracks, appeared in the
late 1960s: after the single (45-rpm) version, there might follow the album
version, 12-inch (extended) version, instrumental version, dub version,
club/disco/house version, a cappella version, and other special ones. The
first remixers were usually club disc jockeys who felt free to experiment
with many songs playing simultaneously on different turntables, in order to
keep the music (and the dancing) flowing and at the same time to show off.
Gradually, with the success of the technique, the industry started releasing
its own remixes. The (main) song used is always already a hit (and there-
fore, for music fans, the remix is always already collectable). Remixes are
commentaries: once they start appearing, no version is original or defini-
tive. In an ever-expanding market for this format, the 1980s witnessed en-
tire albums consisting exclusively of remixes, like Chaka Khan’s Life is a
Dance: The Remix Project (1989), Paula Abdul’s Shut Up and Dance (1990),
Milli Vanilli’s Remix Album (1990). Like the members of the latter group
(who appeared in concerts and videos but never sang on the albums), Der-
rida does not offer any truly new tablets but lip-synchs the old aesthetic
commandments. Synthesized music and synthetic Hebraism have become
such an integral part of our environment that we hostages of the law do not
even notice their presence: they condition our controlled pleasures and
regulated repentances (Neher 1990) automatically. “[Sylvere Lotringer:]
—The Law no longer needs to be written or recognized since it is being
made everywhere. . . . The Law disappears by spreading over everything.
And as it’s absent, it’s always right. [Paul Virilio:] —The law is no longer a
Law in the political sense: a law which eludes politics is not Law, but myth-
ical law. It’s fate” (Virilio and Lotringer 1983: 127). The metapolitics of law
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constitutes the postmodern mythology of the fearful fate of freedom. And
yet, as continuing Hellenophobic alarms show, although the Hellenic allot-
ropy is held hostage by its other, it has not been completely neutralized
because it is not subject to the law, and therefore it may be expelled but
cannot be arrested.
EPILEGOMENA TO MODERNITY
THE MODERN QUESTION of autonomy emerged when the newly empow-
ered Protestant middle class of western Europe was able to exchange the
yoke of feudal tyranny for political hegemony, for its own rules of self-
control. Thus autonomy was not at first a question of democracy so much
as of credible and effective governance: “How to govern oneself, how to be
governed, how to govern others, how to accept him who is to govern us,
how to become the best possible governor, etc. I think all these problems,
in their multiplicity and intensity, are characteristic of the 16th century,
which lies, to put it schematically, at the intersection of two processes: the
process which, shattering the structures of feudalism, is about to form the
great territorial, administrative and colonial states; and, on the other hand,
a totally different movement which, starting with the Reformation and
then the Counter-Reformation, puts in question the manner in which one
is to be spiritually ruled and led on this earth in order to achieve eternal
salvation” (Foucault 1979b: 5–6). While the previous regime was devising
laws from above and ruling by force, the new order aspired to create a civic
realm free from fear, where decisions would be made by consent and people
would rule themselves by self-discipline.
The primary condition for such a realm was a public conduct based on
internalized governance. Disciplined conduct distinguishes political gov-
ernment from sovereignty because, instead of imposing laws, the govern-
ment is disposing exercises, modes of regular behavior. Thus the art of
government becomes a matter of disposition, rather than law. Its principle
is rationalization, attention to and respect for intrinsic rules, namely, the
reason inherent in everything. The supreme nomos of autonomy is imma-
nence, the free structure of interiority, the autocracy of divinely ordained,
and yet self-grounded, depth. Its three models—the individual, the state,
and the artwork—are governed by intrinsic rational principles. The old
divine and cosmological laws, as well as the traditional rhetorical and
moral rules, are superseded by self-regulating constitution, the unique real-
ity of secular identity. Independence is self-administered, transcendence
grounded. The regime of identity, of sameness and otherness, emerges dur-
ing this search for the ground of legitimate autochthony.
The first modern system, created to organize the universal calling of
vocation, was the administrative State of the fifteenth and sixteenth centu-
ries—the period when the enterprise of salvation colonized the world. It
was followed by the disciplinary State of the next two centuries, which was
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based on the exercises of contemplation. The science of aesthetics was
established at that time to formulate a compensatory theoria of rationaliza-
tion. Aesthetic criteria start controlling the status of statements when argu-
ments need to appeal to an intrinsic finality, rather than a divine plan. Thus
governance was modeled on the autotelic aesthetic—the disposition that
bears its telos within itself and is a law unto itself. The aesthetic became
the internalized rule of autonomy, a “lawfulness without a law.” If the
quest for self-assertion was a demand for freedom from the coercion of the
law, the aesthetic fulfilled it by promising a transparent law, the law of
self-founding reason.
The practices of contemplative disposition, better known as manners,
taste, and style, are the forms of aesthetic conduct. The appropriate public
order, the disposition of a shared public culture, was not a question of who
should have access to the temples of discrimination but of what was the
required attitude entitling one to such access. Thus the first realm regu-
lated by the principles of autonomous rationality was that of public
conduct, of the behavior of the emancipated individual who acts as a re-
sponsible reader, one who is capable of personal interpretation. The public
conduct of the reader expresses the introjection of the law, the assimila-
tion of the interpretive dogma. Since the aesthetic is autonomous self-
realization (and its own reflection), the highest bourgeois ideal was to live
autonomously, developing human possibility to the fullest according to the
organic laws of its divine nature.
It was in the governmental State of the nineteenth century that culture
evolved from a mechanism of social education in civility to an elite code of
social distinction cultivated by the canon of art. The cultural prestige, how-
ever, which gave moral authority to the liberal hegemony, did not mean
anything to the masses which started taking over squares, factories, parlia-
ments, and classes before the end of the century. At that point, art aban-
doned its compensatory and supportive role and claimed its own indepen-
dence and moral superiority: it became an autoscopic and ethical activity,
giving up completely its public functions but keeping for itself the canon
and disciplines of interpretation.
The regulatory State of the late twentieth century salvages from admin-
istration, discipline, and government the rule of regulation, the only thing
that has survived the exhaustion of autonomous modernity. Postmodern
appeals to textual laws and interpretive resistance are desperate efforts to
preserve the authority of art and literature when there is nothing to read
because of the anarchy at the airport bookstore, in the college curriculum,
and on the television dial—or when no one interprets because everybody
reads. Although the canon does not hold, contemplation remains the only
element of the bourgeois cultural tradition still under operation. It is the
aesthetic conduct itself, this time a rigorously differentiated position—a
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disposition of indiscriminate, cannibalistic textualization which consumes
everything (things, people, phenomena, history, society, religion, the
earth) by turning it into writing—that is, not by ruling it but by regulating
it, by demanding from it its law.
Postmodern interpretation, interpretation at its last historical phase, is
this scripturalization of the world. Its ideology is still aesthetic, though this
time nihilistic, because it believes that there is nothing of God outside the
rule of law. However, its faith is no longer apocalyptic but messianic: inter-
pretation, like tradition, is the promise which has always already arrived. It
does not matter whether there is a canon; what is read is irrelevant, as long
as everything is read, treated like text, interpreted, Biblicized. Interpreta-
tion, the first political right of the middle class, the fundamental exercise
of reason, remains the last vestige of modernity, a remnant of privilege and
status for intellectuals only, to be sure, and yet their influential way of
supporting the disappearing high bourgeois order which has been for some
time their single source of support. The only emancipation that interpreta-
tion can enunciate now is itself—the claims of an interpretation eman-
cipated from all political connection and contingency, from the covenant
of emancipation itself. Understanding is free to interpret, without any ex-
ternal constraints or outside responsibilities—free to the extent that it
exchanges liberation with self-reflection, obeys the rules of critique, and
identifies independence with aesthetic theoria, thus achieving its own
transfiguration into pure faith.
Absorbed by fin-de-siècle euphoria, interpretation has abandoned its pub-
lic role, denounced its historical accountability, and embraced theological
politics. The question is whether it can survive by itself, with the contract
of emancipation void; whether its cultural capital has any value in a post-
industrial, information economy; whether it can serve the sacred in a world
where everything is Hebraic. The important issue is not the end of moder-
nity, its date with history and the ancients. It is the adventure of autonomy
that needs reexamination. While originally interpretation signaled the re-
bellion of exegesis against dogma and ritual, five centuries later, in order to
insure the survival of the bourgeois dominion, it allies itself with the law
and a new regime of regulations modeled on contemplative, observant con-
sumption. The emphasis has shifted again from auto- to nomos. The re-
markable difference is that now, instead of pursuing self-grounding under-
standing, interpretation promotes legislation and legitimacy: knowledge
must be not just lawful or legitimate but licit. Contemplation, the aes-
thetic ethic, is elevated to a theological doctrine, literalist legalism: salva-
tion by good words. Autonomy succumbs to secular theocracy—scriptural
autotheism.
Hebraic theoria, however, cannot usurp the summit of Sinai for too long.
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The reasons are many. First, the Hellenic is no longer a credible opponent:
holy wars are waged now against non-western gods. Although repeatedly
idolatrized and demonized, the Hellenic no longer inspires artists, philoso-
phers, or revolutionaries to envision a cultural synthesis, a formal antidote
to alienation. Second, in a post-literate society, debates about letter and
spirit or iconomachic crusades are of little consequence to the clashes of
late capitalism with local identity and territory. Since modernity has lost its
exclusively western character, its very monotheism has been questioned.
Third, the dream of assimilation has been discredited to such an extent
that in many places it is not even revised but purposefully reversed. With
the end of colonialism (that is, the international project of forced assimila-
tion), there seems to be no interest in mastering the interpretive practices
which trained the white masters of the earth. Finally, at a time of particu-
larism and tribalism, when individuals, sexes, classes, cultures, and other
identities have become each other’s Other, the cultural status of emanci-
pated otherness is greatly diminished. Too many groups around the world
are emphasizing their distinctiveness for difference (through its differenti-
ation from sameness) to signify still the status of special access to the dom-
inant identity.
Thus the authority of theoria is severely eroded when the whole world is
watching. That is why theoria is forced to discard its higher views and sur-
veys, and seek authorization to legislate. Surveillance is not effective; it is
not enough to generate commentaries on the tablets. When anarchy looms
large, it is time to come down from the heights of theoria with new tablets.
And so the former managers of consciousness surveillance offer their ser-
vices as doorkeepers before the Law. Their new job is to re-present the law,
telling stories about gates, rules, failed appeals, and grave punishments.
This time people who come to seek admission notice the great number of
entrances and doorkeepers, and try many of them, while exchanging expe-
riences and insights with fellow sinners. Nevertheless, confession and col-
laboration will not improve their chances until more and more realize that
the whole purpose of present doorkeeping is to distract them, to make
them believe not that there is no other Law but that there is no outside-
the-Law—the actual, pervasive, and yet invisible law of a land which is run
only by laws.
And yet there must be other (non-Hebraic?) laws and other (non-Hel-
lenic?) lands, and other ways of doing things, without even laws or lands.
But people will not know it before they begin again (as they have done in
the past) to question the law of the land and the land of the law—before
they start rejecting autonomic behavior for autotelic action. The project of
autonomy did not fail—it simply exhausted itself. It deserves credit for
many successes, many sacrifices, many achievements. But it is no longer
valid or useful. The same must be said about its supreme models, Hebraism
EPILEGOMENA TO MODERNITY 331
and Hellenism, which guided and rewarded the quest for emancipation
through interpretation, liberation through self-rule. There is no longer
need to play Hebrews and Hellenes to gain admission to civic society, a
society presently languishing under fatigue and global challenges. The wea-
riness of autonomy, though, does not entail defection from freedom. On
the contrary, it demands a (radically non-theoretical and anti-aesthetic)
refunctioning of freedom, a new dedication to current, concrete, and press-
ing causes of liberation.
The exhaustion of Hebraism and Hellenism may finally allow Jews and
Greeks to live and create like every other people, without the self-enslaving
and -exterminating advantages accorded to their ideal types by Protes-
tantism. The collapse of autonomy may also create possibilities for diverse
initiatives beyond nomothetic concerns and nomocratic regimes. The mys-
tagogues of the aesthetic and the dramaturges of critique will argue against
such possibilities by expertly interpreting them—finding inconsistencies
and contradictions and multiple binds where others see vivid seas and open
paths. Their arguments provide another illustration of why there is need
not for new artistic languages of foundation but for alternative public rhet-
orics of collective assertion. Organic ideals of community, essentialist dec-
larations of otherness, and ascetic exercises of resistance will not suffice
either: they have too strong a theological legacy to be effective in a nomola-
trous culture still combating its horror of alienation with the counter-myth
of religion. The task of a different assertion of self-determination requires
much more if members of society are not to remain political prisoners of
their civil rights. The next revolt should turn against the court of rights
itself, against the interpenetration of nomos and phusis, anarchy and order.
This next project is not a question of end or beginning, catastrophe or
genesis, prophecy or annunciation, fate or destiny, return or redemption. It
is just a matter of (putting together, putting into action, making operative)
a good life, the life we want for ourselves, the society we desire to shape, the
history we intend to make. It is just another episode of human rebellion
against human oppression, a choice of freedom over exploitation, an exper-
iment with some other configurations of an autotelic constitution of soci-
ety. Just that. A change of our own making in the name of our own lives. A
better (in a manner that interests us, namely, those concerned) way of
doing things with those we love. Some other kind of public virtue and
political ethic.

NOTES
CHAPTER ONE
1. Comparative philology, looking at the common oral-formulaic ground of
Biblical and Homeric poetry, concludes that “on the basis of style, the Hebraic mind
or worldview cannot be distinguished from the intelligence behind the Odyssey
or Iliad” (Whallon 1966: 113), and that the distinctive features “Auerbach found
in Homeric epic are also to be found in Old Testament poetry” (130). Thus it
takes Auerbach to task for unjustifiably comparing two different literary provinces,
(Homeric) poetry and (Hebrew) prose, instead of comparing the two oral poetic
traditions.
2. Since the special issue of Critical Inquiry (September 1983) on “Canons” (von
Hallberg 1984), the subject has acquired great importance in many fields. Among
the better discussions within literary studies, see Butler 1988; Condren 1985; De-
leuze and Guattari 1986; Doyle 1989; Fiedler and Baker 1981; Fowler 1982; Fowles
1987; Gilbert 1985; Hernadi 1978 (Part II); Kermode 1985; Lauter 1985; McLaren
1988; Munich 1985; Robinson 1985; Rosenfelt 1982; von Hallberg 1984 and 1985;
and West 1987. Rasula 1987 is a postmodern novel about the authority of the text.
For a parallel trend in religious studies, see Barr 1983; Beckwith 1985; Blenkinsopp
1977; Coats and Long 1977; Kermode 1987 (“The Canon”); Metzer 1987; Morgan
1990; and von Campenhausen 1972
3. “The Bible’s claim to truth is not only far more urgent than Homer’s, it is
tyrannical—it excludes all other claims. The world of the Scripture stories is not
satisfied with claiming to be a historically true reality—it insists that it is the only
real world, is destined for autocracy. . . . The Scripture stories do not, like Homer’s,
court our favor, they do not flatter us that they may please us and enchant us—they
see to subject us, and if we refuse to be subjected we are rebels” (Auerbach 1953:
14–15). The author is reiterating a point made by Hegel in The Philosophy of Fine
Art: “It is only the limited Jewish national god which is unable to tolerate other gods
in its company for the reason that it purports as the one god to include everything,
although in regard to the definition of its form it fails to pass beyond its exclusive-
ness wherein the god is merely the God of His own people. Such a god manifests its
universality in fact only through his creation of Nature and as Lord of the heavens
and the earth. For the rest he remains the god of Abraham, who led his people Israel
out of Egypt, gave them laws on Sinai, and divided the land of Canaan among the
Jews. And through this narrow identification of him with the Jewish nation he is in
a quite peculiar way the god of this folk. . . . Consequently this austere, national god
is so jealous, and ordains in his jealousy that men shall see elsewhere merely false
idols. The Greeks, on the contrary, discovered their gods among other nations and
accepted what was foreign among themselves” (Hegel 1962: 182–83).
4. Similar claims have been made about its importance for literature: “Blake
described the Bible as ‘the Great Code of Art.’ The suggestion is that it codifies and
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stabilizes rules for the production of meaning that can then be applied to individual
texts read anagogically as books and chapters in a secular scripture built up, as
Shelley says in the Defence [of Poetry] from ‘the cooperating thoughts of one great
mind’” (Rajan 1986: 585).
5. Regarding its narrative modes and structure, the debt of Mimesis to the ag-
gadah tradition has not been explored. The aggadah is usually defined as the non-
legal material of the Talmud, everything in talmudic and midrashic literature which
is not halakhah: it is the rabbinic storytelling which amplifies the scriptural narra-
tive, filling in its apparent gaps or inconsistencies. It includes parables, legends,
anecdotes, humor, expositions, explanations, and elaborations of biblical stories,
moral exhortations, and wise sayings (Barth 1984). Although the aggadah and the
halakhah together compose the Oral Law, the “aggadah has often been compared,
even opposed, to the halakhah. Historically, the latter has frequently been viewed
as serious, the former as frivolous. More recently, the terms of the comparison have
been reversed, and halakhah now tends to be depicted as the heavy yoke of the law,
as the prescriptive and binding side of Judaism, while aggadah is portrayed as free
and imaginative, expressing the spiritual, ever-searching heart of religion” (Stern
1987: 11). Auerbach’s approach seems to be part of the latter, post-Enlightenment
view which contrasts the open-endedness of storytelling with the rigidity of reli-
gious dogma: “The genuine opposite to aggadah is not halakhah but dogmatic the-
ology. Standing at the very origin of classical Judaism, aggadah presents the funda-
mental obstacle to every effort to fix Jewish thought in a static moment, to convert
its didactic assertions into systematic discourse. . . . Most playful and novel in form
precisely when it is most commonplace in content, aggadah represents all that is
quintessentially untheological about Judaism. As such, it is the point of discontinu-
ity against which every theology of Judaism must take a stand in order to make its
own beginning” (12). This view shares the same set of aesthetic principles with
Auerbach’s way of telling the grand narrative through stories. Walter Benjamin
defined truth as “haggadic consistency” (Benjamin 1969a: 143).
6. Auerbach’s strategy has obviously worked, since he has been appropriated by
academics and turned into a “master,” a model of the traditional humanist intellec-
tual: “Auerbach is representative for those American critics and students of litera-
ture who believe in the enduring cultural importance, not just of literature, but of
critical, humanistic scholarship in an age of need. Auerbach functions as a fantastic
source for American critics and theorists; his primary function is not as a philologi-
cal model but as a sign that in an anti-historical, anti-humanistic age of relativism,
mass-cultural leveling, and the increasing irrelevance of writers and critics, it is not
only possible for critics to perform opportune and important acts, to construct
monumental synthetic texts in the face of massive specialization, to invent new
techniques for dealing with changed cultural conditions, and to do all this out of the
unique intellectual and existential experience of the individual scholar, but also, in
so doing, to relegitimate culturally a certain image of the responsible and responsive
authoritative critical voice” (Bové 1986: 80–81). An investigation of the “ideological
investment in Auerbach’s redemptive qualities” (107) shows that the critic’s “own
claims and much of his own rhetoric nonetheless draw upon and emerge out of the
discourse and values” (139–40) of the German mandarin tradition of anthropologi-
cal humanism which he seems to oppose. Although Auerbach rejects the subservi-
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ence of academics to the Kulturstaat and their support for the official (educational
and other) policy and nationalist ideology, he never loses his faith in an elite in
charge of Western tradition. Indeed, in his vision of an aristocracy of cultivation,
the mission of the elite transcends national boundaries to take over (like Mimesis)
the legacy of Weltliteratur. The intellectual is called upon to play a universal role.
This strategy of (self)legitimation recalls Auerbach’s later condition that “the hu-
manist who hopes to be effective in preserving or renewing humanity must experi-
ence exile and alienation (as he and Dante both did), in order to be able to tran-
scend the traps of nationalism that threaten humanity’s very existence” (175). This
position of willful alienation is a source of ever greater authority: “By virtue of this
total and loving exile, the philologist becomes a universal intellectual whose very
‘marginality’ to the forces or powers of modernity, as well as to the orthodox effects
of a national or institutional tradition, empowers him to do work basic to the hu-
manist enterprise” (177). Thus the “grand strategy of exile” (180) becomes another
source of prestige for the socially displaced humanist. Auerbach’s identification
with Dante must be seen in the context of this effort of authorial canonization
(197).
7. Northrop Frye (1912–91), a minister of the United Church of Canada from
1936, appropriated this argument for Christianity, proposing that, since the Bible
has provided a mythological framework for Western literature, it should be the
basis for all literary training. See his The Educated Imagination (1963), The Secular
Scripture: A Study in the Structure of Romance (1976), The Great Code: The Bible
and Literature (1982), and Words with Power: Being a Second Study of The Bible and
Literature (1990).
8. On religious and literary uses of typology, see Bercovich 1972; Brumm 1970;
Budick 1986; Charity 1966; Danielou 1960; Korshin 1977 and 1982; Lampe and
Woolcombe 1957; Lewalski 1979; Madsen 1968; Meixner 1971; Miner 1971 and
1977; Preus 1969; Schwartz 1988; von Rad 1963; and White 1971.
9. A study of Auerbach’s language which correlates his figural history with his
figurative style demonstrates how the tension between prefiguration and fulfill-
ment operates in the presentation of Dante and Flaubert as the two critical mo-
ments of self-overcoming for European realism, and how, in its turn, Mimesis fulfills
the figura of Dante in Flaubert (Bahti 1985: 138).
10. In the work of some contemporary theologians, “typology is represented as
agreeing with the historical emphasis of Hebrew thought, while allegory is repre-
sented as serving the Greek disinterest in history and interest in supra-historical
timeless ideas” (Barr 1966: 104–5). The connection between typology and Hebrew
thought in Mimesis is clear, since figural interpretation is the mode of understand-
ing that Auerbach derives from the Bible and uses in his survey of literary tradition.
11. Auerbach’s strategy may be fruitfully compared to the return, through liter-
ary issues, of Martin Heidegger to Pietism or of Harold Bloom to the Kabbalah.
Some commentators have found Auerbach’s understanding of typology too Chris-
tian and have criticized it for reductionism: “Typology, in the form described by
Auerbach, expresses the need to interpret the Old Testament in such a way as to
close down the interpretative treadmill and to declare the fulfillment of all pro-
phetic figures in Christ. Philo’s writings and/or midrash, on the other hand, are
symptomatic of a desire to describe a delayed messianic coming. They affirm the
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continuity of interpretation and even make its endlessness part of the essence of
divine meaning” (Budick 1986: 208).
12. As a project of secular typology, Mimesis has its origins in the abstracted
typologies of the late eighteenth century, when figuralism reached into cosmology
or history. In works like David Hartley’s Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty,
and his Expectations (1791, 3 vols.), scriptural typology “becomes the basis for the
existence of abstracted typology or for other, analogical, predictive structures, not
only in various kinds of literature and learning but in the works of Nature herself.
Hartley’s sweep is so broad that he prepares the way for the predictive structures of
Blake, Wordsworth, Shelley, and Byron by extending typology beyond the narrow
theological sphere” (Korshin 1977: 182). Significantly, Hartley dealt with the role of
the Jews in the typology of secular history, which he deemed figural of humankind:
“Does it not appear agreeable to the whole analogy both of the word and works of
God, that the Jews are types both of each individual in particular, on one hand, and
of the whole world in general, on the other?” (quoted in Korshin 1977: 183) A
similar but pessimistic view attributes modern alienation to “the divorce in our
contemporary world between moral and secular conceptions. . . . In this situation,
the Jew plays a special role. His life and his wanderings are, in a sense, the image of
the world’s destiny” (Bell 1946: 12). In typological pronouncements like Hartley’s
we ought to seek the model of the twentieth-century image of the artist as antitype
of the Jew. I am not aware of any studies of the Jew as figura in contemporary
literature, criticism, or theory.
13. The same care to avoid confrontation with Christianity is evident in an expo-
sition of the cardinal role the Bible has played in Western tradition. The project,
derived from Mimesis, is to tell the story of the West as a conflict between the
Biblical (including the belated Christian) and the Greek. A comparison of two op-
posing cultural modes, the “kerygmatic” (appropriated from Pietist hermeneutics)
and the “cybernetic,” shows that “we are a kerygmatic not a cybernetic society”
(Schneidau 1976: 295). Another corresponding opposition which dominates the
book is that between fiction and myth. A “demythologizing” (12) thrust in Biblical
thought, coupled with skepticism, which was invented by the Hebrews (24), is op-
posed to Greek mythology. Readers are warned that “the heritage of the Western
forms from the Greek ones should not be exaggerated” (260). The value of ancient
culture has been secondary: “On the question of Greek influence, we must always
remind ourselves that the preservation of Greek traditions in the West was ancillary
to religious thought” (261–62). Because of this misdirected attention, the Hebrew
influence has been underestimated. The depth of their contribution may be recog-
nized by examining what is probably its greatest achievement—fiction. “The con-
cept of fiction was resisted by the Greeks, in spite of their flourishing poetry and
drama, whereas the Hebrews laid the groundwork for the idea though they had no
epic, no drama, and only a restricted, if intense, poetry and prose” (278). Thus
fiction, and by extension literature, is a Biblical creation. An investigation of “the
Yahwist roots of literature” (276) suggests that this art uses the kerygma as a model
and is indeed inherently kerygmatic (303), and therefore, as Auerbach said, in need
of interpretation. Despite its debt to mythical thought, the West is not Greek: “The
West is an island of literature in a sea of myth” (274). Thus the position of Mimesis
is advanced to the argument that literature as a whole (and not just one of its
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modes) is Biblical in that it constitutes the kerygmatic expression of the Hebraic
identity of Western culture.
14. This position is quite old. Solomon Formstecher (1808–89) thought that
Christianity was promoting Jewish principles which had been tainted by paganism;
that alien influence, however, was gradually being eliminated, especially with the
advent of Protestantism.
15. This was a rather popular position in the 1940s, when, taking the Nazis’ word
for Hellenism, intellectuals started blaming various forms of Greek inspiration (or
even bad example) for the horrors of the war. See the first volume of Karl Popper’s
The Open Society and its Enemies, entitled The Spell of Plato (1943).
16. I can only allude here to the other major work, one of Romance scholarship
this time, to which Mimesis proleptically responds, Curtius’s European Literature
and the Latin Middle Ages (1948). The antagonistic relationship between Auerbach
and Ernst Robert Curtius (1886–1956) has been noted by various commentators. In
response to the advent of fascism, Curtius published The German Mind in Danger
(1932), a polemical pamphlet which concluded with a plea for a new humanism
based on a shared understanding of the common (medieval Latin) roots of Euro-
pean culture. Following that, he devoted himself to the composition of his magnum
opus. In defining its ideological position, he stressed that his “book is not the prod-
uct of purely scholarly interests, that it grew out of a concern for the preservation of
Western culture. It seeks to serve an understanding of the Western cultural tradi-
tion in so far as it is manifested in literature. It attempts to illuminate the unity of
that tradition in space and time by the application of new methods. In the intellec-
tual chaos of the present it has become necessary, and happily not impossible, to
demonstrate that unity. But the demonstration can only be made from a universal
standpoint. Such a standpoint is afforded by Latinity” (1953: viii). Auerbach must
have been familiar with at least some of its twenty-five parts which appeared as
articles in the years 1932–44, before the volume came out. His own alternative to
the solution of Latinity (Santirocco 1987) was Hebraism; and to Curtius’s defense
of a new canon “bound only by the idea of beauty” (397), he counterproposed a
canon imitating a moral social order. The idea that Curtius modeled the book on
Joyce’s novel, on which he had already written with admiration, is intriguing: “He
too presents a work in eighteen chapters, structured in the way that he describes
Ulysses’s structure. Thus we might see the book as Curtius’s attempt, in his own
fashion, at Ulysses” (Dronke 1980: 1104). Given Auerbach’s modeling of Mimesis
on the Bible, this adds significantly to the complexity of any comparison between
the two concluding monuments of Romance philology. The importance of Cur-
tius’s method of Toposforschung for Auerbach’s hermeneutic principle of Ansatz-
punkt became obvious in the latter’s essay “Philologie der Weltliteratur” (1952). The
title of Auerbach’s last book also shows that, at least for him, their contest over the
legacy of Karl Vossler, Aby Warburg, and the other Weimar historicists never
ended. For both authors, however, the highest critical ideal was the same: to use
Curtius’s terms, it was the two requirements for “reverent reception and faithful
transmission” (1953: 597) of tradition—“devotion and enthusiasm” (597) or “Faith
and Joy” (598).
17. Since Henry Fielding, novelists have often defended their genre as the mod-
ern epic (Watt 1957). German comparisons of the two genres began in the 1770s.
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The tradition of modern literature has also been read as a history of nostos as well
as negotiation between the Hebraic and the Hellenic positions on classicism which
reaches a magnificent expression in Joyce (Perl 1984, especially the chapter “Novel
and Epic: Reading Backwards from Ulysses”).
18. The sublimity of the Bible has been defended by many British writers both
before (Robert South in 1715, Anthony Blackwell in 1725) and after Lowth (Philip
Dodridge in 1763, S. J. Pratt in 1777). Since Blackwell’s The Sacred Classics De-
fended and Illustrated, most writers agree that the Bible is far more sublime than
Greek works. Blake thought that Homer had stolen the sublime from the Bible.
Coleridge asked: “Could you ever discover anything sublime in our sense of the
term, in the classic Greek literature? Sublimity is Hebrew by birth” (Coleridge
1846: 178–80).
19. In his Table Talk, Luther recognized dramatic elements in Job. Later, Milton
and some of his contemporaries saw it as a short epic. Macaulay writes that the
Oriental style of Aeschylus “often reminds us of the Hebrew writers. The book of
Job, indeed, in conduct and diction, bears a considerable resemblance to some of
his dramas” (1878: 5).
20. In an extension of Lowth’s research, John Jebb applied the same principles to
the New Testament, arguing that it was not written “in a purely Greek style” but
rather that “the phraseology is Hebrew” (Jebb 1820: 91) and that the “whole ar-
rangement of the periods is regulated according to the Hebrew verses” (93). More
recently, commentators have argued that all Gospels were translated from Hebrew,
and their present form is “translation Greek” (Tresmontant 1989).
21. The Dutch philosopher is the best-known hero of secularism: “Spinoza is
more than a father of modernity, he is the father of Jewish modernity. . . . Spinoza
is the modern Jew’s second country” (Himmelfarb 1973: 5). The history of his repu-
tation, however, shows that he was discovered much later as the “first secular Jew”
(and has been used as a figura of Jewish modernity) because of his espousal of
(interpretive) secularism—his break with tradition (including both religious and
cultural associations), as well as interest in government, socio-historical analysis,
and the natural sciences. “What can be said confidently is that Spinoza took the
first step in the eventual secularization of Jewish life by examining it empirically as
a natural phenomenon subject solely to the forces of secular history. In doing so he
opened a breach between the Jewish religion and traditional community, on the
one hand, and the broader totality of Jewish life on the other” (Yovel 1990a: 95).
22. The humanistic character of this ideal can be traced to the republican and
Reformation intellectual politics of the Swiss Confederation in the first half of the
sixteenth century.
23. John Wyclif (1329–84), for example, who taught at Oxford, wanted people
to read the Bible for themselves and started translating it from Latin into the ver-
nacular (English), thus giving priority to Scripture over church. In his De Dominio
Divino (1376), he attacked the official doctrine of transubstantiation and argued
that dominion is founded on grace and not in institutional power.
24. This religious position became a common aesthetic principle in formalist
poststructuralism: “However, the structure of the Bible as a redacted, self-interpret-
ing text has this important exegetical consequence: the Bible effectively blocks any
attempt to understand it by reconstruction of its textual history and a working back
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to an original, uninterpreted intention. This self-interpreting text is also self-effac-
ing with respect to its origins” (Bruns 1987: 627).
25. All the major Reformation figures (Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Melanchthon)
devoted themselves to the task of elucidation and wrote many scriptural commen-
taries.
26. At the same time, that “letter” became more spiritual than the “spirit,” and
its meaning was fiercely debated: for example, while Luther invoked the “spirit” of
the Scripture, the humanist Zwingli appealed to its “letter” by requiring philologi-
cal competence.
27. In the wilderness of Sinai, God tells Moses: “Now therefore, if you will obey
my voice and keep my covenant, you shall be my own possession among all peoples;
for all the earth is mine, and you shall be to me a kingdom of priests and a holy
nation. These are the words which you shall speak to the children of Israel” (Exodus
19. 5–6). For an analysis of the passage, see Moran 1962.
28. The most representative example was the curriculum (including Latin,
Greek, and Hebrew) reform (1516 –19) at the University of Wittenberg, where
Luther was a Lecturer in Biblical Studies, under the great-nephew of Reuchlin,
Melanchthon.
29. Starting with Luther’s pan-Germanism, national cohesiveness and tradition
have always been the religion of those churches. Near the end of John Osborne’s
play Luther, Johann von Staupitz, Vicar General of the Augustinian Order, tells the
Reformer: “The world’s changed. For one thing, you’ve made a thing called Ger-
many; you’ve unlaced a language and taught it to the Germans, and the rest of the
world will just have to get used to the sound of it. As we once made the body of
Christ from bread, you’ve made the body of Europe, and whatever our pains turn
out to be, they’ll attack the rest of the world too” (Osborne 1961: 100).
30. In a chapter entitled “Theology and Aesthetic Judgement,” where he rejects
the possibility of a Christian aesthetic, a theologian explores the meaning of artistic
value for the modern believer. “It is especially the Protestant today who faces a
problem when he seeks to define the basis of artistic judgment” (Wilder 1958: 85).
After outlining the difference between Catholic and Protestant aesthetics on the
basis of the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation and the idea of sacred art, he
concludes: “The great exfoliation of art about the Catholic faith is related to its
sacramental conceptions. The Protestant position, with its different view of church
and sacrament, and its emphasis on the ear rather than the eye, suffers greatly with
respect to the whole realm of sacred art itself, but opens the door to the secular
expression of the artist, just as it dignifies the secular vocations of men. In this sense
art is liberated, though Protestantism has often, of course, chained the arts in its
own way” (89). In the distinction between Greek epic and Biblical narrative in
Mimesis, his critique of “classical tools and canons” (66) finds an eminent example
of “the contribution that a theologically oriented criticism can make today” (67).
For another example of such criticism, see his study “Biblical Epos and Modern
Narrative” (Wilder 1969: 41–77).
31. “If your prince or temporal ruler commands you to side with the pope, to
believe thus and so, or to get rid of certain books, you should say, ‘It is not fitting
that Lucifer should sit at the side of God. Gracious sir, I owe you obedience in body
and property; command me within the limits of your authority on earth, and I will
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obey. But if you command me to believe or to get rid of certain books, I will not
obey; for then you are a tyrant and overreach yourself, commanding where you have
neither the right nor the authority,’ etc. Should he seize your property on account
of this and punish such disobedience, then blessed are you; thank God that you are
worthy to suffer for the sake of the divine word. Let him rage, fool that he is; he will
meet his judge. For I tell you, if you fail to withstand him, if you give in to him and
let him take away your faith and your books, you have truly denied God” (Luther
1974: 62).
32. “Bodin tried to show that the nature and extent of [political] authority was
involved in the history, the structure and the end of political association. He strove
to find some principle of order and unity, that should reconcile liberty and subjec-
tion, define political obligation and satisfy conscience and reason” (Allen 1961:
407). Jean Bodin (1530–96), in his last work, the “Dialogue of Seven Wise Men” on
religion Heptaplomeres (1857, op. posth.), surveys seven creeds and favors Judaism
as a spiritualization of the natural law. His work “marked a new turn in the appreci-
ation of Judaism, when he stressed the importance of the Mosaic Law as supreme
authority which embodies natural law” (Ettinger 1961: 197). His contemporaries
sometimes described him as a Jew in religion.
33. Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484–1558) in his declamatio “Against the Slanderers
of Poetry” exclaims: “Truly, Plato, since you composed poetry (and what poetry!
May the gods drive that vice from the earth), and according to your own laws were
exiled from your Republic, but did not live in exile, you showed that other poets as
well should not be exiled. We for our part shall gladly pass our lives outside of your
Republic (as we have said) with our modest wives and children. We shall live with
Moses, with Deborah, with the mother of Samuel, with the minstrel King, with the
prophets, with Zachariah, with Simeon, with the ever-virgin Mother of God, whose
poetry is more important than your whole Republic and all your laws” (Hall 1948:
1129–30).
34. Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek does what the title promises for two
hundred pages of parallel philological (“Wörterbuch”) deciphering of the deep
structures of the racial experience. The author, who endorses Auerbach’s position
(Boman 1970: 23), knows well that his topic “is, so to speak, in the air in our day”
(13) and strives for a balanced view that should make readers equally grateful to
both fountains of wisdom: “From the days of Alexander the Great onward, the
history of European civilization manifests only mixtures and syntheses of the two
ways of thinking, in which now one and now the other prevails” (12). Thus he
explains how we owe dynamic, passionate, temporal, and synthetic thinking to the
Hebrews, while the static, moderate, spatial, and analytic to the Hellenes. In a
typical passage which illustrates his approach and tone, he has the following to say
about their differences in historical understanding: “The one thinks causally and
consequently in terms of natural science; the other thinks finally or teleologically.
The one puts itself outside the events and looks backwards; the other puts itself into
the events and thinks itself ‘into’ the psychic life of the man involved and how they
directed themselves forward in thought and will. The one concerns itself with the
past, the other with the present and future. It cannot be said that the one way of
observing is more correct than the other; both are possible and necessary, and each
in its own field works out best; causal thinking in science, final or teleological think-
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ing in ethics and religion. The former is Greek, and the latter is Israelite. The
Greeks have given to the world the science of history; the Israelites gave to the world
historical religion. In contrast to all their neighbours, both peoples knew what his-
tory is” (170). A later commentator, concerned about “the Biblically ministerial
function of the Church in its confrontation with the world of the modern univer-
sity” and “the problem of the disturbing Hebraic void in the university’s attempt to
preserve and transmit the cultural heritage of the Occident” (Harcourt 1963: 353),
proposed that “the Church will have to act in some way as the transferential agent
of the Hebraic heritage,” “as the Hebraic leaven in the academic dough” (354),
taking Boman’s two types of thinking as a guide in its critique of the curriculum.
35. “Numenius of Apamea, contemporary of Justin and precursor in important
respects of Plotinus and Neoplatonism, affirms the theory of dependence without
qualification: ‘What is Plato,’ he asks, ‘but Moses in Attic Greek?’ ” (Chadwick
1966: 15) Second-century philosophers could only respond by reversing the chro-
nological priority: “The dependence is rather the other way round—Jesus had read
Plato and Paul had studied Heraclitus. Christianity ([the Platonist] Celsus urges) is
a corruption of the primordial truths enshrined in the ancient polytheistic tradi-
tion” (23).
36. Regarding the Hebrews as the first philosophers remained a common notion
for a long time. “There are versions of the medieval Aristotle legend that would
even have us believe that Aristotle was born a Jew or became a proselyte to Ju-
daism! . . . The idea that hidden away in the library of Hebrew books is to be found
the source of all philosophy, science, and learning, and notably that of Aristotle and
the Greeks, persisted long after [Roger] Bacon and far beyond the limits of the
Middle Ages. It was quite seriously held throughout the fifteenth, sixteenth, and
seventeenth centuries and only died out even among the learned in the eighteenth
century” (Bevan and Singer 1928: 300–1). Jean Bodin wrote in 1566: “Not inconsis-
tently did the Egyptian priest taunt Solon with the fact that the Greeks seemed to
him mere children, because they had nothing old. More appropriate, even, the
taunt of the Christian who told the Greeks that Moses the lawgiver was older than
the gods of the Greeks, for Greece has almost nothing older than Danaus and
Cadmus. Of these the one was founder of the race, the other brought letters to the
Greeks. But in those same times the Jews flourished, having the highest reputation
for valorous deeds” (Bodin 1945: 340).
37. Theologies which have emphasized the Hebraic-Hellenic contrast with a
preference for the former have essentially produced a Christian, and therefore
“largely a synthetic Jew,” for their own ideological purposes. “The apparent philo-
Semitism of the contrast has thus always been ambiguous in its relation to the
actual Jews of history, whether ancient or modern” (Barr 1966: 59). The dark story
of this attitude is well known and should always remain so. Here is an example from
British Israelitism: “Messianic enthusiasm was high throughout seventeenth-cen-
tury Europe. On the whole, however, English Puritans drew a distinction between
the Israelites of the Old Testament and their Jewish descendants: they identified
themselves with the first (those who had been the chosen people) but looked with
suspicion and disdain on their descendants—the successful merchants who had
rejected their Messiah and were, in their eyes, heretics” (K. Cohen 1975: 12). The
reasons were partly financial: “To the English Puritans, the Jews of their time were
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representatives of that type of capitalism which was involved in war, Government
contracts, State monopolies, speculative promotions, and the construction and fi-
nancial projects of princes, which they themselves condemned. In fact the differ-
ence may, in general, with the necessary qualifications, be formulated: that Jewish
capitalism was speculative pariah-capitalism, while the Puritan was bourgeois orga-
nization of labour” (Weber 1976: 271). The Western ambivalence toward contem-
porary Jews (and Greeks) is a topic of major importance which unfortunately be-
longs outside the confines of this study. Suffice to quote here what Wittgenstein
wrote in 1931: “In western civilization the Jew is always measured on scales which
do not fit him. Many people can see clearly enough that the Greek thinkers were
neither philosophers in the western sense nor scientists in the western sense, that
the participants in the Olympian Games were not sportsmen and do not fit in to any
western occupation. But it is the same with the Jews. And by taking the words of our
language as the only possible standards we constantly fail to do them justice. So
at one time they are overestimated, at another underestimated” (Wittgenstein
1980: 16e).
38. “In this respect, the century which separates this Reformation from the
English Revolution is the one when the priestly pre-eminence of its kings was
snatched from them by a people resolved to take its destiny into its own hands. In
Europe everywhere, the study of the Scriptures and popular unrest brought about
new heresies and sects which the Church of Rome called judaistic; but it was only
the English who identified themselves wholeheartedly with the people of Moses.
The leaders of Puritanism, like Cromwell and Milton, thought of this affiliation in
an allegorical Christian manner. They did not pretend that Jews were flesh and
blood ancestors of the English. They merely substituted the English for the Jews so
that the former became, in their turn, the people chosen by the Almighty for a
special and at the same time a universal mission” (Poliakov 1974: 42).
39. The seventeenth century also saw the publication of about ten rhetorics de-
voted to the Bible, as well as treatises on the biblical verse like Davidis Lyra, seu
nova hebraea S. Scriptura ars poetica, canonibus suis descripta, et exemplis sacris &
Pindari ac Sophoclis parellelis demonstrata cum selectorum Davidis, Salomnis, Iere-
miae, Mosis, Iobi poematum (1637) by the distinguished Hebraist Franciscus Go-
marus, Milton’s contemporary.
40. In Paradise Regained (1671), pagan writing is one mode of knowledge with
which Satan tempts the son of God:
All knowledge is not couched in Moses’ Law,
The Pentateuch or what the Prophets wrote;
The Gentiles also know, and write, and teach
To admiration, led by nature’s light;
And with the Gentiles much thou must converse. . . .
(IV, 225–29)
Christ’s celebrated rebuke consists in a full-fledged comparison. Here is the part on
poetry:
Or if I would delight my private hours
With music or with poem, where so soon
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As in our native language can I find
That solace? All our law and story strewed
With hymns, our Psalms with artful terms inscribed,
Our Hebrew songs and harps in Babylon,
That pleased so well our victors’ ear, declare
That rather Greece from us these arts derived;
Ill imitated, while they loudest sing
The vices of their deities, and their own,
In fable, hymn, or song, so personating
Their gods ridiculous, and themselves past shame.
Remove their swelling epithets, thick laid
As varnish on a harlot’s cheek, the rest,
Thin shown with aught of profit or delight,
Will far be found unworthy to compare
With Sion’s songs, to all true tastes excelling,
Where God is praised aright, and godlike men,
The Holiest of Holies, and his saints;
Such are from God inspired, not such from thee;
Unless where moral virtue is expressed
By light of nature not in all quite lost.
(IV, 331–52)
41. Research into Milton’s Semitic studies began in the era of modernist com-
parativism. When Harris Fletcher’s pioneering Milton’s Rabbinical Readings ap-
peared in 1930, this philological side of the poet surprised many specialists. Forty
years later, after the development of a whole scholarly industry around “the Jewish
factor, or to take a word of more universal significance, the factor of Jerusalem”
(Fisch 1964: 3), a critic could make this generalization: “His knowledge of Hebrew
is felt on every page of his writings and pervades the style of his prose as well as his
poetry” (K. Cohen 1975: 3). From Werblowsky’s Lucifer and Prometheus (1952) to
Steadman’s chapter on “Sion and Helicon” in Milton’s Biblical and Classical Im-
agery (1984), parallel discussions of the Hebraic and the Hellenic have become
rather common in Milton studies. Some approaches have even taken Milton’s com-
parisons at face value and have added their own anti-Hellenic turn: “The ancient
Greeks vanished from history and nobody prevented the Christian Church from
interpreting Greek philosophy and literature in such a way that it could be incorpo-
rated into Christianity and subordinated to its religious ethos. The Jews, on the
other hand, survived the destruction of their state and temple, preserved their reli-
gious writings and beliefs, and remained a living influence in Western culture”
(K. Cohen 1975: 10). The book which defends the Hebraic cause more openly than
any other promises to deal with “the concept of Jerusalem as applied to English
Literature and History in the seventeenth century” (Fisch 1964: 13), but develops
into an essay on the Hebraic dimension of Puritanism. While it starts with an exam-
ination of the “mythical divorce of Jerusalem from Albion” (11) in Blake’s Jerusa-
lem, it concludes with a discussion of John Locke in terms of Athens and Jerusalem.
Characteristically, after Part One, which is a discussion of the Hebraic rhetorical
manner of the period, a chapter on method follows entitled “The Logos,” where a
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term of contrast is abruptly introduced: “Before we come to the central topics of
Hebraism therefore it will be as well to describe by way of contrast those Greek
modes of thinking which were nourished either in the Middle Ages or the Renais-
sance. Here, the leading term and structure will be the logos which for the Greeks
brings together the spheres of Man, God, and Nature” (67). The rest of the book is
explicitly based on this polarity. A principal aim is to dispel the “false identification
of Hebraism with Puritanism” (227). The attack on the latter by Enlightenment
thinkers, Romantic poets, or cultural critics is totally misdirected. “It is really
against St. Paul and not Moses that the campaign is waged, against the Greek,
Platonic ethic which divides the ‘fallen’ world of Matter and Flesh from the ‘ideal’
world of Spirit. Such divisions are unknown to Hebraism” (277). The author la-
ments the dissociation of sensibility and disintegration of faith that occurred be-
tween Milton and Blake. In conclusion, he presents the “inconceivably sharp and
challenging” (291) dilemma of Western Man: to “seek wisdom by means of the
logos, by means of intellectual concepts and schemes” (290) or to “conform to our
Covenant-bonds, in which case we are united to the Lord of Life” (292). His argu-
ment and plea ends with a poignant question: “Paradoxically, we need Divine help
to carry out the tasks which God lays upon us. Can it be that Hebraism can yet
mediate that help?” (292) This is obviously scholarship as homily. Its dilemma,
however, is not very different from that expressed at the conclusion of Mimesis.
42. Following Martin Heidegger’s suggestion, in the “Letter on Humanism”
(1947), that Humanism is a “specifically Roman phenomenon,” it has been pro-
posed that “what [Matthew] Arnold, [Irving] Babbitt, [I. A.] Richards, and the
contemporary educational establishment allege to be a ‘classical,’ i.e., Greek,
paideia, is, in fact, Roman, that, in other words, modern humanistic education, like
that of Renaissance Humanism, has its origins in and is finally affiliated not with the
originative thinking of ancient Greece, but with the Humanitas of ancient Rome,
that representational, imitative, and calculative thinking which authorized, en-
abled, and legitimated the Roman imperium” (Spanos 1985: 72).
43. The same trend may be observed in France: “One should not forget that,
generally speaking, the Roman model, at the Enlightenment, played a dual role: in
its republican aspect, it was the very embodiment of liberty; in its military aspect,
it was the ideal schema of discipline. The Rome of the eighteenth century and of
the Revolution was the Rome of the Senate, but it was also that of the legion; it was
the Rome of the Forum, but it was also that of the camps. Up to the empire, the
Roman reference transmitted, somewhat ambiguously, the juridical ideal of citizen-
ship and the technique of disciplinary methods” (Foucault 1979: 146).
44. In this respect it is interesting, for example, that even after Augustan admin-
istration prevailed, “Britain had a philo-Semitic tradition which became particularly
strong with the rise of the bourgeoisie in the mid-19th century. Thus many Victori-
ans saw themselves as biblical patriarchs, priding themselves on their diligence,
thrift, discretion, respect for forms and—above all—their sense of rigid righteous-
ness” (Bernal 1987: 347). If the Biblical model lost its political urgency, it did not
lose its authority in configurations of social life based on ideas of community and
local ethics. The ethnic character of the model too, with its racial explanatory
power, remained distinct: “Despite the association between the English and the
Semites, no one compared the English to the Arabs or the Ethiopians. The ‘Sem-
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ites’ they had in mind were Jews and/or Phoenicians” (350). The story of the Arab
struggle to gain acceptance in the discursive domain of Semitism has not been
written.
45. “In the early seventeenth century, the process began (and this is highly sig-
nificant) with a change in the concept of the present. The present was reduced to
an instant without inherent duration. It was said to depend on secondary causes and
human effort for its preservation. This seems to register the loss of common under-
standing . . . made apparent by religious wars, economic fluctuations, and a geo-
graphic and scientific extension of the idea of the world” (Luhmann 1982: 248–49).
46. “In the modern age history emerged as something it never had been before.
It was no longer composed of the deeds and sufferings of men, and it no longer told
the story of events affecting the lives of men; it became a man-made process, the
only all-comprehending process which owed its existence exclusively to the human
race” (Arendt 1968: 58). See also Fussner (1962), Guibbory (1986), Rossi (1984),
and Struever (1970).
47. In the first of the seven Wolfenbüttel Fragments, “On the Toleration of the
Deists,” which Lessing published in 1774, Reimarus demands for the Deists the
same tolerance exhibited toward Jews and pagans.
48. On Bentley’s invention of “an historical science of antiquity,” and its influ-
ence on nineteenth-century philology, see Brink (1986), who shows that equal stan-
dards of scholarship were not attained again before Wolf.
49. A direct literary parallel to Deism has been proposed: “As a theory, resting
upon a coherent, or supposedly coherent, body of principles, neo-classicism was, at
bottom, neither traditionalist nor authoritarian; it was an expression of the same
rationalism of the Enlightenment which was manifesting itself in deism” (Lovejoy
1932: 291).
50. John Husbands, in the Preface to his anthology A Miscellany of Poems By
several Hands (1731), proposes that contemporary poetry needs to study the Scrip-
ture for the best models of writing: “What innumerable Beauties might our Poetry
be furnish’d with from those sacred Repositories? . . . These are the Writings which
far surpass all human Compositions. . . . They exceed in Beauty and Propriety any
Thing that was ever wrote by Man. The greatest Genius’s among the Ancients fall
infinitely short of the inspir’d Books” (quoted in Crane 1922: 29).
51. Regarding the secularization of writing and the emergence of its modern
categories (like literature), the following comments on the disciplining of bodies
apply also to the disciplining of texts by criticism, if we substitute “(autonomous)
text” for “body” in the original: “These methods, which made possible the meticu-
lous control of the operations of the 〈text〉, which assured the constant subjection
of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be called
‘disciplines.’ Many disciplinary methods had long been in existence—in monas-
teries, armies, workshops. But in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries the disciplines became general formulas of domination. . . . The historical
moment of the discipline was the moment when an art of the 〈text〉 was born, which
was directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its
subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it
more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely. What was then being
formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the 〈text〉, a calculated manipulation
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of its elements, its gestures, its behavior. The 〈text〉 was entering a machinery of
power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A ‘political anatomy,’ which
was also a ‘mechanics of power,’ was being born; . . . Thus discipline produces sub-
jected and practiced 〈texts〉, ‘docile’ 〈texts〉. Discipline increases the forces of the
〈text〉 (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political
terms of obedience). In short, it dissociates power from the 〈text〉” (Foucault 1979:
137–38). If this substitution of “text” for “body” is not entirely inappropriate, then
it may indicate that the disciplining of bodies was to a great extent modeled on that
of texts.
52. It is fair to say that “the modern attitude to the written word could not and
did not arise until scripture had become literature and literature scripture” (Lewi-
sohn 1932: x). The two changed status together: scripture “having become litera-
ture, it was necessary for literature to become scripture” (xiii). This entailed a dif-
ferent reading experience: “A new type of reader arose—one to whom literature was
no longer an elegant diversion or an illustration of the foreknown and fixed, but
moral research, a road to salvation, the bread of life” (ix). In addition, when the
impact of Deistic philology is taken into account, it becomes clear that “a literary
approach to the Bible is one that resists the trend of biblical scholarship toward
fragmentation” (Ryken 1974: 36).
53. The study of parallelism goes back to the interest in Biblical repetition of the
sixteenth century (Kugel 1981). At that time, the idea that Hebrew poetry was
simpler than the classical and closer to contemporary vernaculars emerged. Over-
coming Jerome’s metrical theories, however, took a very long time, and only in the
seventeenth century was it possible to distinguish meter from rhythm, as an analogy
between the Bible and the vernaculars was established. But even though Lowth’s
emphasis on the repetition of structures was not totally new, his assumption about
the artistic autonomy of those structures was. He amplified his theory in the “Pre-
liminary Dissertation” introducing his translation of Isaiah in 1778, where he de-
fined parallelismus membrorum. His approach to Hebrew poetry affected the course
of Biblical scholarship and has remained influential, even outside the field. Of par-
ticular relevance to this discussion is the attempt of Roman Jakobson (1896–1982)
to elevate parallelism to an ever-present, all-important aspect of poetry, regardless
of language, form, culture, or time. During the early years of their work, the Russian
Formalists, in an effort to free criticism from the metrical concerns of symbolist
poetry and structural linguistics, did much research on rhythm and repetition in
both poetry and prose. Osip Brik, for example, wrote on sound repetition (Matejka
1964) and Viktor Shklovsky (1973) on retardation. Working in the same direction,
Jakobson first drew attention to parallelism as a stylistic device in 1919, in a study
of Russian modernist poetry (Brown 1973: 58–82). Forty years later, from the late
1950s until the end of his career, he studied it as the basic feature of the poetic
function of language—as the very essence of literariness (‘literaturnost’) that the
Formalists sought to discover. During this long period, he dealt extensively with the
subject in general studies (Jakobson 1960, 1966, 1968, 1980) or in close, often col-
laborative, readings of poems by Baudelaire, Eminescu, Král, Dante, Brecht, Shake-
speare, Codax, Majakovski, Sidney, Blake, Pessoa, Cavafy, Blok, Yeats, and others.
The study of parallelism in the context of variance/invariance was an integral part
of his project for a nomothetic science of language. In the heyday of structuralist
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stylistics, his theory was widely debated. (For representative positions, see American
Journal of Semiotics, Brooke-Rose 1976, Culler 1975, Fowler 1975, Guillen 1987,
S. R. Levin 1962, Lodge 1977, Poetics Today 1980, Reinhart 1976, Riffaterre 1966,
Ruwet 1973, and Werth 1976). Its influence extended beyond literary studies to
linguistics, philology, folklore, and anthropology (Fox 1977). This is another case
where methods of analysis first applied to the Bible to justify its intrinsic unity and
merit provided a model for the study of universals in literature. The work of Henri
Meschonnic, which places the semiotics of the sacred at the center of linguistics,
provides a more recent example of this tendency. His view of discourse is based on
rhythm (1982), the force organizing subject, language, and history, and is a critique
of sign and identity. He presents rhythm as a figure for the Jew, the Jew of the
Greco-Christian sign, since it is “hidden by the sign as the Jew has been treated by
the political theology of the sign” (Meschonnic 1988: 100).
54. Charles Rollin, for example, in the second volume of his Traité des Études
(1726–31, 4 vols., complete English translation 1734), devoted a section to the
eloquence of the sacred writings.
55. It was effeminate, too (Halperin 1986). The endless fascination of the West
with its vision of the Greek as homosexual should also be examined in the context
of the masculine-feminine dimension of the Hebrew-Greek polarity. For a repre-
sentative position, see the definition of the Jew (and his fear of femininity) after
Spinoza, under the self-explanatory title “Modern, Honorable, Masculine,” which
concludes: “For us, manly honor is the truth. It is our truth. It makes sense of what
we are, or what we want to be” (Himmelfarb 1973: 12).
56. Fustel de Coulanges, author of the conservative interpretation of political
life Cité antique (1864), complained in 1872: “In France scholarship is liberal, in
Germany it is patriotic” (quoted in Momigliano 1977: 329).
57. “The particular form which the theory of taste took in Britain stemmed from
the realignment of state and civil society prepared in the revolutions of the seven-
teenth century. The new theory of civil society hammered out of the Revolution
Principles not only reworked the relation between wealth and virtue, but did so on
the basis of the faculty of taste. The outcome was a philosophy of taste which
differed considerably from the German philosophy of aesthetics. While British phi-
losophers elaborated a justification of a moral civil society, their German contem-
poraries concentrated on justifying the welfare absolutism of the ‘police-state.’ The
providentially regulated, sensible discriminations of the British theory of taste were
appropriate to its efforts to legitimate the harmonious working of civil society apart
from the state and law. The German tradition, on the other hand, saw the common
welfare as promoted by the legislative discipline of the state” (Caygill 1989: 100).
58. Such conflicts are already apparent in the attacks of the physician and philos-
opher Isaac Orobio de Castro (c. 1617–87), Spinoza’s contemporary in Amsterdam,
against those learning secular sciences and questioning the authority of the Oral
Law.
59. Regarding civic emancipation, the publication of On the Civil Improvement
of the Jews by Christian Wilhelm von Dohm in 1781 [2nd ed. 1783] may be ac-
cepted as “the commencement of the social movement for the adoption of the Jews
as citizens in European countries. That is also, coincidentally, the date of the prom-
ulgation of the Edict of Toleration by the Emperor Joseph II of Austria. From then
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on, until the full realization of emancipation in the 1860’s and 1870’s, the civic and
social status of the Jew continued to concern both public opinion and state author-
ities” (Katz 1964: 3). Mendelssohn praised the book, which advocated the accep-
tance of Jews as full citizens. “Assessed historically, Dohm’s importance lies not so
much in the shifting of a point of view from the theological to the humanistic and
political but rather in the linking of suggestions pertaining to the Jews’ position
alone to the changes imminent in society at large. Changes in the status of the Jew
in society now presupposed, or at least went hand-in-hand with, changes in the
whole society” (12). In 1791 the first group of Sephardic Jews in France was granted
civil rights.
60. Heine, who was probably the first to connect emancipation directly with the
choice between Hebraism and Hellenism, wrote in 1828: “What is the great assigna-
tion of our times? It is the emancipation, not only of the people of Ireland, of the
Greeks, the Jews of Frankfurt, the blacks of West India and similar depressed peo-
ples, but of the whole world, especially Europe” (quoted in Katz 1964: 21).
61. The following epigram is called “The Impure Philology”:
Once upon a time, a vestal virgin named Philology
Protected the purity and clear meaning of the sacred fire of antiquity;
But soon the flame was snuffed out by a reverent sigh,
For the pietist robbed her of her maidenhood.
(Feuerbach 1980: 181–82)
62. Lowth’s influence was far greater in the realm of literature. Some of this
territory has been charted, especially in a chapter entitled “Hebraism and Classi-
cism,” whose purpose is to show “how the rediscovery of the Bible as literature
rather than as religious text helped to wean the eighteenth-century poet away from
his classical model and to mould not merely his poetic techniques but also his
literary sensibility” (Roston 1965: 18). As the word “rediscovery” indicates, the au-
thor sees the change as a return to the poetic truth of the Hebrew Bible: “Between
neo-classicism and romanticism a change had occurred which was closely in line
with the biblical tradition. For in place of the wit, the stylization, the balance and
the restraint of early eighteenth-century verse, the romantic poet, spurning the
poetic diction of the preceding generation, was turning from the form to the spirit,
from classicism to Hebraism” (40).
63. Positions on the relation between typology and allegory vary widely. Some
consider typology a “spiritual” method of interpretation, and allegory a “literal”
one. Others disagree: “For typology, the historical value of the text to be inter-
preted forms the essential presupposition for the use of it. For allegory, on the
contrary, this is indifferent or even offensive, and must be pushed to one side to
make room for the ‘spiritual’ sense which lies behind” (Eichrodt 1963: 227).
64. The transgressions of hedonism have been portrayed invariably as a Hellenic
trait: “Transgression opens onto a scintillating and constantly affirmed world, a
world without shadow or twilight, without that serpentine ‘no’ that bites into fruits
and lodges their contradictions at their core. It is the solar inversion of satanic
denial. It was originally linked to the divine, or rather, from this limit marked by the
sacred, it opens the space where the divine functions. The discovery of such a cate-
gory by a philosophy which questions itself upon the existence of the limit is evi-
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dently one of the countless signs that our path is circular and that, with each day,
we are becoming more Greek. Yet, this motion should not be understood as the
promised return to a homeland or the recovery of an original soil which produced
and which will naturally resolve every opposition” (Foucault 1977b: 37).
65. Walter Benjamin makes the Hebraic component of the project explicit and
pushes the comparison to an apocalyptic opposition: “Hölderlin’s translations from
Sophocles were his last work; in them meaning plunges from abyss to abyss until it
threatens to become lost in the bottomless depths of language. There is, however,
a stop. It is vouchsafed to Holy Writ alone, in which meaning has ceased to be the
watershed for the flow of language and the flow of revelation. Where a text is
identical with truth or dogma, where it is supposed to be ‘the true language’ in all
its literalness and without the mediation of meaning, this text is unconditionally
translatable. In such case translations are called for only because of the plurality of
languages. Just as, in the original, language and revelation are one without any
tension, so the translation must be one with the original in the form of the inter-
linear version, in which literalness and freedom are united. For to some degree all
great texts contain their potential translation between the lines; this is true to the
highest degree of sacred writings. The interlinear version of the Scriptures is the
prototype or ideal of all translation” (Benjamin 1969: 81–82). Any discussion of
these thoughts (or any German analysis of translation) must begin with “Sendbrief
vom Doletschen” (1530), Luther’s letter on translation.
66. “Herder invented nothing; the ideas of the Sturm und Drang were repre-
sented at Königsberg itself by J. G. Hamann, who . . . really belongs to the mystical
trend which, from throughout the century, under various names and either through
organized sects such as Pietism or through isolated individuals such as Böhme and
Franz von Baader, relieves souls oppressed by the tutelage of reason” (Brunschwig
1974: 92).
67. “The [British and German] traditions of taste and aesthetic culminate in
Smith and Herder’s attempts to uncover the sources of the conformity of judgment
and its objects. Both try to sublate the difficulties raised by the repression of the
conformity between production and legislation in their traditions; one in a political
economy, the other in a philosophy of history. . . . Both traditions separated the
elements of judgment, only to force them back together again. In the theory of
taste, the law of the discriminations is given by providence, while production be-
comes a je ne sais quoi. In aesthetic, the law is administred upon its subjects and
objects, denying them any autonomy. In both cases the proportionality produced by
judgment can only be recognized through the pleasure in beauty. Beauty holds the
promise of a freedom which legislates and produces for itself, and becomes not only
the necessary supplement of the theories of civil society and the police-state, but
also their point of crisis and disruption” (Caygill 1989: 184).
68. In 1787 Herder drew the plan for an “Institute of German National Enlight-
enment” (Patriotisches Institut für den Allgemeingeist Deutschlands).
69. “If the French conception of nationhood has been universalist, rationalist,
assimilationist, and state-centered, the German conception has been particularist,
organic, differentialist, and Volk-centered. Because national feeling developed be-
fore the nation-state, the German idea of the nation was not, originally, a political
one, nor was it linked with the abstract idea of citizenship. This pre-political Ger-
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man nation, this nation in search of a state, was conceived as a cultural, linguistic,
or racial community—as an irreducibly particular Volksgemeinschaft. On this un-
derstanding, it is ethnocultural, not political unity, that is constitutive of nation-
hood” (Brubaker 1989: 4).
70. “The German word Bildung connotes more than its English equivalents, ‘ed-
ucation’ and ‘formation.’ It refers not only to the process of education but also to
the goal of education, of cultivating the qualities and faculties that characterize
humanity. Ideally, it connotes both mastery of knowledge and development of the
self” (Reill 1975: 239).
71. Scaliger was the first to discuss the opposition between Hebraioi and Hellen-
istai in Acts of the Apostles 6:1, raising the question of Jewish Hellenism in post-
Alexandrian antiquity.
72. “Wolf accumulates and carefully analyzes much more evidence than his
predecessors, but the more he argues, the more we realize our necessary ignorance
of the classical world. He enlarged the area of the unknown and located Homer far
within it, beyond the reach of the neoclassical aesthete and the allegorical inter-
preter, both of whom assumed some form of assured communication with the
poet. . . . Wolf effected this removal of the poet in two ways. He oriented specula-
tion not on the poet or his poem but to the media of its preservation: rhapsodes and
alphabets, editors and scholiasts. Second, a negative dialectic replaced, where possi-
ble, rational guesswork and established a methodological docta ignorantia” (Murrin
1980: 189–90).
73. The absolute unity of the literary canon, which can only inhere in fragmen-
tariness, became a cardinal principle of Romanticism: “The new, eternal gospel that
Lessing prophesied will appear as a bible: but not as a single book in the usual sense.
Even what we now call the Bible is actually a system of books. And that is, I might
add, no mere arbitrary turn of phrase! Or is there some other word to differentiate
the idea of an infinite book from an ordinary one, than Bible, the book per se, the
absolute book? And surely there is an eternally essential and even practical differ-
ence if a book is merely a means to an end, or an independent work, an individual,
a personified idea. It cannot be this without divine inspiration, and here the esoteric
concept is itself in agreement with the exoteric one; and, moreover, no idea is
isolated, but is what it is only in combination with all other ideas. An example will
explain this. All the classical poems of the ancients are coherent, inseparable; they
form an organic whole, they constitute, properly viewed, only a single poem, the
only one in which poetry itself appears in perfection. In a similar way, in a perfect
literature all books should be only a single book, and in such an eternally developing
book, the gospel of humanity and culture will be revealed” (Schlegel 1971: 249–50).
74. Classicists (e.g., Murray 1907: 101–15; Lord 1960: 156–57) continue to draw
parallels between the epics and the oldest Biblical documents (especially Jahvist
and Elohist), as Wilamowitz had already demanded in the 1880s.
75. “Wolf’s theories were at first greeted with enthusiasm in England; the ro-
mantics enjoyed the notion that the Homeric epics were the rude, virile utterances
of a barbarous people, like those old English and Scottish ballads which so fasci-
nated them. They saw Homer as they saw Shakespeare, spontaneous, natural, glori-
ously imperfect and unpredictable” (Jenkyns 1980: 197). Higher Criticism of
Homer and the Bible emerged together in the 1820s in England. Later attitudes
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grew more reserved. “Both clergymen and lay [Victorian] scholars recognized the
skeptical implications for the Bible of Wolfian approaches to Homer. They con-
sciously used that apprehension over the Scriptures to inhibit extensive consider-
ation of Wolf’s theory and later of Grote’s analysis of the Homeric epics” (Turner
1981: 449). For Victorian critics (as for Auerbach later), the interpretation of the
Bible sometimes offered a guide to the reading of Homer. Treating a document first
as a text rather than a statement of moral principles was the critical approach “that
British scholars had resisted in regard to Homer from fear of its implications for the
Bible. . . . Once scholars, such as [Benjamin] Jowett, applied the methods of critical
philology and history to the Bible, no substantial religious obstacles remained to
prevent application of similar methods to classical documents. . . . Ironically, in
England many classicists learned the tools of German critical scholarship from the
theologians, as [Alexander] Grant had from Jowett” (Turner 1981: 343).
76. See, for example, the advocacy of William Gladstone, Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer, who, after comparing the epic to the Old Testament and granting that it
“stands between Paradise and the vices of later heathenism” (Gladstone 1858: 4),
insists that Homer still is indispensable to the education of both boys and men (13).
77. “In many respects, then, early romanticism corresponds to the profound eco-
nomic, social, political, and moral crisis of the latter years of the eighteenth cen-
tury. . . . [T]he Germany of the period, suffering from economic crisis and profound
social problems accompanied by continual revolts, found itself . . . plunged into a
triple crisis: the social and moral crisis of a bourgeoisie, with new-found access to
culture . . . but who are no longer able to find positions for those sons traditionally
destined for the robe or the rostrum (unless the sons no longer wanted these jobs,
notably that of the pastor); the political crisis of the French Revolution, a model
that disturbed some and fascinated others, and whose ambiguity becomes ever
more apparent with the French occupation; and the Kantian critique, finally, which
is unintelligible for some, liberating but destructive for others, and which seems
urgently in need of its own critical recasting” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1988: 5).
For a critique of the political fate of liberalism in its inability to attack bourgeois
complacency effectively in the nineteenth century, see Craig 1982.
78. The motto of the book comes from Rousseau: “Si c’est la raison qui fait
l’homme, c’est le sentiment qui le conduit.”
79. “The whole radical aesthetic tradition from Coleridge to Herbert Marcuse,
lamenting the inorganic, mechanistic nature of industrial capitalism, draws suste-
nance from this prophetic denunciation” (Eagleton 1990: 118).
80. For recent discussions of the idea of play, see Derrida 1981: 156–71; the
study of Heidegger and Nietzsche in Hyland 1984; Hearn 1976–77; the special issue
of SubStance 1980; Baudrillard 1975: 33–41 (“Ethic of Labor; Aesthetic of Play”);
the surveys of the philosophy of play in Hans 1981 and Spariosu 1989; Hutchinson
1983; and Guinness and Hurley 1984, which looks at literature as play.
81. “Why, then, did Schiller dismiss democracies as an amalgam of unconsid-
ered decisions and faction? The truth is that from his start as a political commenta-
tor to his final theoretical efforts, Schiller remained loyal to Shaftesbury and the
English constitutional model as it had been interpreted by its eighteenth-century
German admirers. . . . [It] is not democracy but representative institutions that
remain the consistent institutional ideal of Schiller’s political theory: a happy me-
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dium between large and small assemblies, between popular lawlessness and auto-
cratic despotism” (Chytry 1989: 94).
82. “The process of differentiation among fields of practice produces conditions
favourable to the construction of ‘pure’ theories (of economics, politics, law, art,
etc.) which reproduce the prior differentiation of the social structures in the initial
abstraction by which they are constituted. The emergence of the work of art as a
commodity, and the appearance of a distinct category of producers of symbolic
goods specifically destined for the market, to some extent prepared the ground for
a pure theory of art, that is, of art as art” (Bourdieu 1985: 16).
83. Regarding the role of the artist, William Blake, in his annotations of 1808 to
the first volume of Sir Joshua Reynolds’ Discourses, writes: “The Foundation of
Empire is Art & Science. Remove them or Degrade them, & the Empire is No
More. Empire follows Art & Not Vice Versa as Englishmen suppose” (Blake 1972:
445). Reynolds writes in his dedication “To the King”: “To give advice to those who
are contending for royal liberality, has been for some years the duty of my station in
the Academy.” Blake comments: “Liberality! we want not Liberality. We want a
Fair Price & Proportionate Value & a General Demand for Art” (446).
84. “Disciplinary power has as its correlative an individuality that is not only
analytical and ‘cellular,’ but also natural and ‘organic’” (Foucault 1979: 156).
85. The study “Epic and Novel” (1981) by Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975) could
also be fruitfully compared to the studies by Auerbach and Lukács. In regard to the
terms in the title, Bakhtin makes two changes: he generalizes their content, making
them mean not just the respective genres to which they normally refer but funda-
mental modes of writing; and he, like Auerbach, makes them potentially co-exist
and compete for influence and power. For him, the epic stands for all canonical
literature. It depicts a monochronic, idealized past—a closed, finished, complete,
final, self-contained world. It is addressed to the future memory of a nation, trying
to control its past through selective recollection. As for the novel, it stands for what
is always fluid in the history of genres—for the cyclical project of renewal and
modernity, the constant becoming of literature which anticipates and opens the
future. It is the defamiliarization of the commonplace, the transgression of the
normative, the violation of the rules, the parody of the canon. It enunciates
the perennial novelistic spirit of all literature by expressing the present, the real, the
raw, the lower, the transitory, the free. The modernity of the novel, which counters
orthodoxy, is always relevant because it is irreverent. In this reading, Lukács’ con-
ception of the novel as the epic of the sinful age is revised. But while in Mimesis the
novel prefigures a final synthesis, that of the assimilation of Christianity back into
its biblical roots, in Bakhtin it is privileged because it disturbs every synthesis and
opposes solidification. For him, the novel has nothing to do with the Fall (Lukács)
or Redemption (Auerbach). It is the spontaneous, explosive violation of systems
and transgression of codes. In this respect, Bakhtin’s generalization seems the more
generous and promising: it insists on the importance of the festival after the decline
of the religious ritual. But even for him, the demonological dimension of the argu-
ment (namely, the construction of a Hellenic negative) is unavoidable and domi-
nates the essay: even in a world where people can apparently celebrate without gods
and rules, the face and the name of evil, in order to be effectively exorcized, had to
be classical. (There is no need to emphasize the remarkable point of agreement
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among the three theorists: their faith and trust in “reality.” They all believe in a
world out there which is true, natural, present, accessible, and reflected in verbal
art. Their common assumption is that representation is a basic way of human un-
derstanding, and literature its best medium.)
86. “The opening volumes of George Grote’s History of Greece (1846) set the
Homeric question and its implicit relationship to the Bible before the British read-
ing public and permanently associated the issues with rationalist, radical, and utili-
tarian thought” (Turner 1981: 142).
87. This last parallel should also be made chronologically: it was roughly at the
time when the first “real” Greeks were seeking ways to escape the millet system that
the first “real” Jews looked for means of freeing themselves from the bondage of the
ghetto.
88. The term “Semitic” (and the corresponding linguistic family) was created (in
opposition to the “Japhetic” family, better known as Indo-European) in 1781 by
A. L. Schlözer, a student and later colleague of Michaelis at the University of
Göttingen. The term “anti-Semitism” first appeared in the pamphlet The Victory of
Judaism over Germanism (1879) by the German Christian convert Wilhelm Marr.
89. In his reply to Schiller’s “The Gods of Greece” (1788), another poem under
the same title, Heine again finds the Greeks “repugnant” and their gods old, exiled,
and defeated.
90. In addition, the continuing popularity of mimesis among students of narra-
tive and representation should be noted. Auerbach returned to the subject with his
1953 paper. For more recent examinations, see Hume 1985, Costa-Lima 1988, Ma-
honey 1986, Meltzer 1987, Morrison 1982 (which extends the inquiry into cosmol-
ogy, epistemology, and ethics), Prendergast 1986, Ricoeur 1981, Schweiker 1990,
Sörböm 1966, Spariosu 1984, Steele 1988, Weinsheimer 1985, and Wells 1986.
91. This principle has an interesting precedent in Herder’s idea of palingenesis
(recurrent partials in culture that explain cultural universals) which he opposed to
polygenesis (multiple origins of culture). Palingenetic forms are archetypes, univer-
sals of the soul that return. Their function explains the recurrence of cultural ex-
pressions. The idea, which was first mentioned in 1768, is elaborated in the essay
“Palingenesie: vom Wiederkommen menschlicher Seelen” (1797).
92. “What we have done since the masked scepticism of Spinoza, since the cri-
tiques of the rationalist Enlightenment and since the positivism of the nineteenth
century is to borrow vital currency, vital investments and contracts of trust from the
bank or treasure-house of theology. It is from there that we have borrowed our
theories of the symbol, our use of the iconic, our idiom of poetic creation and aura.
It is loans of terminology and reference from the reserves of theology which provide
the master readers in our time (such as Walter Benjamin and Martin Heidegger)
with their licence to practise. We have borrowed, traded upon, made small change
of the reserves of transcendent authority” (Steiner 1985a: 1275).
93. A differentiation between two major modes of Western culture, rhetoric
(whose emblem is the tree) and commentary (whose emblem is the source), pre-
sents modernity as a scholastic age dominated by commentary (Charles 1986).
94. “The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in face of despair is
the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the
standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by
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redemption; all else is reconstruction, mere technique. Perspectives must be fash-
ioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices,
as indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic light” (Adorno
1974: 247).
95. During his visit to Adrian Leverkühn, and after transforming himself into “a
member of the intelligentsia, . . . a theoretician and critic” (Mann 1968: 231), the
Devil observes: “The religious is certainly my line: as certainly as it is not the line of
bourgeois culture. Since culture fell away from the cult and made a cult of itself, it
has become nothing else than a falling away; and all the world after a mere five
hundred years is as sick and tired of it as though, salva venia, they had ladled it in
with cooking-spoons” (237).
96. The methodological convenience of Auerbach’s simplistic good-and-evil op-
position can be quite irresistible. Notice how a critic, in a chapter entitled “From
Odysseus’ Scar to the Brown Stocking: A Tradition,” unwittingly repeats the He-
braic-Hellenic formula by drawing a biographical parallel between the author and
Odysseus: “In exile in Istanbul, Auerbach begins with the homecoming of the ar-
chetypal wanderer” (Robbins 1986: 26).
97. There have been comparable developments in other fields too. Regarding
anthropology, for example, Claude Lévi-Strauss’s “work on American Indian my-
thologies might be understood as an act of atonement for a world destroyed, parallel
to the creation of the Talmud” (Fischer 1986: 200). Hermeneutics has been quite
important for this discipline. “In this respect, the model of post-modern ethnogra-
phy is not the newspaper but that original ethnography—the Bible” (Tyler 1986:
127).
98. Reading the Bible as Literature has developed into an interpretive and peda-
gogical discipline. In addition to those mentioned in the Bibliography, there has
been a great number of books with titles like What is Structural Exegesis? (1976);
Biblical Structuralism: Method and Subjectivity in the Study of Ancient Texts (1977);
Structuralism and Biblical Hermeneutics (1979); Ways of Reading the Bible (1981);
Literary Criticism and Biblical Hermeneutics: A Critique of Formalist Approaches
(1985); The Bible and the Narrative Tradition (1986); Theology and Literature
(1988); Story, Text, and Scripture: Literary Interests in Biblical Narrative (1988);
European Literature and Theology in the 20th Century: Ends of Time (1990). The
Centre for the Study of Literature and Theology, established in 1986 as part of
Hatfield College, University of Durham, has published since 1987 the semi-annual
journal Literature and Theology (Oxford University Press). It has also become the
home of the National Conference on Literature and Religion, established in 1981.
The Times Literary Supplement devoted its issue of May 23, 1986 to the topic
“God.” The 1989 Georgetown University Bicentennial Symposium was devoted to
“The Bible and Contemporary Literary Theory.” The University of Chicago Press
began in 1989 a new series, “Religion and Postmodernism,” under the editorship of
Marc C. Taylor.
99. In comparisons of “The Hebrew Literature, and Other Literatures” (Taylor
1861), “Other” often means only the Greek.
100. In this spirit, authors often examine the identity of their historical moment
using the same terms: “We often speak of ‘the Greek miracle’; from this point of
view we are fully justified in speaking of ‘the Hebrew miracle.’ For their phenome-
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non was equally great, unique, and unexplained as that of the Greeks. And there is
another resemblance between the Hebrew and the Greek miracles. Exactly as, from
time to time, the world has seemed to forget the Greeks and their accomplishment,
or, at least, to ignore them, and then has been compelled to return and again go to
school with them; so, again and again, the world has thought that it could ignore the
Hebrews and even make jest of that Jehovah whom they expressed. We are now,
more or less, in such a time. Yet there are ample signs that the necessity of explain-
ing our thoughts and ourselves is driving us back to seek an explanation of the whole
phenomenon of the Hebrews and of their faith in Jehovah” (Macdonald 1933: 9).
This author also compares Greek drama with Hebrew poetry, the “Greek Diké” with
the “Hebrew Reason” (35), and suggests that “the Hebrews, so far as concerns even
the cold workings of their minds, were Platonists rather than Aristotelians” (12).
101. One study of the legacy of Israel in modern literature is a case in point.
First, the author compares Arnold’s Greek style with Tennyson’s Hebrew: “The
Greek simile is foreign to English habits of speech, the Hebrew simile has become
naturalized” (Magnus 1928: 485). But this is not just a question of literature and
style: “The legacy of Israel in the English language is not merely a matter of words
and phrases; it is a matter of the association of ideas. It is mental as well as mechan-
ical, and thus, quite apart from the occurrence of occasional Hebraisms in our daily
speech, it is intimate of our life and habits. We think and act more Hebraico without
conscious imitation, as a son enjoying his patrimony does not to remember whence
it came” (487). The conclusion draws on the required comparison but attempts to
give a balanced view: “For Hellenism and Hebraism are not contrary, but comple-
mentary; for if Plato could be called ‘Moses Atticus’ by a reader in the second
century, A.D., readers in the twentieth century would be skilful to discern that mod-
ern literature is inextricably Greek and Hebrew, since it inherits and enhances the
glory of Greece and the righteousness of Zion” (505).
102. “The poet of The Iliad seems to me to have only one ancient rival, the prime
and original author of much of Genesis, Exodus, Numbers, known as the Yahwist or
J writer to scholars. Homer and J have absolutely nothing in common except their
uncanny sublimity, and they are sublime in very different modes. In a profound
sense, they are agonists, though neither ever heard of the other, or listened to the
other’s texts. They compete for the consciousness of Western nations, and their
belated strife may be the largest single factor that makes for a divided sensibility in
the literature and life of the West. For what marks the West is its troubled sense
that its cognition goes one way, and its spiritual life goes in quite another. We have
no ways of thinking that are not Greek, and yet our morality and religion—outer
and inner—find their ultimate source in the Hebrew Bible” (Bloom 1986: 2–3).
Auerbach’s point about the exclusive claim of the Bible returns with a vengeance:
“If the Bible is unique (in the West, except for the Koran), it is because we remain
enclosed by it, whether we overtly believe in it or not. Shakespeare and Freud,
rather than Homer and Plato, remain the Bible’s only rivals in enclosing us against
our wills, determining our responses to life and art” (Bloom 1988: 25). Of course, it
is never explained who is meant by “us” here.
103. Although he blames the crude market considerations of his (British? Amer-
ican?) publisher (“black women still sell!”) for his decision to keep the present title,
it appears that Bernal has always referred to his book as “Black Athena.” However,
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after being told that it should have been called “Egyptian Athena,” Bernal believes
that his title should have been “African Athena” (Bernal 1989: 31), conceivably
because people have started calling themselves “African Americans” rather than
“blacks.” It is probably with an eye to market considerations that, in various publica-
tions, Bernal has defined the topic of his project as the “African and Levantine
Roots of Greece” (1985), the “Afroasiatic Roots of Europe” (1986), the “Egyptian
and Semitic Roots of Ancient Greece” (1986: 55), the “Egyptian and West Semitic
Components of Greek Civilisation” (1986: 68), and the “Afroasiatic Roots of Classi-
cal Civilization” (1987). Changing “1780–1980” (1986) to “1785–1985” (1987) in
the subtitle also makes the book look more up to date.
104. Like Harold Bloom (who meticulously fashions himself on Disraeli’s
Sidonia), Bernal presents himself as an outsider (non-classicist, British Jew), a “pub-
lic nuisance,” a gadfly, and seeks exotic alliances: “Interestingly, I find it easier to
place myself and my promotion of the Revised Ancient Model in the spectrum of
black scholarship than within the academic orthodoxy. I see myself in Carruthers’
second class, whom he damns as ‘Negro intellectuals’” (Bernal 1987: 437).
105. Bernal yearns for opponents: he sees conspiracies and reactionaries every-
where plotting against his work, is disappointed when none are found or when
recognition comes quickly. To his utter embarassment, the Classics establishment,
which he thought he had attacked, has welcomed him. To my knowledge, there has
not been a single (professional or other) negative (let alone hostile) review, despite
the numerous disagreements—which he has always welcomed. In addition, the
record shows “the enthusiastic and uncritical adoption of Black Athena by many
nonclassicists precisely because of its ideological congeniality impressively but-
tressed by the academic credentials and broad learning of its author” (Levine 1989:
12). Suffice to mention Bernal’s influence on the albums To the East, Blackwards
(1990) by New York rappers X-Clan and Neither Fish Nor Flesh (1989) by Terence
Trent D’Arby. This is how D’Arby defines his reading: “I’ve got a book written by a
man who has been at Oxford for 18 years and who spent eight or nine years re-
searching this book called Black Athena. Now what this book is saying is when the
Romans came to Greece they were fascinated by Greek traditions and the Greeks
were dumbfounded as to why the Romans didn’t know that most of this came from
Africa or Asia, from black and Judaic traditions. Interestingly enough, a few months
ago—and this ran in all the major papers and it wasn’t a big headline—a group
of scientists and anthropologists had evidence concluding that the first person
who actually spoke was an African woman and genetically passed language onto
us” (D’Arby 1989: 58). Rappers like X-Clan and Brand Nubian sometimes com-
bine Bernal’s message with the teachings of the Black Muslim sect, the Nation of
Islam.
106. He finds that “the Broad Aryanists led largely by Jewish scholars, both Zion-
ist and anti-Zionist, are gaining ground and will certainly succeed by the end of the
century” (Bernal 1985: 70). Here is his promise: “By 1990 we should be back to the
Broad Aryan Model. There will be then a period of competition, after which I
believe the Ancient Model—with some revisions—will triumph. It should be
dominant by the beginning of the third millennium A.D.—if there is one” (Bernal
1986: 54).
107. Bernal mentions Stolen Legacy: The Greeks were not the Authors of Greek
Philosophy, but the People of North Africa, Commonly called the Egyptians (1954) by
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George G. M. James. The book takes as extreme a position as Joseph Yahuda (re-
ported in the Jewish Chronicle of London in 1987), who sees Biblical Hebrew as a
“camouflaged Greek” language and its speakers as an “ancient Greek tribe,” thus
transforming the Jews into “Indo-Europeans.” Responding with some indignation,
a commentator notes that she comes “from an orthodox Jewish ideology which
would certainly resent being ‘upgraded’ to the status of major contributor to Greek
civilization and would be downright dismayed at a rewritten version of history
which set Jews aswim with Greeks in a common Mediterranean soup” (Levine 1989:
14).
108. To mention a few examples, it has been reviewed in the Christian Science
Monitor (“The next far-in book?”), the Village Voice, and Z Magazine; highlighted
in the Chronicle of Higher Education and the Utne Reader; discussed in the Science
section and the Letters to the Editor page of the New York Times; praised by Edward
Said and Toni Morrison (in the Michigan Quarterly Review); it also provided the
topic of the conference “Challenging Tradition: Cultural Interaction in Antiquity
and Bernal’s Black Athena,” organized by the Departments of Classics and of Afri-
can-American Studies at Temple University (1990), and of the Presidential Panel
“The Challenge of Black Athena: The Classicists’ Response” at the 1989 Annual
Meeting of the American Philological Association.
109. Counting the Jews all the time, Bernal observes that “by the 1970s many of
the dominant figures in the field [of Classics] were Jewish” (Bernal 1987: 403). He
notes that Cyrus Gordon and Michael Astour “are self-consciously Jewish” (415)
and Semitists “mainly Jewish” (434), and refers to Gordon’s “mainly Jewish” (419)
students. He also records that the movement for a return to what he calls the Broad
Aryan Model, which started in 1945, has been “led mainly by Jewish scholars,” and
adds: “Since the late 1960s, however, the Extreme Aryan Model has been under
heavy attack, largely by Jews and Semitists” (442). I was reminded of that positive
use of ethnic origin for potentially dangerous race arguments when, after presenting
part of this chapter at a conference, the first question I was asked was: “Are you
saying these things because you are Greek?”
110. This alternative was by 1912 already obvious to Walter Benjamin, who
thought that “the intellectualist mission of the Jews is the Western alternative to
Zionism. This ‘modern asceticism,’ as Benjamin called it, even determines the
‘forms’ in which Jewish cultural life appears. What he means is evident—‘even the
Café.’ The Jew, to continue in the idiom of Christian discourse, ‘is called,’ accord-
ing to the ‘new social consciousness’ to be what ‘the poor in spirit, the enslaved and
the meek were for the first Christians.’ ‘The best Jews today are linked to a valuable
process in European culture’” (Rabinbach 1985: 95). The same letter offers a clear
distinction: “ ‘I see three zionist forms of Jewishness (Judentum),’ Benjamin con-
cludes, ‘Palestine Zionism (a natural necessity); German Zionism in its halfness,
and cultural Zionism which sees Jewish values everywhere and works for them. Here
I will stay, and I believe I must stay’” (96).
111. Bernal sees the ancient civilization as a Third World country: “Thus in
many ways Vietnam and Japan . . . have served as my models for Greece” (Bernal
1987: xii). He has no difficulty in establishing geographical or chronological analo-
gies with his own area of expertise: “I see relations between Greece and the Near
East as analogous to those between Vietnam, Korea, or Japan to China” (Bernal
1989: 23).
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112. Addressing the best hopes of a philologist or any other empiricist, Bernal
has promised to reveal, in the next three volumes of his work, the true character
(read: stolen treasures) of Greek civilization—a claim surprisingly and unanimously
overlooked even by proponents of ethnographic specificity with exceptional sensi-
tivity to discursive colonialism.
113. Other commentators have been more specific, noting, for example, that
Bernal “overlooks another Greek motive: the desire to excel, to outshine and do
down one’s immediate Greek rivals and predecessors. . . . The Egyptians served as
a stick with which Greeks beat other Greeks” (Griffin 1989: 26).
114. Bernal notes in a footnote: “The view of L. Canfora that there was a right
wing usurpazione of classics at the turn of the twentieth century takes as its base the
Jacobin use of antiquity: Ideologie del classicismo (Turin 1980), pp. 39–56. Follow-
ing conventional wisdom in northern Europe, I do not include this in the tradition
of Altertumwissenschaft/classics” (Bernal 1986: 62, note 131). This is a strange
choice for a scholar who takes great pride in going against the oppression of conven-
tional wisdom.
115. At times Bernal gives the impression that he almost regrets the outcome of
the War: “Classics as we know it today was created between 1815 and 1830—an
intensely conservative period. The same period also saw the Greek War of Indepen-
dence, which united all Europeans against the traditional Islamic enemies from
Asia and Africa. This War—and the philhellenic movement, which supported the
struggle for independence—completed the already powerful image of Greece as the
epitome of Europe. The Ancient Greeks were now seen as perfect, and as having
transcended the laws of history and language” (Bernal 1987: 440–41).
116. “In capitalist societies the educational system, whether lay or clerical, the
structure of moral reflexes handed down from father to son, the exemplary honesty
of workers who are given a medal after fifty years of good and loyal service, and the
affection which springs from harmonious relations and good behavior—all these
aesthetic expressions of respect for the established order serve to create around the
exploited person an atmosphere of submission and of inhibition which lightens the
task of policing considerably” (Fanon 1968: 38).
117. “In other words, a situation comes about in which interpretations are adju-
dicated almost entirely by interpreters, or rather by interpreters/workers (i.e., inter-
preters who interpret within the context, ends, etc., of capitalist economic rela-
tions), and thus by individuals to whose concrete advantages or disadvantages those
adjudications redound. . . . It follows, then, that the adjudicative concerns of the
interpreters who compose the body of workers and consumers would tend towards
establishing—in a tacit and ideological fashion—criteria of adjudication which
open markets, presumably by obsolescence, and reduce capital outlays. It also fol-
lows . . . that the establishment of such criteria will be facilitated by the absence of
gross criteria of applicative success or failure. To put it crudely, critics will value
precisely those varieties of interpretation and criteria of adjudication which, what-
ever their plausibility, allow them to produce more salable interpretations more
simply and less laboriously, and these valuations will not be hindered by the results
of technological applications” (Hogan 1985: 181–82).
118. “Worst of all, while it opens up a radical prospect by acknowledging the
authenticity of other voices, postmodernist thinking immediately shuts off those
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other voices from access to more universal sources of power by ghettoizing them
within an opaque otherness, the specificity of this or that language game. It thereby
disempowers those voices (of women, ethnic and racial minorities, colonized peo-
ples, the unemployed, youth, etc.) in a world of lop-sided power relations” (Harvey
1989: 117). The fundamentally essentialist logic of Otherness, by treating all minor-
ities like Jews of Hebraism, succeeds in giving them moral superiority and cultural
status (that is, Hellenic prestige) but no means necessary for political liberation.
119. “The [romantic] Hellenism associated with Bible studies was a very much
wider phenomenon than the interest in Greek classical antiquity. Its concern was
with the Hellenistic period, the immediate environment of early Christianity both
before and after Christ, with the meeting and synthesis of cultures and ideas out of
which emerged a distinctive Christian worldview. ‘Orientalism’ was one aspect of
this broad Hellenism” (Shaffer 1975: 14).
CHAPTER TWO
1. During the 1980s, the decade of epigonality (dominated by trends like post-
structuralism, new historicism, neo-geo, meta-fiction, and “after Foucault”), mo-
dernity as a project or predicament became a very popular issue. In addition to
well-known contributions by Jürgen Habermas and Jean-François Lyotard, see Ber-
man 1982; Cahoone 1987; Connolly 1988; Eisenstadt 1987; Galgan 1982; Giddens
1990; Meschonnic 1988a; Sloterdijk 1987; Vattimo 1989; and Xenos 1989. Many
journals (such as Les Cahiers, Cultural Critique, Modern Age, New German Cri-
tique, Theory, Culture and Society have devoted special issues to the topic. For
surveys of older discussions, see Barnouw 1988; Benjamin 1989; Frisby 1986; Kolb
1987; and Love 1986. On modernity as a specifically Jewish problem, see Bauman
1989; Eidelberg 1989; Ellenson 1989; and Meyer 1988. In 1988, Wayne State Uni-
versity Press inaugurated a publication series, “The Culture of Jewish Modernity,”
edited by Alan Udoff.
2. Schelling lectured on “The Philosophy of Mythology” and “The Philosophy of
Revelation” in 1815.
3. On sin and the fall, in addition to Paul’s Epistle to the Romans 7 and T. S.
Eliot’s essay “After Strange Gods” (1933), see Addy 1989; Bataille 1988; Carroll
1985; Highfield 1989; Reilly 1988; Ricoeur 1974: 425–39; and Vergote 1988.
4. “There runs through modern criticism the fantasy of a Second Fall of Man. . . .
The Second Fall seems to result from the introduction of scientific utilitarian values
and modes of thinking into the world of personal choice between good and evil,
with the result that values cease to be personal and become identified with the
usefulness or destructiveness of social systems and material things” (Spender 1965:
26).
5. A precedent of the Augustinian curiositas may be found in the allegory De
migratione Abrahami by Philo of Alexandria, where it is the Greek periergia (curios-
ity) that inspires Abraham’s travels (and spiritual path) from Chaldea to Egypt
(Blumenberg 1983: 284–87). This is obviously not Auerbach’s Abraham, who obeys
without asking questions.
6. Dante and Virgil encounter Odysseus in the Bolgia of the Evil Counselors who
abused the gift of reason. He tells them the story of his last trip, beyond the Pillars
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of Hercules (considered the western limit of navigation) and “out of the world of
man.” On the uses of the Ulysses theme, see Stanford 1976.
7. Lukács responded to the Dialectic of Enlightenment with his own critique of
modernity, The Destruction of Reason (1955).
8. An illustration of this introversion is Adorno’s own style—an exercise in re-
nunciation, “a discourse pitched into a constant state of crisis, twisting and looping
back on itself, struggling in the structure of every sentence to avoid at once a ‘bad’
immediacy of the object and the false self-identity of the concept” (Eagleton 1990:
341).
9. There are many features that this view of the Homeric world shares with Lu-
cien Lévy-Bruhl’s theory of “modern” (as opposed to “primitive”) thought pre-
sented in The Mental Functions in the Inferior Societies (1910). The main character-
istics of that thought are “natural orientation,” “objectivity,” “induction,” “logical
attitude,” and “separation from and mastery of the world” (Horton 1973: 254).
Lévy-Bruhl also saw the growth of individualism as crucial for the radical change
from primitive to modern thought. In contrast, the portrait of the Jews in the Dia-
lectic, with its emphasis on the importance of organized ritual for reflexively ration-
alizing the pagan fear and sacrifice, is indebted to Émile Durkheim’s view, in The
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912), that religion is that moment in
human evolution at which all forms of higher cultural articulation become possible.
10. Melancholy “from its beginning was identified with the artistic personality,
which was seen as essentially ambivalent. Melancholy was seen as both a humor and
a disease, and, through the merging of the originally opposed theories of Galen and
Aristotle, as both curse and blessing. It was a sign of both a genius and of a vicious
daemon, both in the older sense of good and bad presiding spirits and later in the
modern sense of innate qualities” (Kilgour 1990: 153).
11. Writing on “The State of Israel” Horkheimer remarked with bitter ambiva-
lence: “Jewry was not a powerful state but the hope for justice at the end of the
world. They were a people and its opposite, a rebuke to all peoples. Now, a state
claims to be speaking for Jewry, to be Jewry. The Jewish people in whom the injus-
tice of all peoples has become an accusation, the individuals in whose words and
gestures the negative of what is reflected itself, have now become positive them-
selves” (Horkheimer 1978: 206–7). The same historical development has evoked
contrasting feelings: “It is the difficult freedom of Israel, which is not to be treated
as an ethnographic curiosity but as one extreme limit of human potential” (Levinas
1989a: 279). This position obviously stems from a very different philosophy: “Zion-
ism is a politics and already a non-politics. An epic and a Passion. Wild energy and
extreme vulnerability. Zionism, after the realism of its first political formulations,
is finally revealed, in the terms of a Judaism of substance, to be a great ambition of
the Spirit” (280).
12. “Neither Adorno nor Horkheimer could say anything positive about God.
They believed the critical theorist could not represent the Absolute. Speaking
about the Absolute, all that can be said is that the present world is a relative one; by
saying what the world is, the critical theorist expresses what God is not. In this
Adorno and Horkheimer stand in the great tradition of Western negative theology”
(Siebert 1983–84: 113). More important than naming, finding, showing God was to
protect him from relativism. “In the tradition of mystical negative theology, Adorno
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negated God for God’s sake” (114). This is why he engaged not in ideology but “in
idology—the destruction of the idolatry” (114) of bourgeois religion.
13. Related to this policy is the iconoclastic Bilderverbot mentioned by Hork-
heimer in 1970: “In my opinion, Marx was influenced by Judaic Messianism while
for me the main thing is that God cannot be depicted . . . but is the object of our
yearning” (quoted in Marcus and Tar 1986: 346). The same taboo, which found its
typical modernist expression in the paintings of Mark Rothko (1903–70), was also
accepted by Horkheimer’s collaborator: “Aesthetic images are subject to the prohi-
bition of graven images” (Adorno 1984: 153).
14. Horkheimer has noted the close relation of German idealism with Judaism:
“Among the particular traits to be found both in idealism and emancipated Jewish
thought, I can mention here only one essential one: the impossibility of giving a
name to the Divine” (Horkheimer 1974: 112–13). After describing the circular
course of Hegel’s teaching in Berlin, he comments: “The story sounds like one from
the Talmud, and the similarity is more than accidental. In both cases the issue is a
truth which cannot be isolated and positively stated, but which is there nonetheless.
This element of contradiction is inherent in the Jewish tradition as it is in dialectical
philosophy where it becomes explicit as a moment in the process of thought as it
strives toward the truth” (113). Horkheimer’s studies of Jewish culture began in
1939 with the esssay “The Jews and Europe” (Reichmann 1974).
15. Conservative thinkers who admire this mechanism believe that “there can be
no culture without guilt” (Rieff 1972: 68). Consequently, they see an urgent need
for “masters of the knowledge of guilt” (33) who can bring back the order of fear
through moral control, and they ask: “Who are to be our truth-tellers—better say,
our guilt-provokers?” (69).
16. “In a letter Horkheimer wrote to [Leo] Lowenthal on July 5, 1946, he talked
of the mistrust the peasant had of the urban manipulator of language, which he
called partly justified. ‘This distrust,’ Horkheimer continued, ‘is an element of anti-
Semitism itself, and the Jew who manipulates language so easily is not free from
guilt in the prehistory of what you explain as the fascist handling of language. Here,
too, the Jew is the pioneer of capitalism’ (Lowenthal collection, Berkeley, Califor-
nia)” (Jay 1980: 146).
17. Compare this point (which alludes to Abraham and Jesus) to another state-
ment: “The mythic compulsiveness of the word in prehistory is perpetuated in the
disaster which the enlightened word draws down upon itself. Udeis, who compul-
sively acknowledges himself to be Odysseus, already bears the characteristics of the
Jew who, fearing death, still presumes on the superiority which originates in the fear
of death; revenge on the middleman occurs not only at the end of bourgeois society,
but—as the negative utopia to which every form of coercive power always tends—at
its beginning” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972: 69).
18. “Adorno’s much quoted remark made shortly before his death in 1969, that
‘when I made my theoretical model, I could not have guessed that people would try
to realize it with Molotov cocktails’” (Jay 1973: 279), best illustrates the political
resignation in the face of barbarism which the Frankfurt School first adopted in the
Dialectic.
19. Ahasverus was often called in medieval legend the “wicked Jew.” A study of
the agitator devotes a chapter to “The Enemy as Jew” which lists features of the
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stereotype: “The Jews are conceived as living by their wits and avoiding physical
work. They achieve their goals by means of intellectual machinations, Stock Ex-
change manipulations, or revolutionary propaganda, but they never seem to toil in
the sweat of their brows” (Lowenthal and Guterman 1949: 85). This “resentment
against the Jews as wielders of intellectual power” (84) is often combined with
anti-intellectualism: “Domination by intellect is experienced as usurpation because
it is not backed by actual physical power and ultimately it depends on the consent
of the dominated or on deception. Consistently depicted as over-sophisticated,
practicing debauch, enjoying forbidden things, tempting the suckers by futile en-
tertainment and pursuing destructive aims, the modern intellectual, as the agitator
sees him, is a secular variation of the devil” (85). It is the same alarmist rhetoric
that, inverting here Hegel’s notion of “the cunning of reason,” warns against the
Homeric temptations of knowledge and pleasure. (Incidentally, Lowenthal is cred-
ited in the Dialectic as the co-author of the first three of the seven sections of its last
chapter, “Elements of Anti-Semitism.”) On the other hand, writers who believe in
“innate intellectuality” (Lowenthal and Guterman) have made appeals to “our Jew-
ish cunning” (Bloom).
20. From a comparable perspective, in the short essay “Helen’s Exile” (1948),
Albert Camus writes: “We have exiled beauty; the Greeks took up arms for her”
(Camus 1955: 134). And later he explains: “The historical spirit and the artist both
want to remake the world. But the artist, through an obligation to his nature, knows
his limits, which the historical spirit fails to recognize. This is why the latter’s aim
is tyranny whereas the former’s passion is freedom. All those who are struggling for
freedom today are ultimately fighting for beauty” (137).
21. The critique of instrumental reason is often attributed to Jewish thought:
“But where does the ethical passion against instrumentality derive from? From the
Enlightenment? No, it is older than the Enlightenment. From ‘humanism’? No, it
is older than humanism. The ethical passion against instrumentality—intrinsicness,
‘personhood’—derives from the beginning of Jewish civilization. We will find it in
the first sentence of Chapter Five of the Book of Genesis: The human being is made
in the likeness of the Creator” (Ozick 1984: 8).
22. Max Brod, Kafka’s first editor after his death in 1924, takes a similar position
from a Zionist perspective. After mentioning the ridicule of Greek deities in the
operettas of Jacques Offenbach (1819–80), he notes: “This is a typically Jewish
criticism of the prolongation of visible ethics into invisible ones. This became quite
clear to me when, in 1915, I gave lectures on ancient literature at a school for Jewish
refugees from Eastern Europe in Prague. I must admit that it was only on that
occasion that I began to understand the historical fight of Judaism with Hellenism
(Maccabees) and the permanent difference between the two worlds of civilization”
(Brod 1970: 241). The problem with Greek thought is that it takes the material
world as something natural and primary. “Paganism in all its forms is the attempt
to construct the supernatural world upon the visible one by way of induction”
(241). To this, Brod contrasts “the boldness with which the Jews connected an
entirely ungraspable meaning of the world with their God, and from there
they derived the world in a deductive way” (241). Greek materialism, however, is
far from extinct. “Paganism is not an historical type. We are in the midst of pagan-
ism right now, with additional Christian ingredients. The following trends in
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modern thinking are mainly emanations of a prevailing paganism: evolution, bio-
logical-scientific Weltanschauung, monism, the Marxist theory of socialism, his-
toricism” (245). The world is dominated by a pagan-Christian “amalgamation”
and “collaboration.” Brod traces the history of the unholy pact, which is “the his-
tory of the Caucasian mankind” (252), to Renaissance Hellenism and capitalism.
Thus his accusation against Christianity is one of complicity only. The original sin
was what he, like Lukács and Auerbach, defined as the Homeric “flight to the sur-
face of the world” (243). Other students of paganism have felt that the West has
inherited two very different traditions, the dominant Christian-Kantian and the
pagan one (Casey 1990): although realistic, pragmatic thought belongs to the latter,
the dominant view does not allow people to recognize it because faith prevails over
ethics.
23. In a letter published in the editorial column of the New York Times (national
edition) under the rubric “Letter: On Society” and the title “Light of Hope in Face
of Decadence,” a rabbi worries about “decay and decline” and concludes that “we
are decadent. Youth and body and indulgence. What if this is the Hellenization of
America? What comes next? . . . We have a holiday that celebrates a triumph over
Hellenism. The Jews are ready to share this victory. The holiday is Hanukkah and its
lights have lasted a long time, more than two thousand years. Have hope” (Turetsky
1990: 14). The historical event commemorated in this holiday, the Jewish revolt
against Hellenization, has also inspired different feelings: “A great opportunity pre-
sented itself to mankind when Judaism and Hellenism met—an opportunity which
unfortunately was not seized in its entirety. Had these two worlds interpenetrated
each other peacefully, an ideal pattern for man’s living might have been created.
This would have preserved the intellectual alertness and aesthetic sensitivity of
Hellenism in synthesis with the Hebraic religious outlook and ethical values. Such
a fusion would have abstracted the virtues of both cultures and enabled them to
supplement each other. Mankind still entertains the hope that the time may yet
come when Hebraic faith and ethics will be harmoniously fused with Hellenistic
science, philosophy, and art, into a pattern of living richer than either alone” (Stein-
berg 1937: 15).
24. “The reconciliation of civilization with nature, which Christianity tried pre-
maturely to contrive by means of its doctrine of the crucified god, remained as alien
to Judaism as to the rigorism of the Enlightenment” (Horkheimer and Adorno
1972: 114). The authors seek a higher form of harmony, since “Adorno is repeatedly
forced by systematic considerations to take seriously the idea of reconciliation. This
Adorno cannot escape” (Habermas 1983: 108). The overcoming of division and
dejection is a major theme in the Romantic lyric where “the ancient struggle for the
blessedness of reconciliation with an alienated God becomes the attempt to recover
in maturity an earlier stage of integrity with oneself and the outer world” (Abrams
1971: 123) through aesthetic reflection.
25. Adorno’s minimalist ethics, which draws on “the genuinely theological con-
ception of the melancholic” (Benjamin 1977: 155), is a vivid illustration of the
“need on the part of the ‘bourgeois’ theorist to participate in the historical guilt of
not having been one of the victims” (Blumenberg 1983: 118).
26. Structuralist exegesis has traced the silence of God from the Bible to
Auschwitz (Neher 1981).
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27. The ineffectiveness of Edmund Husserl’s moral commitment to “theory as
the initial act of European humanity and as a corrective for its most terrible devia-
tion” (Blumenberg 1983: 236) was uppermost in Adorno’s concern with the future
of civilization.
28. The same development may be observed in criticism: “The antecedents of
heterocosmic theory emerged in critics of literature who, beginning in the late
fifteenth century, reversed the traditional comparison of God the creator to a
human artisan by making the portentous comparison of the literary artisan to God
the creator. . . . In the sixteenth century the partial parallel between the poet’s
making and God’s creating, with the corollary parallel between God’s created world
and the poem as ‘an other nature’ or ‘a second world,’ occurred frequently enough
to be almost a standard topos in literary criticism” (Abrams 1989a: 172).
29. From a Hebraic perspective, this account has been criticized for failing to
discuss “the radical creativity of the God of Genesis or Job. [Blumenberg] charac-
terizes originary activity solely with references to Hellenistic and Patristic sources
such as Philo and Irenaeus” (Luft 1987: 24).
30. It is ironic that some commentators have seen the two followers of the Greek
king in the same way that others portray Auerbach in Istanbul as Odysseus: “With
the image of Odysseus whose impotence is documented in the fact that, being tied
to the mast, he is only able to nod his head, Horkheimer and Adorno demonstrate
the impotence of the intellectual, of their work in their own period, their position.
Did they hear the song of the Sirens, the call to revolution, when they were on their
way in the 1930s? In any case, at the time of writing the Dialectic of Enlightenment
they had to experience their return politically as well as philosophically as the story
of a refusal, as allegory” (van Reijen 1988: 426–27). They returned to West Ger-
many in 1950.
31. Taste and public reinforced each other. “Actually this is what I would call
classicism: a situation in which an author can write while putting himself at the
same time in the position of a reader, being able to substitute himself for his own
reader, and to judge and sort out what he has accomplished from the point of view
of the reader that he also is. The writer knows the solicitation that is addressed to
him; he shares it in his capacity as reader; he answers it in his capacity as writer.
Whereas in what we call modernity, he no longer knows for whom he writes, since
there no longer is any taste” (Lyotard and Thébaud 1985: 9).
32. “The virtuoso vogue in the seventeenth century . . . had all along been
‘strongly class-conscious,’ flaunting a leisure-time avocation free of material and
utilitarian ends as a sign of social rank unachievable by what a number of virtuosi
. . . had called ‘the vulgar’ and requiring a cultivated knowledge and taste that serves
to distinguish the ‘polite’ class from social climbers. This defensiveness of the
landed upper classes against interlopers from below is itself an index to the instabil-
ity of the established class structure in England, in an era of new wealth acquired by
flourishing commercial and manufacturing enterprises” (Abrams 1989: 144).
33. Thus the aesthetic became a quality first of an attitude and then of an object.
“It is worth reminding ourselves that in traditional thought, moral edification,
‘truth,’ or the dignity of the ‘real life’ model ‘imitated’ in the work, legislate for the
value of the art-object. That the work is autonomous and unique, and that it there-
fore defies such extra-aesthetic criteria, is an idea which comes into prominence
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only after the concept of ‘disinterestedness’ has established itself. For it is just in its
relation to disinterested perception that the work is autonomous—because it is
attended to for its own sake—and unique—because such perception dwells upon
and relishes its qualitative individuality” (Stolnitz 1961: 99).
34. “The aesthetic disposition, a generalized capacity to neutralize ordinary ur-
gencies and to bracket off practical ends, a durable inclination and aptitude for
practice without a practical function, can only be constituted within an experience
of the world freed from urgency and through the practice of activities which are an
end in themselves, such as scholastic exercises or the contemplation of works of art.
In other words, it presupposes the distance from the world . . . which is the basis of
the bourgeois experience of the world” (Bourdieu 1984: 54).
35. The situation deeply worried even writers who, since the advent of modern-
ism, were praised as heralds of artistic integrity. Hölderlin begins his “Remarks on
Oedipus” (1803) with a direct market consideration: “It will be good, in order to
secure for today’s poets a bourgeois existence—taking into account the difference
of times and institutions—if we elevate poetry today to the mechane [skill, craft] of
the ancients. When being compared with those of the Greeks, other works of art,
too, lack reliability; at least, they have been judged until today according to the
impressions which they made rather than according to their lawful calculation and
their other mode of operation through which the beautiful is engendered. Modern
poetry, however, lacks especially training and craftsmanship” and it is therefore “in
need of especially certain and characteristic principles and limits. Thereto, then,
belongs that lawful calculation” (Hölderlin 1988: 101). As he sees it, the problem is
to devise that calculable law that would give poetry reliability, the intrinsic impor-
tance necessary for the survival of the bourgeois poet.
36. Weber cited approvingly the view of Albert Ritschl, in his History of Pietism
(1880–86), that “the purely emotional form of Pietism is . . . a religious dilettantism
for the leisure classes” (Weber 1976: 139). Feuerbach mocks this attitude in the
epigram “The Pietists in Rome and Athens”:
In order to display to us the pagan world in all its nakedness
They sit on the toilets of Rome and Athens
Demonstrating how once the foul heathen sh—
And how faith now releases us from all the needs of nature.
(Feuerbach 1980: 190)
37. “As the ancient peoples have experienced their pre-history in imagination, in
mythology, so we Germans have experienced our future history in thought, in phi-
losophy. We are philosophical contemporaries without being historical ones. Ger-
man philosophy is the ideal prolongation of German history. So if, instead of criti-
cizing the incomplete works of our real history, we criticize the posthumous works
of our ideal history, philosophy, then our criticism will be at the centre of the
question of which the present age says: that is the question. What in developed
peoples is the practical conflict with the modern state institutions, in Germany,
where these institutions do not even exist, it is a critical conflict with the philosoph-
ical reflection of these institutions” (Marx 1971: 120–21).
38. This ideal is best expressed in the “terrorism of pure theory” advocated by
Bruno Bauer in the 1840s. “ ‘The true and pure critic,’ [Bauer] wrote, ‘never puts his
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hand to anything.’ His task is to struggle for the consistency of our ideals and to op-
pose all attempts to compromise their immaculate purity by realising them into ac-
tion. ‘The ideal is already realised in itself. Its reality consists in being an ideal in and
for itself. It is the only reality which can exist in the realm of thought. The ideal is
thought and as such first elevates things to their true reality’ ” (Hook 1962: 95–96).
39. The ideal of critique was rapturously celebrated: “At the same time, I noted
with sincere pleasure the progress of our country—not to speak of our age! The
same age in which we too have the honor to live; the age that, to wrap it all up in a
word, deserves the humble but highly suggestive name of the Critical Age, so that
soon now everything is going to be criticized, except the age itself, and everything
is going to become more and more critical, and artists can already begin to cherish
the just hope that humanity will at last rise up in a mass and learn to read” (Schlegel
1971: 261).
40. “The great schism between understanding and not understanding will grow
more and more widespread, intense, and distinct. Much hidden incomprehension
will still erupt. But understanding too will reveal its omnipotence: understanding
that ennobles disposition into character, elevates talent into genius, purifies one’s
feelings and artistic perceptions. Understanding itself will be understood, and peo-
ple will at last see and admit that everyone can achieve the highest degree and that
up to now humanity has been neither malicious nor stupid but simply clumsy and
new” (Schlegel 1971: 269).
41. The character of Western colonialism is closely linked with the autopathic
“self-consciousness of consciousness” (Collins 1989): “Western culture was the first
to critically reflect upon itself (beginning in the 18th century). But the effect of this
crisis was that it reflected on itself also as a culture in the universal, and thus all
other cultures were entered in its museum as vestiges of its own image. It ‘estheti-
cized’ them, reinterpreted them on its own model, and thus precluded the radical
interrogation these ‘different’ cultures implied for it” (Baudrillard 1975: 88–89).
42. On the Bildungsroman (and the overlapping Erziehungsroman, Entwick-
lungsroman, and Künstlerroman), see Alden 1986; Bakhtin 1986; Beddow 1982;
Bruford 1975; Buckley 1974; Lemon 1985; Moretti 1988; Swales 1978; and also
Herbert Marcuse’s dissertation (1978). For feminist studies, see Abel, Hirsch, and
Langland 1983; and Labovitz 1987. For approaches based on questions of identity,
see Ratz 1988; and Sax 1987. Important philosophical background is provided in
Gadamer 1979: 10–19; and Smith 1988.
43. Among the studies on Antonio Gramsci (Selections from Cultural Writings,
1985) which pay more attention to his notion of hegemony are Adamson 1980;
Bocock 1986; Femia 1981; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Lears 1985; and Rustin 1988.
44. J. G. Hamann’s early short essay “The Merchant” provides a good picture of
the Enlightenment interest in creating a public sphere and of the bourgeois search
for Bildung, distinction, and rank. It is a defense of commerce as not just an occupa-
tion but a “calling,” and therefore an important social position: “Men knew for-
merly very little of the principles of trade. It was pursued rudely, and was so much
condemned, as to be left almost entirely to the Jews. Now, on the other hand, men
have with much sagacity aimed to make a science of commerce” (Hamann 1856:
122). His concern is the need for “forming the merchant” (123), “the true noble-
man of our age” (Merlan 1948: 382), through cultivation: “What happy changes
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 367
may not the world promise itself from the commercial spirit, now beginning to
prevail, if it should be purified by insight and noble impulses?” (Hamann 1856:
122). He finds in its carrier nobility and virtue, and hopes that, if more respect is
shown to his class, through rewards and privileges, the merchant will become a
model for all.
45. Although very common in romantic music, the theme of wandering, as the
artistic expression of alienation, has found its best medium in that ultimate expres-
sion of the unfulfilled self, the German lied. See especially song cycles from Franz
Schubert’s Die Winterreise, D. 911 (1827) to Gustav Mahler’s Songs of a Wayfarer
(1883). Opera, too, is full of characters wandering into monologues of self-exile.
46. Hamann’s self-discovery, which turned a trip to London (1758) into a literary
voyage, is the exemplary (in both artistic and philosophical terms) Bildung narra-
tive. Its negative model, which Hamann appropriates for literary autobiography, is
the journey to England in 1741 of the young Dozent Johann David Michaelis (1717–
91), who later became an eminent Higher Critic. “Michaelis, as a result of the visit
to England, was able to disabuse himself of the notion of supernatural grace as
working in human life; Hamann, on the other hand, as a result of his visit to En-
gland some seventeen years later, was convinced of the overpowering work of super-
natural grace in human life” (O’Flaherty 1950: 177). Hamann’s narrative reminds
us that, long before Wagner’s Flying Dutchman (1843), the journey of cultivation
was often undertaken as a business assignment (by, say, a merchant like Hamann),
and was only later allegorized into an artistic illumination. The universal destiny of
art as an allegory for the international destination of capital has received very lim-
ited attention. Other legendary conversions include that of Lukács to Marxism in
1919 and Simone Weil’s mystical experience of union with Christ in 1938.
47. Schiller found the capitalist division of labor an obstacle to culture: “ ‘The
mental state of most men is, on the one hand, fatiguing and exhausting work and,
on the other, debilitating pleasure.’ And Schiller sees . . . two dangers for poetry
arising out of this social situation: the view that art exists only to provide pleasure
and relaxation, and the view that it should serve only to ennoble mankind morally.
Schiller recognizes that both these elements contain a kernel of justification. But at
the same time he recognizes that the way in which they become operative in the
modern age can only lead to the deterioration of poetry and literary culture”
(Lukács 1978a: 134).
48. In the journeys narrated in the Romantic Bildungsreisen “the crisis, both of
history and of the poet’s inner life, is the French Revolution and its aftermath. This
crisis is resolved on the higher level of comprehensive and unillusioned awareness
which is the correlative, whether in a developed culture or a mature consciousness,
to the extended prospect from the mountain height to which the traveler, despite
the ever wilder and more terrifying terrain, has won his way” (Abrams 1978a: 134).
49. On the high-low culture distinction, see Gans 1974; Hawkins 1990; Levine
1988; MacCabe 1986; and Miles 1987.
50. On leisure, see Bailey 1987; Coalter 1988; Cunningham 1980; Linder 1970;
MacCannell 1975; Rojek 1989; Seabrook 1988; Veblen 1899; and Winnifrith and
Barrett 1989. For a critique of Veblen pertinent to this discussion, see Adorno 1941.
51. Thus Bildung appears superior to Kultur, which becomes one of its provinces:
“ ‘But if in our language we say Bildung, we mean something both higher and more
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inward, namely the attitude of mind which, from the knowledge and the feeling of
the total intellectual and moral endeavor, flows harmoniously into sensibility and
character’ (Wilhelm von Humboldt). Bildung here no longer means ‘culture,’ i.e.,
the development of capacities or talents. The rise of the word Bildung calls rather
on the ancient mystical tradition, according to which man carries in his soul the
image of God after whom he is fashioned and must cultivate it in himself. The Latin
equivalent for Bildung is formatio, and accordingly in other languages, e.g., in En-
glish (Shaftesbury), ‘form’ and ‘formation.’ In German also the corresponding deri-
vations of the idea of forma, e.g., Formierung and Formation, have long vied with the
word Bildung” (Gadamer 1979: 11–12).
52. This may answer a question that has not lost its relevance: “through what
turn was German Philosophy able to make of Revolution the promise of a true and
good State, and of the State the serene and accomplished form of the Revolution?
All our submissions find their principle in this double inducement: make the Revo-
lution quick, it will give you the State you need; hurry up and make a State, it will
generously lavish on you the reasonable effects of the Revolution. Obliged to think
the Revolution, beginning and end, the German thinkers pinned it to the State, and
designed the State-Revolution, with all of its final solutions. Thus did the master-
thinkers implement an entire mental apparatus, the very one subtending the sys-
tems of domination and patterns of obedience of modern societies” (Michel Fou-
cault, quoted in Mehlman 1983: 18).
53. At the beginning of Joyce’s Ulysses, tempted by Buck Mulligan’s exclamation
(“Ah, Dedalus, the Greeks!”) and exhortation (“God, Kinch, if you and I could only
work together we might do something for the island. Hellenise it”), Stephen thinks
to himself: “To ourselves . . . new paganism . . . omphalos.” The idea had already
been suggested by Yeats and Wilde. “Joyce’s compatriot, Oscar Wilde, had urged
‘a new hellenism,’ and in his early critical writing Joyce spoke with only the faintest
irony of Ireland’s becoming ‘the hellas of the north’” (Ellmann 1977: 581).
54. “The contrast between vanished Hellas, which must be renewed in a revo-
lutionary manner, and the miserable condition of contemporary Germany con-
stitutes the constant, though always variously recurring, content of [Hölderlin’s]
lament. . . . It is the complaint of the best bourgeois intellectuals over the loss of the
revolutionary ‘illusions’ of the heroic period of their own class” (Lukács 1978b:
152). The Jacobin poet celebrated the Greek unity of nature and culture in order to
contrast “the vanished democratic public character of life” (149) with modern real-
ity and appeal to action. Nevertheless, although he abandoned the “New Letters on
the Aesthetic Education of Man,” which he considered writing in 1796 in order to
move “from philosophy to poetry and religion” (Hölderlin 1988: 132), and instead
composed Hyperion (1797–99), the long, passionate letter which closes Part One of
the novel shows that aesthetic concerns never lost their primacy.
55. “What is the basis of a partial, purely political revolution? It is that a part of
civil society emancipates itself and attains to universal domination, that a particular
class undertakes the general emancipation of society from its particular situation.
This class frees the whole of society, but only under the presupposition that the
whole of society is in the same situation as this class, that it possesses, or can easily
acquire for example, money and education. No class in civil society can play this role
without arousing a moment of enthusiam in itself and among the masses. It is a
moment when the class fraternizes with society in general and dissolves itself into
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society; it is identified with society and is felt and recognized as society’s general
representative. Its claims and rights are truly the claims and rights of society itself
of which it is the real social head and heart” (Marx 1971: 125).
56. “It may be more to the purpose to note that this intellectual pre-eminence
of the Jews has come into bearing within the gentile community of peoples, not
from the outside; that the men who have been its bearers have been men immersed
in this gentile culture in which they have played their part of guidance and incite-
ment, not bearers of a compelling message from afar or proselyters of enlighten-
ment conjuring with a ready formula worked out in the ghetto and carried over into
the gentile community for its mental regeneration” (Veblen 1964: 223–24).
57. The precious, romantic friendship of Jew and Gentile, modeled on that be-
tween Mendelssohn and Lessing, is a common biographical topos. Suffice to men-
tion here Marx and Engels, Hofmannsthal and Strauss, Benjamin and Brecht, or
Derrida and de Man.
58. The convergence of views expressed in the responses of Mendelssohn and
Kant to the question “What is Enlightenment?” has often been noted: “With the
two texts published [in 1784] in the Berlinische Monatschrift, the German
Aufklärung and the Jewish Haskala recognize that they belong to the same history;
they are seeking to identify the common processes from which they stem. And it is
perhaps a way of announcing the acceptance of a common destiny—we know to
what drama that was to lead” (Foucault 1984: 33).
59. Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–64), aspiring to Hegelianize Judaism, writes in a
letter of 1843: “The dilemma I have defined is therefore a double one, and is,
briefly, this: The Talmud must be rejected, the restoration of Mosaism cannot be
thought of; what will you set up, then, as positive articles of faith? . . . Moreover, it
is not yet possible to come out frankly with the true and full contents of our knowl-
edge and thinking. At the same time, however, care must be taken not to lag too far
behind the achievements of German science” (quoted in Silberner 1952–53: 161).
His suggestion, though, is not one of rejection: “[I]t might be most advisable to
preserve the development of Mosaism, so far as this development can hold its own
before the critical forum of reason. It might perhaps be best to retain the interpreta-
tion of the Talmud, so far as this interpretation can hold its own before the forum
of sound reason. This would at least give infinitely great latitude” (162). This posi-
tion has been called elsewhere “Hebrew dualism” and has been defined as “the
tendency to expand and its opposite, to contract” (Bialik 1961: 19).
60. “It is no accident that the Goethe cult at the start of the nineteenth century
was created in the salon of Rachel Varnhagen, for it is certain that no one else strove
with such intensity to live in accord with the model of Wilhelm Meister, who un-
derstood the ‘cultivation of personality’ so peculiarly and so deceptively as an assim-
ilation of the bourgeois to the nobleman, as did those Jews who were also called
‘exceptional Jews of culture’” (Habermas 1983b: 32). Taking Goethe as a great
leader, they “found in Germany’s hero Judaism’s white knight. . . . In short, he was
the model for German Jewish nationalism” (Bolkosky 1975: 141). This choice had
no inherent justification. Although he studied Hebrew and Yiddish, Goethe’s
“whole interest in the Jews was no more than an intellectual curiosity” (Rose 1964:
179). His preference was probably more Hellenic, since he declared “to Böttiger in
1795 that humanity would have taken a healthier turn if Homer had been its Bible
instead of the Scriptures” (164).
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61. A similar pattern has been noticed in the ascendancy of American Jews:
“They wanted the full privileges and opportunities of the middle-class society into
which, unlike the major immigrant groups, they moved en masse” (John Higham,
quoted in Aaron 1965: 33). Their background was also relevant: “The Jews who
were actually welcomed by Puritan nations, especially the Americans, were not
pious Orthodox Jews but rather Reformed Jews who had abandoned orthodoxy,
Jews such as those of the present time who have been trained in the Educational
Alliance, and finally baptized Jews” (Weber 1963: 261). For a microscopic study,
see Kanfer 1989.
62. This achievement, associated with the so-called “Jewish mystique” (van den
Haag 1969), has been celebrated with unabashed triumphalism. The cultural critic
Moritz Goldstein wrote in the essay “German-Jewish Parnassus” (1912): “Suddenly
Jews are to be found in all the positions from which they are not deliberately ex-
cluded; they have made the tasks of the Germans their own; German cultural life
seems to pass increasingly into Jewish hands. This, however, the Christians had
neither foreseen nor intended when they granted the Pariahs in their midst a stake
in European civilization. They began to resist, again they began to call us foreigners,
to consider us dangerous in the temple of their civilization. And now we are con-
fronted with the problem: We Jews are administering the spiritual property of a
nation which denies our right and our ability to do so” (quoted in Goldstein 1957:
237). Claims in the same spirit remain common: “In literature, in the mass media,
in drama and music, in certain branches of the mathematical and physical sciences,
the American Jew holds a commanding position. It is the gentile who has to break
in” (Steiner 1964: 18).
63. For a despicable example of socialist anti-Semitism, which identifies capital-
ism with the Jews, see Rizzi 1985–86. The most systematic critique of modernity
from a left anticapitalist anti-Semitic viewpoint is La France juive (1886, 2 vols.) by
Edouard Drumont (1844–1917).
64. There have been different explanations of the phenomenon: “But the more
eminent a modern Jew is, the less Jewish he becomes, the less is he usually con-
cerned with Jewry, the less is he attached to Judaism. Our great men do not demon-
strate the greatness of our distinctive tradition, but rather reveal—by the success of
those who abandoned that tradition—its state of sheer exhaustion” (Polanyi 1943:
38).
65. “As they had turned to Lessing and Schiller to examine their enlightened
attitudes, German Jews anxious to display their nationalism and national allegiance
turned to identification with Herder, Humboldt, Fichte, and again Goethe. . . . The
words that described Goethe and Herder were the same as those that described the
Old Testament and Old Testament prophets” (Bolkosky 1975: 139).
66. “By one of the cruel, deep ironies of history, the concept of a chosen people,
of a nation exalted above others, was born in Israel. In the vocabulary of Hitler there
is a vengeful parody of the Judaic claim. The theological motif of a people elected
at Sinai is echoed in the pretense of the master race. Thus there was in the obsessed
relation of Nazi to Jew a minute but fearful grain of logic. Torturer and victim had
chosen each other as they have chosen themselves” (Steiner 1964: 22).
67. The same position was also adopted by the young Walter Benjamin who,
“barely out of school at the age of twenty, rejoiced in his newly discovered Jewish
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identity. Jewish intellectuals, he wrote in 1912, provide the principal support and
dynamic for true culture, which in this case included not only literature and art but
also socialism and the women’s emancipation movement. Among Jewish intellectu-
als, he continued, writers were in the vanguard of change; here the otherwise much
maligned Literatenjuden—Jews as men of letters—took a central role in creating
alternatives to the existing order. Jewishness became a metaphor for the critical
mind and for Bildung; it is through the study of Goethe, he repeats, that the nature
of Jewishness is fully revealed. This definition of Jewishness summarized in an al-
most uncanny manner the Jewish substance . . . not as an idealization of bourgeois
society but as an alternative to the present” (Mosse 1985: 66).
68. The same holds true for painters’ views, like a manifesto (Kitaj 1989) where
the geopolitical reality of the diaspora is reduced to an artistic mode, “Diasporism,”
and its misreadings.
69. “Generally speaking, it is clear that the producers of the Romantic anti-capi-
talist worldview are certain traditional sectors of the intelligentsia, whose culture
and way of life are hostile to bourgeois industrial civilization: independent writers,
ecclesiastics or theologians . . . , poets and artists, academic mandarins, etc.” (Sayre
and Löwy 1984: 90).
70. In a discussion of protests by student activists, the old Adorno still affirmed
the superiority of art: “When the political avant-garde disrupts events of the artistic
avant-garde, the result is confusion writ large: neither the belief that disruption is
revolutionary nor the related belief that revolution is a thing of artistic beauty holds
any water. Artlessness is not above art but below it; and commitment is frequently
no more than lack of talent or of adaptation, in any event a weakening of subjective
strength” (Adorno 1984: 355–56).
71. References to ancient philosophy, religion, or democracy recur in modern
definitions of Judaism. A discussion of the two founding traditions of Western high
culture, which compares Hebrew “narrative monotheism” and Greek secular litera-
ture, asserts in its introduction: “If Western civilization is looked upon as a product
of the interaction of Judaic and Hellenic elements, then ‘culture’ as we know it is
given to us by the Greeks. Because the secular perspective of modern society derives
rather from the Greek than from the Judaic side of its heritage, the ‘anticultural,’
iconoclastic component of this heritage tends to go unnoticed, and indeed to be
repressed. The Greek contribution to modernity scarcely needs elucidation. The
state, authoritarian or democratic, the generalized international exchange-system,
science and its technological by-products, as well as the arts and ‘humanities,’ all
have clearly visible Greek antecedents. The Judaic side seems scarcely visible; one
might wonder what this Middle Eastern tribe has contributed to the greatness of
Western civilization” (Gans 1985: 1). The principle of the aesthetic is here, as
always, indispensable for an answer to this last question: “It is not through perver-
sion of its spirit that Western cultural reflection has maintained its gaze fixed on its
Greek more than its Hebrew ancestry. The moral imperative may be our greatest
cultural force, and its formulation our greatest achievement, but in its purity it
cannot be realized as a positive ethic. In the concrete social context, only esthetic
culture permits us to construct an imaginary universe of reciprocal relations. It is
through the estheticization of social interaction that modern society offers the only
possible path to the realization of the moral imperative” (187–88).
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72. Feuerbach began his “Theses for the Reform of Philosophy” (1843) as fol-
lows: “The secret of theology is anthropology, but the secret of speculative philoso-
phy is theology.” The importance of this kind of approach for German philosophy
is crucial. “As far as Germany is concerned, the criticism of religion is essentially
complete, and the criticism of religion is the presupposition of all criticism” (Marx
1971: 115). To put this maxim differently, all critique, from the Idealists to the
Poststructuralists, presupposes and requires a critical involvement with religion.
73. Marx’s choice is remarkable in light of his impressive familiarity with Greek
thought (he wrote his doctoral thesis in 1841 on the atomic theories of Democritus
and Epicurus) and the parallels he saw between the post-Aristotelian and post-
Hegelian age. The romantic and idealist versions of the Hellenic, however, do not
seem to have a place in his materialist philosophy. His debt to Hebraic thought, on
the other hand, is a more ambiguous question: “Even Marx’s notorious ‘final solu-
tion,’ his wish to see the Jew absorbed into the anonymity of mankind, is only a
parodistic inversion of the prophetic image of a last gathering and confluence of all
men at the hour of redemption” (Steiner 1976: 67).
74. Bruno Bauer returned to the “Jewish question” many years later, in an entry
he published in the Political and Social Encyclopaedia on “The Jews as Aliens”
(1863). This time, he wished to erect a permanent barrier between Jews and Gen-
tiles by emphasizing their racial differences (Rotenstreich 1959). His position com-
manded little attention, as general discussions were influenced by very different
studies, like Rome and Jerusalem (1863) by Moses Hess.
75. There is an interesting contemporary parallel in the debate between two
French socialists in the pamphlet Les Juifs, rois de l’époque: histoire de la féodalité
financière (1845) by Alphonse Toussenel and Pierre Leroux’s article by the same
title (1846).
76. The persisting use of the “Jewish question” (which, we must always insist, is
as different from the situation of the actual, historical Jews as, say, Orientalism is
different from the condition of the Arabs) to ward off considerations of the political
became manifest again in the efforts of the German government to distance itself
from the recent past: “The reparations treaty [of 1953] was also a social contract
among Germans: the abandoned Nazi question was replaced by the new ‘consensus’
on the Jewish Question about which there could be no statute of limitations (this
was implicit) or public debate. . . . If the famous paragraph 131 permitted the re-
integration of former Nazis into the civil service, the reparations declaration sanc-
tioned the substitution of the Jewish Question for the Nazi question. . . . The rep-
arations settlement circumscribed the discourse of National Socialism within a
version of ‘metaphysical guilt’ in which the state assumed moral responsibility for
its legal predecessor. On the other hand, the antifascist concept of political respon-
sibility broadly defined . . . was exiled to West German literary culture” (Rabinbach
1988: 167). When a new socio-political contract was sought, the “Jewish question,”
a well-tested basis for civil society, was used as its covenant of atonement and resti-
tution. This time, it took the form of “Judaizing the memory of the Holocaust”
(181). Thus it became “a central fact of the postwar history of the Federal Republic
of Germany: every expansion of German political sovereignty has been accompa-
nied—at least subjectively—by a debate about the ‘Jewish Question.’ . . . Since
1945, the German Question and the Jewish Question have been inseparable” (192).
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77. For the advocates of emancipation, assimilation was indeed a question of
disinterested taste. “The problem of Diaspora in its most crucial essence is the
problem of aesthetics” (Ozick 1970: 273). This is absolutely true provided it stands
as a reminder of the aesthetic conditions of emancipation which turned it into a
successful apprenticeship in contemplation. To claim nevertheless that the “Ger-
man Final Solution was an aesthetic solution: it was a job of editing” (273), is to
take an aesthetic (that is, contemplative, disinterested, formalist, apolitical) view of
the catastrophe.
78. “The melancholy of the adult state arises from our dual, conflicting experi-
ence that, on the one hand, our absolute, youthful confidence in an inner voice has
diminished or died, and, on the other hand, that the outside world to which we now
devote ourselves in our desire to learn its ways and dominate it will never speak to
us in a voice that will clearly tell us our way and determine our goal” (Lukács 1971:
86).
79. There have been a few attempts to accept Sartre’s re-definition of the “Jew-
ish question” and give voice to the historical (as opposed to the aesthetic) moder-
nity of Jewishness. The result, however, has been to talk not about the Jew of anti-
Semitism but the “Catastrophe Jew” (Améry 1980: 25) and his anger at his fate,
rather than the “situations” that produced him: “Anti-Semitism and the Jewish
Question, as historical, socially determined conceptual phenomena, were not and
are not any concern of mine. They are entirely a matter for the anti-Semites, their
disgrace or their sickness. The anti-Semites have something to overcome, not I. I
would play into their unclean hands if I began investigating what share religious,
economic, or other factors have in the persecution of the Jews” (22–23). Like the
look at ethnic identity, the view from the existential predicament cannot produce
a program for change and often results in little more than cries of anguish to the
God who “suffers gusts of murderous exasperation toward the Jews, toward a people
who have made Him a party to history and to the brutish infirmity of man’s condi-
tion. . . . It may have been the Jew who caught Him by the skirt, demanding con-
tract and dialogue” (Steiner 1964: 17).
80. The accuracy of Weber’s evidence has often been challenged. An examina-
tion of capitalist development in the Dutch Republic, for example, concludes that
“trade and industry are not dependent on either the Protestant or the Catholic
religion, but on certain secular forces” (Hyma 1937: 161). Many critics find the
liberation from religious influence much more important: “Thus it was the spirit of
Erasmus, not of Calvin, which in the end set the tone of economic and cultural life
in Dutch society, which became the most capitalist nation of Europe. And it suc-
ceeded in this precisely in that it institutionalized the typically bourgeois separation
between business and religion” (Pellicani 1988: 72). In addition, most medieval
historians have argued that the capitalist spirit already existed in the European city
of the Low Middle Ages.
81. They included works like Tomas Masaryk’s The Social Question (1898),
Georg Simmel’s The Philosophy of Money (1900), Sigmund Freud’s The Interpreta-
tion of Dreams (1900), Edmund Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (1900, vol. I), Fritz
Mauthner’s Contributions toward a Critique of Language (1901–2), Benedetto
Croce’s Estetica come scienza dell’espressione e linguistica generale (1902), Som-
bart’s Das moderne Kapitalismus (1902), Otto Weininger’s Sex and Character
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(1902), Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904–5), Hein-
rich Rickert’s The Problem of the Philosophy of History (1905), Ernst Troeltsch’s
Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit (1906), Henri Bergson’s
L’évolution créatrice (1907), William James’ Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old
Ways of Thinking (1907), Friedrich Meinecke’s Cosmopolitanism and the National
State (1908), Georges Sorel’s Réflexions sur la violence (1908), Lenin’s Materialism
and Empirical Criticism (1909), and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s The Mental Functions of
the Inferior Societies (1910). Ferdinand de Saussure, Émile Durkheim, Jean Jaurès,
and Theodor Herzl also belonged to the same generation.
82. In a rare Hebraic appropriation, mythology has also been attributed to great
Jewish thought (from Marx, Freud, and Durkheim to Wittgenstein, Lévi-Strauss,
and Chomsky), where “the mythological element—in the true sense of the word,
meaning an articulate, imaged, self-consistent narrative diagnosis of the origins and
shapes of human experience—is paramount” (Steiner 1976:74).
83. Others have asked: “Did the Greeks believe in their myths?” (Veyne 1988).
Some formulations of the same question admit to sheer exasperation: “Why the
unbroken authority of Greek myths over the imagination of the West? Why should
a handful of Greek myths, that of Antigone among them, recur in the art and
thought of the twentieth century to an almost obsessive degree? Why is there no
end to Oedipus, to Prometheus, to Orestes, to Narcissus, no laying to rest in archae-
ology?” (Steiner 1984: 300).
84. The long evolution of this idea has led to accommodating positions like the
following: “Homer and the Bible, literature and sacred history, sum up better than
anything else the complementary contribution of Greek and Jew to Western civili-
zation. . . . The biblical text is designed to inspire fear of God, that is, respect for
ethical constraints. The Homeric text contents itself with inspiring a love for the
text itself, or more precisely, for its position of hearer subordinated to the reciting
Subject” (Gans 1985: 7).
85. “Lowth thus places the Bible beyond rationalist disintegration and urges a
view that could immediately be transferred to any other early sacred scripture or
mythology. Lowth’s influence was considerable: in Germany his approach
influenced Herder and led to an affirmation of mythical thought and experience
that claimed, in essence, that religious truth expresses itself in early noble ages as
poetry and myth, which cannot be reduced or explained away but which must be
accepted as valid. Myth thus becomes the essential expression of religious truth. . . .
Blackwell urged that Homeric myth be taken seriously as Greek wisdom and reli-
gion. Lowth urged that the Bible should be approached as poetry. The effect of
these two ideas, together with the general climate of preromantic interest in myth,
was a tendency, beginning in the late eighteenth century and manifest in most of
the romantic poets, to raise mythic truth to the level of religious truth and to regard
both as the natural province of the highest poetry” (Richardson 1978: 27–28).
86. “The Zionist movement would be a kind of Gesamtkunstwerk of the new
politics. Herzl sensed this when he said, ‘Moses’ exodus would compare [to mine]
like a Shrove Tuesday Singspiel of Hans Sachs to a Wagnerian opera’ ” (Schorske
1980: 163).
87. From a comparably religious view but without any confidence in the Hel-
lenic, Adorno revises this position by endowing the historicity of Hebraic art with
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the ability to redeem myth, and argues that “what constitutes the redemptive as-
pect of art is the act through which spirit discards itself in art. Art remains loyal to
shudder not by reverting to it, but by preserving its legacy. The spirit of works of art
produces shudder by externalizing itself in objects. Thus, art partakes of the course
of real empirical history in accordance with the general dynamic of enlightenment,
which is that, owing to the self-reflection of genius, elements of reality enter into
the imagination there to become conscious of their unreality. The historical evolu-
tion of art qua spiritualization is therefore not only a criticism of myth but also a
redemption of myth, because as the imagination recollects something it also re-
affirms its possibility” (Adorno 1984: 173).
88. Concern about the viability of dogma after Higher Criticism led another
theorist through a parallel path during the 1790s to a similar quest: “Coleridge’s two
major interests, Christian theology under the penetrating probes of Enlightenment
criticism, and a new poetry of the supernatural, met in the need for a modern
mythology” (Shaffer 1975: 32). It could be argued that this need was first answered,
albeit through a different synthesis, during the next decade in the classical land-
scapes of his contemporary, J. M. W. Turner (1775–1851).
89. In his discussion of the Idealist project of the system, Heidegger writes: “Like
many other words which have left their imprint on the realm of our human exis-
tence, whether directly or in translation, the word comes from the Greek. When we
state this, we are not just naming the original language of the word, but the people,
the creative force of that people which in its poets, thinkers, statesmen, and artists
brought about the greatest formative attack on the whole of Being which ever oc-
curred in Western history” (Heidegger 1985: 25).
90. In The Rights of Man (1791–92), Thomas Paine declared: “What Athens was
in miniature, America will be in magnitude. The one was the wonder of the ancient
world; the other is becoming the admiration and model of the present.”
91. Although the genealogy of the Hebraic-Hellenic opposition shows that the
former term has been consistently privileged over the latter, there has been no
scholarship exploring the phenomenon. Furthermore, research has concentrated
exclusively on anti-Semitism and phil-Hellenism. For example, while in a single
page of a book one may find a variety of words such as “anti-Judaism,” “anti-Semi-
tism,” “anti-Mosaism,” and “judeophobia” (Markish 1986: 6), no comparable vo-
cabulary exists for negative attitudes toward the Hellenic. If there has been only a
handful of books on philo-Semites and no study of Greek-haters, this is precisely
because these two attitudes are almost never acknowledged as existing and
influencing positions and policies. Hebreophilia and mis-Hellenism are the twin
ideologies that the post-Reformation world has most strongly repressed (cultivating
the impression that they are rather impossible) and can never admit, since their
function is cardinal to Western religious identity, the catholicism of civil rites.
92. The aversion of the cultural elite to politics had turned many intellectuals
against egalitarian ideals. In his Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man (1918), Mann
defended the “nonpolitical ethos” against democracy, which he equated with poli-
tics, while recognizing and honoring a German resistance against “Roman civiliza-
tion” and the “Roman West.” Anticipating many of Adorno’s positions, he also
advocated the integrity of art against politics, the superiority of the musical over the
verbal, and the purity of the mystical above the rational. A theory of myth is out-
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lined in Mann’s Doktor Faustus by the conservative scholar Dr. Chaim Breisacher.
It takes the form of an “anti-cultural” philosophy of culture which portrays civiliza-
tion as the decline from cult to culture. The figure of Breisacher is based on the
historian of mythology Oskar Goldberg, the author of The Reality of the Hebrews
(1925) and leader of a theosophic circle in Berlin with which Benjamin was in-
volved. Through a discussion of the Pentateuch, Breisacher proposes that a new age
of myth should follow the road of Socratic philosophy. “The coming mythical age
will be discovered by reason. Goldberg’s philosophy of myth presents a classical case
for the dialectic of reason that destroys itself ‘reasonably’ and calls for the magical
ritual of the mythical age to counteract the tyrannical rule of technology in our
civilization. . . . It speaks for the deep insight of Thomas Mann that he describes the
process of reason’s self-annihilation by analyzing Goldberg’s philosophy of myth”
(Taubes 1954: 391–92).
93. Here are a few more recent representative titles which indicate the unabated
interest in myth: Mythe et pensée chez les grecs (1966) by Jean-Pierre Vernant;
Mythe et épopée (1968) by Georges Dumezil; Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in
Ancient and Other Cultures (1970) by Geoffrey Kirk; Terror und Spiel: Probleme der
Mythenrezeption (1971), edited by M. Fuhrmann; Mythe et tragédie en Grèce an-
cienne (1972), edited by Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet; Mythe et société en
Grèce ancienne (1974) by Vernant; The Nature of Greek Myths (1975) by Kirk; Phi-
losophie und Mythos: Ein Kolloquium (1979), edited by H. Poser; The Best of the
Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry (1979) by Gregory Nagy;
Der kommende Gott: Vorlesungen über die neue Mythologie (1982) by Manfred
Frank; Mythos und Moderne: Begriff und Bild einer Rekonstruktion (1983), edited by
Karl Heinz Bohrer; Les Grecques sans miracle (1984) by Louis Gernet; Sacred Narra-
tive: Readings in the Theory of Myth (1984), edited by Alan Dundes; Faszination des
Mythos: Studien zu antiken und modernen Interpretationen (1985), edited by Renate
Schlesier; and Die Restauration der Götter (1986), edited by Richard Faber and
Renate Schlesier.
94. Starting with German Romantics like Friedrich Schlegel and Schelling, the
Dionysian has also been associated with the feminine. “ ‘Dionysian gyneocracy’
(rule by women) and ‘Apollonian paternity’ are the true opposing themes in
[Johann Jakob] Bachofen’s Matriarchal Rights (Das Mutterrecht) of 1861”
(Baeumer 1976: 187). Paglia 1990 sees the universe as the product of the tension
between two cosmic forces: the Apollonian (masculine, artistic, and logocentric)
and the Dionysian (feminine, natural, and pagan).
95. “That is why Germany, having discovered the oriental (mystical, enthusias-
tic, nocturnal, savage—natural) depths of Greece, regularly identified itself with
what one might, from an historico-political point of view, term its ‘Doric order’
(Hölderlin’s ‘Junonian,’ Nietzsche’s ‘Apollinian’: rigorous, circumscribed, solar—
technical). And it is obviously here that Rome, which received only that heritage . . .
becomes superimposed on the image, which was presented as intact, of Greece. The
inaugural gesture of National Socialism is no less Roman, for this reason, nor
Sparto-Roman, than the founding gestures of the French Revolution, the Consu-
late or the Napoleonic Empire” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1990: 74).
96. Marx expresses this aporia in his discussion of the arts in the Grundrisse
(1857–58): “It is well known that Greek mythology is not only the arsenal of Greek
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art but also its foundation. Is the view of nature and of social relations on which the
Greek imagination and hence Greek mythology is based possible with self-acting
mule spindles and railways and locomotives and electrical telegraphs? . . . But the
difficulty lies not in understanding that the Greek arts and epic are bound up with
certain forms of social development. The difficulty is that they still afford us artistic
pleasure and that in a certain respect they count as a norm and as an unattainable
model” (Tucker 1978: 245–46).
97. A rare example of the same doubling within the Hebraic is a suggestion by
“Bernard Lazare (1865–1903), who before his conversion to Zionism proposed a
metaphysical distinction between ‘Jews’ (bad) and ‘Israelites’ (good)” (Lichtheim
1968: 331).
98. In his book, Creuzer “presented the symbolism of the Ancients . . . as the
expression of a religious consciousness and a religious world view, rather than as the
invention of a free poetic imagination. The implication of Creuzer’s work, which
revived ideas mooted by Vossius (De theologia gentili, 1641) and Kircher (Oedipus
aegyptus, 1652), a century and a half before, was that there had been an original
religious consciousness, an original knowledge of the Divine, shared by all men and
corresponding to the original adamitic language. This original religion had subse-
quently been corrupted and fragmented into a thousand ‘pagan’ cults, just as the
original language had broken up, after Babel, into a thousand alien tongues. But to
the Christian mythologists it had been restored by Revelation” (Gossman 1986:
46–47).
99. “In keeping with his destruction of the Romantic picture of the world, Hein-
rich Heine also dissolves the tenuous Romantic unification of Christ with Dio-
nysus. . . . For Heine, the Dionysian has an exclusively negative connotation. Every
one of the late Romantic images of a terrifying Bacchus is brought forth by him for
the purpose of a biting satire on the classical German image of Greece. . . . The
ecstatic passion expressed by Bacchus in Heine’s works is more base sensuality than
anything else. Its function is not the Romantic rejuvenation and poeticization of
the world, rather the demythologization and the zestful destruction of the moral
and social order; not the ecstatic exaltation and deification of life, but rather an
anguished lust for life; not the unification of religion and poetry, antiquity, and
Christendom, rather their separation into mutually hostile camps. The synthesis
Dionysus-Christ is transposed to the antithesis Dionysian-Christian, which corre-
sponds to Heine’s antithetical formulation Hellenic-Nazarene. . . . Just as the Dio-
nysian topos, because of its ecstatic character, had become the appropriate form for
thought and expression for the early Romantics, so it is for Heine, writing at the
close of the Romantic period, the favorite topos of the period’s rapturous dissolu-
tion and destruction” (Baeumer 1976: 173–75).
100. Writers and artists have “sensed an affinity between Yahweh and Dionysus.
Like Dionysus, Yahweh can seize, tempt, and destroy; his theophanies can be fear-
ful and even horrifying. It is true that the O.T. is pervasively ethical in a way that
The Bacchae is not, and that Yahweh has an orderly and rational Apollonian side,
possibly connected with one of his other major names, Elohim” (Stock 1989: 52).
101. The most important works of the School were Prolegomena to the Study of
Greek Religion (1903) by Jane Harrison, From Religion to Philosophy (1912) by
Francis Cornford, Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion (1912) by
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Harrison, From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Specula-
tion (1912) by Cornford, The Origins of Attic Comedy (1913) by Cornford, Ancient
Art and Ritual (1913) by Harrison, Euripides and His Age (1914) by Gilbert Murray,
and Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion (1921) by Harrison.
102. In the notes for the last meeting of the seminar Warburg conducted at the
University of Hamburg, dedicated to a comparison between Burckhardt and
Nietzsche, he wrote: “Thus we suddenly see the influence of antiquity in both its
currents, the so-called Apollonian and Dionysian. What part does antiquity play in
the development of prophetic personalities? Agostino di Duccio and Nietzsche
stand on one side of the divide, the architects and Burckhardt on the other”
(quoted in Gombrich 1986: 258). “Structure versus line” was the abstract formula-
tion he gave to this opposition.
103. The other major concern for Warburg from early on was religion. “In the
autumn of 1888 he jots down a scheme for a history of religion:
(A) Personal gods whose power makes itself felt in an arbitrary and incalcula-
ble way—sacrifices for particular ends. (B) One personal god, ruling steadily,
angry but can be reconciled—clearly prescribed and regular sacrifices. (C)
Christ, God is love. Rejection of St. Paul: the crudely sensuous aspect of sac-
rifice: sacrifice and ceremony (the law) eliminated from daily life; what re-
mains is prayer and a few ceremonies, baptism, Eucharist. (D) God is within
us: daily work the same as divine service. (Fragmente, 4 September 1988)
Subsequent notes link this evolutionary scale once more with the problem of anxi-
ety. Paganism, with its ad hoc sacrifices prompted by fear, lacks any sense of secu-
rity. Judaism achieves a sense of security by constant sacrifices. Christianity
achieves the same sense of security by its spiritual sacrifices and its consecration of
work. The scientific world-view finally achieves a sense of security without sacrifices
since it regards both life and work as divine” (Gombrich 1986: 71–72). Culture
emerges again as the realm of synthesis and reconciliation.
104. “Another element in the process was the formation of liberal Judaism, that
is, of Judaism as a confession. Ever since the earthly fatherland won out over the
heavenly fatherland, this confession, like others, has been intended solely as a mat-
ter of private life. In contrast to Judaism as a principle that determines the life of
both individual and society and in large measure prescribes the course of daily life
and the relations of Jews with each other, liberal Judaism prides itself that Jewish
communities and their members form part of the national state in which they hap-
pen to live” (Horkheimer 1974: 108).
105. From this position, the Gentiles are blamed for the condition of the
Jews. “The traditional, observant Jew will explain it as part of sacred salvation his-
tory—that is, it is a punishment for Israel’s sins. The secularizing, intellectual Jew
will turn this theodicy inside out, forging it into an instrument with which to blame
the Gentile. The older, intrapunitive theodicy becomes an exteropunitive so-
ciodicy: ‘You made us what we are today,’ the secularist intelligentsia of the Dias-
pora will insist, indicting the Gentile West, creating what Salo Baron calls the
‘lachrymose’ historiography of the Jews. The culture of the West being what it
is—Christian—the victim-status carries considerable prestige” (Cuddihy 1974:
147). The sociodicy may find even more universal expressions and become again a
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view of destiny: “The Jews are a people whom barbarism must choose for its hatred”
(Steiner 1964: 20). The same may hold true for views that blur other historical
differences (and will predictably see this book with hostility): “Anti-Semites are not
just destructive rock throwers or defacers of synagogues; and philo-Semites are not
just celebrators of Jewish achievements. Whether they see the Jew as sub-human or
as super-human, they share a sense of fear and loathing of the Jew as such” (Horo-
witz 1990: 19).
106. This optimism always finds its strongest adherents among humanists:
“Western civilization is compounded of three ingredients: local custom and super-
stition, Greek science and art, Hebraic religion. The quantity of the several ingredi-
ents varies. In some places, such as France, the Hellenic is as great as the Hebraic;
in others, such as contemporary Germany, the local is in ascendance over both the
Hellenic and the Hebraic; in America, with its strong Anglo-Saxon heritage and
Puritan background, the Hebraic is perhaps the most important” (Boas 1939: v).
107. Since Modernism, Hebraic anti-humanist attacks have become increasingly
common and aggressive: “I want to dare to observe that if Jewish feminism does not
emerge from Torah, it will disintegrate. For Jews the Enlightenment is an idol that
will not serve women as it did not serve Jews; Voltaire was an anti-Semite. For Jews
humanism is an idol that will not serve women as it does not serve Jews: in the West
it is mainly the self-declared humanists who stand in the gutter with other Jew-
haters to support Arafat” (Ozick 1984: 9–10).
108. Lassalle writes in a letter of 1844: “The Jewish religion is the religion of
harsh servitude under the abstract spirit, God; hence the fate [of the Jews] is also
that of harsh servitude. . . . And yet what a speculative kernel lies for the thinker in
this ugliness of formation [of the Jewish spirit]. In the Jewish people, the spirit has
achieved such a profound consciousness of itself that it has broken with its outward
creatural appearance, [and] with the whole of nature itself. The spirit has compre-
hended itself as something higher than all nature and creatureliness, to which latter
it had been surrendered in all previous religions. For it, naturalness and finiteness
are devoid of essence; absolute essence is [to be sought] in the abstract spirit”
(quoted in Silberner 1952–53: 163–64).
109. An interesting dimension of this universalization was the cultivation,
mainly in the twentieth century, of a nomothetic language theory often based on
norms of Jewish expressive culture. In addition to Roman Jakobson’s poetics of
parallelism, to the same category arguably belong the studies of Fritz Mauthner
(1849–1923), Wittgenstein, Benjamin (in its life-long dialogue with the Kabbalah),
and Chomsky (whose first work dealt with Hebrew grammar). This body of scholar-
ship, which sought the fundamentals of human expression in deep structures or
ordinary communication, is marked by the drama of questionable reference specific
to the linguistic tension between Yiddish and Hebrew, on the one hand, and Yid-
dish and German, on the other.
110. Since that time, promoting Jewish thought as a non-ethnic philosophy
“done in a Jewish way” which gives primary emphasis to ethics (Seeskin 1990) has
become quite common. Claude Montefiore (1858–1939) proposed the idea of “a
new and purified Judaism” that would be non-ethnic and would take over as a
universal religion once traditional Judaism and Christianity withered away (Bowler
1988).
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111. Scholem and his generation found true Judaism and bourgeois culture in-
compatible, and rejected the Science as subservient to the latter. At the same time,
his debt to its lessons should not be minimized: “Scholem may be seen as the
dialectical fulfillment of the original impulse in the Wissenschaft des Judentums,
since nineteenth-century Jewish historiography laid the basis for anarchistic histori-
cism but belied its promise by generally succumbing to a rationalist, dogmatic the-
ology” (Biale 1979: 102–3).
112. The last (and best-known) sickness to appear, “self-hatred” (Gilman
1986)—a term which achieved wide currency in 1930, through Theodor Lessing’s
Der jüdische Selbsthaß—has been called “the pathological side of the German Jews’
confident assertion of their German identity” (Gay 1975: 61).
113. “German-Jewish scholarship sought to provide a new spiritual framework
for German Jewry by rediscovering a colourful, variegated and coherent Jewish past
that would also provide the rationale for variety, orderly change and development
within the modern Jewish community. German-Jewish scholarship was a massive
effort at reinfusing vitality into what many Jews had understandably come to regard
as a fossil that was totally irrelevant to contemporary spiritual life. In the reconquest
of the past and in the mastery of the dynamics of history—of law, liturgy, philoso-
phy—the scholars hoped to provide the rationale and motivation for adherence and
the guidelines for a spiritual rebirth and future creativity. Zunz never pretended
otherwise, nor did Geiger or David Hoffmann or Martin Buber or Franz Rosenzweig
or Harry Torczyner. Literaturgeschichte, Ritusgeschichte, Religionsgeschichte were
all oriented towards parallel goals” (G. Cohen 1975: xxvii). Thanks to this broad
view of the longer course of the Science, we can see why its project is not over yet:
so long as there is faith in interpretive emancipation, and therefore (decon-
structionist, feminist, phenomenological, humanistic, Third-World, or any other)
critique engaged in idolomachy, the Science of Judaism will remain a vital and often
exemplary force in the (aesthetic) dialectic of modernity—(cultural) resistance and
assimilation.
114. “Of one thing we may be quite certain, and that is: the Jews excel as inter-
preters, whether of literature, the acted drama, music or painting. . . . The reason
for the peerlessness of the Jew in the realm of interpretation is to be found un-
doubtedly in his empathic endowment. With his cosmopolitan spirit and universal
reach he can . . . readily gain an insight into the purpose of a masterpiece; and all
interpretation is, to a certain extent, creation” (Roback 1929: 59).
115. Since “the Jews have preserved their purity of blood to a greater extent than
any other nation” (Roback 1929: 425), physiological and hereditary factors are given
serious consideration: “The Jews are, as a people, possessed of a nervous system
which allows of a readier canalization and, therefore, rapid distribution of nervous
energy, thus facilitating adjustment and re-adjustment with greater ease than in the
case of perhaps any other race. The Greeks were not endowed with this plastic
nervous system and, consequently, in time were reduced to an insignificant nation-
ality” (Roback 1929: 54).
116. “What has become of the powers that teemed with genius? There is a Greek
nation just as there is a Jewish people still existing. While the former has exhausted
its supply of greatness, the latter is still producing in ever greater numbers and in a
variety of fields. Must we not come to the conclusion that there is a dynamic quality
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to the genius of the Jew in contradistinction to the static properties of the ancient
Greeks, and probably of other nations?” (Roback 1929: 49).
117. Jung’s internalization of myth followed in the footsteps of Freud’s meta-
physical attribution of internalization of authority to human nature: “It is in keep-
ing with the course of human development that external coercion gradually be-
comes internalized—for a special mental agency, men’s super-ego, takes it over and
includes it among its commandments” (Freud 1964: 13).
118. The flight from the unruly crowd and the longing for a genuine, true com-
munity has usually been studied among individual nations and groups. “Yet the
similarity between Buber’s rediscovery of the Hasidim and the contemporary Ger-
man revival of mystics like Meister Eckhart and Jacob Böhme is too striking to be
ignored. Germans also wanted to go beyond ‘liberal’ or ‘orthodox’ Protestantism to
an earlier heritage which seemed more dynamic because it was less rationalistic, less
fossilized. . . . Buber’s Hasidim performed a similar function by embodying a Juda-
ism which was not rationalized, not fossilized, and surely not quiescent. Moreover,
the dynamic nature of the Hasidim arose from a mysticism linked to a revived love
for the Volk” (Mosse 1970: 85). Mysticism offered a powerful counter-mythology to
those, like Buber (Breslauer 1990), apprehensive about a technocratic and material-
istic modernity. “Just as the Germans attempted to root this mystical tradition in
their national mystique, so Buber eventually attempted to embody this Mythos in
the Jewish Volk, exemplified by the Hasidim” (87). Another comparable develop-
ment was the search in the national mystique for a civil religion, “a common objec-
tive for those intellectuals and politicians who proposed the formation of a national
consciousness for a modern Italy. In this case, the formulation of a new lay religious-
ness was considered to be an essential component in cultural modernization” (Gen-
tile 1990: 232). The sacralization of politics, combined with the messianism of a
new civilization, attempted to create, through a “new faith,” a political life based on
the national community. “In essence, the construction of a fascist religion, centred
around the sacralization of the state, appears to be an attempt to evoke—in order
to legitimize the fascist regime—the sacred nature of the Roman archetype as ‘an
expression of an ethical-religious concept, in which the essential reasons behind the
state’s existence and power are projected as symbols of faith’ [P. de Francisci]”
(Gentile 1990: 247–48). The model for these religious constructions linking “deity
and domination” (Nicholls 1989) is the “Cult of the Supreme Being,” Robespierre’s
reaction to atheist-anarchist trends that emerged in the early 1790s. The goal of his
civil religion was to reconcile the contradictions of the Republic of Virtue, which
reason appeared unable to resolve, through the “sacralizing of the political author-
ity” (Fehér 1990: 190), the creation of the first political religion. “For Robespierre,
‘the happiness of the people’ was the major item on the political agenda. And
without having ever heard the name Immanuel Kant, he was on this point, as on
so many others, in a surprising harmony with Kant (of course, only within an over-
arching disagreement), who contended that while freedom unites, the quest for
happiness divides” (190–91). The success of all these efforts, however, to found a
political community on the religion of a national tradition were short-lived since the
gradual Hellenization of the political marked it with an unassailably secular charac-
ter. The twentieth-century community certainly had its politics but could never be
political.
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119. Hermann Cohen attempted to distinguish mythology from Judaism
through a rationalist transformation of messianism. “In Cohen’s utopian universal-
ism, we find equally the suppression of the restorative and apocalyptic aspects of
messianism. Cohen’s utopianism was based on his distinction between mythology
and monotheism. Mythology has no real concept of historical progress and instead
harks back to an idyllic Golden Age (das goldene Zeitalter). Monotheism, on the
other hand, does not seek to return to the happiness of the Golden Age, but instead
to increase knowledge of the true God. . . . Unlike mythology, which is romantic
and reactionary, monotheism is the aspiration for infinite time. The messianic age
will truly be an ‘age of culture’ since it will be the age of complete knowledge” (Biale
1979: 151). The importance of this position for thinkers from Buber, Benjamin, and
Scholem to Heidegger, Rosenzweig, and Lukács cannot be overestimated.
120. Adorno’s racism surfaces in his many hostile pieces on jazz as commodity,
written from 1936 until the end of his life, where he treats its black identity as a
myth: “In fact, Adorno argued [in 1936], ‘the skin of the Negro as well as the silver
of the saxophone was a coloristic effect.’ If the Negro contributed anything to jazz,
it was less his rebellious reaction to slavery than his half-resentful, half-compliant
submission to it. In a later essay on the same subject [1953], Adorno made the point
even clearer: ‘However little doubt there can be regarding the African elements in
jazz, it is no less certain that everything unruly in it was from the very beginning
integrated into a strict scheme, that its rebellious gestures are accompanied by the
tendency to blind obeisance, much like the sado-masochistic type described by
analytic psychology’ ” (Jay 1973: 186). The Frankfurt School would consistently try
to neutralize unruly expressions of rebelliousness by attributing them to a false and
pathological myth of revolt. From the same position stem more recent attacks
against African-American tradition: “One of the most preposterous proclamations
of all is that of ‘black culture.’ It is a necessary political put-on, a kind of Zionism
without Zion and its cultural history. There is American culture, to which blacks
belong, mainly as remissive figures in its mythology; there are various African cul-
tures; but no black culture. Thousands of young minds have been violated by this
preposterous idea. . . . ‘Black culture’ is the worst kind of Americanism, a rancorous
hiding, behind empty self-assertion and apartheid, of the typically American fear of
inferiority. . . . We teachers are creating a cast of crippled black pets (who are ex-
pected to bite the feeding hand, of course)” (Rieff 1972: 42).
121. In a book published in 1948 that “should be regarded as an extended appen-
dix” (Adorno 1973: xvii) to the Dialectic, Adorno, the twelve-tone composer and
student of Alban Berg, explores how Igor Stravinsky’s “regression [to archaism] . . .
replaces progress with repetition” (164). As usual, he locates the idolatry of myth in
its substitution of repetition for (historical) development. “The Romantic religion
of art to which Schoenberg subscribed wholeheartedly—a religion of art which his
opposite Stravinsky felt to be inadmissible and dishonest, as regards both religion
and aesthetics” (Dahlhaus 1987: 82) is the cardinal difference between the two
composers that Adorno does not discuss.
122. The Flight to Lucifer (Bloom 1979), a philosophical Star Wars (or a Tolkien
for theorists) about heresies and false gods, tells the story of the giant Perscors, a
combination of Prometheus and Odysseus, who travels from Earth to Lucifer, a
planet in a Hellenistic time, in search of meaning and self. Among other literary
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uses of Prometheus, see Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus (1818) by Mary
Shelley (1797–1851), the epic Prometheus and Epimetheus (1881) by Carl Spitteler
(1845–1924), The Book of Promethea (1983) by Hélène Cixous, and Wotan Un-
bound (1923), the play by Ernst Toller (1893–1939), whose hero, an anti-Semitic
barber addicted to Romantic literature, turns dictator. Recent operatic treatments
of the myth include Prometheus Unbound (1944) by Havergal Brian (1876–1972),
Prometheus (1966) by Carl Orff (1895–1982), and Prometeo (1984) by Luigi Nono
(1924–90). Under the influence of the Dialectic, Marcuse, in a chapter called “The
Images of Orpheus and Narcissus,” finds that “the predominant culture-hero is the
trickster and (suffering) rebel against the gods, who creates culture at the price of
perpetual pain. He symbolizes productiveness, the unceasing effort to master life;
but, in this productivity, blessing and curse, progress and toil are inextricably inter-
twined. Prometheus is the archetype-hero of the performance principle. . . . If
Prometheus is the culture-hero of toil, productivity, and progress through repres-
sion, then the symbols of another reality principle must be sought at the opposite
pole. Orpheus and Narcissus (like Dionysus to whom they are akin: the antagonist
of the god who sanctions the logic of domination, the realm of reason) stand for a
very different reality. They have not become the culture-heroes of the Western
world: theirs is the image of joy and fulfillment” (Marcuse 1966: 161–62). The
experience they represent, the “aesthetic dimension” (171), negates the perfor-
mance principle, helps the reconciliation of opposites, and provides gratification.
“Orpheus is the archetype of the poet as liberator and creator: he establishes a
higher order in the world—an order without repression. In his person, art, freedom,
and culture are eternally combined. He is the poet of redemption, the god who
brings peace and salvation by pacifying man and nature, not through force but
through song” (170).
123. A point of contrast, which illuminates the often forgotten ideological con-
text of the Dialectic, is the “crisis theology” of Karl Barth (1886 –1968) and his
school launched during World War I. Their interest in protecting religion from
culture led them by 1920 to see the former as “the crisis of culture” (Krüger 1966:
148), and later to resist the authority of philosophy with a Christocentric “theology
of the Word.” (On the importance of autonomy for Barth, see Macken 1990.)
124. In sharp contrast, Bertolt Brecht (1898–1956), who never won any respect
from the Institute, sought through his “epic theater” and the political adaptation of
myth (which he did not confine to Greek) “to make dialectics into a source of
enjoyment,” and alienation a matter of strategic viewpoint (rather than social or
existential situation). Adorno also had no use for the “utility music” (Gebrauchs-
musik) of the 1920s associated with Hans Eisler and Paul Hindemith, preferring
instead the apparitions of the negative in twelve-tone asceticism. “Radical avant-
gardism and neo-classicism remain equally outside Adorno’s concept of the
modern” (Bürger 1984–85: 122).
125. “Spengler’s most direct influence on the Frankfurt School, then, was
through his concept that culture (in this case, Enlightenment) moves decadently
toward its own annihilation and comes to rest in its antipode: barbarism. His
influence conditioned their vision of the historical possibilities. Spengler, more
than Marx, created and nurtured the School’s historical vision” (G. Friedman 1981:
85).
384 NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
126. It is interesting to note “the strange alliance that the Frankfurt School
forged between such disparate thinkers as Marx and Nietzsche. In part, the per-
ceived commonality was the shared loathing of bourgeois life, but in greater part
the appeal to them came from the desire to appropriate the strength of all who had
created the crisis discovered at Auschwitz” (G. Friedman 1981: 20). An extreme
example of such appropriation was the psychology of Bruno Bettelheim (1903–90),
who was influenced by the model of Dachau and Buchenwald, where he was incar-
cerated, and believed that the Nazi environment of total control could be used for
the rehabilitation of children at the Sonia Shankman Orthogenic School in Chi-
cago, which he directed (1944–73).
127. “In a way, Heidegger’s project paralleled that of the Frankfurt School. The
problem of history was such that we were presented with the end of metaphysics.
The fall of metaphysics meant the emptiness of the critical faculty. Neither party
was certain that a critical philosophy could be resurrected. Assuredly, none could be
resurrected that did not, in some way, resurrect the relationship between truth and
beauty that Plato had forged, this time with beauty gaining sovereignty over truth”
(G. Friedman 1981: 75).
128. The tradition that has developed out of this Puritan undertaking considers
asceticism “as sub-ideological, common to all cultures. In this large sense, asceti-
cism is the ‘cultural’ element in culture” (Harpham 1987: xi), it declares with Euro-
centric confidence. At the same time, with statements of this kind, the tradition
reveals its religious ideology and salvation politics, as when it concludes “that liter-
ary theory, especially as it concerns interpretation, is therefore a covertly but con-
stantly ethical activity predicated on the ascetic imperative to resist temptation;
and that various theories differ only in the forms of temptation they define and the
strategies of resistance they prescribe” (240). Religious definitions and defenses of
culture, which often assume a tone of moral edification, arrive swiftly at the predict-
able comparison: “Our anthropological hypothesis concerning the phenomenon of
‘culture’ is the following: in submitting ourselves to the esthetic (in particular, the
discursive) Subject, we accept the localization of our desire within a self-contained
universe of discourse, and at the same time experience this sacrificial acceptation of
constraint as a sign of our integration into a universal ethical community. This
synthesis—tentative, problematic, indeed, essentially paradoxical—is, in effect,
that of the ‘Greek’ and the ‘Jewish,’ the discursive and the moral, elements of mod-
ern Western society” (Gans 1985: 11).
129. Bruno Bauer’s quietism of critique comes again to mind: “ ‘The critic,’
writes Bauer, ‘does not take sides. Nor does he want to take sides with any party. He
is lonely—lonely in that he loses himself in the object of criticism—lonely in that
he sets himself up against it. Criticism separates itself from everything’” (Hook
1962: 106). Distinction discriminates against action and history. “Criticism is the
only power which can enlighten us about the self-deception of the existing order
and give us the upper hand. History will take care of the crisis, and its outcome”
(quoted in Hook 1962: 110). As Heidegger wrote in 1945: “We are to do nothing
but wait.” This apraxia is further glorified when “we inactivists, we academic men”
(Rieff 1972: 27), in order “to prevent the mental disease of praxis” (13), accept
alienation as the strength of the impotent: “It is our duty, as teachers, not to be
public men; as public men, we cannot teach” (13).
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130. “The aesthetic necessity of art supersedes the terrible necessity of reality,
sublimates its pain and pleasure; the blind suffering and cruelty of nature (and of
the ‘nature’ of man) assume meaning and end—‘poetic justice.’ The horror of the
crucifixion is purified by the beautiful face of Jesus dominating the beautiful com-
position, the horror of politics by the beautiful verse of Racine, the horror of fare-
well forever by the Lied von der Erde” (Marcuse 1969: 44).
131. “Critical Theory, therefore, had a threefold task. First, it had to identify and
define the texture of the catastrophe that was the ground for the Messianic crisis.
Second, it had to identify the Messianic force. Faced with historical catastrophe,
the Frankfurt School had to discover, through the hermeneutics of the texts of the
tradition that presaged the catastrophic epoch, the name of the force that could
break the epoch apart. Once this name was discovered, then they needed, third, to
discover the formulas through which the power of the Messiah could be invoked”
(G. Friedman 1981: 241).
132. In certain respects, the self that Benjamin built, with his leisurely attention
to the returns and repetitions of tradition, was an early postmodern theoros-turned-
voyeur: “Since the whole is untruth, metaphysics and theology can only survive
in the most minute and inconsequential particulars (i.e., in what Hegel called
lazy existence: one indifferent to or opposed to the universal)” (Siebert 1983–84:
109).
133. The mission of the critic according to Lukács provides a splendid example:
“Lukács’s essayist is a mystic on the path leading toward the vision of the One. . . .
‘It is true that the essay strives for truth: but just as Saul went out to look for his
father’s she-asses and found a kingdom, so the essayist who is really capable of
looking for the truth will find at the end of his road the goal he was looking for: life.’
Lukács’s essayists are the mystics of everyday life. This might seem a peculiar idea
until one remembers that it is precisely everyday life that is the locus of anomie for
the bourgeois” (Holzman 1985: 81).
134. This is a form of transcendental Zionism. “Apocatastasis, ‘the retrieval of
everything and everyone,’ is the figure that most precisely characterizes Benjamin’s
materialist messianism. In the Jewish apocalyptic and neoplatonic-gnostic tradi-
tions, apocatastasis refers to the restoration of an original paradisal state brought
about by the coming of the messiah. With this restoration, things would reassume
their proper relations to each other, the displacements that characterize the ‘dream
condition of the world’ would be undone. The goal of Benjamin’s ‘dialectics of
cultural history’ is thus the abolition of the prevailing context of expression in favor
of the original context of being” (Witte 1986: 57).
135. Here is a complementary view: “In their relation to empirical reality works
of art recall the theologumenon that in a state of redemption everything will be just
as it is and yet wholly different. There is an unmistakable similarity in all this with
the development of the profane. The profane secularizes the sacred realm to the
point where the latter is the only secular thing left. The sacred realm is thus objec-
tified, staked out as it were, because its moment of untruth awaits secularization as
much as it tries to avert it through incantation” (Adorno 1984: 8).
136. According to another suggestion (Rue 1989), to overcome its present crisis
the West needs a new cultural mythology, one based on the “root metaphor” of the
covenant: the new modern myth should be drawn from the covenantal tradition.
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137. “It is no secret that Benjamin’s writings exerted considerable influence on
the second phase of Critical Theory. The Dialectic of Enlightenment . . . develops
the motif of a critique of the mythical condition of bourgeois society in the form of
a historical reconstruction of the civilizing process. In this process, the ‘self-destruc-
tion of enlightenment’ comes to pass. Just as in myth enlightenment assumed its
first and yet uncertain form, self-conscious enlightenment of modern reason veers
back to mythology. . . . Myth returns or actualizes itself as instrumental reason,
logic of exchange, and logocentrism” (Lindner 1986: 37–38).
138. There are many examples of cunning appropriation of myth in Das Pas-
sagen-Werk, like the “parallels between the figure of Odysseus in the Dialectic of
Enlightenment and that of the ‘flaneur’ in Benjamin’s work. The double meaning
of ‘the passage’ in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment corre-
sponds to the ‘twilight’ of the passages (arcades) in Paris noted by Benjamin. This
is to be understood not only literally but also allegorically” (van Reijen 1988: 421).
Another example of the flaneur, this time as anthropologist, is Claude Lévi-Strauss
(1908), author of Mythologiques (1964–71), the largest compendium of mythology
in the twentieth century. “Lévi-Strauss’s own stylization of the myth analyst as a
hero of a fairy tale corresponds with his application to the myths of the morphology
of the fairy tale as developed by V. Propp” (Schlesier 1988: 148–49). In his work,
which has been called “a surrealist enterprise” (Rodney Needham), the collector
and connoisseur ventures into the underworld of mythic thinking itself in search of
signs that can show a safe passage home. In general, the flaneur is a conflation of
Odysseus and the Wandering Jew—the interpreter whose only possible nostos is
commentary, that is, the return to the (textual) passage.
139. Here is an example of his vision: “The Aufhebung of commodity relations
enables men and cultural products . . . to recover their autonomous character. . . .
With the emergence of the product as an end in itself, it will naturally fit into the
totality and the final questions of human life. With the Aufhebung of human isola-
tion and of anarchic individualism, human society will form an organic whole; its
parts—individual members and products—will support and magnify each other in
the service of the common goal—the idea of further human development” (Lukács
1970: 29). Ironically, he believed that in philosophy from Kant to Hegel “capitalism
[has] produced the idea of a new society whose task is to bring about the destruc-
tion of capitalism” (30).
140. The artist becomes, accordingly, the model of modern moral conduct:
“Thus it can be said that for Lukács the most basic image of human freedom is not
the hero of the novel, for he can never succeed in his quest for ultimate meaning,
but rather the novelist himself, who in telling the story of failure succeeds—whose
very creation stands as that momentary reconciliation of matter and spirit toward
which his hero strives in vain. The creative activity of the novelist is the ‘negative
mysticism of godless epochs’ ” (Jameson 1971: 173).
141. Lukács’ friend Béla Balázs writes in his diary of the period: “Gyuri’s new
philosophy. Messianism. The homogeneous world as the redemptive goal. Art as
the Luciferean ‘better made.’ The vision of the world become homogeneous before
the actual process of transformation. The immorality of art. Gyuri’s big turn toward
ethics” (quoted in Holzman 1985: 91). Furthermore, regarding the divergent and
yet comparable paths of Heidegger and Adorno, the question of eschatology also
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helps explain why “buried deeply beneath philosophical disputes there hovers an-
other theological difference: the demarcation between Jewish and Christian Mes-
sianism, the latter characterized by affirmation of divine redemption and incarna-
tion, the former by indefinite postponement of the messianic event” (Dallmayr
1989: 100).
142. Form, “the highest judge of life” (Lukács) becomes for this generation dur-
ing the first decade of the century a religious issue or, as Lukács wrote in 1911, “the
question of the boundary between religion and art” (Congdon 1983: 81). Soul and
Form was the title of his collection of essays (1908 –10) that appeared in Hungarian
(1910), and in a revised form in German (1911). The Frankfurt School too found
form “the unfolding of truth. . . . It is also a secularized version of the theological
notion that God created the world in his own image” (Adorno 1984: 207).
143. It is from this viewpoint that Greeks like Odysseus are accused of being the
source of evil by those who “hope for a renascence of guilt” (Rieff 1972: 71) and
subscribe to “the ideology of Hebraism—namely, that whereas ‘you may be a supe-
rior civilization (whatever that is), we, in our political and economic impotence, are
a superior moral heritage.’ There is Hellenism, which is pagan, perhaps civilized,
and with an eye to beauty, but greater still is Hebraism, with its concern for justice
and its superior morality. . . . It is the ‘moralistic style’ of the modern oppositional
intelligentsia” (Cuddihy 1974: 183). The moralistic style finds narcissistic entitle-
ment and dignity in resisting what it knows it will reproduce anyway, like the stan-
dard account of Western origins: “It is significant, surely, that when, today, an
after-dinner speaker refers to the sources of our civilization, he always names Jerusa-
lem and Athens” (Auden 1948: 2), or she observes in a scholarly study that “the
history of the West has not only been that of metaphysics, of its structures and
dichotomies. It has also been that of Judeo-Christianity: the strange dialogue be-
tween the Greek and the Jew—and their sons. . . . For example, if the Greek father
was there to confer authority on his son, . . . the Judaic father turned his back on the
son and disappeared from the Temple. . . . [I]f Oedipus was able to accomplish his
primordial desire through a confrontation with the Father, Abraham was not led by
desire, but closed his eyes in order to listen to rather than to see God the Father”
(Jardine 1985: 79). In 1990 Taylor University, an Evangelical Christian institution
in Indiana, organized a three-day series of lectures under the general title “Jerusa-
lem-Athens.”
144. For the first time there is even skepticism about the identification with
Spinoza’s project: “There is much evidence that the modern world may indeed be
moving toward something postmodern; except that the Jews, on the whole, remain
conservatively attached to the old modernity of Spinoza. In this conservative at-
tachment Jewish intellectuals differ little from nonintellectuals. At least in this they
are all Jews together. All are more comfortable with modernity than with anything
less” (Himmelfarb 1973: 14). Already in 1955 Levinas expressed his opposition to
lifting the anathema pronounced against Spinoza by the religious authorities of his
community (Levinas 1990: 106–10).
145. The virtuosos of critique have been the soloists of assimilation: “Conse-
quently, the problem of assimilation is still with us, and is so to the exact extent that
we all—in Israel and among the Diaspora, Zionists and non-Zionists—acknowledge
western civilization and lay claim to all that it has contributed and contributes still
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to our public and intellectual life, open as it is to the world’s vast compass. But our
belonging to a religious or national or linguistic Judaism is not something purely
and simply to be added to our Western inheritance. One or other of the two factors
becomes discredited. We must ask ourselves if there is not a permanent risk of the
traditional aspect of our existence sinking, despite what affection and good-will may
attach to it, to the level of folklore” (Levinas 1989b: 284).
146. “The intellectually gifted Jew is in a peculiarly fortunate position in respect
to this requisite immunity from the inhibitions of intellectual quietism. But he can
come in for such immunity only at the cost of losing his secure place in the scheme
of conventions into which he has been born, and at the cost, also, of finding no
similarly secure place in that scheme of gentile conventions into which he is
thrown. . . . He becomes a disturber of the intellectual peace, but only at the cost of
becoming an intellectual wayfaring man, a wanderer in the intellectual no-man’s-
land, seeking another place to rest, farther along the road, somewhere over the
horizon” (Veblen 1964: 227). Such intellectual wayfarers have been variously called
“Jewish heretics” (Deutscher), “meta-rabbis” (Steiner), “prophets of alienation”
(Bell), and “slayers of Moses” (Handelman).
147. This attitude harks back to the program of “positive Jewishness” proposed
in the late 1940s during comparisons of the “negative” with the “positive” Jew.
Warnings about “some of the parallels that have appeared between Jewish and
German nationalism—especially the post-1918 variety of the latter” (Greenberg
1950: 428) were responses to the rise of militant separatism.
148. “The Christian mystery cult evolved into the most terrible rationalizing of
transgressiveness ever to curse our culture. Nietzsche knew that Christendom’s love
was a covert form of making war on culture in any form, an expression of the most
terrible hatred, envy, revenge. How sad that Nietzsche remained Christian enough
to blame the proud, elitist culture of Israel for this curse, derived from Hellen-
ism. . . . Nothings would be instant everythings by imposing a love that was entirely
mendacious. Despite his residual Christian sentimentalism, Nietzsche tried to
make war on this love. Judged by the results especially among our educated classes,
Nietzsche failed miserably. His prophetic message is lost. But we must continue to
make war on this Christening love—on all the envies, for and against, that now
disguise the particular conditions of transgressive behavior in our society” (Rieff
1972: 74).
149. In Trilling’s early work, it is not the satyr who opposes the Jew of culture but
rather the Jew as satyr who opposes bourgeois complacency. “In his second Menorah
Journal story, ‘Chapter for a Fashionable Jewish Novel’ [1926], the Prufrockian hero
imagines himself, self-parodically, as a kind of Jewish Dionysus, come to shock his
friends out of their middle-class respectability: ‘He began to feel not like a prophet
come howling from the wilderness to warn a people defiling holiness, but like a satyr
leaped into a respectable home . . . lustfully Hebraic, rowling gloriously, drunkenly,
madly, in Jewishness, disgusting the inhabitants by the abandon and licentiousness
of his Semitic existence’” (Krupnick 1986: 26).
150. Many of his contemporaries agreed: “Jewishness, insofar as it has to be as-
serted in a predominantly Gentile world, should be a personal rather than mass
manifestation, and more a matter of individual self-reliance” (Greenberg 1950:
431). The communal understanding of the problem was rejected: “What I want to
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be able to do is accept my Jewishness more implicitly, so implicitly that I can use it
to realize myself as a human being in my own right, and as a Jew in my own right”
(432).
151. As J. Hillis Miller told a reporter: “I remember [Paul] de Man looking me in
the eye . . . and saying, ‘For me, the most important questions are religious ques-
tions’ ” (Campbell 1986: 48). According to a Christian Science Monitor edito-
rial, “Stewards of the Language” (April 24, 1985), A. Bartlett Giamatti, President of
Yale University, said in a talk that same month at Harvard University: “Ours is still
a rhetorically based culture, a culture based on Greek ideas of paedeia, those cul-
tural values whose textual study is education and whose pursuit forms the good
citizen, a concept the Romans would translate under the rubric studia humanitates;
it is a culture whose Judeo-Christian roots are manifested in sacramental texts, and
acts of interpretation, texts of revealed word. Ours is a culture radically imbued
with logocentricity, with the ancient, enduring, and finally numinous awe of writing
and what is written.” The model for this ideal is often a portrait of the intellectual
within the traditional Jewish community: “The intellectual has to an unusual de-
gree formed the religious culture and the moral civilization of the Jews at the lower
as well as the higher levels: he gave them not only ideology but mythos, not only
form but matter, not only an ordering but much of the substance of values. . . .
Through the deliberate design of intellectuals, we Jews became for centuries a peo-
ple of priests. It is characteristic of the traditional Jewish intellectuals, of the rabbis
and teachers, that they defined the sphere of their activity as Law—posing in this
way a demand for the reception by the people of their special attitudes” (Halpern
1946: 16).
152. Thus concludes “the long, dark and fairly dismal drama that modern critics
are always writing about. For it is that drama and this kind of spiritual insight that
finally explain the pervading tone of modern critical style. The critics have inflated
their language and turned their business into melodrama in order to give impor-
tance to an otherwise inconsequential occupation. They have developed a woolly
cant so as to communicate with the other participants in the mystery, and an inhu-
mane jargon to get at the objectivity of science, while at the same time asserting
their peremptory claim to a grander knowledge. Their tone, though—the porten-
tous imitation-mysticism, the blood-and-thunder language of sin and salvation, the
conviction of being among the elect—these they have made up as they follow along
the glory trail, circuit riders of literature, revivalists of criticism, missionaries of a
bleak and desperate back-country religion, whose tears wet the mourners’ benches
in a dozen critical reviews” (Douglas 1953–55).
CHAPTER THREE
1. Difficile liberté: Essais sur le Judaïsme (1963), Quatres lectures talmudiques
(1968), Du sacré au saint: Cinq nouvelles lectures talmudiques (1977), L’Au-delà du
verset: Lectures et discours talmudiques (1982). Levinas’s return to Talmud repeats
the recovery of the sacred texts in the Ethik des Judentums by Moritz Lazarus
(1824–1903).
2. The comparison of the two figures has also served more localized arguments:
“If there is an English equivalent of the American Dream, it is essentially domestic;
390 NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
its literary roots are Homeric: the wanderer is always really on his way home, and
home is fairly unsurprising; despite the annoying suitors, Penelope is the same as
ever. The American Dream has a more biblical flavor. Our Abraham and Sarah,
impelled by some inner command or outward necessity, journey forth into an un-
known country, guided by restlessness and faith” (Taylor 1988).
3. In the essay “God’s Nearness” (1914), Cohen contrasts the Greek idea of “like-
ness between man and God” with the monotheistic idea of the nearness of God:
“Drawing close to God constitutes man’s moral activity and provides, at the same
time, a safeguard against that mysticism which is a violation of pure monotheism.
The nearness of God—but by no means a union with God—is man’s highest good”
(Cohen 1971: 155).
4. The notion is indebted to Luther’s practice of speaking about Deus abscondi-
tus, occultus, and especially in his later works, nudus (as opposed to revelatus) to
represent the negative way to God. This doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God
dates as early as his first Lectures on the Psalms (1513–16). Luther “speaks of the
Hidden God as ‘God himself’ ” (Gerrish 1973: 278). According to his message,
“faith’s object is always the Word of God. The Hidden God is never the object of
faith. But faith nonetheless takes on an urgency, perhaps even a passion, because of
the Hidden God, who prevents faith from becoming complacent. Faith, in Luther’s
sense, was a dare, a risk, or—in one of his favorite words—a ‘flight.’ Under An-
fechtung [attack], a man must dare against God to flee to God (ad deum contra
deum). Faith is not repose, but movement. Hence, faith really does take into itself
something of the meaning of God’s hiddenness even though it is not directed to-
wards that hiddenness: rather it is movement away from the Hidden God” (291).
5. “Not only is language always accompanied by faciality traits, but the face crys-
tallizes all redundancies, it emits and receives, releases and captures signifying
signs. It is a whole body unto itself: it is like the body of the center of significance
to which all of the deterritorialized signs affix themselves, and it marks the limit of
their deterritorialization. The voice emanates from the face. . . . The face is the Icon
proper to the signifying regime, the reterritorialization internal to the system. The
signifier reterritorializes on the face. The face is what gives the signifier substance;
it is what fuels interpretation, and it is what changes, changes traits, when interpre-
tation reimparts signifier to its substance. . . . The signifier is always facialized”
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 115).
6. “The order, then, that allows us simultaneously to escape the totalitarianism
of philosophy, which ignores the anxiety of ‘the individual all the same,’ and also
the anarchy of individual desires; this life that is beyond the book, this philosophy
that becomes life instead of becoming politics, is religion. It does not precede phi-
losophy, it follows it” (Levinas 1990: 186). At the same time, his approach is a
literalist one: “I do not preach for the Jewish religion. I always speak of the Bible, not
the Jewish religion” (Levinas 1988: 1).
7. The existential hermeneutics of Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976) suggests that
one must allow oneself to be questioned by the text and be receptive to its claims.
Derrida’s study of political responsibility (1988) is also based on a “grammar of the
response.”
8. The seven-volume poetic magnum opus of Edmond Jabès, which was pub-
lished during the period of Levinas’s Talmudic writings, is called The Book of Ques-
tions (1963–73) (Motte 1990).
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 391
9. “JLT[hébaud]: You are saying then that ontology is a specific kind of language
game. There is thus the Parmenides game, if it is true that he was the first to play
it. JFL[yotard]: Yes, just as there is, on the opposite side, the Moses game” (Lyotard
and Thébaud 1985: 54).
10. Shestov also dismisses the acknowledged pioneer of modernity: “Spinoza was
Socrates’s second incarnation” (Shestov 1966: 248). The other great traitor of Bibli-
cal faith, who subjected it to Hellenic criteria of knowledge, was Philo of Alexandria:
“Philo’s thought has even made its way into Holy Writ and has given the Fourth
Gospel a tinge of its own. ‘In the beginning was the Word’—that meant: first
Athens was, and only later Jerusalem. And consequently everything which pro-
ceeded out of Jerusalem must be weighed in the balances of Athens” (Shestov 1932:
xxiii).
11. While condemning the horror inspired by rational philosophy, Shestov does
not hesitate to threaten his opponents with the Last Judgment: “And when reason
and morality will call before their tribunal the prophets and the apostles and along
with them Him in whose name they dare defy the Greek philosophy, do you think
that Tertullian will be afraid of the judgment, as Leibniz was?” (Shestov 1966: 288).
12. Solomon Ludwig Steinheim (1789–1866), who opposed philosophy because
of its rationalism, sought to make faith based on revelation an independent realm
of knowledge with its own cognitive content. He identified the religion of reason
with idolatry because it accepts natural laws. Revelation, on the other hand, which
is based on the principle of creation by a transcendent force, effects a breach in the
closed system of reason which is based on causality and allows for no freedom.
Revelation dictates and demands faith, not understanding. True freedom is non-
rational and open.
13. According to Levinas, “the request that is made of me by the other, by the
simple fact that he speaks to me, is a request that can never be justified. The model
here is the relation of God to the Jewish people, with God’s initial statement to
Moses: ‘Let them obey me!’ ” (Lyotard and Thébaud 1985: 22).
14. The commercial success of his ideas has sometimes exasperated his defend-
ers: “Like nuclear war, deconstruction can be staged, filmed in terms of the clichés
of a disaster movie and using the same set and the same lighting as its predecessors:
‘Skyscraper,’ ‘Airport,’ ‘Airplane,’ ‘The Day After,’ and now ‘Deconstruction’ (with
‘Deconstruction II’ and ‘Deconstruction III’ shortly to follow). Definitely a low-
budget operation” (Warminski 1985: 48).
15. Following in the footsteps of Heidegger’s impact on theology, psychiatry,
criticism, historiography, theory of language, philosophy of science, critique of
technology and modernity, Derrida has affected the course disciplines like peda-
gogy (Atkins and Johnson 1985, Johnson 1982); law (Cardozo Law Review 1990);
psychoanalysis (Smith and Kerrigan 1983, Spivak 1985); psychology (Parker and
Shotter 1990); analytic philosophy (Dasenbrock 1989); Marxism (Holub 1983,
Ryan 1982); theology (Altizer 1982, Raschke 1988, Taylor 1982 and 1985); Bible
studies (Greenstein 1989, Hart 1990, McKnight 1985); translation studies (Graham
1985); film theory (Brunette and Wills 1990); architecture (Papadakis, Cooke, and
Benjamin 1990); and feminism (Poovey 1988).
16. Levinas’s own use of words like liturgy, diaconia, epiphany, and ikhnos in
“The Trace of the Other” is a representative example of speaking Greek. Levinas
protests that this is not peculiar: “I am Greek, it is Greek thought. The thought of
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comparison, of judgment, the attributes of the subject, in short, the entire termi-
nology of Greek logic and Greek politics appear. Consequently, it is not true that
my thought isn’t Greek. On the contrary, everything that I say about justice comes
from Greek thought, and Greek politics as well. But, what I say, quite simply, is that
it is, ultimately, based on the relationship to the other, on the ethics without which
I would not have sought justice” (Levinas 1988: 174). Using Greek to speak non-
Greek philosophy is not contradictory but necessary. “I believe that Greek philoso-
phy cannot be eliminated. Even in order to criticize the ultimate character of Greek
philosophy, one needs Greek philosophy. That is not at all a contradiction. The
Greeks have taught us how to speak. Not to speak, not the saying [le dire] but to
rediscover ourselves in the said. Greek philosophy is a special language which can
say everything to everyone because it never presupposes anything in particular.
Greek philosophy is the way that people speak in the modern university the world
over. That is speaking Greek. They all speak Greek, even if they don’t know the
difference between alpha and beta. It is a certain way of presenting things. It is a
way of using a language which everyone can enter” (178).
17. Scholars have detected in the Bible the models of rhetorical “structures of
conflict” (McKnight 1985: 94) outlined by Derrida.
18. Derrida’s presentation of violence as the anarchic side of metaphysics, which
domesticates it within the dominant Western discourse, is indebted to Benjamin’s
praise of divine violence. But Shestov had already gone even further: following
Buber’s suggestion, he had presented it as the supreme Biblical command. His book
concludes on this appropriate note: “Philosophy is not Besinnen [turning backward]
but struggle. And this struggle has no end and will have no end. The kingdom of
God, as it is written, is attained through violence” (Shestov 1966: 443). Another
phrasing is even more explicit: “For it is written: the kingdom of God is conquered
only by violence” (112). Derrida’s positive conception of violence is already articu-
lated unambiguously here.
19. Among recent investigations of différance, see Barrett 1987; Eisenstein and
Jardin 1985; Harvey 1986; Heath 1978; Irigaray 1987; Taminiaux 1985; and Vattimo
1980.
20. The question of the negative (Budick and Iser 1989) has been very important
for twentieth-century French philosophy (Descombes 1980: 23–26), especially for
Alexandre Kojève’s commentary on Hegel (32–39) and the “philosophie du non” of
Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962). Adorno stressed its significance for aesthetics:
“Whether negativity is the barrier or the truth of art is not for art to decide. Art
works are negative per se because they are subject to the law of objectification; that
is, they kill what they objectify, tearing it away from its context of immediacy and
real life. They survive because they bring death” (Adorno 1984: 193).
21. Here is a similar distinction: “The same never coincides with the equal, not
even in the empty indifferent oneness of what is merely identical. The equal or
identical always moves toward the absence of difference, so that everything may be
reduced to a common denominator. The same, by contrast, is the belonging to-
gether of what differs, through a gathering by way of the difference. We can only say
‘the same’ if we think difference” (Heidegger 1971b: 218).
22. Major examinations of difference and otherness, before Derrida, include
Hegel’s section on “Absolute Difference” in The Science of Logic, Heidegger’s de-
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construction of “The Principle of Identity” (1969) and discusssion of “dif-ference”/
“diaphora” (1971d: 202–10), and Deleuze (1956, 1968).
23. Some have seen Derrida’s Talmudic typography as one example of this
strategy: “The columns of Glas are cut by the arbitrary ‘justification’ of the mar-
gins and the edginess of pages that interrupt, like a caesura, the words. Glas
becomes a stylish reprisal against style—that word whose y grecque was hellenized
into it during the Renaissance. Derrida rescues style from its confusion with
Greek stulos, column, and so recovers its link both with stiletto, a pointed weapon,
and stiglus or stigma that emphasize cutting, pointing, branding” (Hartman 1985:
41).
24. The entry “Hellenism” by Arnaldo Momigliano in the Encyclopedia Judaica
does not recognize the early or classical periods of Greek civilization, and instead
defines the word as “the term used by historians to refer to the period from the
death of Alexander the Great (323 B.C.E.) to the death of Cleopatra and the incor-
poration of Egypt in the Roman Empire in 30 B.C.E. . . . The word Hellenism is also
used to indicate more generically the cultural tradition of the Greek-speaking part
of the Roman Empire between Augustus and Justinian and/or the influence of
Greek civilization on Rome, Carthage, India, and other regions which were never
part of the empire of Alexander” (vol. 8, 290–91). This use follows the model of
J. G. Droysen’s Geschichte des Hellenismus (2 vols., 1836, 1843), which broadened
the meaning originally given to the term by Scaliger: “The originality of Droysen
was to take Hellenism to mean, not specifically the way of thinking of Jews under
the influence of Greek language and thought, but generally the language and way
of thinking of all the populations which had been conquered by Alexander and
subjected to Greek influence. In other words, he used the word Hellenism to indi-
cate the intermediary and transitional period between classical Greece and Christi-
anity” (Momigliano 1977a: 310).
25. According to the evidence of the Babylonian Talmud, a ban against “Greek
wisdom” (Momigliano 1975) was pronounced about 66 B.C. “The Hasmonean re-
volt in 169–165 B.C.E. has been recorded in Jewish history as the paradigmatic state-
ment of spiritual opposition to the intrusion of foreign practices on traditional
beliefs and worship. It is significant that a localized political struggle whose under-
lying motives were in part economic and social should be perceived in the popular
and scholarly imagination as a purely ideological confrontation between Jewish and
Greek values. This perception is already well established in the Book of Second
Maccabees—an epitome of the lost volumes of Jason of Cyrene—where we first
encounter the term Judaism (2:21, 8:1, 14:38) and Hellenism (4:13) representing
opposing spiritual forces” (Satran 1987: 334). The lessons of the religious obser-
vance of Hanukkah are explained in an article called “Hellenism: Ancient and Mod-
ern,” published in 1926, where parallels are discovered between the ancient story
and the present: “Can the old Judaism withstand the new civilization, if it degener-
ates, as it sometimes threatens to do, into an easy acquiescence in things that are
diametrically opposed to the Jewish spirit of purity of thought and holiness of liv-
ing?” (Herzog 1974: 177). Some participants in the debate about the ostensible
contradiction between Torah and Madda (or religious tradition and secular learn-
ing) propose a reconciliation based on seeing secular study as a sacred activity, and
therefore part of worship (Lamm 1990).
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26. Shestov (1932: 207) believed that names, by classifying things, cast them in
the light of the universal, thus destroying their particularity.
27. Levinas (1977) later joined this attack with his distinction between the pagan
sacre and the Jewish search for the saint. Meschonnic has followed this by attacking
the metaphysics of the sacred (which he opposes to history) as a theory of power
and identifying it with Christianity. He has questioned Derrida’s use of the word
“Hebraism” instead of Judaism, and his association of the former with Hellenism:
“Now if one takes everything that is biblical and post-biblical—in brief, Jewish
culture—from Greek notions and names the exile with Greek words, would this
not already be nothing other than Diaspora, to have lost in advance all properly
Hebraic anteriority? And in a certain way this is to betray the Jew” (Meschonnic
1988: 456).
28. In 1875, Hermann Cohen “gave a definition of Christianity’s central dogma,
the incarnation, which brought it into the orbit of his philosophical understanding
of Judaism. The doctrine of God’s descent into human existence was understood by
Cohen as the symbol for the divine force of the moral law which has joined the
human mind and enabled Man to act autonomously. The future vocation of Juda-
ism was based on the fact, that the deepest content of the prophetic preaching
about God could still not be expressed in this idea of humanisation” (Liebeschütz
1968: 18).
29. At the turn of the century Jews were attracted to racism by the science of race
and the racial hygiene movement. There was a great debate among them “as to
whether or not Jews were a race” (Mosse 1978: 124), especially before World War
I. The major treatise in the field was The Racial Problem with Special Attention to
the Theoretical Foundation of the Jewish Race (1910) by the Zionist physician Ignaz
Zollschan (1877–1948), which adopted the ideas of Houston Stewart Chamberlain.
Fears of misgeneration, ideals of purity of blood, projects in eugenics, and dreams
of national mystique were in general very popular among both Jews and Gentiles
during that time. After World War II, views of race often adopted the terminology
of ethnicity: “Judaism cannot be other than ethnic because it can transcend ethical
but not political resentment. Politics can enter the monotheistic narrative only as
a moral punishment for the failure of ethics” (Gans 1985: 211).
30. This was limited to the Western church. Orthodoxy never developed in this
direction. “Judging at least from a superficial survey of the preaching of the
Churches of the East from olden times to the present, it is striking how their hom-
iletical tradition is either one of doxology or meditative mysticism or exhortation—
but it does not deal with the plagued conscience in the way in which one came to
do so in the Western Churches” (Stanley 1907: 85).
31. A recent example was the linguistic turn in theological hermeneutics, the
development of a theory of the Word of God which, in Bultmann’s words, sees
kerygma as a “language event” (Ebeling 1968).
32. The following two passages express Paul’s position: “He is a Jew who is one
inwardly, and real circumcision is a matter of the heart, spiritual and not literal. His
praise is not from men but from God. Then what advantage has the Jew? Or what
is the value of circumcision? Much in every way” (Romans 2.29–3.2). “Now I, Paul,
say to you that if you receive circumcision, Christ will be of no advantage to you. . . .
You are severed from Christ, you who would be justified by the law; you have fallen
away from grace” (Galatians 5.2, 4).
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33. Even from the Catholic side it is charged that, “if we consider the history of
the second millennium of Christianity we are likely to conclude that the progressive
alienation between the Christian faith and the secular, real-life experience of man-
kind, can be principally accounted for by the artificial maintenance of a cultural
form of Christianity, namely, the hellenic, which was gradually (but with accelerat-
ing rapidity over the last century and a half), outstripped by a historical develop-
ment of human consciousness characterized above all by its progressive de-Hellen-
ization” (Dewart 1966: 120)
34. This has been a common strategic move. “Philosophy in Germany lives so
thoroughly out of the Protestant spirit that Catholics practically have to become
Protestant in order to do philosophy, and Catholic thought has scarcely emerged
from the ivory tower of Thomism except in nonphilosophical forms” (Habermas
1983a: 70).
35. In contrast, Rosenzweig sees the Christian church as a way from the Incarna-
tion to Parousia, from Christ’s coming to his return.
36. Compare the last lines from Hölderlin’s fragment “Colombo”:
For often, when
The heavenly grow
Too lonely, so that
Alone they hold together
or Earth; for all too pure is
Either
But then
the traces of ancient discipline,
(1980: 649)
37. “Thus, I relate this concept of trace to what is at the center of the latest work
of Emmanuel Levinas and his critique of ontology: relationship to the illeity as to
the alterity of a past that never was and can never be lived in the originary or
modified form of presence. Reconciled here to a Heideggerian intention—as it is
not in Levinas’s thought—this notion signifies, sometimes beyond Heideggerian
discourse, the undermining of an ontology which, in its innermost course, has de-
termined the meaning of being as presence and the meaning of language as the full
continuity of speech. . . . This deconstruction of presence accomplishes itself
through the deconstruction of consciousness, and therefore through the irreducible
notion of the trace (Spur), as it appears in both Nietzschean and Freudian dis-
course” (Derrida 1976: 70).
38. “The idea of the Incarnation is ultimately the result of a fundamental differ-
ence between biblical and pagan theology, which can be reduced to the simple fact
that the word ‘God’ left the tongue of the Jews with as much difficulty as it left the
tongue of the Greeks with ease. Whether that was connected with the fact that the
God of the Old Testament was the protective power allied with one people, with-
drawn from and to be concealed from the rest of the world, while the Greek gods
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were of the world and enjoyers of the world, were receivable and transportable, need
not be decided here” (Blumenberg 1983: 594).
39. On the copula see also Adorno 1973: 100–104. The original context of the
discussion is set in the Frankfurt sketch (1798) of Hegel’s “Faith and Being” (Harris
1972: 512–15). For an interesting comparison, see the section on “Errors concern-
ing abstract essences” in Chapter 46, “Of Darkness from Vain Philosophy, and
Fabulous Traditions,” in Leviathan (Hobbes 1962: 483–86).
40. Derrida’s “traces” are similar to what Ernst Bloch in his virtuoso aggadah,
Spuren (1930), describes as traces and signs through which Hope announces itself
(Jameson 1971: 121–22).
41. Luther had the following to say on the spiritual use of the law: “The law of
the letter [said he] is whatever is written in letters, said in words, conceived in
thoughts, the tropological, allegorical, anagogical or whatever other mystical sense.
This is the law of works, the old law, the law of Moses, the law of flesh, the law of
sin, the law of wrath, the law of death, damning all things, making us all culprits,
increasing concupiscence, killing by so much the more as it is spiritual because the
command ‘thou shalt not lust’ makes many more guilty than the command ‘thou
shalt not kill.’ All of these are carnal and literal when the letter has sway and the
spirit is absent” (quoted in Bainton 1963: 19).
42. “When Man died all his attributes (the ability to create or posit) were trans-
ferred to Language. Language was given a voice: language began to speak. ‘Die
Sprache spricht.’ Language was divinized” (Hauge 1989: 174).
43. The truth of “pure language” recalls the letter of Benjamin’s “pure law.”
“Pure Language” was the theme of all world-wide 1990 conventions of the Watch-
tower Bible and Tract Society (“Jehovah’s Witnesses”), which had as their topic
Biblical literalism.
44. According to an Athens News Agency report, Shimon Peres, the Israeli For-
eign Minister, in a speech at Ben Gurion Airport on November 30, 1987 welcoming
Greek Foreign Minister George Papoulias, characterized his colleague’s “visit as ‘a
historic event,’ not only because it is the first visit of a Greek Foreign Minister to
Israel, but because ‘the Israelis and the Greeks are the two oldest nations in the
region, and the Greeks distinguished themselves in philosophy while the Jews were
known for their prophecies.’ ”
45. “The Greeks were an eminently visual people. They gloried in the visual arts;
. . . and they created tragedy and comedy, adding new dimensions to visual art. The
Hebrews were not so visual and actually entertained a prohibition against the visual
arts. Neither did they have tragedies or comedies. . . . The Greeks visualized their
gods and represented them in marble and in beautiful vase paintings. They also
brought them on the stage. The Hebrews did not visualize their God and expressly
forbade attempts to make of him an object—a visual object, a concrete object, any
object. Their God was not to be seen. He was to be heard and listened to. He was
not an It but an I—or a You” (Kaufmann 1970: 33).
46. The question of Jewish iconoclasm is dramatized by Chaim Potok in two
novels (1972, 1990) dealing with a Hasidic painter caught in the dilemma of reli-
gious orthodoxy and pagan beauty.
47. “Everything, in the world, exists to end up in a book” (Mallarmé 1977: 49).
The dark side of this aphorism is the beginning of his poem “Sea Breeze”: “La chair
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est triste, hélas! et j’ai lu tous les livres” (90). “To the Nietzschean question: ‘Who
is speaking?’ Mallarmé replies—and constantly reverts to that reply—by saying that
what is speaking is, in its solitude, in its fragile vibration, in its nothingness, the
word itself—not the meaning of the word, but its enigmatic and precarious being”
(Foucault 1973: 305). See also Langan 1986.
48. “Removing the bad faith is the program of . . . modern poetry since Mallarmé
and the novel since Flaubert” (Fish 1980: 182), a program which has also been
elaborated in the other arts. “The faith is bad because it is a faith in the innocence
and transparency of language, which is in turn a faith in the innocence and trans-
parency of the mind and in its ability to process and elucidate a meaning of which
it is independent” (182).
49. The formalist pathos of word play and puzzle making in the work of Georges
Perec (1936–82) is the best contemporary example of this textual faith.
50. Around 1957, Derrida registered his thesis topic under the title “The Ideality
of the Literary Object.” Jean Hippolyte agreed to direct it. Derrida planned for his
thesis a critique of the “Husserlian project of a transcendental aesthetics” (Derrida
1976: 291). “It was then for me a matter of bending, more or less violently, the
techniques of transcendental phenomenology to the needs of elaborating a new
theory of literature, of that very peculiar type of ideal object that is the literary
object” (Derrida 1983: 37), the masterpiece of language. This was the expression of
a life-long commitment since “my most constant interest, coming even before my
philosophical interest I should say, if this is possible, has been directed towards
literature, towards that writing which is called literary” (37). Subsequently Derrida
has worked on the transformation of asking about literature into making literature:
“Then, since I’ve always been interested in literature—my deepest desire being to
write literature, to write fictions—I’ve the feeling that philosophy has been a detour
for me to come back to literature. Perhaps I’ll never reach this point, but that was
my desire even when I was very young. So, the problematics of writing, the philo-
sophical problematics of writing, was a detour to ask the question, ‘What is litera-
ture?’ But even this question—‘What is literature?’—was a mediation towards writ-
ing literature” (Derrida 1987a: 22).
51. The influence of Levinas on thinkers like Blanchot, Lyotard, Paul Ricoeur,
and Luce Irigaray illustrates the fact that “Judaism has become adopted as the
‘unofficial religion’ of so much contemporary writing in France” (Parker 1986: 80).
See also Weinberg 1987. This use of “le Juif imaginaire” (Alain Finkielkraut), espe-
cially popular in the post-1968 movement “from Mao to Moses,” is complemented
by simultaneous efforts to merge Frenchness and Jewishness (Friedlander 1990),
making Enlightenment and mitnagdic rationalism (as opposed to hasidic mysti-
cism) compatible. The overall picture is a deeply conservative one of religious pres-
ervation and renewal. “Contemporary thought in France, taking on the problem-
atics of modernity, is . . . concerned almost wholly with somehow reintegrating
the sacred into the Western symbolic system before it collapses” (Jardine 1985:
101).
52. Martin Buber argues that the Biblical and the historical cannot be disentan-
gled because they are mutually authenticating and admit no other evidence from
profane parallels: this is the self-confirming law of this document. “All we can do
therefore, is to refer to the Bible . . . under the law of its conception of history, its
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living of history, which is unlike everything which we are accustomed to call history”
(Buber 1948a: 122).
53. A discussion of the traditional Ashkenazic practice of Lernen also includes
interesting insights into such notions as the always already of the text, translation,
“radical traditioning” (Heilman 1983: 63) and “radical contemporization” (64),
prefiguration, repetition (242), restoration (tikkun), and many others familiar to
poststructuralists from the work of Derrida. From another perspective, a dissenting
critic notes that “what has been demonstrated overwhelmingly by normative Jewish
scholarship of the twentieth century, is that what is supposed to be the very essence
of normative Judaism—which is the notion that it is by study that you make your-
self a holy people—is nowhere present in Hebrew tradition before the end of the
first or the beginning of the second century of the Common Era. It is perfectly clear
that the notion reached the rabbis directly or indirectly from the writings of Plato,
because it is a thoroughly Platonic notion. And yet it has become more characteris-
tic of normative Jewish tradition than any other Western tradition still available to
us” (Bloom 1987: 53).
54. “It is a puzzle why anti-Semitism should have held such sway among those
writers representative of high modernism, since the Jew of the period—urban, cos-
mopolitan, expatriated, ironic, intellectual, and supremely alienated—was in so
many ways the modern aesthetic made flesh” (Berman 1989: 57).
55. In Joyce’s Ulysses, Odysseus becomes a Wandering Jew whose departing is
dwelling in the site of Dublin. Here philosophy’s itinerary is cyclical and yet differ-
ential. Leopold Bloom and Stephen Dedalus have often been seen as representing
Hebraism and Hellenism respectively. “Unlike a modern Greek, Poldy is in surpris-
ing continuity with a lineage of which he has little overt knowledge. How different
would the book have been if Joyce had centered on a Greek living in Dublin? The
aura of exile would not be there” (Bloom 1986a: 2). Bloom is also a better person
than Odysseus: “Homer’s Ulysses may be as complete as Poldy, but you wouldn’t
want to be in one boat with him (you would drown, he would survive). Poldy would
comfort you in every sorrow, even as he empathizes so movingly with the pangs of
women in childbirth” (3). The view of The Authoress of the Odyssey (1897) by
Samuel Butler (1835–1902), which argued that Homer was a woman, is repeated in
The Book of J (1990), “translated by David Rosenberg and interpreted by Harold
Bloom,” where it is proposed that the earliest part of the Bible was written by a
princess of the line of King David. In addition to Odysseus and Robinson Crusoe,
another archetype for Bloom is Spinoza, who is his “philosopher, and in Ulysses as
a whole Spinoza plays a greater role than any other philosopher, including Aristotle
and St. Thomas who appear, surprisingly, rarely and always, with one exception, in
the Stephen Dedalus context” (Raleigh 1977: 585). The suggestion that “Spi-
noza is to Bloom as Aristotle and Aquinas are to Dedalus” (588) may repay closer
examination.
56. The best compendium of cultural Hebraism is Paul Celan’s Georg Büchner
Prize speech, “The Meridian” (1960), whose vocabulary covers the entire repertory
of aesthetic alienation: calling-into-question, strangeness, encounter, otherness, si-
lence, path, date, homecoming, circularity, and much more. The same Hebraism is
staked in statements like “all the poets are Jews” (Marina Tsvetayeva) or “every
writer is a rabbi” (Cynthia Ozick), and stories like “I, a Jew” (1934) by Borges. It is
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also examined regularly in academic panels like “The Jew as Artist/The Artist as
Jew” (conference on “Creativity and Continuity: Jewish Culture in America,”
1985), “The Jew as Writer, the Writer as Jew” (MLA Convention, 1987), “The Jew
as Poet, the Poet as Jew” (MLA Convention, 1988), or “The Jew as Writer/The
Writer as Jew (conference on “The Writer in the Jewish Community,” 1988). In
turn, this popular artistic identification creates the need for essays and books which
examine writers’, philosophers’, and artists’ attitudes on Jews, from Milton and
Spinoza to Goethe, Dostoyevsky (Goldstein 1981), and Joyce (Nadel 1989), since
every writer is expected to have one. This unique expectation is not unjustifiable in
light of the centrality of Hebraism in culture and aesthetics, which has been
strengthened further by the apparent marginalization of reading in popular culture:
“Yet if there is something undying in the Jewish concern with text, perhaps we
might see a saving elitist remnant that in some odd Messianic sense will make ‘Jews’
of all—Gentile or Jewish—who study intensively” (Bloom 1982: 322).
57. Some feminists (Hélène Cixous, Chalier 1982) have extended the category
to include specifically woman: “ ‘Woman as Jew, Jew as Woman.’ Now let us add to
these: Torah as feminism, feminism as Torah” (Ozick 1984: 10).
58. “Derrida sees the Greco-Christian Dialectic as unfailingly antisemitic, and in
his guerrilla warfare with Truth as the ultimate product of any dialectic, Derrida’s
own texts come to resemble the Judaic Tabernacle itself” (Jardine 1985: 180). In a
public debate at the Hebrew Institute of Riverdale in New York, Rabbi Meir Ka-
hane, the founder of the Jewish Defense League and a member of the Knesset,
“condemned the Israeli Government for being ‘godless Hellenists’ and said they
had brought ‘a magnificent land to despair and defeat.’ ‘If we walk in God’s path,’
he said, Israel will flourish. ‘If we go in the ways of Cambridge and Harvard and the
Hellenists, then surely we will be destroyed.’ ” (Goldman 1984). Kahane frequently
denounced Western culture as “Hellenism.” For the importance of the question of
Hellenism on another dimension of contemporary Hebrew culture, see Levin 1985.
59. The legend of the Wandering Jew, which was popularized in modern litera-
ture by Eugène Sue’s best-selling novel Le Juif errant (1844–45, 10 vols.), has found
its aesthetic echo in “la vérité nomade” (Blanchot 1969: 183). The epic poem
Ahasverus in Rom (1866) by Robert Hamerling provides another interesting literary
example of nomadism: “In the figure of Ahasuerus, the Wandering Jew, utter denial
of life and a longing for death are contrasted with the ruthless greed for life and
pursuit of sensual pleasure symbolized by the person of ‘Nero-Dionysus,’ the proto-
type of the Caesar-craze in the popular tradition of the nineteenth century”
(Baeumer 1976: 175). In the sciences, Sombart, drawing partially on Adolf Wahr-
mund’s Law of the Nomads and Contemporary Jewish Domination (1887), discussed
the “inherent ‘Nomadism’ or ‘Saharaism’” (Sombart 1951: 328) of the Jews, who
are a desert people, and distinguished between “the nomadic and the agricultural
life, between Saharaism and ‘Sylvanism’” (342). He suggested that two factors
“make up the Jewish spirit . . . —desert and wandering, Saharaism and Nomadism”
(344). He also found that “the modern city is nothing else but a great desert” (334),
and called Nomadism “the progenitor of Capitalism” (343). Postmodern writers too
have found the notion useful. Economists see the privileged members of the domi-
nant regions of the world turning, in the coming “hyper-industrial” period of service
economy, into nomads, as they used to be when the “Order of the Sacred” prevailed
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(Attali 1990). Philosophers who oppose nomadology to history (Deleuze and Guat-
tari 1987: 23) make another distinction: “The abstract machine exists enveloped in
each stratum, whose Ecumenon or unity of composition it defines, and developed
on the plane of consistency, whose destratification it performs (the Planomenon)”
(73).
60. The classicist Victor Bérard, author of La Turquie et l’Héllenisme contempo-
rain (1893), argued in The Phoenicians and the Odyssey (1902–3, 2 vols.) that, while
Homer was Greek, he invented nothing and worked only with foreign material be-
cause Ulysses was a Phoenician rover. Joyce based his understanding of the Odyssey
in Bérard’s view that the epic was of Semitic origin: “The Ulysseid . . . appears to be
a Phoenician periplous (log-book) transposed into Greek verse and a poetic legend
according to certain very simple and typically hellenic principles: anthropomorphic
personification of objects, humanization of natural forces, hellenization of the raw
material. . . . In the Odyssey imagination and fantasy play but a small part. Arrange-
ment and logic were the poet’s part in the work. . . . The Hellene is, first and fore-
most, a skilled arranger. The poet invents nothing. He utilizes the facts given in the
‘log.’ . . . The poem is obviously the work of a Hellene, while the ‘log’ is clearly the
record of a Semitic traveller. The poet . . . was a Greek; the seafarer . . . was Phoeni-
cian” (quoted in Gilbert 1963: 80–81). By making his Odysseus a Jew, Joyce semiti-
cizes again the hero of the epic. During their discussion in the “Ithaca” section,
Dedalus (who in the beginning of the book had been tempted by thoughts of
Hellenization) explores with Bloom similarities between the Hebrew and Irish
traditions.
61. As usual, Derrida has tried equivocally to distance himself from the theolog-
ical underpinnings of his ideas: “So much so that the detours, locutions, and syntax
in which I will often have to take recourse will resemble those of negative theology,
occasionally even to the point of being indistinguishable from negative theol-
ogy. . . . And yet those aspects of différance which are thereby delineated are not
theological, not even in the order of the most negative of negative theologies, which
are always concerned with disengaging a superessentiality beyond the finite catego-
ries of essence and existence, that is, of presence, and always hastening to recall that
God is refused the predicate of existence, only in order to acknowledge his superior,
inconceivable, and ineffable mode of being” (Derrida 1982: 6).
62. A representative example is the work of Stanislaw Lem (1921). A Perfect
Vacuum consists of sixteen reviews of imaginary books, including one called “Odys-
seus of Ithaca” (where the full name of the hero is Homer Maria Odysseus) and one
“A Perfect Vacuum” by Stanislaw Lem. Three more reviews of imaginary books
appear in One Human Minute. Books are also invented in the essay “Metafantasia:
The Possibilities in Science Fiction” (1985). For a parody of this parody, see Tuleja
1989. For a similar effort in the realm of literary theory, which includes parodies of
book-reviewing styles, see Sharratt 1985. Finally, Lem’s Imaginary Magnitude is a
series of introductions to books that may one day be written, where the first intro-
duction introduces the book itself. This particular game goes back to Kierkegaard’s
book Prefaces (1989), which consists of eight prefaces and was published on the
same day as The Concept of Anxiety, under the pseudonym Nikolaus Notabene.
63. Jorge Luis Borges (1899–1986) has written on the book as Scripture and the
universe as library in “On the Cult of Books” (1951); see also his “The Total Li-
brary” (1939), and “The Library of Babel” (1945).
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64. “The space of language today is not defined by Rhetoric, but by the Library:
by the ranging to infinity of fragmentary languages, substituting for the double
chain of Rhetoric the simple, continuous, and monotonous line of language left to
its own devices, a language fated to be infinite because it can no longer support
itself upon the speech of infinity. But within itself, it finds the possibility of its own
division, of its own repetition, the power to create a vertical system of mirrors, self
images, analogies. A language which repeats no other speech, no other Promise, but
postpones death indefinitely by ceaselessly opening a space where it is always the
analogue of itself” (Foucault 1977: 67).
65. For instance, right after expressing doubts about the degree to which his
research would conform to classical norms of a thesis, he adds: “If, from this mo-
ment on, I was indeed convinced of the necessity for a profound transformation,
amounting even to a complete upheaval of university institutions, this was not, of
course, in order to substitute for what existed some type of non-thesis, non-legiti-
macy or incompetence. In this area I believe in transitions and in negotiation—even
if it may at times be brutal and speeded up—I believe in the necessity for a certain
tradition, in particular for political reasons that are nothing less than traditionalist,
and I believe, moreover, in the indestructibility of the ordered procedures of legiti-
mation, of the production of titles and diplomas and of the authorization of com-
petence” (Derrida 1983: 42). Derrida’s radical conformism has received little
attention.
66. An eminent example is the short-lived “Center for Philosophical Research on
the Political” (December 1980–November 1984), organized in Paris by Jean-Luc
Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, whose orientation from the beginning re-
flected a “decision to replace the project of politicizing deconstruction with the proj-
ect of deconstructing the political” (Fraser 1984: 137).
67. It is hard to read Nietzsche’s description of the ironic intellectual without
thinking of Derrida’s public performance: “The madly thoughtless shattering and
dismantling of all foundations, their dissolution into a continual evolving that flows
ceaselessly away, the tireless unspinning and historicizing of all there has ever been
by modern man, the great cross-spider at the node of the cosmic web—all this may
concern and dismay moralists, artists, the pious, even statesmen; we shall for once
let it cheer us by looking at it in the glittering magic mirror of a philosophical
parodist in whose head the age has come to an ironical awareness of itself, and has
done so with a clarity which (to speak Goethean) ‘amounts to infamy’” (Nietzsche
1983: 108).
68. The rhetoric of the following interdiction is typical: “Auschwitz is something
else, always something else. It is a universe outside the universe, a creation that
exists parallel to creation. Auschwitz lies on the other side of life and on the other
side of death. There, one lives differently, one walks differently, one dreams differ-
ently. Auschwitz represents the negation and failure of human progress; it negates
the human design and casts doubts on its validity. Then, it defeated culture; later,
it defeated art, because just as no one could imagine Auschwitz before Auschwitz,
no one can now retell Auschwitz after Auschwitz. The truth of Auschwitz remains
hidden in its ashes” (Wiesel 1989).
69. Derrida has referred to the “Puritan integrity” of certain deconstructionists.
Among the convictions that Hartman, J. Hillis Miller, and Bloom shared during the
1960s was the following: “For all three, the imaginative consciousness underlying
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the words of literature was connected with the sacred—with those impulses and
experiences that, before the second Fall, had given rise to religion and theology”
(Martin 1983: xxi). This explains their intense dedication to interpretation: “The
sacred has so inscribed itself in language that while it must be interpreted, it cannot
be removed. One might speculate that what we call the sacred is simply that which
must be interpreted or reinterpreted, ‘A Presence which is not to be put by’ ” (Hart-
man 1980: 248). Bloom in his first book (1959) examined the “mythopoeic aspects”
of Shelley’s poetry from the viewpoint of Buber’s I-Thou relation. “In books like The
Disappearance of God (1963) and Poets of Reality (1965), Miller had not merely
delineated the place for these masterworks in what he as a post-structuralist would
come to call the logocentric tradition, but with an uncanny sense of the interpene-
trability of sacred and secular canon, he identified the mystery of the Incarnate
logos as his means of sanctioning their placement” (Pease 1983: 68). His Christo-
mathic interest has always been prominent: “Throughout his earlier work, Miller
draws relationships between the role of Christ as mediator and the mediatorial
functions of the artwork” (89). The “Puritan, iconoclastic, Jahvist tendency”
(Hauge 1989: 168) in Paul de Man’s American writings has also been increasingly
noticed.
70. To mention an eminent case, Rosenzweig elaborated a dialogic Biblical the-
ology in contrast to Greek pagan consciousness. In a letter to Buber in 1922, Rosen-
zweig says that for both his The Star of Revelation and Buber’s I and Thou (which
Buber was planning as a lecture series on “The Primary Forms of Religious Life”),
the crucial problem was the relationship between paganism and religion. Regarding
Buber’s plan, he writes: “You want nevertheless, if I understand you correctly, to use
two pedal points throughout your lectures: magic, which is the ‘paganism of all
nations,’ and prayer, which is ‘Judaism in all religion,’ one as the decrescendo and
the other as crescendo” (quoted in Horwitz 1978: 253).
71. “Hence, this new definition of truth: truth is what passes history by and
which history does not notice” (Shestov 1966: 432).
72. Popular versions of this view exhibit no less confidence. They still compare
“these two races, master-builders of the gigantic temple of civilization” (Herzog
1974: 211), though on a more simplistic level: “It is universally admitted that the
most valuable elements in the cultural wealth of modern humanity are ultimately
traceable to the legacies it has received from Israel and Hellas” (211). “Civilization
exhibits two forces—religion and science—contending for mastery over the human
mind. Science is ultimately traceable to the contribution made by the Hellenic race.
Israel, on the other hand, has brought into the world the light of religion in its
highest and purest form” (222).
73. “[T]he State, in accordance with its pure essence, is possible only if pene-
trated by the divine word; the prince is educated in this knowledge; this knowledge
is taken up by each person on his own account; tradition is renewal. What is impor-
tant above all is the idea that not only is the essence of the State not in contradic-
tion with the absolute order, but that it has been called up by that order” (Levinas
1989: 271). Levinas opposes this to “the pagan State, jealous of its sovereignty, the
State in pursuit of hegemony, the conquering, imperialist, totalitarian, oppressive
State, attached to a realist egoism. As such it separates humanity from its deliver-
ance. Unable to exist without adoring itself, it is pure idolatry” (274). This view is
consonant with his distinction between the messianic community and Caesar’s state.
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74. Independence from the judgment of history, the most ancient claim of Juda-
ism, is “its claim to a separate existence in the political history of the world. It is the
claim to judge history—that is to say, to remain free with regard to events, whatever
the internal logic binding them. It is the claim to be an eternal people. . . . The
thing that attacks this claim to be an eternal people is the exaltation of the judg-
ment of history, as the ultimate jurisdiction of every being, and the affirmation that
history is the measure of all things” (Levinas 1990: 199). More than Christianity,
atheism, science, or philosophy, it is the challenge of history to the superiority of
Judaic judgment that is the greatest threat.
75. A particularly interesting area of Derrida’s disagreement with Levinas is the
meaning of terms they both appropriate from Heidegger, like dwelling and depart-
ing, apartness and nearness, homelessness and rootlessness, sameness and dif-fer-
ence, trace, call, and response. Derrida appears the greater supporter. “One might
say, then, that Derrida underwrites Heidegger, in the various and contradictory
senses of that word” (Riddel 1979: 245). In this regard he “floats the possibility,
perhaps even necessity of reading Heidegger not from some exterior position but
from another place in his interior” (Wood 1987:111).
76. Cohen contrasts eschatology and messianism, as does Derrida, in parallel
with tragic to religious moral heroism. He finds that “Platonic courage has only an
ending, similar to that of tragedy, in which the hero must go to ruin in order to be
victorious in the consciousness of the spectator. In Judaism, on the other hand, the
hero does not live only for the sake of his own heroism, but, insofar as he is a man,
he is in correlation with God. He is therefore able to live and to defend his life only
as God’s confederate, as God’s servant, and hence as God’s hero” (Cohen 1972:
438). To the extent that both Greek and Jewish moral courage reject the sensuality
of this life in the name of heroic reason, they are similar and equivalent; but the
superiority of the latter inheres in its covenant with God and consequent self-tran-
scendence. Rosenzweig (in The Star) and Benjamin (in the 1921 essay “Fate and
Character”) took the comparison in interesting directions. Buber (1968), on the
other hand, distinguishes between the prophetic and the apocalyptic.
77. In Otherwise than Being, in response to Derrida’s critique of the exteriority
of the Other, the notion of exteriority crucial for Totality and Infinity “is abandoned
as a way of explaining how the Other relates to the self and is replaced by the
metaphor of ‘proximity’ or the idea of, ‘the Other within the Same’” (Blum 1985:
294). Proximity refers to the fact that one is the Other’s hostage, to election by
accusation, to “the ethical or religious election of the self by the Other” (305).
Levinas (1976) is a more direct response to Derrida, who later (1980) continued the
discussion.
78. Prefacing Totality and Infinity, Levinas calls Rosenzweig’s The Star of Re-
demption “a book too often present in this book to be cited” (Levinas 1969: 28).
79. Typical narratives of this kind are the apocryphal story about Rosenzweig’s
epiphany in a Berlin synagogue during a Yom Kippur service in 1913, which
changed his mind about converting to Protestantism, and Simone Weil’s mystical
experience of union with Christ in 1938. Similar experiences are not uncommon in
the history of aesthetics. Heidegger, for example, considered the true artwork “the
epiphany of the world it illuminates and protects.”
80. “In his essay on Boehme in 1901 Buber writes that Boehme’s dialectic of
the reciprocal conditioning of things finds its completion in Ludwig Feuer-
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bach’s sentence: ‘Man with man—the unity of I and Thou—is God’ ” (Friedman
1960: 51).
81. “Reading Habermas is extraordinarily like reading Luther. . . . Above all,
both put their trust in ‘the redeeming power of reflection’ (Habermas’s phrase), and
hence in our ability to save ourselves through the healing properties of the
Word. . . . But it is disconcerting to see how far his assumptions and vocabulary
merely recast a traditional story of deliverance in secular modern dress. We are
surely entitled to something more rigorous from our social philosophers than a
continuation of Protestantism by other means” (Skinner 1982: 38).
82. Gadamer (1979: 321–25), in his discussion of the “hermeneutical experi-
ence,’ describes the understanding of a text and the assimilation of the relevant
tradition in terms of an I-Thou relation.
83. Buber defines Biblical or Hebrew Humanism, first advocated by Hamann and
Herder, as follows: “By this I mean that, just as the West has for centuries drawn
educative vigor from the language and the writings of antiquity, so does the pivotal
place in our system of education belong to the language and the writings of classical
Israel” (Buber 1968a: 211). In his paper “For a Jewish Humanism” Levinas suggests:
“Monotheism is a humanism” (Levinas 1990: 275).
84. Levinas (1968a: 165) compares the Jewish and Greek notions of the founda-
tion of justice as reflected in Tractate Sanhedrin and Aeschylus’ Eumenides.
85. A commentator on the abduction of Adolf Eichmann by Israeli agents in
1960 and the subsequent trial in Jerusalem exclaims: “ ‘Wo kein Klager, ist kein
Richter’—without an accuser there is no judge, it is said in German. Now, Israel
alone wants to accuse—can and must accuse. And judge also? Of course!” (Facken-
heim 1973: 224)
86. Hölderlin writes in 1799: “Kant is the Moses of our nation who leads it out of
the Egyptian apathy into the free, solitary desert of his speculation and who brings
the rigorous law from the sacred mountain” (Hölderlin 1988: 137).
87. Derrida was to teach a course on the “Political Theology of Language” at the
Ninth International Summer Institute for Semiotic and Structural Studies, held in
June 1987 at the University of Toronto. In the brochure advertising the Institute,
the course was described as follows: “What is a sacred language? Is a language
sacred in itself, or through its association with sacred things or significations: What
are the political dimensions of the opposition sacred/profane, sacred/secular with
respect to language? The birth of a nation, its mythology, its history, its representa-
tions and fantasies constitute a privileged domain in which these questions can be
tested. Through close examination of the values of alliance, promise, contract, mis-
sion, universal responsibility, messianism, eschatology, and utopia, the discourse on
‘the Chosen People’ in general, and primarily on the Jewish nation, will be ana-
lyzed. . . . The authors studied will include Gershom Scholem and Franz Rosen-
zweig, but also Walter Benjamin, Hannah Arendt, Martin Buber and Theodor
Adorno.”
88. Levinas’s entire work since his Hebraic “turn” in the early 1950s ought to be
read as a large-scale, systematic critique of Weil—political activist, anti-authoritar-
ian philosopher, theoretician of democracy and power, theologian of suffering, and
Catholic saint—and especially her denial of Jewishness. Since 1952, even before
major works like her La Source grecque (1953) and Oppression et liberté (1955)
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appeared, Levinas is engaged with her philosophy. “To Love the Torah more than
God” (1955) proposes a “Jewish science” to counter the work of Weil “who, as
everyone in Paris knows, is the last word in religious terminology” (Levinas 1979:
217). In this essay, the author exclaims: “Simone Weil, you have never understood
anything of the Torah” (219).
89. Levinas’s own ideas often contribute to this tyranny: “This end of philosophy
is not only an event that touches a host of intellectuals and their scholarly quarrels.
It is perhaps the very meaning of our age. . . . [T]he end of philosophy is the begin-
ning of an age in which everything is philosophy, because philosophy is not revealed
through philosophers” (Levinas 1990: 185).
90. “On the one hand and on the other hand. This is a pattern one finds in and
among the writings of Derrida. It is a pattern one used to find in leading articles of
The Times of London. In The Times the outcome was either a neutral, middle of the
road compromise or a dissolution of an apparent conflict through the exposure of
an equivocation in the terms in which the views of the parties to the dispute were
expressed” (Llewelyn 1988: 273). The most notorious example of this strategy is
Derrida 1988c. “Nonetheless, Derrida apparently wants to have it both ways: to
undermine all logocentric concepts and yet to continue to use them for his own
purposes. The tactic of using them ‘under erasure’ strikes me as less like being
‘suspended over an abyss’ than like trying to be on both sides of a fence” (McCarthy
1989–90: 154). In a typical gesture, when “the question of political strategy” regard-
ing the field of women’s studies is posed to him, Derrida answers: “This may not
answer the question, but one way of dealing with these problems, not necessarily
within women’s studies, but on the whole, is to try to do both things at the same
time, to occupy two places, both places. That is why deconstruction is often accused
of being conservative and . . . not conservative. And both are true! We have to
negotiate” (Derrida 1987: 202).
91. Compare Heidegger’s linguistic aesthetics: “Mortal speech is a calling that
names, a bidding which, out of the simple onefold of the difference, bids thing and
world to come” (Heidegger 1971d: 208).
92. The Zionist perception of Israel defines its total independence (political,
historical, geographical, cultural, ethnic) in terms of the absolute artwork. For the
late romantic Cohen, who still believed in the power of civic culture, an Israeli state
was unthinkable since state and culture could still support each other beneficially
in Germany. For the modernist Buber, on the other hand, only an independent
state—with its sovereignty modeled on the self-justifying authority of art, its right
to exist, not to mean but to be—could be an absolute expression of Judaism.
93. “Where it has traded its homeland in the text for one of the Golan Heights
or in Gaza—‘eyeless’ was the clairvoyant epithet of that great Hebraist, Milton—
Judaism has become homeless to itself” (Steiner 1985: 22).
94. With its millennialist appropriation of Jewish destiny (Feldman 1990),
“evangelical Protestantism has profoundly colored American civic culture. It under-
lies the notion of American exceptionalism: the idea that America is a redeemer
nation, a people charged with a divine mission in the world. Beyond that, it has been
the engine for most social-reform movements of the left and on the right, and it has
sustained the idealistic, even visionary, quality in American life. Abolitionism, civil
rights, women’s rights, pacifism and internationalism have historically grown out of
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left-wing evangelical movements with their optimistic millenarianism. Social con-
servativism, nativism and jingoistic nationalism have grown out of conservative
evangelical movements and pessimistic millenarianism. Both millennial traditions
look forward to an end to human history, an end to politics and government” (Fitz-
Gerald 1987: 38–39).
95. Compare this with the end of Barthes’ book on the erethisms of the text,
where he talks about the capacity of cinema “to succeed in shifting the signified a
great distance and in throwing, so to speak, the anonymous body of the actor into
my ear: it granulates, it crackles, it caresses, it grates, it cuts, it comes: that is bliss”
(Barthes 1975: 67).
96. Contemporary messianic criticism is based on “the theology of the aesthetic
critic’s redemptive mission, whereby the Baptist-critic-jester, crying ‘in the wilder-
ness,’ undertakes to ‘save the text’ from the Babylonian ‘Fate of Reading’” (Argyros
and Flieger 1987: 57) in the name of a privileged tradition.
97. “The text Hartman would save is finally part of the archive of traditional
literary history and critical practice” (Rowe 1985–86: 55). “In Hartman’s view, then,
the aesthetic critic turns out to be a privileged reader, a shaman-priest-analyst-guide
who navigates the dangerous eddies of theoretical currents without being pulled
in. . . . The critic-cum-analyst, then, is a mediator as well, who liberates and teaches
the reader whom he initiates to the textual mysteries. His function is not only
analytic, or even therapeutic, but is actually messianic, even sacrificial, in character”
(Argyros and Flieger 1987: 55).
98. Among the innumerable responses, the answer to the (phone)call by Ronell
(1990) has been in all respects the most extravagant.
99. In the Buber-Rosenzweig translation of the Bible the name of God does not
appear—God is spoken of as He. The two philosophers held quite different views
about the importance of the name (Friedman 1981: 218–19).
100. For a similar effort to translate the New Testament, which assumes that the
Greek text is a translation of lost Hebrew and Aramaic documents, see Schonfield
(1985).
101. “One might suggest that Derrida, in proclaiming the abyss within man’s
personal self-identity, has merely rediscovered sin” (Young 1985: 115).
102. Bernal’s Black Athena has been followed by Gerard Lucotte’s Introduction
à l’anthropologie moléculaire: Eve était noire (1990). They both recuperate, in very
different ways, the old tradition of exploring the Jewish origin of Greek thought—
for example, the Mosaic and prophetic influence on Plato: “The spirituality of the
God-idea as evolved by Greek metaphysics had nothing new to offer to Israel’s
teachers. At a time when the Hellenic race had scarcely emerged from the savage
state, the Sinaitic revelation virtually declared that no material representation
could, in the remotest degree, serve as symbolical of the Supreme Being. . . . Nor
had the sages of Israel much to learn from Greek ethics. All that was really sound in
the teachings of the Grecian masters, which, by the way, unlike the ethics of Juda-
ism, failed to influence the lives of the masses, they could find equalled, nay, sur-
passed, in the inspired Word, and in native Jewish doctrines evolved from Scrip-
tural principles and from the ethical concept of the God-idea taught by the Torah,
the Psalmists, and the Wisdom Literature of ancient Israel” (Herzog 1974: 104).
103. Levinas is building on a common comparison which finds that faith is not
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pistis but the audacity to reject absolute laws, accept nothing as impossible, and
seek absolute freedom—groundlessness. This groundlessness, this absurdity, is
faith—the only freedom possible. By nature, man has no freedom of choice, since
he is a fallen man (Shestov 1932: 199–201). The only freedom he can choose is the
freedom of “unfounded” faith which leaves him groundless—without a basis in
reason. This view demands the audacity to transcend the lack of freedom by surren-
dering the illusion of free will. In a related discussion in Two Types of Faith (1950),
Buber shows the similarities between Judaism and Christianity by distinguishing
between a Hebraic and a Hellenic Christianity, the former based on the Jewish
emunah and the latter on the Greek pistis. Hebraic faith is based on trust (in the
word of God) while Hellenic on belief in the truth of propositions (concerning
incarnation). Thus Hellenic Christianity is Paul’s message of salvation, of Jesus as
Messiah. It is the fact that Paul made the Law secondary to faith, external to action,
that made pistis necessary. In a bold move, Buber opposes Jesus and Paul, appropri-
ating the former for Biblical Judaism.
104. In different situations of passivity Blanchot discovers “common traits: ano-
nymity, loss of self; loss of all sovereignty but also of all subordination; utter uproot-
edness, exile, the impossibility of presence, dispersion (separation)” (Blanchot
1986: 18). See also Deleuze on “passive synthesis” in Différence et répétition (1968).
105. At the same time, the slave of the lord turns into his independent servant:
“Just as Mastery showed that its essential reality is the reverse or perversion of what
it wants to be, so much the more will Slavery, in its fulfillment, probably become
the opposite of what it is immediately; as repressed Consciousness it will go within
itself and reverse and transform itself into true autonomy” (Kojève 1969: 20).
106. Other contemporary thinkers, like Weber, express a special interest in com-
parisons between East and West: “In Weber’s later work the question of the evolu-
tion of modern capitalism and its distinctive morale becomes subordinate to an
analysis of the enormous historical differences between the Orient and the Occi-
dent” (Fischoff 1944: 59).
107. Jakob Wassermann, in an essay of 1919, tried to account for the eminent
role of Jews in literature. “The ‘Jew as European, as cosmopolitan, is a man of
letters; the Jew as Oriental, not in the ethnographic, but in the mythic sense, with
the transforming strength for the present day which he is bound to possess, can be
a creator.’ Challenged by Martin Buber in the early 1920s to clarify this dichotomy,
Wassermann stood by it, called the ‘European’ Jew sterile, formalistic, and solitary,
and the ‘Oriental’ Jew sure of himself, of his world and his humanity. . . . ‘He is free,
and the others are servants. He is truthful, and the others lie.’ Vague and rhetorical
as these assertions are, Wassermann further reduces what little specificity they have
by insisting that ‘Oriental’ is ‘naturally’ only a ‘symbolic figure: I could just as soon
call him the fulfilled or the legitimate heir.’ To call the Jew an Oriental, which is so
often intended as an insult, here becomes a source of pride and self-confidence”
(Gay 1975: 50).
108. Buber’s view has been criticized for confusing the reality of revelation with
the relation of meeting: “God is Thou, not because Israel has met Him as Thou, not
because Israel has, at a past moment of its history, addressed God with wholeness
of intent, but rather because God has revealed Himself. Revelation is deeply auton-
omous. It is neither the labor nor the fruit of the divine-human relation. The issue
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of relation comes after and without any necessary connection to the reality of reve-
lation” (Cohen 1952: 251). Thus the two must be sharply distinguished so that
God’s commandment to history in regard to Israel will become apparent: “Revela-
tion is the act of God whereby He has disclosed the way and destiny of Israel.
Meeting is the act whereby that destiny, that way, and its divine source are drawn
into the inner life” (253). Other commentators have suggested that the wisdom of
halakhah transcends Western civilization and its secularism-religion opposition,
pointing the way out of the crisis of modernity (Eidelberg 1989).
109. The aesthetic dimension of the ideal of community is highlighted by the
observation that the work of art “seems to be made specifically in order to provoke
communication. It is not a question of a sum of isolated pleasures to be attained but
of a socially-arrived-at judgment which has no other meaning beyond itself. In art,
one could almost say, communication becomes its own purpose, to use a problem-
atic concept” (Luhmann 1985: 7). Compare Buber’s community (Gemeinschaft)
with Kant’s community of aesthetic judgment, Landauer’s counter-community
(Gegengemeinschaft), Berdyaev’s (Orthodox) communal society, Schmitt’s (Catho-
lic) national community, Fish’s interpretive community, Derrida’s community of
the question, Lyotard’s “community of ethical phrases” (Lyotard 1988: 125) or
Eco’s community as intersubjective guarantee of truth.
110. “What is proper to Judaism is to say: Well, God himself we know nothing
about; there is nothing to say about it. We call that God, but ultimately we do not
know what we are saying when we say God. We know nothing about it. We merely
say: There is a law. And when we say ‘law,’ it does not mean that the law is defined
and that it suffices to abide by it. There is a law, but we do not know what this law
says. There is a kind of a law of laws, there is a metalaw that says: ‘Be just.’ That is
all that matters to Judaism: ‘Be just.’ But we do not know what it is to be just. That
is, we have to be ‘just’ ” (Lyotard and Thébaud 1985: 9).
111. The structural study of myth applied to the story of Moses discovers a major
“transformation of Land into Law, with the compensation of the vision of the prom-
ised land recorded in it” (Marshall 1980: 786). Research shows that “the myth of
Moses was being transformed into a sacred text at the same time it was being
reshaped to model the Israelites’ problem of how, in the face of all-too-familiar
evidence to the contrary, they might continue as a distinctive people without full
control of an adequately sized piece of territory. . . . The solution offered was a
double one: the identity of Land with Law, and the distinction between the individ-
ual and collectivity” (787).
112. For others, it is the fear of style and revolution canceling each other:
The Tupamaros/An immutable truth (all right)
I got a razor blade/An’ a beautiful youth (and I like it)
A Moto Guzzi/An’ a Gaultier pants (all right)
I got a reason girl/Was Immanuel Kant’s (and I like it).
(Scritti Politti: “Boom! There she was,” from
Provision, 1988, on the Jouissance label)
113. Sharing the same vague view, most critics agree: “Some indicators speak in
favor of the fact that, in reaction to the mass loss of the religious certainty of salva-
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tion, a new Hellenism is taking shape, that is, a regression below the level of identity
reached in communication with the one God in the monotheistic high religions”
(Habermas 1983: 18). Other writers worry: “I am well aware that any praise of
Derrida is bound to seem folly to the Greeks. But we are almost certainly more
Greek than we ought to be” (Megill 1985: 313).
114. It has been argued that there are similarities between Hasidism and
postmodern society: “In Hasidic fashion, Buber adequately portrays this view of the
polity when he writes that a community is ‘the being no longer side by side but with
another or a multitude of persons.’ Recognizing and integrating otherness is the
hallmark of the community in the postmodern world” (Murphy 1989: 141).
115. Levinas had again prepared the ground: “Oral law is eternally contemporary
with the written” (Levinas 1990: 138). Compare the position of Abraham Isaac
Kook (1861–1935), Chief Rabbi of Palestine, on the same relation: “The world will
have its remedy to the degree that these two spiritual forces unite and mutually
influence each other. The oral tradition is from heaven but is manifested on earth,
and it is necessary that the land of Israel be built and the orders of priesthood,
prophecy, judges, and rulers be restored; then the Oral Law will shine forth resplen-
dent and be united to the Written Law. In the Diaspora the two had been severed
and the Written Law raised to the level of holiness while the Oral Law was relegated
to an inferior station. The distinction between prophecy (the Written Law) and the
halakah (the Oral Law) is only a historical distinction and does not refer to their
respective contents. The religious conception bridges the gap between them by
placing them both on the same plane” (Rotenstreich 1968: 225).
116. “After the attack on aesthetic autonomy by structuralism, Marxism, and
various political forces, deconstruction represented an effort to roll back the spread
of secularization into the world of art. Hence the religious, often nearly clerical
atmosphere in deconstructive seminars: the aura has returned, the master speaks,
the acolytes murmur. Hence also the preference for romantic texts and metaphors
of violence: now the critic is the poet-priest. The point is not comprehension but
belief, credo quia absurdum, for the alternative would be banal logocentric rational-
ity. Literature, beyond ratiocinative explanation (denounced as reductionist), be-
comes mystery, sacrament, catachresis, and studied obscurity becomes a virtue. The
more religiously deconstructive critics behave, the more they effectively recover the
theological origins of the thinker from whom they inherit the most: Heidegger”
(Berman 1990: 9).
117. Derrida borrows the notion of grace from Levinas’s 1982 discussion of
Buber’s ethics of the relation. Grace is an important notion in Buber’s I and Thou:
“That a meeting can never be brought about through my deed but requires a co-
operation from the other side presents itself out of the inner perspective of the
meeting, in such a way that when it happens, it happens ‘out of will and grace in
one’” (Theunissen 1984: 280). Grace is also important in Simone Weil’s La
Pesanteur et la Grâce (1950). Compare Alexander Pope’s passage on originality in
An Essay on Criticism (1711):
Great wits sometimes may gloriously offend,
And rise to faults true critics dare not mend;
From vulgar bounds with brave disorder part,
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And snatch a grace beyond the reach of art,
Which, without passing through the judgment, gains
The heart, and all its ends at once attains
(I, 152–57)
118. In Peter Handke’s novel Absence (1987), three individuals are seeking an
enigmatic book which promises revelation and has been left behind by an old man,
the writer, who disappeared in the desert.
119. Thinking about the function of culture in the fragmented world of diverse
opinions and virtues, Hölderlin wrote to his brother: “I said that poetry unites man
not like the play; it unites people if it is authentic and works authentically with all
the manifold suffering, fortune, striving, hoping, and fearing, with all their opinions
and mistakes, all their virtues and ideas, with everything major and minor that exists
among them, unites them into a living, a thousand times divided, inward whole, for
precisely this shall be poetry itself; and like the cause, so the effect. Is it not true, my
dear, the Germans could well use such a panacea, even after the politico-philosoph-
ical cure; for, regardless of everything else, the philosophico-political education
already contains in itself the inconvenience that it knits together the people in the
essential, inevitably necessary relations, in duty and law; yet how much is left, then,
for human harmony?” (Hölderlin 1988: 139–40). The deconstructionist aesthetic is
such a panacea for the inconvenience of law.
120. This kind of religious practice fits Daniel Bell’s description: “Redemptive
religion: Retreating from the (post) modernity, rooted in the intellectual and pro-
fessional classes; and the growth of intellectual and professional classes; and the
growth of ‘mediating institutions’ of care (family, church, neighbourhood, volun-
tary associations), opposed to the state” (paraphrased in O’Neill 1988: 497). Ben-
jamin was the first spokesman of this position. The painter Anselm Kiefer (b. 1945)
and the composer Arvo Pärt (b. 1935) are among its best-known contemporary rep-
resentatives.
121. Humanist academic literalism also continues strong: “Jewish studies exem-
plifies the sorts of commitments that I have outlined, at a time in the history of the
American university when these commitments face serious challenge. This is so,
first of all, in the commitment to text as such. Textual study, whether the texts be
‘classic’ or modern, involves a care for the word, a demand for depth rather than
breadth, a command to go slowly where others have gone before. This is a far more
traditional exercise than others in the academy, suited to—and formative of—a
different sort of temper. It breathes the air of bygone ages” (Eisen 1989: 29).
122. Heidegger’s oracular style, parodied by Günter Grass in Dog Years (1963),
has been compared with Derrida’s Pharisaic one. In addition, the modernist popu-
lism of Heidegger’s demotic use of concepts deserves comparison with Derrida’s
postmodern appeal to pop culture, which includes the following: the consummate
“Jacques Derrida” (1982) single (later included in the album Songs to Remember of
the same year) by Scritti Politti, in a cover that alludes to the Napoleon brandy
label; deconstructed garments by French designer Jean-Paul Gaultier for various
tours, from Grace Jones’ “One-Man Show” (1981) to Madonna’s “Blond Ambition”
(1990); the Italian record label De-Construction, established in 1987, which spe-
cializes in house disco music; the work of “deconstructionist” disc jockey Christian
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Marclay; the “postmodernist-deconstructionist” (Mick Jagger) stage set by British
architect Mark Fisher for the Rolling Stones’ “Steel Wheels” 1989 tour; and the
Italian band The Difference, which emerged in 1989. In addition, Derrida’s appear-
ances on records include his reading of “Feu la cendre” on cassette (Antoinette
Fouque, 1987) and a question-and-answer session included in the album Minutes
(Les Temps Modernes, 1987), a compilation of archival material of voices from Jean
Cocteau to rock singer Richard Jobson. Derrida has also starred in the film Ghost
Dance (1983) by Ken McMullen.
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